[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [xmca] Culture & Rationality
On 29 June 2012 16:03, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> Huw
>
> I support to returning to Martin's thread but would appreciate a separate
> thread which puts in play tthe various notions of rationality and reasoning
> and types of logic USED by you, Andy, and Martin.
> Not as assertions but as questions.
> I may be lost in the *answers* [in over my head] but as I struggle to
> understand each of your positions, it does open up this central question of
> rationality and what it means.
>
> The differences may be ambiguous with many mis-understandings but may lead
> to further understanding through the misunderstandings
> Larry
>
>
Hi Larry,
The basic point is about digitality. All of the recent threads on
rationality, creativity etc are implicated.
I'm not sure a mail server is the best forum, but if you post questions
I'll read them and perhaps venture to give my opinion.
Huw
On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 7:26 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>wrote:
>
> > On 29 June 2012 15:03, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >
> > > I think we are at cross purposes here, Huw. Symbolic logic can only
> deal
> > > with various kinds of propositional calculus, but always comes down to
> > > "atoms" whose truth value is "outside the theory". I am not really
> > > interested (these days) in formal languages. I am talking about real
> > > languages.
> > >
> >
> > Thank goodness! I thought you were only interested in Andy language.
> >
> > That does beg the question why you're making assertions about formal
> logic
> > though.
> >
> > But lets drop it and let Martin continue with the thread.
> >
> > Huw
> >
> >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > Huw Lloyd wrote:
> > >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On 29 June 2012 14:16, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
> > >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Huw, I think the scope for using formal logic is very limited in
> > >> the case of true concepts.
> > >>
> > >> Basically, you are limited to chains of inferences from true
> > >> propositions.
> > >> But as I see it, pseudoconcepts, like the concepts of Set Theory,
> > >> are native to Formal Logic. The type of logic and the type of
> > >> concept are, as you point out, two different things, but I think
> > >> there is a definite and strong connection between defining a
> > >> concept as a set and the applicability of syllogistic logic.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> That connection is one of activity. Discriminating on 'types' of
> logic
> > >> by application is pseudoconceptual. In fact if you look at the
> various
> > >> kinds of logics, it becomes apparent that their key difference is in
> > terms
> > >> of application, each introduces a particular 'library' of notations
> > >> particular to certain kinds of problems, yet these are actually built
> > out
> > >> simple logical operations. One can describe one formal language in
> > terms
> > >> of another, which is what Godel did.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Andy
> > >>
> > >> Huw Lloyd wrote:
> > >>
> > >> On 29 June 2012 11:50, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> > >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> **
> > >>
> > >> I wasn't talking about examples so much as archetypes of
> > >> "scientific
> > >> concepts", and for archetypes he uses exploitation, class
> > >> struggle,
> > >> exploitation, or the Paris Commune (T&S Ch 5 and 6).
> > >>
> > >> The system of nature does of course provide ample material
> > >> for talking
> > >> about the difference between taxonomy and true concepts.
> > >> So for example:
> > >>
> > >> "In its external characteristics, the pseudoconcept is as
> > >> similar to true
> > >> concept as the whale is to the fish. However, if we turn
> > >> to the 'origin of
> > >> the species' of intellectual and animate forms, it becomes
> > >> apparent that
> > >> the pseudoconcept is related to complexive thinking and
> > >> the whale to the
> > >> mammals [ie true concepts]." [T&S ch 5]
> > >>
> > >> which allows LSV to show how sorting by contingent
> > >> attributes (rather than
> > >> according to essential relations within a system)
> > >> corresponds to
> > >> pseudoconcepts and formal logic.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> I think you'll find its the types used that are
> > >> pseudoconceptual, rather
> > >> than the logic.
