[Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity]

[Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>]

Seems like there is third approach to take with regard to the figure and
ground ("figure" being the traditional object of analysis, "ground" being
Shotter's object of analysis) that will be familiar to any artist in
training - namely, figures in nature do not have boundary lines. For
convenience we tend to draw them as such, with the result being a
heightening of the 2-dimensional nature of the drawing. They look flat
(much like social scientific descriptions of the world!). It is only when
we draw objects using shading and contrast, light and dark between figure
and ground ("chiaroscoro") that the figures appear as having
3-dimensionality.
Perhaps there is a lesson in this for social scientists?
-greg
p.s. check out this book on chiaroscuro - with a number of lovely portraits:
http://www.amazon.com/Artists-Complete-Guide-Drawing-Head/dp/0823003590/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1377284355&sr=1-1


On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 11:56 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Greg,
> Your question,
> Wondering where Shotter stands on the the usefulness of science. Is there
> value to be had in the scientific field of meaning? Or is it just a ruse?
> E.g., is there value in seeing "social structure" and "class" in the world?
> I believe Shotter would answer by saying that "social structure" and
> "class" are ways of talking and carry values within these particular ways
> of talking. He would want to FOCUS our attention on what is normally the
> background within which our frames positing "social structure" and "class"
> are ways of talking. He describes his approach as "rhetorical-RESPONSIVE".
>
> Therefore talk of "social structure" and "classes" is a way of
> participating in an ongoing dialogue that is *partially sedimented" and
> "partially open".
> He would say that academic discourses with their written language bias are
> only able to exist as instructed discourses using analytic tools for making
> de-cisions are always carried out within conversational realities which are
> expressing particular values. By foregrounding this conversational ontology
> Shotter hopes to reveal the contested argumentative, negotiated and value
> informed collaboration within which all discourses and model building are
> carried out.
> He uses the metaphor of partially sedimented centers of discourse where we
> are INSTRUCTED in know-HOW exist within a background of ongoing spontaneous
> conversational realities.  He emphasizes that written modes of
> communication emerge within conversational realities and take on an assumed
> reality that occludes the hurly burly of the spontaneous dis-organized
> background within which the instructed partially sedimented discourses
> occur.
> Greg, he would acknowledge the reality of "social structures" and "classes"
> as ways of talking with REAL AND ACTUAL consequences. However he would say
> they do not exist outside of our ways of talking which are open ended,
> negotiated, and within which the talk of "social structure" and "classes"
> gets organ-ized
> I would guess he would say that "social structures" and "classes" as ways
> of talking emerge within literately informed and instructed ways of
> talking.
> All this social structure talk emerges within our de-cisions and ways of
> talking. Now these ways of talk REALLY MATTER and have real existence in
> the world.
> He would not reject the talk of social structures but he would say they
> come into existence within the background of our ways of talking.
> His project is to FOCUS OUR ATTENTION on this hurly burly background which
> is ALWAYS FORMING and foreground what has been invisible in plain sight. In
> the language of phenomenology he is attempting to "say to show" LOOK,
> FOCUS, the world is partially sedimented. We do require to be INSTRUCTED
> and develop the tools to carry on within these partially structured
> cultural historically formED worlds. These worlds exist.
> How we talk about these worlds are not formed but formING. Without our talk
> informing ourselves dialogically [he says joint action] our informed worlds
> would cease to exist.
>
> What Shotter wants to SHOW us [make explicit] is THIS background "field"
> within which our centers of discourse using our psychological tools are
> INSTRUCTED as "knowing-HOW".
> Shotter emphasizes the tension within our ways of talking and he wants to
> shift from *picture* meataphors of "frames" to alternative metaphors of
> *voice* which come into existence THROUGH the response of the other.
> KNOWING "from within" privileges the realm of values and asks if everyone
> has a voice. This voice is not a subjective inner voice but rather a voice
> which emerges within the hurly burly dis-organized places between the
> centers of instructed discourse. To find one's voice only within the
> discourses as already formed and instructed is to loose the vitality of
> life within the hurly burly. In this "sense ability"
>  I would say he is developing a way of talking that shares Merleau-Ponty's
> understanding that all analysis and "de-cision making" has LIMITS which do
> not exhaust the EXCESS and SYNERGY OF LIVING existence lived within
> expressive cognition. Both M-P and Shotter want to [using a gestalt
> metaphor] shift or turn our FOCUS from the figured foreground with its
> marked boundaries to the background and bring it to the fore.
> This fore is where we "shape" the "social structures" and "classes".
> Greg, this is my interpretation. I do not see it as questioning but adding
> to CHAT. In this I may be naive or mis-informed. That is why I tune in and
> try to focus on these other perspectives.
> Larry
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 8:09 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> >wrote:
>
> > Just thought I'd mention that it sounds like there are strong resonances
> > between Shotter's ideas here and Goodwin's paper Professional Vision that
> > Antti recently mentioned.
> >
> > In that piece, Goodwin looks at the processes of coding, highlighting,
> and
> > the articulation of graphic representations. He shows first how these
> > practices function in archaeology to define particular shadings of dirt
> as
> > evidence of posts of a building (rhetorically the paper is brilliant - to
> > start off with a neutral profession such as archaeology and then move to
> > the much more emotionally charged issue of the police beating of Rodney
> > King). Then he moves to the Rodney King case to show how the coding,
> > highlighting, and representational practices of the police justified the
> > brutal beating of Rodney King.
> >
> > Goodwin's key points resonate well with not just Shotter, but with
> Activity
> > Theory:
> > "The ability to build and interpret a material cognitive artifact, such
> as
> > an archaeological map, is embedded within a web of socially articulated
