tures, which not only does not facilitate the understanding, but hampers it. Wundt called his psychology “physiological,” but later be repented and regarded this as an error and reasoned that the same work should be called “experimental.” This illustrates best how little all these terms mean. For some, “experimental” is a synonym for “scientific,” for others, it is only the designation of a method. We will only point out the epithets which are most widely used in psychology, considered in the light of Marxism.

I consider it inexpedient to call it “objective.” Chelpanov correctly pointed out that in foreign psychology this term is used in most diverse senses. In Russia as well it engendered many ambiguities and furthered confusion in the epistemological and methodological problem of mind and matter. The term promoted the confusion of method as a technical procedure and as a method of knowledge. This resulted in the treatment of the dialectical method alongside the survey method as equally objective, and in the conviction that the natural sciences have done away with all use of subjective indicators, subjective (in their genesis) concepts and divisions. The term “objective” is often vulgarized and equated with “truthful,” while the term “subjective” is equated with “false” (the influence of the common use of these words). Further, it does not express the crux of the matter at all. It expresses the essence of the reform only in a conditional sense and concerning one aspect. Finally, a psychology which also wishes to be a theory about the subjective or also wishes to explain the subjective on its paths, must not falsely call itself “objective.”

It would also be incorrect to call our science “the psychology of behavior.” Apart from the fact that this new epithet, like the preceding one, does not distinguish us from quite a number of currents and, therefore, does not reach its goal; apart from the fact that it is false, for the new psychology wants to know the mind as well; it is a philistine, everyday term, which is why it attracted the Americans. When Watson equates “the concept of personality in the science of behavior and in common sense” (1926, p. 355), when he sets himself the task of creating a science so that the “ordinary man” “who takes up the science of behavior would not feel a change of method or some change of the object” (ibid., p. ix); a science which among its problems also has the following one: “Why George Smith left his wife” (ibid., p. 5); a science which begins with the exposition of everyday methods; which cannot formulate the difference between them and scientific methods and views the whole difference in the study of those cases which are of no interest for everyday life, which do not interest common sense—then the term “behavior” is the most appropriate one. But if we become convinced, as will be shown below, that it is logically untenable and does not provide a criterion by which we might decide why the peristalsis of the intestine, the excretion of urine, and inflammation should be excluded from the science; that it is ambiguous and undefined and means very different things for Blonsky and Pavlov, Watson and Koffica; then we will not hesitate to throw it away.

I would, further, consider it incorrect to define psychology as “Marxist.” I have already said that it is unacceptable to write textbooks from the viewpoint of dialectical materialism (Struminsky, 1923; Kornilov, 1925); but also “Outline of Marxist Psychology,” as Rejsner translated the title of Jameson’s booklet [73], I regard as improper word usage. Even such word combinations as “reflexology and Marxism,” when one is dealing with different concrete currents within physiology, I consider to be incorrect and risky. Not because I doubt the possibility of such an evaluation, but because one takes incommensurable quantities, because the intermediate terms which alone make such an evaluation possible are missing. The scale is lost and distorted. After all, the author passes judgment upon the whole of reflexology not from the viewpoint of the whole of Marxism, but on the basis of different pro-