[Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii

[Helen Grimmett <helen.grimmett@monash.edu>]

This link should work:
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002238/223830E.pdf

Cheers,
Helen


Dr Helen Grimmett
Lecturer, Student Adviser,
Faculty of Education,
Building 902, Room 159
Monash University, Berwick campus
Phone: 9904 7171




On 4 December 2013 11:29, valerie A. Wilkinson <vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp>wrote:

> Larry,
> Deeply interested in this Unesco work you mention.
> However, am not authorized to view it.
> It there any way to get a link to pdf?
> Valerie
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2013 12:54 AM
> To: Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii
>
> This is a direct link to the book
> http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002238/223830E.pdf<
> https://mymail.vsb.
>
> bc.ca/OWA/redir.aspx?C=Y0ABaXqqBUOHY_44FHGENQ5-WDkNw9AIqBadDtF8Qdai01f0pI1LB
>
> C7DW77zb0q1_MeI8nlZ7so.&URL=http%3a%2f%2funesdoc.unesco.org%2fimages%2f0022%
> 2f002238%2f223830E.pdf>
>
> Sandra has worked with Mike and been discussed on XMCA previously
>
> Larry
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 7:48 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Paul,
> > The point may be to *see through* or go *beyond* the ideological AS
> > reified *objectivity* and *return* to notions of *humanity* as
> > emerging WITHIN dialogue
> >
> > Here is a free book that may be of interest in this regard. It
> > develops a dialogical perspective on resistance in Rio
> >
> >
> > https://mymail.vsb.bc.ca/OWA/?ae=Item&t=IPM.Note&id=RgAAAABcrMEZpb%2b8
> > RJLCMeBKJvxxBwDeh%2bQItXNbTpnLOftNk%2bwXAAAAUCKsAAB%2fylgzNh6DSbgzmJ7G
> > jNoSAACiyLfjAAAJ
> >
> > and is published by the UN
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Dec 1, 2013 at 9:08 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
> >
> >> Larry,
> >>
> >> If the ideological, via reification, becomes tantamount to the
> >> ontological whats the point of and for dialogue?
> >>
> >>
> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> >> President
> >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> >> www.mocombeian.com
> >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> -------- Original message --------
> >> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >> Date: 12/01/2013 2:09 PM (GMT-05:00)
> >> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>
> >> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,Andy
> >> Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking,
> >> po russkii
> >>
> >>
> >> Paul,
> >> Once any ideology becomes reified it becomes the *nature of reality*
> >> and therefore can become an object of scientific investigations.
> >> However, taking a wider perspective [bild] the ontological nature of
> >> THIS transformation may come into view. Therefore any ideology is a
> >> reification of this ontological *realm*when it  comes into view as
> >> this transformational process [dialectical, dialogical, analogical]
> >>
> >> Returning to the question of *intersubjectivity*, I wonder how
> >> central the question of *friendship* [philia] is to this concept.  I
> >> am attempting to *bridge* back to the notion of *intimacy* [what the
> >> medieval called *tenderness*] whichconcept has become transformed
> >> into a confidence in private judgement Ardent suggests, as a
> >> consequence of THIS HISTORY [transformation] philia and the common
> >> good has withdrawn [dispersed] and civil society becomes transformed
> >> from civic *virtues* to realms of power.
> >> For the ancient Greeks the essence of philia was not solely a matter
> >> of
> >> *intimacy* but was fundamentally a realm of DIALOGUE. tHE CONSTANT
> >> INTERCHANGE OF TALK CREATED THE COMMON GOOD.
> >>
> >> This is one aspect of *intersubjectivity* and the dialectic of
> >> private and public realms of intersubjectivity Larry
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sun, Dec 1, 2013 at 10:03 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Larry I agree with althusser because  once capitalism becomes
> >>> reified through ideologies and ideological apparatuses in the
> >>> material world it becomes the nature of reality as such...hence the
> >>> realm for scientific investigations.  However, I do not believe that
> >>> that Gramscian/althusserian reification negates the ontological
> >>> nature of being as such highlighted by heidegger in "being and time"
> >>> the job of the social philosopher is to outline where ideology attempts
> to be ontology and correct it.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> >>> President
> >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> >>> www.mocombeian.com
> >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> -------- Original message --------
> >>> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >>> Date: 12/01/2013 10:04 AM (GMT-05:00)
> >>> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>,"eXtended Mind,
> >>> Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>> Cc: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking,
> >>> po russkii
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Paul,
> >>> Your comment that Hegel, and Marx begin their analysis at the level
> >>> of *scientific rationality* AS species-being is an interesting opening.
