>
> Gordon Wells described some aspects of language that seem to point to an
> inherent, inescapable inability of language to communicate the complexities
> and ambiguities of human existence. This seems to be in direct contradition
> with the Western/Aristotelian/Cartesian/logocentric assumption that
> knowledge doesn't "count" unless it can be articulated and the tools of
> language are the best defense against the evils of "uncertainty."
>
> I have been approaching this paradox from a rhetorical perspective, arguing
> that looking ONLY at explicit, articulated discourse (and cognition) misses
> most of the point. So far, my best "proof" is Godel's Theorem, but I haven't
> come across any research that tackles this head-on, from a
> cognitive/psycholinguistic angle. Is anyone out there an expert in this
> area? I'd sure like some pointers to the "right" literature.
> Dale Cyphert
> dxc20 who-is-at psuvm.psu.edu
> Department of Speech Communication, Penn State University
>
>