> > >>
> > >> Huw
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> True, he does not confine himself to the concepts of
> > >> Marxist social
> > >> science. He uses different sets of concepts for different
> > >> purposes. The
> > >> reasons for falling off your bicycle (somethign within a
> > >> child's
> > >> experience) at one point; kulaks from prerevolutionary
> > >> days at another
> > >> point (outside a child's experience), at another. I was
> > >> just saying that he
> > >> takes scientific conepts as the purest form of true
> > >> concept and the
> > >> concepts of marxist social science as the purest type of
> > >> scientific concept.
> > >>
> > >> Andy
> > >>
> > >> Peter Smagorinsky wrote:
> > >>
> > >> And yet, most of LSV's own examples are biological, no?
> > >>
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> >
> > >> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> >
> > >> <xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>>>]
> > >> On Behalf Of Andy
> > >> Blunden
> > >> Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2012 10:54 PM
> > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Culture & Rationality
> > >>
> > >> Oh, and also, when Vygotsky uses "scientific concepts" as
> > >> the archetype for a true concept, remember that he *does
> > >> not* use the concepts of
> > >> *natural* science, as Piaget did, but the concepts of
> > >> Marxist social theory. So, when we are considering
> > >> Vygotsky's ideas about "scientific concepts" it is
> > >> probably useful to *not* have in mind concepts like those
> > >> of physics which Piaget, not Vygotsky, took as ideal types.
> > >>
> > >> Andy
> > >>
> > >> Andy Blunden wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Stephen Toulmin, in "The Philosophy of Science. An
> > >> Introduction"
> > >> (1953) I thought definitively proved that the method of
> > >> reasoning of
> > >> science is not formal logic, or what Toulmin called
> > >> "syllogistic"
> > >> inference. For example, on p.33: "Certainly none of the
> > >> substantial
> > >> inferences that one comes across in the phsyical sciences
> > >> is of a
> > >> syllogistic type. This is because, in the physical
> > >> sciences, we are
> > >> not seriously interested in enumerating the common
> > >> properties of sets
> > >> of objects." In other words, the concepts of the physical
> > >> sciences are
> > >> not pseudoconcepts, therefore we can't use formal logic to
> > >> makes
> > >> inferences about them. Brandom uses the idea of "formal"
> and
> > >> "material" inference to make the distinction.
> > >>
> > >> So scientific, and in fact all true, concepts imply going
> > >> past formal
> > >> logic, which only works with pseudoconcepts.
> > >>
> > >> Andy
> > >>
> > >> Jennifer Vadeboncoeur wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Yes, exactly Martin, this work is consistent. I do think
> > >> Vygotsky
> > >> privileges dialectical logic over formal logic; by
> > >> definition, it
> > >> subsumes formal logic and moves beyond it. From my
> > >> cultural position,
> > >> growing up comfortably with formal logic and having to
> > >> practice
> > >> thinking dialectically, the above statement doesn't bother
> > >> me. But I
> > >> would take a different position relative to an Indigenous
> > >> perspective, and be much more circumspect about saying that
> > >> dialectical logic can or should be privileged there. The
> > >> difference
> > >> in the two positions is one of power. In the first, it
> > >> seems that a
> > >> marginalized position (Marx's in North America) works to
> > >> challenge a
> > >> privileged position (formal logic in North America). In
> > >> the second,
> > >> privileging a dialectical perspective seems like another
> > >> act of
> > >> colonization.
> > >>
> > >> If we look equally across these three positions, which is
> > >> problematic
> > >> because the is no single homogenous Indigenous
> > >> perspective, but let's
> > >> say for this one exercise, then it seems like we are
> > >> comparing three
> > >> different cultural, historical perspectives on reasoning,
> > >> right and
> > >> logical, or rational,behavior.
> > >>
> > >> The question remains to the effects of these different ways
> > of
> > >> thinking, but for the people thinking within these
> > >> systems, what is
> > >> the evidence to show that they cannot think at the adult
> > >> level of
> > >> their cultural form of rationality? Yikes, now that I've
> > >> written
> > >> this, I'm not even sure it's the question. Is the issue
> > >> when we try
> > >> to compare the standards of one cultural group to another?