> > discourse."
> >
> > and, "Within such a framework the ability to see relevant entities is not
> > lodged in the individual mind, but instead within a community of
> competent
> > practitioners."
> >
> > and further:
> > "As argued by Wittgenstein (1958) a category or rule cannot determine its
> > own application; seeing what can count as a "change of slope" or
> > "aggression" in a relevant domain of scrutiny is both a contingent
> > accomplishment, and a locus for contestation, indeed a central site for
> > legal argument. Categories and the phenomena to which they are being
> > applied, mutually elaborate each other (Goodwin
> > 1992; Heritage 1984; Keller and Keller 1993),"
> >
> > I think Goodwin's account is interesting b.c. it is mostly descriptive of
> > the phenomena. While pointing in some ways to the injustice of the Rodney
> > King trial, he doesn't go so far as to say that the work of
> "professionals"
> > is entirely a ruse. Rather, it seems like his point is that there are
> > better and worse ways of doing it. E.g., the archaeologist student is
> able
> > to engage with the materials herself while learning, whereas the jurist
> is
> > expected to passively sit and listen to the testimony of "experts"
> (strange
> > to think that "inquiry" - as in "an inquiry" - and legal proceedings
> could
> > be linked - or, at least, this is a strange form of "inquiry" conducted
> > entirely by "experts").
> >
> > Wondering where Shotter stands on the the usefulness of science. Is there
> > value to be had in the scientific field of meaning? Or is it just a ruse?
> > E.g., is there value in seeing "social structure" and "class" in the
> world?
> >
> > -greg
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 6:47 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Christine,
> > > You are exploring structures and systems and whether the concept of
> > > *system* develops in a *general* way or does it appear [making or
> > > finding!?] immanantly within particular practices.
> > >
> > > I will share a perspective from John Shotter who is attempting to make
> an
> > > ontological case for *conversational joint activities. He critiques
> > > *systems* thinking as a form of *scientific* thinking and he links it
> to
> > a
> > > particular form of social practices that could exist only within
> literate
> > > societies.
> > > He is not making a case for *literacy* in general but literacy as used
> > > within scientific communities. Here is a summary of his position,
> [coming
> > > from a bias of conversational realities as the background within which
> > > scientific and *systems* ways of *knowing* develop.
> > > Shotter's account takes place as a response or answer to Bhaskar's
> > > *realist* perspective on scientific knowledge. Shotter says Bhaskar
> [and
> > > realists in general] neglect the TEXTUAL nature of the productive and
> > > reproductive process in science. Bhaskar says the most important
> practice
> > > supporting a science is its *methodology*: the assumption that proper,
> > > scientific knowledge is ONLY acquired as a result of systematic thought
> > and
> > > orderly investigation. Shotter says that this *methodology* only has
> > sense,
> > > and only MAKES sense, within a context of other activities and
> practices.
> > > Central among these other practices is the production of WRITTEN TEXTS.
> > All
> > > professionally conducted science moves from text to text, usually
> > beginning
> > > with the reading of already written text and ending in the writing of
> > > further texts. Within the many forms of linguistic communication
> written
> > > text has a special place. Texts can be used by readers [with the
> > > appropriate prior showing training] to construct a meaning by reference
> > to
> > > linguistic resources which the reader possesses within themselves. The
> > > reader [as writer] carefully composes an interwoven sequence of written
> > > sentences, structured within ITSELF [to a much larger degree than
> > > conversational compositions] by essentially intralinguistic or
> > syntactical
> > > relations. Thus to a critical degree scientific text is a relatively
> > > de-contextualized FORM of communication. Shotter says, to the extent
> > that a
> > > *scientific* theory is always something written and published and
> making
> > > claims that things are not what they ordinarily seem to be, but are IN
> > > REALITY something else, the theory is not intelligible in the same way
> as
> > > terms are intelligible in ordinary conversational language.
> > > If we want to be taken seriously in our scientific claims we need to be
> > > INSTRUCTED in HOW [knowing-how] to *see* various social phenomena AS
> > having
> > > a certain psychological character. Shotter gives examples to be able to
> > > *see* social phenomena AS  social structure, or AS social classes.
> Other
> > > examples is to see social phenomena AS social representations, AS
> rules.
> > > Being instructed in HOW to read scientific texts INSTRUCTS us in how TO
> > SEE
> > > social life AS consisting in structures and systems.
> > >
> > > What Shotter wants to add to this understanding is that science is also
> > > conducted within a context of argumentation. Shotter says Bhaskar's
> > realist
> > > account lacks a certain *reflexiveness* and is biased toward
> propositions
> > > and statements rather than metaphors.
> > >
> > > Christine, not sure if my *turn* was a *swerve off course* but Shotter
> > > holds up *systems* as an object and gives us another perspective on
> this
> > > object of discussion.
> > >
> > > Larry
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 6:36 AM, Christine Schweighart <
> > > schweighartc@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Jack,
> > > > Perhaps  a way of distinguishing significant aspects coherently
> across
> > > > various sciences would be helpful.
> > > > There is research in
> > > > http://www.journals.elsevier.com/psychoneuroendocrinology/
> > > >
> > > > cortisol and memory work
> > > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03064530/36/3
> > > > cortisol and stress kind of work done in variable separating lab
> work;
> > *
> > > > but not reaching to  'values'as a bridge to be able to work in the
> > > > 'everyday' context in fieldwork.......
> > > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306453013002667
> > > >
> > > > developmental influence on structural capacities.
> > > >
> > > >
> http://www.psyneuen-journal.com/article/S0306-4530(12)00303-4/abstract
> > > >
> > > > Anyone with useful reading suggestions please send an email.
> > > >
> > > > Christine
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > Department of Anthropology
> > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > Brigham Young University
> > Provo, UT 84602
> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >
>



-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Visiting Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson