Re: [xmca] AW: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice

[Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>]

Hello -- Exactly my point in my MCA article on using AT to study work.

Helena Worthen
Hworthen@illinois.edu

On 3/22/13 8:40 AM, "Holodynski, Manfred"
<manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de> wrote:

>Dear colleagues,
>
>thank you very much for all your valued comments on my article. There are
>a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some difficulties to follow
>all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like to answer to the
>following:
>
>1. Emotions as psychological function within the macrostructure of
>activity.
>
>As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN Leont'ev and I focused
>especially on his concept of macrostructure of activity and its levels of
>activity that is related to motives, actions that are related to goals
>and operations that are related to the conditions under which an action
>is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it when he stated that
>my article needs to be read with attention to motivation and how the
>macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and goals of an
>individual. One activity can be realized by different actions, and one
>action can realize different activities.
>
>
>
>May I quote Andy's words:
>
>" Because motives are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
>inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the success,
>failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both
>participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion is
>tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an
>activity. One and the same action could be part of different ""actions
>activities (!) (MH)"". It is the emotions which signal (internally and
>externally) the success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering
>an activity, and it is this which makes manifest and actual that
>connection between action and activity, for both the observer/participant
>and the individual subject.
>
>So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind", or
>intelligent infants, etc."
>
>
>
>a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's the behavior.
>What's the goal?
>
>b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in order to greet
>his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal. What is the activity?
>
>c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that the speech is a
>part of a political activity in order to celebrate the election victory.
>So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the victory there
>is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and the personally
>felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be possible that he
>doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally feels to be
>overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the societal
>meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the personal
>sense assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader framed
>this situation under an achievement perspective whether he is able to
>fulfill the leadership.
>
>
>
>But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we speak about an
>advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults, but not in infants
>who start to have intentions but still not a mental image of a future
>state of affairs.
>
>
>
>2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and advanced level
>in older children:
>
>- A young infant has not already established a goal-driven level of
>actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition of first
>operations and of first expectations what should happen. But these
>expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about the desired
>future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a sign system
>which enables the person to evoke and  imagine a future state in the here
>and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting point, not
>only to imagine different future states, but also to select one of them
>and to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into play that
>color one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth striving for
>and that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it.
>
>However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to transform them
>into actions is not something that occurs automatically. It emerges in a
>long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the attainment of goals
>through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly optimized. Older
>children are
>
>
>
>So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the macrostructure of an
>activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a specific
>psychological function within the macrostructure of an activity.
>
>
>
>Best
>
>Manfred
>
>
>
>Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
>
>Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
>
>Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
>
>Fliednerstr. 21
>
>D-48149 Münster
>
>+49-(0)-251-83-34311
>
>+49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
>
>+49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
>
>http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
>
>manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
>
>
>
>
>
>-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
>Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13
>An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>Cc: Holodynski, Manfred
>Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice
>
>
>
>Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev, rather than
>Engestrom's "systems of activity."
>
>So actions and activities are defined by their goals and motives. So
>Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to motivation and how
>the structure of an activity is related to motives and goals. Because
>motives are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
>inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the success,
>failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both
>participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion is
>tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an
>activity. One and the same action could be part of different actions. It
>is the emotions which signal (internally and externally) the success,
>etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it is
>this which makes manifest and actual that connection between action and
>activity, for both the observer/participant and the individual subject.
>
>So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind", or
>intelligent infants, etc.
>
>
>
>It's all in there.
>
>
>
>Andy
>
>
>
>mike cole wrote:
>
>> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why operation/action/activity were
>
>> not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out the views in
>
>> this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems important
>
>> for me to get clear about!
>
>> Mike
>
>>
>
>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
>
>>
>
>>     Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening the
>
>>     window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e., the
>
>>     meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a part,
>
>>     which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to
>
>>     "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the
>
>>     signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an
>
>>     activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that activity -
>
>>     is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state and
>
>>     intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not
>
>>     fundamental.
>
>>
>
>>     Andy
>
>>
>
>
>
>
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