> > >>
> > >> I'll jump to Peter's post, because I totally appreciate
> > >> what he has
> > >> written there as well. I appreciate the idea of separating
> > >> dialogical
> > >> thinking from scientific ... but I also think of Vera
> > >> John-Steiner's
> > >> cognitive pluralism, and want to reaffirm all the other
> > >> ways of
> > >> thinking and experiencing the world through image, sound,
> > >> diagram.
> > >> These are sometimes more obvious to draw on in some
> > Indigenous
> > >> cultures, but the move also shifts the discussion from
> > >> speech to
> > >> writing, whether we are writing lines, or diagrams, or
> words.
> > >>
> > >> I was looking back over my sad copy of Luria & Vygotsky
> > >> (1992), the
> > >> bottom of page 41 through pages 61 are interesting to this
> > >> topic
> > >> because they show how much Vygotsky struggled with the
> > >> necessity of
> > >> using the work of others and at the same time trying not
> > >> to be bound
> > >> by it. He relies on the work of Levy-Bruhl and takes up
> > >> his language
> > >> "so-called 'primitive peoples'" and then tries to
> > >> problematize this a
> > >> bit. "Primitive man, in the true sense of the term, does
> > >> not exist
> > >> anywhere at the present time," but then of course he
> > >> continues to use
> > >> this language. He argues against any biological type,
> > >> discusses
> > >> "objectively logical thinking" in relation to nature, and
> > >> goes on to
> > >> say .... hm, hm, okay, page 59, the focus is on the
> > >> development of
> > >> writing, and the transition from natural to cultural
> > >> memory, and
> > >> later the historical development of human memory. The
> > >> ability of sign
> > >> systems to enable an external form of memory, an external
> > >> storage of
> > >> memory.
> > >>
> > >> What is different about people with access to the
> > >> accumulation of
> > >> cultural knowledge of any particular culture and people of
> > >> that same
> > >> culture who do not have access to this accumulated
> > >> knowledge? In some
> > >> cultures this may be scientific concepts, as defined by
> > >> Vygotsky, in
> > >> other cultures it may be ....?
> > >>
> > >> But I keep returning to my post a bit ago, the quote there
> > >> makes it
> > >> clear that Vygotsky realizes that even after formal
> > >> schooling, many
> > >> people do not think with scientific concepts, and adults
> > >> do not think
> > >> with scientific concepts across all domains ... this has
> been
> > >> supported by contemporary work, from Panofsky,
> John-Steiner,
> > &
> > >> Blackwell (1990) to Howard Gardner's work with Project
> Zero.
> > >>
> > >> Vygotsky's goal of thinking in scientific concepts is
> > >> actually not
> > >> accessible to many people within our own cultures ....
> > >>
> > >> Okay, have I completely gone overboard? :)
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Hi Jennifer,
> > >>
> > >> Yes, there has been interesting work recently proposing
> that
> > >> indigenous cultures are using a distinct kind of
> > >> reasoning. These guys:
> > >>
> > >> Berkes, F., & Berkes, M. K. (2009). Ecological complexity,
> > >> fuzzy
> > >> logic, and holism in indigenous knowledge. Futures, 41(1),
> > >> 6-12.
> > >> doi:10.1016/j.futures.2008.07.**003
> > >>
> > >> ...suggest that indigenous peoples have learned to deal
> with
> > >> complexity, and to manage natural environments rather than
> > >> master
> > >> them; that what has been dismissed as animism is actually a
> > >> sophisticated non-dualistic ontology; and that a holistic
> > >> systems
> > >> thinking is being used. I like several aspects of their
> > >> analysis,
> > >> not least that it explains the "simple number system" -
> > >> one, two,
> > >> many - that has been found in many indigenous cultures, as
> > >> due to an
> > >> approach in which people read and interpret signals from
> the
> > >> environment rather than counting and measuring it.
