[Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Andy,

Thanks for keepin
Thanks for keeping this topic of sense and meaning alive.
Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process
with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning
relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted
to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows.
I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to
prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows.
The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor.
Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer"
which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi].
Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a showing
in phenomenological discourse]
The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is
presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker to
hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the
listener's "mind"
Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a
verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological "aha"
moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor as
a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker.
I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the
power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central.
Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation"
Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new metaphor
IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense]
Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of
acting as transfering *sense* to *pictures* as a *psychological instrument*
and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation
within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a psychological
and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and
THROUGH which we think, act, and perceive.
Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is
"presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and
therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one
*way* of knowing as argumentation.
This is questioning the relation between *forming* as presentation/showing
&
*formed* as representation of what was previously presented.
Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneityg this topic of
sense and meaning alive.

Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process
with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning
relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted
to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."

Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows.
I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to
prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows.

The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor.
Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer"
which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi].
Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a showing
in phenomenological discourse]
The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is
presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker to
hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the
listener's "mind"
Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a
verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological "aha"
moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor as
a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker.
I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the
power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central.
Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation"
Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new metaphor
IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense]
Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of
acting as transfering *sense* by showing and creating metaphors
as *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural
resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor [something
AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a
PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which] we think,
act, and perceive.
Greg, I wonder if this showing is always volitional [under our control] or
if we spontaneously "respond" intersubjectively?

 Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is
"presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and
therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one
*way* of knowing as argumentation. Intersubjective not subjective.
This is questioning the relation between
 *forming* as presentation/showing
&
 *formed* as representation of what was previously presented.

Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneity as expressive
cognition.

I hope I am making sense in my drawing attention to the relation between
thoughts and shadows.
Huw, asked if there is a question here? I would say the question is the
models of "sense" as presentations [showings] and representations.
Merleau-Ponty understood words AS GESTURES.
Is there any "truth" to this notion?
Larry


On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:24 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing excessive
> stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 of
> "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such stability:
>
>    "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word’s sense
>    over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the psychological
>    analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a word’s
>    sense and meaning. A word’s sense is the aggregate of all the
>    psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result of
>    the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which has
>    several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of
>    these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of
>    speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these zones.
>    In different contexts, a word’s sense changes. In contrast, meaning
>    is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains constant
>    with all the changes of the word’s sense that are associated with
>    its use in various contexts. Change in the word’s sense is a basic
>    factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of the
>    word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one
>    meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of
>    meaning leads us to Paulhan’s problem, to the problem of the
>    relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, the
>    word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more
>    than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in
>    living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of sense."
>
> As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that of
> sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of all
> psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy or the
> cultural and historical migration of meaning.
>
> Andy
> mike cole wrote:
>
>> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along with
>> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and thought,
>> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
>>
>> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of
>> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of
>> sense making capturable with
>> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even
>> dictionary
>> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history of
>> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in
>> ontogeny.
>>
>> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in these
>> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do.
>> mike
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>