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The Crisis in Psychology
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Now let us suppose that we have various centers as in the case of a debate between separate disciplines that aspire to become the center, or in the case of different ideas claiming to be the central explanatory principle. It is obvious that to these will correspond different circumferences and each new center will at the same time be a peripheral point on the former circumference. Consequently, we get several circumferences that intersect with each other. In our example this new position of each circumference graphically represents the special area of knowledge that is covered by psychology depending on the center, i.e., the general discipline.
Whoever takes the viewpoint of the general discipline, i.e., deals with the facts of the special disciplines not on a footing of equality, but as the material of a science, just as these disciplines themselves deals with the facts of reality, will immediately change the viewpoint of critique for the viewpoint of investigation. Criticism is on the same level as what is being criticized; it proceeds fully within the given discipline; its goal is exclusively critical and not positive; it wishes to know only whether and to what extent some theory is correct; it evaluates and judges, but does not investigate. A criticizes B, but both Occupy the same position as to the facts. Things change when A begins to deal with B as B does with the facts, i.e., when he does not criticize B, but investigates him. The investigation already belongs to general science, its tasks are not critical, but positive. It does not wish to evaluate some theory, but to learn something new about the facts themselves which are represented in the theory. While science uses critique as a means, the course [of the investigation, Russian eds.] and the result of this process nevertheless differ fundamentally from a critical examination. Critique, in the fmal analysis, formulates an opinion about an opinion, albeit a very solid and well-founded ppinion. A general investigation establishes, ultimately, objective laws and facts.
Only he who elevates his analysis from the level of the critical discussion of some system of views to the level of a fundamental investigation by means of the general science will understand the objective meaning of the crisis that is taking place in psychology. He will see the lawfulness of the clash of ideas and opinions that is taking place, which is determined by the development of the science itself and by the nature of the reality it studies at a given level of knowledge. Instead of a chaos of heterogeneous opinions, a motley discordance of subjective utterances, he will see an orderly blueprint of the fundamental opinions concerning the development of the science, a system of the objective tendencies which are inherent in the historical tasks brought forward by the development of the science and which act behind the backs of the various investigators and theorists with the force of a steel spring. Instead of critically discussing and evaluating some author, instead of establishing that this author is guilty of inconsistency and contradictions, he will devote a positive investigation to the question what the objective tendencies in science require. And as a result, instead of opinions about an opinion he will get an outline of the skeleton of the general science as a system of defining laws, principles and facts.
Only such an investigator realizes the real and correct meaning of the catastrophe that is taking place and has a clear idea of the role, place, and meaning of each different theory or school. Rather than by the impressionism and subjectivism inevitable in each criticism, he will be led by scientific reliability and veracity. For him (and this will be the first result of the new viewpoint) the individual differences will vanish—he will understand the role of personality in history. He will understand that to explain reflexology’s claims to be a universal science from the personal mistakes, opinions, particularities, and ignorance of its founders is as impossible as to explain the French revolution from the corruption of the king or court. He will see what and how much in the development of science depends upon the good and
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