> >>> I went to Wikipedia to search out *structural Marxism* and this is
> >>> the first paragraph.
> >>>
> >>> :Structural Marxism arose in opposition to the humanistic
> Marxism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_humanism>that dominated many
> western universities during the 1970s.
> >>> [*citation needed
> >>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed>*] In
> >>> contrast to Humanistic Marxism, Althusser stressed that Marxism was
> >>> a science<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science>that examined
> >>> objective structures, [1]
> >>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_Marxism#cite_note-1> and he
> >>> believed that
> >>> humanistic<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_humanism>,
> >>> historistic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historicism#Karl_Marx> and
> >>> phenomenological Marxism
> >>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Marxism>, which was based on Marx's
> early works, was caught in a "pre-scientific humanistic ideology".
> >>> [2] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_Marxism#cite_note-2>
> >>>
> >>> So scientific rationality is merely one *level* which implies other
> >>> levels of rationality in EXCESS [Merleau Ponty] of the scientific
> >>> level of rationality.  In other words *extensions* of rationality
> >>> that are not merely *scientific* but may be extended BEYOND the
> >>> scientific
> >>> *perspectives* to include humanistic, historical, and
> >>> phenomenological/existential forms of rationality.
> >>> I am in over my head and using this medium to extend my
> >>> understanding of
> >>> *rationality* and exploring what is dismissed as merely
> >>> *pre-scientific* humanistic ideology.
> >>> Your question is opening a *clearing* to imagine a *synthesis of
> >>> heideggerian phenomenology AND structural Marxism.
> >>> Larry
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 8:58 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> >>> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> I think hegel and marx begins their anaylsis where, as heidegger
> >>>> points out, husserl does...at the level of scientific rationality.
> >>>> This they impute to species-being.  Heidegger's "being and time", I
> >>>> believe is the proper place to start if we want to understand
> >>>> intersubjectivity and empathy.  The attempt should be to synthesize
> >>>> heideggerian phenomenology with structural Marxism.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> >>>> President
> >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> >>>> www.mocombeian.com
> >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> >>>>
> >>>> -------- Original message --------
> >>>> From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> >>>> Date: 11/30/2013  8:19 PM  (GMT-05:00)
> >>>> To: ablunden@mira.net,"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> >>>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
> >>>> russkii
> >>>>
> >>>> Charles, and I. Addition to getting smith via Hegel, pretty certain
> >>>> that mead would have had fairly direct contact with smith's looking
> >>>> glass theory of the self (from Theory of MorAl Sentiments) from
> >>>> Charles Horton Cooley (who is often cited as the origi ator of the
> >>>> looking glass theory of the self). Is the looking glass theory of
> >>>> the self an example of perspective taking?
> >>>> Still no closer to an answer to mikes original question!
> >>>> Greg
> >>>>
> >>>> Sent from my iPhone
> >>>>
> >>>> On Nov 30, 2013, at 4:14 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> > Yes, Charles, it is well known that Hegel read and admired the
> >>>> > work
> >>>> of the political economists and he also gave prominant place to the
> >>>> Scots in his History of Philosophy, namely, Reid, Beattie, Oswald
> >>>> and Douglas Stewart.
> >>>> > And Mead wrote in a letter that his I/Me dialectic was based on
> Hegel.
> >>>> >
> >>>> > Andy
> >>>> >
> >>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>> -----
> >>>> > *Andy Blunden*
> >>>> > http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> >>>> >
> >>>> >
> >>>> > Charles Bazerman wrote:
> >>>> >> Do any of you scholarly folk also know if there is a line of
> >>>> influence from the Scottish moralists to Hegel's views on
> >>>> perspective taking? Given the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment
> on U.S.
> >>>> education, I wouldn't be  surprised if that work got to Mead as
> >>>> well.  Chuck
> >>>> >>
> >>>> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >>>> >> From: Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> >>>> >> Date: Saturday, November 30, 2013 1:27 pm
> >>>> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking,
> >>>> >> po
> >>>> russkii
> >>>> >> To: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>, "eXtended Mind, Culture,
> >>>> Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>> >>
> >>>> >>
> >>>> >>> Mike,
> >>>> >>> Not so dumb, I would think, since this is a very central part
> >>>> >>> of
> >>>> Hegel's
> >>>> >>> social ontology of the subject. (Too) Simply put,
> >>>> self-consciousness arises
> >>>> >>> from our awareness that others are subjects just like ourselves.
