Habermas

Mike Cole (mcole who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu)
Thu, 15 Feb 1996 21:35:09 -0800 (PST)

fyi
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 1996 18:02:31 -0800 (PST)
>From: Laura Webber <lwebber who-is-at sdcc3.ucsd.edu>
To: cs200 who-is-at ucsd.edu
Subject: Habermas' paper, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'"

In this paper Habermas is examining the concept of rationality as it
pertains to a rational society. He argues that there are two types of
rationality that it is important to distinguish as separate from one
another. They are: instramental, or purposive rationality, and
communicative or interactional rationality. Instramental rationality is
appropriate to all human activities involving work. It includes
empirical knowledge of nature and laws that will enable people to achieve
a certain end. This end is ususually the sustaing and reproduction of
life through dominance over nature. This means-end relationship can be
duplicated in the social sphere in areas such as business, law, and
economics.
The second kind of rationality is connected to interaction
and communication between humans. This kind of rationality requires
agreement on norms in order for communication or a related activity to
successfully occur. In order for the participants in this activity to
agree on norms they must come to their agreement independently without
having been manipulated or objectified as a means to an end.
In order to increase the degree of rationalility in a society both
kinds of rationality must be increased. The reduction of one form of
rationality (namely, communicative rationality) to another form of
rationality (instramental) results in a decrease in the level of
rationality in a society. Habermas' critique is that a society in which
science and technology serve as ideology, all rationality is reduced to
purposive rationality. Instramental rationality is the only form of
rationality. Thus the level of human interaction is treated
instramentally. There are certain goals and experts (such as politicians
and economists) are relied upon to bring about the goal in the most
efficient way. This prevents rationality at the level of communication,
causing irrational behavior and the objectification of people.
Habermas argues against Marcuse's critique of Weber. Marcuse argues
that "rationality" as definded by Weber as a type of purposive or
instramental action which in a capitalist society can be extended to
sub-systems of society previously embdying interactional rationality is
just a disguise for social and political domination. Because technology
requires domination over nature in order to achieve an end (say, the
elimination of a disease) and thus embodies purposive rationality,
Marcuse believes that we must discover an alternative approach to nature
and abandon our current technologies which will necessarily lead to
political oppresion.
Habermas argues that technology and instramental decision making are
a constant in human history. They embody the strategies that humans have
always used to sustain and reproduce life. However, until the rise of
capitalism, technology and sets of purposive rational action existed as
subsystems within the larger institutional framework of a society that
was legitimated by religious or mythical traditions which provided an
interpretation of both a "cosmic" and a social reality. With the rise of
capitalism the sub-systems of production (work) and purposive rational
action expand and eventually take over the institutional framework and
supplant the traditional forms of legitimation. However, the new basis of
legitimation is initially still based in interactional rationality. The
idea is that the market is based on a fair exchange of labor, property ,
and commodities. Thus, "reciprocity" is initially the basis for
legitimation in society, in both the realms of communication and
production.
But with the depression of capitalist markets came the collapse of
the ideology of "just exchange." According to Habermas "the
institutional framework of society was repoliticized. It no longer
coincides immediately with the relations of production." The result was
the economic and political intervention of governments in the
institution of the "free" market. This resulted in a new ideology
legitimating political power. Hence politics is now oriented towared
"the solution of technical problems." Therefore, we now rely on
political and economic "experts" with technical skills to solve solve
problems in our social systems. We no longer rely on public dialogue
and interaction. Hence, the new ideology is one of science and
technology.
The problem that results is that people are no longer aware
that there is a distinction between work and interaction. Communicative
action has been reduced to instramental action and science. The result
is that human beings have objectified themselves completely and see
themselves as part of a larger technical system. As a result oppressed
workers cannot conceive of challenging the technology used to oppress
them because they would necessarily be "irrational." Habermas suggests
that Marx's model of the forces of production and relations of production
be replaced by one of work and interaction. In order for
"rationalization" of society to occur public dialogue must be freed of
restiction and domination. This would not necessaily result in the
improved "functioning" of social systems, but it would allow for the
emancipation of individuals in society.
"The question," according to Habermas, "is not whether we completely
utilize an available or creatable potential, but whether we choose what
we want for the purpose of the pacification and gratificationof existence."