> > >>
> > >> And I agree with you that judgments of rationality are
> > >> often violent
> > >> impositions; all the judgments of people as 'primitive' are
> > >> presumably of this kind. Presumably what we need are
> > >> non-violent
> > >> ways to look at difference.
> > >>
> > >> As for dialectical logic, it take it that LSV believed
> > >> that this was
> > >> the form of rationality he was employing, and the
> > >> ontogenesis of
> > >> which he was describing. And that he considered it superior
> > to
> > >> formal logic, not an alternative.
> > >>
> > >> Martin
> > >>
> > >> On Jun 27, 2012, at 2:04 PM, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Hi Martin,
> > >>
> > >> I am thinking about what you wrote,
> > >>
> > >> "On the contrary, it seems to me that much of LSV's
> > >> writing can be
> > >> read as pointing to the conclusion that *standards* of
> > >> rationality
> > >> will vary from one culture another. But I don't think he
> > >> followed
> > >> his own pointers, and, as I've said above, it is a pretty
> > >> radical
> > >> conclusion to come to."
> > >>
> > >> I was first thinking about different standards of
> > >> rationality as
> > >> noted in the quote below, between formal and dialectical
> > >> logic.
> > >> Both are tied to "Western" countries, through dialectical
> > >> thinking
> > >> can also be tied to "Eastern" countries, so maybe the
> > >> issue is one
> > >> of "industrialized" countries?
> > >>
> > >> "A child who has mastered the higher forms of thinking, a
> > >> child
> > >> who has mastered concepts, does not part with the more
> > >> elementary
> > >> forms of thinking. In quantitative terms, these more
> > >> elementary
> > >> forms continue to predominate in many domains of
> > >> experience for a
> > >> long time. As we noted earlier, even adults often fail to
> > >> think in
> > >> concepts. S When applied to the domain of life experience,
> > >> even the
> > >> concepts of the adult and adolescent frequently fail to
> > >> rise higher
> > >> than the level of the pseudoconcept. They may possess all
> the
> > >> features of the concepts from the perspective of formal
> > >> logic, but
> > >> from the perspective of dialectical logic they are nothing
> > >> more
> > >> than general representations, nothing more than complexes."
> > >> (emphasis added, Vygotsky, 1987, p. 160)
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> But the issue in your quote has surfaced several times as
> > >> well in
> > >> my work with Indigenous students and scholars, and we have
> > >> ended in
> > >> the place noted in your quote above. Particular examples
> > >> include
> > >> the complexity and unity of some Indigenous cosmological
> > >> systems,
> > >> their symbolic representation through the medicine wheel,
> for
> > >> example, and the narratives, signs, gestures, practices,
> > >> writings
> > >> that accompany these cosmological systems.
> > >>
> > >> Can this be considered another cultural form of
> > >> rationality (seems
> > >> dialectical in a sense as well ...)?
> > >>
> > >> I know this is different from the question you posed in
> > >> the follow
> > >> up email, but isn't "demonstrably weaker" a matter of
> > >> cultural,
> > >> historical, political, economic positioning ... assessed
> by a
> > >> particular dominant group at a particular time on the basis
> > of
> > >> their own potentially culturally irrelevant assessments?
> > >>
> > >> Is part of your question also asking for a standard that
> > >> exists
> > >> outside of culture?
> > >>
> > >> Just thoughts here ... jen
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Hi Peter,
> > >>
> > >> I am glad to see you join in the discussion, since I know
> > >> you've
> > >> done interesting research on inner speech.
