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Chapter 15

science (the characteristic example is Russian reflexology). The veil of natural sci-

ence which was, according to Petzoldt,18 thrown over the most backward metaphys-

ics, saved neither Herbart nor Wundt: neither the mathematical formulas nor the

precision equipment saved an imprecisely stated problem from failure.

We are reminded of MUnsterberg and his remark about the last decimal point

given in the answer to an incorrectly stated question. In biology, clarifies the author,

the biogenetic law is a theoretical generalization of masses of facts, but its appli-

cation in psychology is the result of superficial speculation, exclusively based upon

an analogy between different domains of facts (Does not reflexology do the same?

Without investigation of its own it borrows, using similar speculations, the ready-

made models for its own constructions from the living and the dead—from Einstein

and from Freud). And then, to crown this pyramid of mistakes, the principle is not

applied as a working hypothesis, but as an established theory, as if it were scien-

tifically established as an explanatory principle for the given area of facts.

We will not deal with this matter, as does the author of this opinion, in great

detail. There is abundant, including Russian, literature on it. We will examine it to

illustrate the fact that many questions which have been incorrectly stated by psy-

chology acquire the outward appearance of science due to borrowings from the

natural sciences. As a result of his methodological analysis, Shchelovanov comes

to the conclusion that the genetic method is in principle impossible in empirical

psychology and that because of this the relations between psychology and biology

become changed. But why was the problem of development stated incorrectly in

child psychology, which led to a tremendous and useless expenditure of effort? In

Shchelovanov’s opinion, child psychology can yield nothing other than what is al-

ready contained in general psychology. But general psychology as a unified system

does not exist, and these theoretical contradictions make a child psychology impos-

sible. In a very disguised form, imperceptible to the investigator himself, the theo-

retical presuppositions fully determine the whole method of processing the

empirical data. And the facts gathered in observation, too, are interpreted in ac-

cordance with the theory which this or that author holds. Here is the best refutation

of the sham natural-science empiricism. Thanks to this, it is impossible to transfer

facts from one theory to another. It would seem that a fact is always a fact, that

one and the same subject matter—the child—and one and the same method—ob-

jective observation—albeit combined with different objectives and starting points,

allow us to transfer facts from psychology to reflexology. The author is mistaken

in only two respects.

His first mistake resides in the assumption that child psychology got its positive

results only by applying general biological, but not psychological principles, as in

the theory of play developed by Groos [1899]. In reality, this is one of the best

examples not of borrowing, but of a purely psychological, comparative-objective

study. It is methodologically impeccable and transparent, internally consistent from

the first collection and description of the facts to the final theoretical generaliza-

tions. Groos gave biology a theory of play created with a psychological method.

He did not take it from biology; he did not solve his problem in the light of biology,

i.e., he did not set himself general psychological goals as well. Thus, exactly the

opposite is correct: child psychology obtained valuable theoretical results precisely

when it did not borrow, but went its own way. The author himself is constantly

arguing against borrowing. Hall, who borrowed from Haeckel, gave psychology a

number of curious topics and far-fetched senseless analogies, but Groos, who went

his own way, gave much to biology—not less than Haeckel’s law. Let me also remind

you of Stern’s theory of language, BUhler’s and Koffka’s theory of children’s think-

ing, BUhler’s theory of developmental levels, Thorndike’s theory of training: these