We have finished our investigation. Did we find everything we were looking for? In any case, we have come quite close. We have prepared the ground for research in the field of psychology and, in order to justify our argumentation, we must test our conclusions and construct a model of general psychology. But before that we would like to dwell on one more aspect which, admittedly, is of more stylistic than fundamental importance. But the stylistic completion of an idea is not totally irrelevant to its complete articulation.

We have split the tasks and method, the area of investigation and the principle of our science. What remains is to split its name. The processes of division which became evident in the crisis have also influenced the fate of the name of our science. Various systems have half broken with the old name and use theft own to designate the whole research area. In this fashion one sometimes speaks, of behaviorism as the science of behavior as a synonym for psychology and not for one of its currents. Psychoanalysis and reactology are often mentioned in this way. Other systems break completely with the old name as they see the traces of a mythological origin in it. Reflexology is an example. This latter current emphasizes that it rejects the tradition and builds on a new and vacant spot. It cannot be disputed that such a view has some truth to it, although one must look at science in a very mechanical and unhistorical manner not to understand the role of continuity and tradition at all, even during a revolution. Watson, however, is partly right when he demands a radical rupture with the older psychology, when he points to astrology and alchemy and to the danger of an ambiguous psychology.

Other systems have so far remained without a name—Pavlov’s is an example. Sometimes he calls his area physiology, but by terming his work the study of behavior and higher nervous activity he has left the question of the name open. In his early works Bekhterev openly distinguished himself from physiology; for Bekhterev reflexology is not physiology. Pavlov’s students set forth his theory under the name “science of behavior.” And indeed, two sciences which are so different should have two different names. MUnsterberg [1922, p. 13] expressed this idea long ago:

Whether the intentional understanding of inner life should really be called psychology is, of course, still a question that can be debated. Indeed, much speaks in favor of keeping the name psychology for the descriptive and explanatory science, excluding the science of the understanding of mental experiences and inner relations from psychology [emphasis by Vygotsky].

However, this knowledge nevertheless exists under the name of psychology; “It is true that it seldom appears in pure and consistent form. It is mostly somehow superficially connected with elements of causal psychology” [ibid., p. 13]. But as we know the author’s opinion that the whole confusion in psychology is due to this mixture, the only conclusion is to select another name for intentional psychology. In part this is how it goes. Right before our eyes phenomenology is producing a psychology which is “necessary for certain logical goals” [ibid., p. 13] and instead of a division into two sciences by means of adjectives, which cause enormous confusion... [65], it begins to introduce various substantives. Chelpanov observes that “analytical” and “phenomenological” are two names for one and the same method, that phenomenology partially coincides with analytical psychology, that the debate as to whether the phenomenology of psychology exists or not is a terminological matter. If we add to this that the author considers this method and this part of psychology to be basic, then it would be logical to call analytical psychology phe