[Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

I am finding this conversation especially hard to follow because of the
huge train of headers and repititions. This problem has arisen before with
no
solution.

Anyone have a practical suggestion for how to limit the length of history
that replies contain other than what the writer specifically is referring
to??
mike


On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 4:21 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>wrote:

> On 14 August 2013 23:10, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Apparently this conversation didn't go to the group - or maybe parts of
> it
> > did. So here is a recap of the thread:
> >
> > Huw commented that an activity is defined by its object.
> >
> > I inquired about what the "object" is when *conversation* is the
> activity.
> >
> > Huw responded "the object of the conversation is the subject's purpose".
> >
> > Andy added:
> > "There are important differences in the methodological implication which
> > go to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These
> > mainly arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes
> > through different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and
> > the forms of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary
> > snap-shot of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes."
> >
>
> This was with respect to Leontyev's concept of Activity and Andy's concept
> of project.
>
> Regarding interaction, and without having to go beyond classic texts, the
> notions of leading activity and ZPD are such boundary concepts that you
> allude to, Greg.
>
> As I see it, Leontyev's activity is principally a psychologically oriented
> concept.
>
> With respect to Goffman, for me motive and goals have a profound bearing
> upon the social situation, but perhaps I am rather goal oriented? But in
> many situations there are implicit demands (such as professional commercial
> work) where one is not expected to bring one's pet motives/projects to the
> table.
>
> Note that the performative with the word is the doing, as is the notion of
> "this is play".
>
> "Thus, meanings refract the world in man's consciousness. The vehicle of
> meaning is language, but language is not the demiurge of meaning."
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
>
> > And here is my (as yet unsent! Hot off the presses!) response to Huw and
> > Andy:
> >
> > "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm wondering
> > how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not
> master
> > and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what about
> a
> > golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - the
> > different participants in a discussion on XMCA.
> >
> > I'm rather fond of Goffman's question "what is it that is going on here?"
> > as a way of thinking about "activity". As Goffman notes, the golfer and
> > caddy have different "motivational relevancies" (1973, p. 8), but this
> > doesn't mean that they are "doing" different activities. In the end I
> think
> > Goffman is really working out a practice theory that treat's John
> Austin's
> > famous question of how it is that we can "do things with words" (although
> > his lectures, of course, were titled as the answer to the question - How
> to
> > do Things with Words). Goffman is trying to figure out how Austin's
> primary
> > performatives are accomplished, joked, faked, imitated, fabricated, etc.
> in
> > actual practice. What is it that goes into making an instance of talk an
> > instance of an "insult" or a "compliment" or an "argument"? And how do
> > these become consequential in practice. This, it seems, is Bateson's
> point
> > in "This is Play"; it is a life and death matter for the animal to know
> > whether or not an instance of interaction is play or serious. Maybe not
> > quite so consequential (immediately) for us humans, but it can certainly
> be
> > the difference between getting a laugh and getting a punch in the nose.
> >
> > Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives
> > (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a
> notion
> > of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between
> > participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have to
> > deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a side-wards
> > glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James
> Scott
> > didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as
> participants
> > take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a
> > certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the
> > participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants
> create
> > a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common
> > that frames are built out of a plethora of motives.
> >
> > I should add that I wonder if Susan Leigh Star's concept of Boundary
> > Objects might be useful here as well. These are objects that emerge
> despite
> > a plurality of motivations. Building on Latour's notion of interessement
> > (and From Star and Griesemer, boundary objects are: “objects which are
> > both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the
> > several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common
> > identity across sites...The objects may by abstract or concrete.”
> >
> > Etienne Wenger seems to offer a start in this direction. But only a
> start.
> >
> > Can we imagine "activity" (or whatever we want to call it - "project,"
> > "frame," "social doing," etc.) as a boundary object - something that
> > captures a relation BETWEEN persons. Activity always as "inter-activity."
