social "reductionism"

Rolfe Windward (IBALWIN who-is-at mvs.oac.ucla.edu)
Thu, 09 Nov 95 10:04 PST

Gordon's note brings up an issue that has been niggling me for awhile as
well (I don't know if it's the same itch but I sure seem to want to scratch
it). I've recently been perusing some of the Sociology of Scientific
Knowledge (SSK) literature (e.g., Woolgar, 1988; Latour, 1981) in the
interest of seeing how they deal with the problem of self-reference
(reflexivity). I discovered that although it appears to be a useful tool in
unpacking Others (e.g., natural scientists) it is largely evaded and/or
discounted in the evaluation of their own work (see Ashmore, 1989). Now
that's not such a big deal: after all, contemplating ones navel doesn't put
bread on the table and, as I've commented elsewhere, self-nullification is
probably the inevitable consequence of any epistemology that is only
internally consistent (i.e., lacks a realistic referent) anyway although
Makcolm Ashmore (ibid) argues there's a way through that morass. In any
case, as such things do, it led me to another thought:

In reading Latour in particular (whose work I respect a great deal) I was
struck by the way(s) professional and scientific practice were conflated. I
think I mean a couple of things by that. First, in relationship to Gordon's
comment, social reductionism is no more appetizing than any other kind of
reduction--we still require ways to account for individual variance and, as
I think Jay has commented, a way to reconcile the typological and
topological world views. Second, apropos my "lead-in" comments, it is also
possible to "wash out" differences between groups or sub-groups in a like
manner as with individuals. For example, the ways that scientists and
engineers form social/professional networks clearly has a powerful impact on
the way they work and ultimately think about their practice _but is that
unique to science_?

The answer is clearly no--this fact does not distinguish science from any
other discipline and, more to the point, from "professionalism" generally
--the social description of science is fundamentally technocratic (a good
thing to talk about for other reasons though). In fairness that is a large
part of the SSK point: science knowledge can not be privileged but frankly,
after one has said _that_, what other point is there? And can one even say
that if one has conceptually failed to distinguish what, if anything, makes
science unique? (Clearly it is, or we could not categorize it so ... )

I think this loops back to previous conversations and my point about
specification hierarchies. Somehow research has to get done and one can't
always explicitly state or even model the individual when the research has
other goals but ... somehow there needs to be an ETC. embedded in the
discourse. The social level is _more_ specific and implies a more detailed
human individual but it takes too long to list all the ways that is real
just as it may take too long to list ways scientism differs from
professionalism (if it does) but still, there's that etcetera in all talk
about the Other that needs to be more explicit.

Hmmmm ... I'm going to have to think about this some more.

Ashmore, M. (1989). _The Reflexive Thesis: Wrighting Sociology of
Scientific Knowledge_. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Latour, B. (1981). Insiders and Outsiders in the Sociology of Science:
Or, How Can We Foster Agnosticism. In R. A. Jones & H. Kuklick (Eds.),
_Knowledge and Society_ (pp. 199-216). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Woolgar, S. (1988). _Science, the Very Idea_. (Vol. 8). New York:
Tavistock Publications.

Rolfe Windward
UCLA GSE&IS
ibalwin who-is-at mvs.oac.ucla.edu
rwindwar who-is-at ucla.edu (Eudora)