> >>>> Here is
> >>>> >>> what I take to be Hegel's description of perspective-taking:
> >>>> >>> "It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of
> >>>> >>> that
> >>>> first
> >>>> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning.
> >>>> >>> First, it
> >>>> must
> >>>> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order
> >>>> >>> thereby
> >>>> to
> >>>> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon
> >>>> proceeds to
> >>>> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself."
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> This is, of course, the second paragraph in the introduction to
> >>>> Hegel's
> >>>> >>> Master/Slave dialectic (all 5 paragraphs of the intro are below).
> >>>> In that
> >>>> >>> tale, perspective-taking fails b.c. although the slave takes
> >>>> >>> the perspective of the master, the master has no reason to take
> >>>> >>> the
> >>>> perspective
> >>>> >>> of the slave. This is imperfect recognition and does not allow
> >>>> >>> for
> >>>> the full
> >>>> >>> constitution (consummation, following Bakhtin) of the subjects
> >>>> >>> as
> >>>> fully
> >>>> >>> self-conscious.
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> [There is good evidence that this was part of G. H. Mead's
> >>>> inspiration in
> >>>> >>> his development of perspective taking (but this is both
> >>>> >>> debatable
> >>>> and, to
> >>>> >>> my mind, of little consequence).]
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> I also wonder if some variant of perspective taking can be
> >>>> >>> found in
> >>>> Marx's
> >>>> >>> early concept of species being, or perhaps in the idea of the
> >>>> relations of
> >>>> >>> persons one to another. It would seem that Marx's writings on
> >>>> >>> the
> >>>> commodity
> >>>> >>> fetish are precisely a problem of perspective taking - the
> >>>> individual
> >>>> >>> participants no longer see that there are others who are full
> >>>> >>> and
> >>>> rich
> >>>> >>> individuals like themselves; instead, other people become tools
> >>>> >>> for accomplishing MY aims. And it is this that communism is
> >>>> >>> supposed to reconcile - bringing all people into a deep
> >>>> >>> appreciation of not
> >>>> just our
> >>>> >>> deep dependence upon one another, but also of our universal
> >>>> kinship, i.e.
> >>>> >>> our "mutuality of being" as Rupert Stasch has so eloquently put
> it.
> >>>> >>> Mutuality of being requires an understanding that other people
> >>>> >>> are
> >>>> "just
> >>>> >>> like us".
> >>>> >>> Isn't that perspective taking?
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> But I have no clue how or in what linguistic forms this would
> >>>> >>> have
> >>>> made its
> >>>> >>> way from Hegel's and Marx's German to Vygotsky's Russian (if at
> >>>> all...).
> >>>> >>> -greg
> >>>> >>> p.s. psychological anthropologist Doug Hollan has been
> >>>> >>> seriously
> >>>> looking
> >>>> >>> into "empathy" along with fellow psyc anth scholar C. Jason
> Throop.
> >>>> One of
> >>>> >>> Doug's pieces is listed in the email that just I'll forward in
> >>>> >>> just
> >>>> a
> >>>> >>> minute to XMCA.
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> Full text of paras 179-184 from Phenomenology of Spirit:
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> Φ <
> >>>> >>> 179 <
> >>>> >>> . Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness;
> >>>> >>> it
> >>>> has come
> >>>> >>> outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has
> >>>> >>> lost
> >>>> its own
> >>>> >>> self, since it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, it
> >>>> >>> has
> >>>> thereby
> >>>> >>> sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as
> >>>> essentially real,
> >>>> >>> but sees its own self in the other.
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> Φ <
> >>>> >>> 180 <
> >>>> >>> . It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of
> >>>> >>> that
> >>>> first
> >>>> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning.
> >>>> >>> First, it
> >>>> must
> >>>> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order
> >>>> >>> thereby
> >>>> to
> >>>> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon
> >>>> proceeds to
> >>>> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> Φ <
> >>>> >>> 181 <
> >>>> >>> . This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double
> >>>> sense is at
> >>>> >>> the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For,
> >>>> firstly,
> >>>> >>> through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one
> >>>> >>> with
> >>>> itself
> >>>> >>> again through the cancelling of *its *otherness; but secondly,
> >>>> >>> it
> >>>> likewise
> >>>> >>> gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for
> >>>> >>> it
> >>>> was
> >>>> >>> aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in
> >>>> >>> the
> >>>> other and
> >>>> >>> thus lets the other again go free.
