In any case, Arne's distinction is a good one since it serves to remind that
in some sense the probe(s) into the topic of mimesis contain a significant
element of the tacit; areas of our phylogeny and development that are
difficult, maybe even impossible, to gain direct access to; e.g., bodily
kinesthetics or a time when there was no differentiation between cognition-
affect-action. Not an easy thing to theorize about. I was reminded of this
earlier (in responding to Genevieve) when considering the extensive
discussion of simulation theory in the journal _Mind and Language_ (this is
collected in Davies & Stone, 1995a; 1995b). The initial proposal by Gordon
clearly speaks against a rule based (a _theory theory_) model of "folk
psychology" but, as the second title in the anthology suggests, the
computational metaphor--the need to represent (and process information)--has
rather overwhelmed the discussion and made the central point somewhat moot.
Still, it is clear that representationalism is becoming increasingly less
satisfactory so some progress was made.
My own way of thinking through this is somewhat half-baked but is first via
a model of the brain and central nervous system that is fundamentally
correlational rather than information processing (Edelman, 1992). This sense
also feeds into Maxine Sheets-Johnstone's work I think. Second is a rather
generalized sense of what mimesis implies in biology: a way to "trick" the
environment and forestall or transform its contingencies. This would be the
case whether the purpose is to hide, entrap prey, or copy other species who
are more aggressive and/or distasteful. What defines the social in this
context is the transference of mimesis from other species to con-specifics;
that is, con-specifics increasingly become the affordances of the individual
organism's ecology. Third is a rather broad sense of the general systems
approach (e.g., Luhmann, 1989) but with the concept of mimesis used to fend
off some of the implications of the cybernetic component. That is,
consistent with Stan Salthe (1993), to maintain a sense of necessary
"vagueness," the sense that also led to C. S. Peirce's great insight when
posing and answering the riddle of the Sphinx (see Houser & Kloesel, 1992)
that law (determinism) is the endpoint of developmental/historical
trajectory, not an intermediary. This is why, in response to Jay, I chose
the word "sympathy" rather than "resonance" (without I should add, any
intended criticism of Luhmann who, like Bordieu (or Jay for that matter),
has developed one of the more sophisticated models of social systems extant
and who I could not hope to emulate -- I'm not even sure I completely
understand the implications of these works yet although I'm trying).
As a matter of disclosure, I should add that my metaphysics is distinctly
materialistic (I enjoy reading about ghosts but don't care much for spooks
in theory) but would hope not naively or crudely so; e.g., I'm afraid I
giggled in disbelief when I first read E. O. Wilson's sociobiological
hypothesis--someone I otherwise have boundless respect for and wouldn't
dream of ridiculing.
regards, Rolfe
Davies, M., & Stone, T. (Eds.). (1995a). Folk Psychology: The Theory of
Mind Debate. (Vol. 3). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Davies, M., & Stone, T. (Eds.). (1995b). Mental Simulation: Evaluations
and Applications. (Vol. 4). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Edelman, G. M. (1992). Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the
Mind. New York: BasicBooks.
Houser, N., & Kloesel, C. (Eds.). (1992). The Essential Peirce: Selected
Philosophical Writings. (Vol. 1). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Luhmann, N. (1989). Ecological Communication (John Bednarz Jr., Trans.).
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Salthe, S. N. (1993). Development and Evolution: Complexity and Change in
Biology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Rolfe Windward [UCLA GSE&IS: Curriculum & Teaching]
e-mail: rwindwar who-is-at ucla.edu (Text/BinHex/MIME/Uuencode)
70014.0646 who-is-at compuserve.com (text/binary/GIF/JPG)