> > >>
> > >> I am certainly willing to grant that patterns of social
> > >> interaction will become patterns of self-regulation and
> > >> thereby
> > >> parts of patterns of individual thinking. It also makes
> > >> sense to
> > >> me, and in my opinion LSV clearly states the view, that
> > >> the higher
> > >> psychological processes are cultural processes. I think he
> > >> goes so
> > >> far as to say that reasoning is cultural.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> But, importantly, that is not the same as saying that
> > >> reasoning
> > >> *varies* across cultures. We *all* live in culture, and
> > >> one can
> > >> say that reasoning is cultural and still maintain that
> > >> reasoning
> > >> is universal. Are we willing to take another step, and
> > suggest
> > >> that in specific cultures the ways that people reason will
> be
> > >> different, because the specific conventions of each
> > >> culture are
> > >> involved? That is a big step to take, because the rules of
> > >> logic,
> > >> to pick what is usually taken to be one component of
> > >> reasoning,
> > >> are usually considered to hold regardless of local
> > >> conventions.
> > >>
> > >> One way to take this step, of course, is to say that
> > >> people in
> > >> cultures reason in different ways but then to add an
> > >> evaluative
> > >> dimension. Those people in that culture reason differently
> > >> from
> > >> the way we do, but that is because their reasoning is less
> > >> adequate than ours. They are more childlike, more
> primitive.
> > >> *This* move has often been made, and I can find many
> > >> passages in
> > >> LSV's texts where he seems to be saying basically this.
> > >> That's not
> > >> a move I find interesting or appealing, and it's not what I
> > am
> > >> proposing.
> > >>
> > >> On the contrary, it seems to me that much of LSV's
> > >> writing can be
> > >> read as pointing to the conclusion that *standards* of
> > >> rationality
> > >> will vary from one culture another. But I don't think he
> > >> followed
> > >> his own pointers, and, as I've said above, it is a pretty
> > >> radical
> > >> conclusion to come to.
> > >>
> > >> Martin
> > >>
> > >> On Jun 27, 2012, at 9:33 AM, Peter Feigenbaum wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Martin--
> > >>
> > >> If you grant that interpersonal speech communication is
> > >> essentially a cultural invention, and that private and
> inner
> > >> speech--as derivatives of interpersonal speech
> > >> communication--are
> > >> also cultural inventions, then Vygotsky's assertions about
> > >> inner
> > >> speech as a tool that adults use voluntarily to conduct and
> > >> direct such crucial psychological activities as analyzing,
> > >> reflecting, conceptualizing, regulating, monitoring,
> > >> simulating,
> > >> rehearsing (actually, some of these activities were not
> > >> specifically asserted by Vygotsky, but instead have been
> > >> discovered in experiments with private speech) would imply
> > >> that
> > >> these "higher mental processes" are themselves cultural
> > >> products.
> > >> Even if the *contents* of inner speech thinking happen to
> > >> bear no
> > >> discernible cultural imprint, the process of production
> > >> nonetheless does.
> > >>
> > >> Of course, you may not agree that interpersonal speech
> > >> communication is a cultural invention. But if you do go
> along
> > >> with the idea that every speech community follows (albeit
> > >> implicitly) their own particular conventions or customs
> for:
> > >> assigning specific speech sounds to specific meanings
> (i.e.,
> > >> inventing words); organizing words into sequences (i.e.,
> > >> inventing grammar--Chomsky's claims not withstanding); and
> > >> sequencing utterances in conversation according to rules of
> > >> appropriateness (i.e., inventing rules that regulate "what
> > >> kinds
> > >> of things to say, in what message forms, to what kinds of
> > >> people,
> > >> in what kinds of situations", according to the
> cross-cultural
> > >> work of E. O. Frake), then reasoning based on the use of
> > >> speech
> > >> must be cultural as well.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> >>>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> My guess is that you are looking for evidence that
> cultures
> > >> reason differently. While there may be evidence for such a
> > >> claim,
> > >> I only want to point out that the tools for reasoning are
> > >> themselves manufactured by human culture.