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> Φ <
> >>>> >>> 182 <
> >>>> >>> . This process of self-consciousness in relation to another
> >>>> >>> self-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the
> >>>> action of one
> >>>> >>> alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the
> >>>> >>> double significance of being at once its own action and the
> >>>> >>> action of that
> >>>> other
> >>>> >>> as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within
> >>>> itself, and
> >>>> >>> there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The
> >>>> >>> first
> >>>> does
> >>>> >>> not have the object before it only in the passive form
> >>>> characteristic
> >>>> >>> primarily of the object of desire, but as an object existing
> >>>> independently
> >>>> >>> for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything
> >>>> >>> for
> >>>> its own
> >>>> >>> behalf, if that object does not *per se *do what the first does
> >>>> >>> to
> >>>> it. The
> >>>> >>> process then is absolutely the double process of both
> >>>> self-consciousnesses.
> >>>> >>> Each sees the other do the same as itself; each itself does
> >>>> >>> what it
> >>>> demands
> >>>> >>> on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it
> >>>> >>> does,
> >>>> only so
> >>>> >>> far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would
> >>>> >>> be
> >>>> useless,
> >>>> >>> because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of
> >>>> both.
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> Φ <
> >>>> >>> 183 <
> >>>> >>> . The action has then a *double entente* not only in the sense
> >>>> >>> that
> >>>> it is
> >>>> >>> an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the
> >>>> sense that
> >>>> >>> the act *simpliciter* is the act of the one as well as of the
> >>>> >>> other regardless of their distinction.
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> Φ <
> >>>> >>> 184 <
> >>>> >>> . In this movement we see the process repeated which came
> >>>> >>> before us
> >>>> as the
> >>>> >>> play of forces; in the present case, however, it is found in
> >>>> consciousness.
> >>>> >>> What in the former had effect only for us [contemplating
> >>>> experience], holds
> >>>> >>> here for the terms themselves. The middle term is
> >>>> self-consciousness which
> >>>> >>> breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme is this
> >>>> interchange of
> >>>> >>> its own determinateness, and complete transition into the
> opposite.
> >>>> While
> >>>> >>> *qua* consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still,
> >>>> >>> in
> >>>> being
> >>>> >>> outside itself, it is at the same time restrained within
> >>>> >>> itself, it
> >>>> exists
> >>>> >>> for itself, and its self-externalization is for consciousness.
> >>>> >>> *Consciousness *finds that it immediately is and is not another
> >>>> >>> consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when
> >>>> >>> it
> >>>> cancels
> >>>> >>> itself as existing for itself , and has self-existence only in
> >>>> >>> the self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to
> >>>> >>> the
> >>>> other,
> >>>> >>> through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and
> >>>> >>> each
> >>>> is to
> >>>> >>> itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality,
> >>>> >>> which,
> >>>> at the
> >>>> >>> same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation.
> >>>> >>> They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 10:08 AM, mike cole
> >>>> >>> <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>> Hi Larry-- You are almost certainly way ahead of me on these
> >>>> issues.
> >>>> >>> My
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>> interest at present is on the development of social and
> >>>> >>>> relational perspective taking. From, say, a Vygotskian, or
> >>>> >>>> Bakhtinian point
> >>>> of
> >>>> >>> view
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>> (perspective!) what are the socio-cultural contributions to
> >>>> interpersonal
> >>>> >>>> understanding that we associated with psychological
> >>>> >>>> perspective
> >>>> taking,
> >>>> >>>> perhaps just the ability to "stand in someone else's shoes"?
> >>>> Empathy
> >>>> >>> has to
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>> be one potential contributor, and...... (in the Russian
> >>>> traditionS
> >>>> >>> we often
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>> discuss)?
> >>>> >>>>
> >>>> >>>> Perhaps just a really dumb question. Wouldn't be the first time!!
> >>>> >>>> mike
> >>>> >>>>
> >>>> >>>>
> >>>> >>>>
> >>>> >>>>
> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 6:37 AM, Larry Purss
> >>>> >>>> <lpscholar2@gmail.com
> >>>> >
> >>>> >>> wrote:
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>> Mike,
> >>>> >>>>> I am wondering if you could expand on your question that
> >>>> is
> >>>> >>> referring to
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>> perspective taking and its possible meanings. I believe
> >>>> this
> >>>> >>> question of
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>> perspective taking is also converging with your other
> >>>> >>>>> question
> >>>> on
> >>>> >>> *kinds*
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>> or *types* of persons. [personhood like childhood]
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> I am asking for more clarity on your *bad question* which
> >>>> >>>>> seems
> >>>> to
> >>>> >>> be
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>> central to the multiple discourses on *sociocultural* theory
> >>>> >>>>> and
> >>>> practice
> >>>> >>>>> This *space* or *zone* of  questioning which opens up a
> >>>> clearing
> >>>> >>> for the
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>> multiple notions of the concept *intersubjectivity* and its
> >>>> convergence
> >>>> >>>>> with the concept of *perspective-taking* and how this topic
> >>>> >>>>> is
> >>>> explored
> >>>> >>>> in
> >>>> >>>>
> >>>> >>>>> Russian translation is a topic I want to explore further.
