That night I just happened to be reading up some literature on "script"
theory in an attempt to see for myself whether that sort of model might be a
useful articulation of the level of action of an activity system. In
particular, I have been trying to figure out how to account for situations
where my students and I broke the expected sequence of events in an
instructional program. My problem is how to explain this break in the
expected action sequence using Yrjo Engestrom's model of the activity
system. It's the same problem, I think (?): explaining how individual
action sequences relate to the structure of a social activity system.
Graham's note hit a chord, especially since I had literally just finished
reading this interesting paragraph in an article by K. Nelson (1981):
"...when there is no shared script, when the situation is novel, when one or
both participants lack script knowledge, or when a script is not invoked (as
in play with blocks or artwork), then the conversational support of the
shared script will be lacking and "egocentric" speech may result."
It would seem that "script" theory and various script-like models (e.g.
Hasan's model of genre structure) allow for the possibility that script
processes may be altered in some fashion. For example, K. Nelson suggests
that some steps in a script sequence could be at least re-arranged (1981, p.
108), and Hasan suggests that some elements in the script-like speech genre
structure might be considered optional while others may be compulsory (1985).
Yrjo's model of the activity system suggests that an activity system evolves
through responses to contradictions that arise between its components and at
the points of contact with neighbouring activity systems. After reading
Graham's note, I am now wondering if these strains in the activity system
model might also appear at the action level as negotiations and conflicts
over the appropriate structure of action level scripts. Relating this to
the discussion by Graham, Gordon and others, I am NOW wondering whether it
would make sense to say that these are the occasions in our theoretical
models which we can use to define the notion of individuality. And...if
this is the case, then individuality is best seen as the ongoing processes
whereby we suddenly exercise the freedom to make the choices which create,
adjust, adapt such social knowledge practices as "scripts" -- or even the
elements of activity systems.
I have a breathless feeling, as if walking on thin ice here. So, I would
like to ask whether this makes sense to anybody? Does it seem to save the
notion of individuality, or does this still reduce the individual to the social?
--glenn
Glenn Humphreys
P. O. Box 11
Echo Bay,
Ontario, Canada.
Telephone (home): (705) 248-1226
Telephone (work): (705) 945-7185
Fax: 705-945-7195
Internet: glenhump who-is-at soonet.ca