> >
> > So then, how do we tell "what it is that is going on here?" where "here"
> > is the "current" temporally displaced moment of me writing and you
> reading
> > this. Is this just me being a show-off? Is this me trying to work through
> > some of my ideas in order to publish a paper (with the real motivation to
> > simply keep my job)? Is this just me musing with friends about ideas
> about
> > which I feel very strongly? Or is something altogether different
> happening
> > here?
> >
> > I take Goffman's answer to this to be: it's up to you - or better, to the
> > relation that will emerge BETWEEN us. Who's to say what that will be.
> >
> > -greg
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 7:26 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >
> >> There are important differences in the methodological implication which
> >> go to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These
> >> mainly arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes
> >> through different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change
> and
> >> the forms of collaboration and objectification change. But as a
> momentary
> >> shap-shot of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes.
> >>
> >> Andy
> >>
> >> Is this going to go back on the list?
> >>
> >> Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>> On 13 August 2013 16:55, <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com <mailto:
> >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>     Thanks huw, sorry i missed your response - I must have missed it
> >>>     amid the flurry of activity about activity!!
> >>>     So does this mean that you have a different take than Andy? Seems
> >>>     like he was arguing against a motive-based definition of activity.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Well, as far as I know I have a similar interpretation to Andy
> regarding
> >>> the interpretation/reading of these texts.  Andy has reasons to
> elaborate
> >>> something different he calls a project.
> >>> My personal inference was that this has more to do with preferred
> >>> methods rather than empirical based disagreements with Leontyev's
> >>> formulation.
> >>>
> >>> Does that help?
> >>>
> >>> Best,
> >>> Huw
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>     Just trying to sort out what this word means for everybody.
> >>>     (And I cc'd Andy on this to get his thoughts)
> >>>     Cheers,
> >>>     Greg
> >>>
> >>>     Sent from my iPhone
> >>>
> >>>     On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:53 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> >>>     <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.**com <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>      Hi Greg,
> >>>>
> >>>>     Yes.  My response (that I sent to xmca-l) was "the object of the
> >>>>     conversation is the subject's purpose(s)".
> >>>>
> >>>>     You can gchat me or gvideo if you wish.
> >>>>     Best,
> >>>>     Huw
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>     On 13 August 2013 15:47, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> >>>>     <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>>>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>         Huw,
> >>>>         Did you get this question I posted to XMCA?         I meant it
> >>>> in all sincerity. As someone interested in
> >>>>         discourse, this kind of thing really matters to me. And I
> >>>>         think it is where things start to get a little messy with
> >>>>         defining activity. But I may be wrong about that!
> >>>>         Looking forward to hearing more.
> >>>>         Very best,
> >>>>         greg
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>         ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> >>>>         From: <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> >>>>         <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com <
> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> >>>> >>
> >>>>         Date: Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 9:09 AM
> >>>>         Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities
> >>>>         To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> >>>>         <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.**edu<
> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>>> >>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>         Huw,
> >>>>         Pardon my ignorance on this issue (I can assure you this is
> >>>>         more than just pretense!), but if conversation is activity,
> >>>>         what is the object of this activity?
> >>>>         Greg
> >>>>
> >>>>         Sent from my iPhone
> >>>>
> >>>>         On Aug 11, 2013, at 7:28 AM, Huw Lloyd
> >>>>         <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> >>>>         <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.**com <
> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>         > FYI, Greg.
> >>>>         >
> >>>>         > Activity is defined by its object.  See p. 363 in The
> >>>>         Development of Mind
> >>>>         > (Problems of Dev.)
> >>>>         >
> >>>>         > Huw
> >>>>         >
> >>>>         >
> >>>>         >
> >>>>         > On 9 August 2013 04:24, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> >>>>         <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >>>>         >
> >>>>         >> Greg Thompson wrote:
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>> Andy, I think I need still more help.
> >>>>         >>>
> >>>>         >>> I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists".
> >>>>         Wondering what
> >>>>         >>> this could mean.