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> I wanted to offer a quote which I found interesting
> >>>> exploring
> >>>> >>> notions of
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>> *identity* AS KINDS [categories]
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> Oakeshott argues that "This distinction, then, between
> 'goings-on'
> >>>> >>>>> identified as themselves
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> exhibitions of intelligence and 'goings-on' which may be made
> >>>> >>>> intelligible
> >>>> >>>>
> >>>> >>>>> but are not themselves
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> intelligent, is not a distinction between mental and physical
> >>>> >>>>> or
> >>>> between
> >>>> >>>>> minds and bodies regarded
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> as entities. It is a distinction within the engagement of
> >>>> understanding,
> >>>> >>>> a
> >>>> >>>>
> >>>> >>>>> distinction between
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> 'sciences' (that is, ideal characters) and the identities
> >>>> with
> >>>> >>> which they
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>> are concerned. And in
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> calling it a categorial distinction what is being asserted is
> >>>> that
> >>>> >>> the
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>> understanding of identities
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> recognized as themselves exhibitions of intelligence cannot
> >>>> >>>>> be
> >>>> 'reduced'
> >>>> >>>>> to the understanding of
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> identities no so recognized", *On Human Conduct*, pp. 14-15.
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> I was intrigued by Oakeshott's understanding of *sciences*
> >>>> >>> [multiple] AS
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>> RESPRESENTING IDEAL KINDS [categorical distinctions]. This
> >>>> realm
> >>>> >>> of KINDS
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>> AS perspective taking moves the question of intersubjectivity
> >>>> >>>>> to
> >>>> converge
> >>>> >>>>> with *culture* and *history*.
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> I will pause, but this topic is endlessly fascinating.
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> Larry Purss
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>> On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 10:21 AM, mike cole
> >>>> >>>>> <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>>
> >>>> >>>>>> Dear Russian experts on XMCA
> >>>> >>>>>>
> >>>> >>>>>> I have been reading about the development of
> >>>> >>>>>> intersubjectivity
> >>>> and
> >>>> >>>>>> perspective taking, including an article by scholars who say
> >>>> they
> >>>> >>> are
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>>> working in the "sociocultural perspective." It got me
> >>>> to
> >>>> >>> wondering how
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>>> Russian scholars discuss these topics. No Russians are cited
> >>>> >>>>>> in
> >>>> the
> >>>> >>>> work I
> >>>> >>>>
> >>>> >>>>>> am reading, but Mead and
> >>>> >>>>>> Piaget.
> >>>> >>>>>>
> >>>> >>>>>> When looking at suggested translations into Russian from
> >>>> English
> >>>> >>> for
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>> these
> >>>> >>>>
> >>>> >>>>>> terms, the cognate
> >>>> >>>>>> perspectiv seems to appear almost everywhere. The phrase
> >>>> for
> >>>> >>> "point of
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>>> view" is literally that,
> >>>> >>>>>> tochka-point  zreniya-seeing, genetive case.
> >>>> >>>>>>
> >>>> >>>>>> I figure I am blind to something obvious here, but darned if
> >>>> I
> >>>> >>> know what
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>>> it
> >>>> >>>>>> is. Any help out there??
> >>>> >>>>>> mike
> >>>> >>>>>>
> >>>> >>>>>> P
> >>>> >>>>>> S-- Eugene wrote an interesting article in MCA a while back
> >>>> >>>>>> on intersubjectivity and there are Vygotsky refs but they do
> >>>> >>>>>> not seem to go to the question I am
> >>>> asking.
> >>>> >>> Perhaps its
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>>>>> just my bad question!
> >>>> >>>
> >>>> >>> --
> >>>> >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >>>> >>> Visiting Assistant Professor
> >>>> >>> Department of Anthropology
> >>>> >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >>>> >>> Brigham Young University
> >>>> >>> Provo, UT 84602
> >>>> >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >>>> >
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
>
>
>
Status: O