254 Chapter 15

which they now possess. So, in like manner, the intellect, by its native strength, makes

for itself intellectual instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other

intellectual operations, and from these operations gets again fresh instruments, or the

power of pushing its investigations further, and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches

the summit of wisdom.

The methodological current to which Binswanger belongs also admits that the

production of tools and that of creative work are, in principle, not two separate

processes in science, but two sides of the same process which go hand in hand.

Following Rickert, he defines each science as the processing [Bearbeitung] of ma-

terial, and therefore for him two problems arise in every science—one with respect

to the material and the other concerning its processing. One cannot, however, draw

such a sharp dividing line, since the concept of the object of the empirical science

already contains a good deal of processing. And he (Binswanger, 1922, pp. 7-8)

distinguishes between the raw material, the real object [wirklichen Gegenstand] and

the scientific object [wissenschafthichen Gegenstand]. The latter is created by science

from the real object via concepts. When we raise a third cluster of problems—about

the relation between the material and its processing, i.e., between the object and

the method of science—the debate must again focus on what is determined by what:

the object by the method, or vice versa. Some, like Stumpf, suppose that all dif-

ferences in method are rooted in differences between the objects. Others, like Rick-

ert, are of the opinion that various objects, both physical and mental, require one

and the same method. [12] But, as we see, we do not find grounds for a demarcation

of the general from the special science here either..

All this only indicates that we can give no absolute definition of the concept

of a general science and that it can only be defined relative to the special science.

From the latter it is distinguished not by its object, nor by the method, goal, or

result of the investigation. But for a number of special sciences which study related

realms of reality from a single viewpoint it accomplishes the same work and by the

same method and with the same goal as each of these sciences accomplish for their

own material. We have seen that no science confines itself to the simple accumu-

lation of material, but rather that it subjects this material to diverse and prolonged

processing, that it groups and generalizes the material, creates a theory and hy-

potheses which help to get a wider petspective on reality than the one which follows

from the various uncoordinated facts. The general science continues the work of

the special sciences. When the material is carried to the highest degree of gener-

alization possible in that science, further generalization is possible only beyond the

boundaries of the given science and by comparing it with the material of a number

of adjacent sciences. This is what the general science does. Its single difference

from the special sciences is that it carries out its work with respect to a number

of sciences. If it carried out the same work with respect to a single science it would

never come to the fore as an independent science, but would remain a part of that

single science. The general science can therefore be defined as a science that re-

ceives its material from a number of special sciences and carries out the further

processing and generalization of the material which is impossible within each of

the various disciplines.

The general science therefore stands to the special one as the theory of this

special science to the number of its special laws, i.e., according to the degree of

generalization of the phenomena studied. The general science develops out of the

need to continue the work of the special sciences where these end. The general

science stands to the theories, laws, hypotheses and methods of the special sciences

as the special science stands to the facts of the reality it studies. Biology receives

material from various sciences and processes it in the way each special science does