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>   xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for
> >>>>         the many
> >>>>         >>   thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is
> >>>>         >>   "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than
> >>>>         create
> >>>>         >>   activities (projects).
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >> Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me:
> >>>>         activities don't
> >>>>         >>> simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their
> >>>>         participants, but then
> >>>>         >>> lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in
> >>>>         '*immanent* in the project
> >>>>         >>> itself". Not sure what exactly that means either.
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>   As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates
> >>>> the
> >>>>         >>   activity (the development of the concept) cannot in
> >>>>         itself account
> >>>>         >>   for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which
> >>>>         >>   corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by
> >>>>         the agents,
> >>>>         >>   is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as
> >>>>         such, but the
> >>>>         >>   conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what
> >>>>         this ideal
> >>>>         >>   is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*.
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>> And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out
> >>>>         "where" the activity
> >>>>         >>> exists? And "who" is a part of it?
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>   OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical
> >>>>         (logical
> >>>>         >>   positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is
> >>>>         an aggregate
> >>>>         >>   of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the
> >>>>         fundamental (micro)
> >>>>         >>   unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life
> >>>>         as a whole.
> >>>>         >>   So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions,
> >>>>         not a group
> >>>>         >>   of people.
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>  For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an
> >>>>         activity? What
> >>>>         >>> about all the intersections and overlaps with previous
> >>>>         and soon-to-be
> >>>>         >>> discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity?
> >>>>         >>> And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e.
> >>>>         writing!), or are
> >>>>         >>> the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA
> >>>>         folks with whom the
> >>>>         >>> writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly
> >>>>         influenced the
> >>>>         >>> writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity?
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>   (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science,
> >>>>         projects are
> >>>>         >>   *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or
> >>>>         object which
> >>>>         >>   makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects.
> >>>>         All the
> >>>>         >>   concepts of a science obviously have complex
> >>>>         interactions and
> >>>>         >>   interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of
> >>>>         demarcation. Their
> >>>>         >>   truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who"
> >>>>         is part of
> >>>>         >>   it  is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate
> >>>>         of actions,
> >>>>         >>   not individual persons. Also, a project is the
> >>>>         particular of a
> >>>>         >>   concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively
> >>>>         definite
> >>>>         >>   location in time and space. But it is an instance
> >>>>         realising a
> >>>>         >>   concept which is a unit of an entire social formation.
> >>>>         So the scope
> >>>>         >>   of a project, being part of a family of such projects,
> >>>>         may be larger
> >>>>         >>   than the immediate participating actions.
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>> In short, what are the bounds of an activity?
> >>>>         >>> (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?)
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>   Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The
> >>>>         question is
> >>>>         >>   what is the concept (or in common parlance the
> >>>>         "essence") of a project.
> >>>>         >>   "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But
> >>>>         it has its
> >>>>         >>   own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW
> >>>>         "project" and
> >>>>         >>   "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the
> >>>>         etymology
> >>>>         >>   of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a
> >>>>         different word
> >>>>         >>   I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone
> >>>>         else says
> >>>>         >>   is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the
> >>>>         object of a
> >>>>         >>   project is immanent within the project, I am not directly
> >>>>         >>   contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object
> >>>>         or motive is
> >>>>         >>   given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the
> >>>>         concepts of
> >>>>         >>   Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a
> >>>>         new word helps.
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>   Andy
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >> -greg
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>         >>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>         --         Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >>>>         Visiting Assistant Professor
> >>>>         Department of Anthropology
> >>>>         883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >>>>         Brigham Young University
> >>>>         Provo, UT 84602
> >>>>         http://byu.academia.edu/**GregoryThompson<
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >> --
> >> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> >> ------------
> >> *Andy Blunden*
> >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> >> http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden<
> http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> > --
> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > Department of Anthropology
> > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > Brigham Young University
> > Provo, UT 84602
> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >
>