> > >>
> > >> Peter
> > >>
> > >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > >> Associate Director of Institutional Research
> > >> Fordham University
> > >> Thebaud Hall-202
> > >> Bronx, NY 10458
> > >>
> > >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 <tel:%28718%29%20817-2243>
> > >> Fax: (718) 817-3203 <tel:%28718%29%20817-3203>
> > >> e-mail: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> > >> <mailto:pfeigenbaum@fordham.**edu <pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu
> > >> <mailto:packer@duq.edu>> <packer@duq.edu
> > >> <mailto:packer@duq.edu>>
> > >>
> > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> > >> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> > >> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Date: 06/26/2012 05:06 PM
> > >> Subject: [xmca] Culture & Rationality
> > >> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Thank you for the suggestions that people have made about
> > >> evidence that supports the claim that culture is
> > >> constitutive of
> > >> psychological functions. Keep sending them in, please! Now
> > >> I want
> > >> to introduce a new, but related, thread. A few days ago I
> > gave
> > >> Peter a hard time because he wrote that "higher mental
> > >> processes
> > >> are those specific to a culture, and thus those that embody
> > >> cultural concepts so that they guide activity."
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> >>>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> I responded that I don't think that LSV ever wrote this
> > >> - his
> > >> view seems to me to have been that it is scientific
> > >> concepts that
> > >> make possible the higher psychological functions (through
> > >> at time
> > >> he seems to suggest the opposite).
> > >>
> > >> My questions now are these:
> > >>
> > >> 1. Am I wrong? Did LSV suggest that higher mental
> > >> processes are
> > >> specific to a culture and based on cultural concepts?
> > >>
> > >> 2. If LSV didn't suggest this, who has? Not counting
> > >> Peter! :)
> > >>
> > >> 3. Do we have empirical evidence to support such a
> > >> suggestion?
> > >> It seems to me to boil down, or add up, to the claim that
> > >> human
> > >> rationality, human reasoning, varies culturally. (Except
> who
> > >> knows what rationality is? - it turns out that the Stanford
> > >> Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not have an entry for
> > >> Rationality; apparently they are still making up their
> > minds.)
> > >>
> > >> that's all, folks
> > >>
> > >> Martin
> > >>
> > >> ______________________________**____________
> > >> _____
> > >> xmca mailing list
> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >> ______________________________**____________
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> > _____
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> xmca mailing list
> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >> ______________________________**____________
> > >> _____
> > >> xmca mailing list
> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >> --
> > >> ______________________________
> > >>
> > >> Jennifer A. Vadeboncoeur, Ph.D.
> > >> Associate Professor
> > >> The University of British Columbia
> > >> Faculty of Education
> > >> 2125 Main Mall
> > >> Library Block 272B
> > >> Vancouver BC V6T-1Z4
> > >> http://leap-educ.sites.olt.**ubc.ca/<
> > http://leap-educ.sites.olt.ubc.ca/>
> > >>
> > >> phone: 1.604.822.9099 <tel:1.604.822.9099>
> > >> fax: 1.604.822.3302 <tel:1.604.822.3302>
> > >>
> > >> ______________________________**____________
> > >> _____
> > >> xmca mailing list
> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >> ______________________________**____________
> > >> _____
> > >> xmca mailing
> > >> listxmca@weber.ucsd.eduhttp://**
> > dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/
> > >> **xmca <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >> <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> --
> > >> ------------------------------
> > >>
> > >> *Andy Blunden*
> > >> Joint Editor MCA:
> > http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> > >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > >> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/**<
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/**>
> > >
> > >>
> > >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> > >>
> > >> ______________________________**____________
> > >> _____
> > >> xmca mailing list
> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> ______________________________**____________
> > >>
> > >> _____
> > >> xmca mailing list
> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> --
> > ------------------------------**------------------------------*
> > >> *------------
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> *Andy Blunden*
> > >> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> > >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <
> > http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/* <http://home.mira.net/~andy/*>
> > >> *>
> > >>
> > >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> > >>
> > >> ______________________________**____________
> > >> _____
> > >> xmca mailing list
> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > > --
> > > ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> > > ------------
> > > *Andy Blunden*
> > > Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> > >
> > > ______________________________**____________
> > > _____
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca