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Re: [xmca] Culture & Rationality
Huw
I support to returning to Martin's thread but would appreciate a separate
thread which puts in play tthe various notions of rationality and reasoning
and types of logic USED by you, Andy, and Martin.
Not as assertions but as questions.
I may be lost in the *answers* [in over my head] but as I struggle to
understand each of your positions, it does open up this central question of
rationality and what it means.
The differences may be ambiguous with many mis-understandings but may lead
to further understanding through the misunderstandings
Larry
On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 7:26 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>wrote:
> On 29 June 2012 15:03, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > I think we are at cross purposes here, Huw. Symbolic logic can only deal
> > with various kinds of propositional calculus, but always comes down to
> > "atoms" whose truth value is "outside the theory". I am not really
> > interested (these days) in formal languages. I am talking about real
> > languages.
> >
>
> Thank goodness! I thought you were only interested in Andy language.
>
> That does beg the question why you're making assertions about formal logic
> though.
>
> But lets drop it and let Martin continue with the thread.
>
> Huw
>
>
> > Andy
> >
> > Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> On 29 June 2012 14:16, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
> >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >>
> >> Huw, I think the scope for using formal logic is very limited in
> >> the case of true concepts.
> >>
> >> Basically, you are limited to chains of inferences from true
> >> propositions.
> >> But as I see it, pseudoconcepts, like the concepts of Set Theory,
> >> are native to Formal Logic. The type of logic and the type of
> >> concept are, as you point out, two different things, but I think
> >> there is a definite and strong connection between defining a
> >> concept as a set and the applicability of syllogistic logic.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> That connection is one of activity. Discriminating on 'types' of logic
> >> by application is pseudoconceptual. In fact if you look at the various
> >> kinds of logics, it becomes apparent that their key difference is in
> terms
> >> of application, each introduces a particular 'library' of notations
> >> particular to certain kinds of problems, yet these are actually built
> out
> >> simple logical operations. One can describe one formal language in
> terms
> >> of another, which is what Godel did.
> >>
> >>
> >> Andy
> >>
> >> Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >>
> >> On 29 June 2012 11:50, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> **
> >>
> >> I wasn't talking about examples so much as archetypes of
> >> "scientific
> >> concepts", and for archetypes he uses exploitation, class
> >> struggle,
> >> exploitation, or the Paris Commune (T&S Ch 5 and 6).
> >>
> >> The system of nature does of course provide ample material
> >> for talking
> >> about the difference between taxonomy and true concepts.
> >> So for example:
> >>
> >> "In its external characteristics, the pseudoconcept is as
> >> similar to true
> >> concept as the whale is to the fish. However, if we turn
> >> to the 'origin of
> >> the species' of intellectual and animate forms, it becomes
> >> apparent that
> >> the pseudoconcept is related to complexive thinking and
> >> the whale to the
> >> mammals [ie true concepts]." [T&S ch 5]
> >>
> >> which allows LSV to show how sorting by contingent
> >> attributes (rather than
> >> according to essential relations within a system)
> >> corresponds to
> >> pseudoconcepts and formal logic.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I think you'll find its the types used that are
> >> pseudoconceptual, rather
> >> than the logic.
> >>
> >> Huw
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> True, he does not confine himself to the concepts of
> >> Marxist social
> >> science. He uses different sets of concepts for different
> >> purposes. The
> >> reasons for falling off your bicycle (somethign within a
> >> child's
> >> experience) at one point; kulaks from prerevolutionary
> >> days at another
> >> point (outside a child's experience), at another. I was
> >> just saying that he
> >> takes scientific conepts as the purest form of true
> >> concept and the
> >> concepts of marxist social science as the purest type of
> >> scientific concept.
> >>
> >> Andy
> >>
> >> Peter Smagorinsky wrote:
> >>
> >> And yet, most of LSV's own examples are biological, no?
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> >
> >> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> >
> >> <xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>>>]
> >> On Behalf Of Andy
> >> Blunden
> >> Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2012 10:54 PM
> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Culture & Rationality
> >>
> >> Oh, and also, when Vygotsky uses "scientific concepts" as
> >> the archetype for a true concept, remember that he *does
> >> not* use the concepts of
> >> *natural* science, as Piaget did, but the concepts of
> >> Marxist social theory. So, when we are considering
> >> Vygotsky's ideas about "scientific concepts" it is
> >> probably useful to *not* have in mind concepts like those
> >> of physics which Piaget, not Vygotsky, took as ideal types.
> >>
> >> Andy
> >>
> >> Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> Stephen Toulmin, in "The Philosophy of Science. An
> >> Introduction"
> >> (1953) I thought definitively proved that the method of
> >> reasoning of
> >> science is not formal logic, or what Toulmin called
> >> "syllogistic"
> >> inference. For example, on p.33: "Certainly none of the
> >> substantial
> >> inferences that one comes across in the phsyical sciences
> >> is of a
> >> syllogistic type. This is because, in the physical
> >> sciences, we are
> >> not seriously interested in enumerating the common
> >> properties of sets
> >> of objects." In other words, the concepts of the physical
> >> sciences are
> >> not pseudoconcepts, therefore we can't use formal logic to
> >> makes
> >> inferences about them. Brandom uses the idea of "formal" and
> >> "material" inference to make the distinction.
> >>
> >> So scientific, and in fact all true, concepts imply going
> >> past formal
> >> logic, which only works with pseudoconcepts.
> >>
> >> Andy
> >>
> >> Jennifer Vadeboncoeur wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> Yes, exactly Martin, this work is consistent. I do think
> >> Vygotsky
> >> privileges dialectical logic over formal logic; by
> >> definition, it
> >> subsumes formal logic and moves beyond it. From my
> >> cultural position,
> >> growing up comfortably with formal logic and having to
> >> practice
> >> thinking dialectically, the above statement doesn't bother
> >> me. But I
> >> would take a different position relative to an Indigenous
> >> perspective, and be much more circumspect about saying that
> >> dialectical logic can or should be privileged there. The
> >> difference
> >> in the two positions is one of power. In the first, it
> >> seems that a
> >> marginalized position (Marx's in North America) works to
> >> challenge a
> >> privileged position (formal logic in North America). In
> >> the second,
> >> privileging a dialectical perspective seems like another
> >> act of
> >> colonization.
> >>
> >> If we look equally across these three positions, which is
> >> problematic
> >> because the is no single homogenous Indigenous
> >> perspective, but let's
> >> say for this one exercise, then it seems like we are
> >> comparing three
> >> different cultural, historical perspectives on reasoning,
> >> right and
> >> logical, or rational,behavior.
> >>
> >> The question remains to the effects of these different ways
> of
> >> thinking, but for the people thinking within these
> >> systems, what is
> >> the evidence to show that they cannot think at the adult
> >> level of
> >> their cultural form of rationality? Yikes, now that I've
> >> written
> >> this, I'm not even sure it's the question. Is the issue
> >> when we try
> >> to compare the standards of one cultural group to another?
> >>
> >> I'll jump to Peter's post, because I totally appreciate
> >> what he has
> >> written there as well. I appreciate the idea of separating
> >> dialogical
> >> thinking from scientific ... but I also think of Vera
> >> John-Steiner's
> >> cognitive pluralism, and want to reaffirm all the other
> >> ways of
> >> thinking and experiencing the world through image, sound,
> >> diagram.
> >> These are sometimes more obvious to draw on in some
> Indigenous
> >> cultures, but the move also shifts the discussion from
> >> speech to
> >> writing, whether we are writing lines, or diagrams, or words.
> >>
> >> I was looking back over my sad copy of Luria & Vygotsky
> >> (1992), the
> >> bottom of page 41 through pages 61 are interesting to this
> >> topic
> >> because they show how much Vygotsky struggled with the
> >> necessity of
> >> using the work of others and at the same time trying not
> >> to be bound
> >> by it. He relies on the work of Levy-Bruhl and takes up
> >> his language
> >> "so-called 'primitive peoples'" and then tries to
> >> problematize this a
> >> bit. "Primitive man, in the true sense of the term, does
> >> not exist
> >> anywhere at the present time," but then of course he
> >> continues to use
> >> this language. He argues against any biological type,
> >> discusses
> >> "objectively logical thinking" in relation to nature, and
> >> goes on to
> >> say .... hm, hm, okay, page 59, the focus is on the
> >> development of
> >> writing, and the transition from natural to cultural
> >> memory, and
> >> later the historical development of human memory. The
> >> ability of sign
> >> systems to enable an external form of memory, an external
> >> storage of
> >> memory.
> >>
> >> What is different about people with access to the
> >> accumulation of
> >> cultural knowledge of any particular culture and people of
> >> that same
> >> culture who do not have access to this accumulated
> >> knowledge? In some
> >> cultures this may be scientific concepts, as defined by
> >> Vygotsky, in
> >> other cultures it may be ....?
> >>
> >> But I keep returning to my post a bit ago, the quote there
> >> makes it
> >> clear that Vygotsky realizes that even after formal
> >> schooling, many
> >> people do not think with scientific concepts, and adults
> >> do not think
> >> with scientific concepts across all domains ... this has been
> >> supported by contemporary work, from Panofsky, John-Steiner,
> &
> >> Blackwell (1990) to Howard Gardner's work with Project Zero.
> >>
> >> Vygotsky's goal of thinking in scientific concepts is
> >> actually not
> >> accessible to many people within our own cultures ....
> >>
> >> Okay, have I completely gone overboard? :)
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Hi Jennifer,
> >>
> >> Yes, there has been interesting work recently proposing that
> >> indigenous cultures are using a distinct kind of
> >> reasoning. These guys:
> >>
> >> Berkes, F., & Berkes, M. K. (2009). Ecological complexity,
> >> fuzzy
> >> logic, and holism in indigenous knowledge. Futures, 41(1),
> >> 6-12.
> >> doi:10.1016/j.futures.2008.07.**003
> >>
> >> ...suggest that indigenous peoples have learned to deal with
> >> complexity, and to manage natural environments rather than
> >> master
> >> them; that what has been dismissed as animism is actually a
> >> sophisticated non-dualistic ontology; and that a holistic
> >> systems
> >> thinking is being used. I like several aspects of their
> >> analysis,
> >> not least that it explains the "simple number system" -
> >> one, two,
> >> many - that has been found in many indigenous cultures, as
> >> due to an
> >> approach in which people read and interpret signals from the
> >> environment rather than counting and measuring it.
> >>
> >> And I agree with you that judgments of rationality are
> >> often violent
> >> impositions; all the judgments of people as 'primitive' are
> >> presumably of this kind. Presumably what we need are
> >> non-violent
> >> ways to look at difference.
> >>
> >> As for dialectical logic, it take it that LSV believed
> >> that this was
> >> the form of rationality he was employing, and the
> >> ontogenesis of
> >> which he was describing. And that he considered it superior
> to
> >> formal logic, not an alternative.
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >> On Jun 27, 2012, at 2:04 PM, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Hi Martin,
> >>
> >> I am thinking about what you wrote,
> >>
> >> "On the contrary, it seems to me that much of LSV's
> >> writing can be
> >> read as pointing to the conclusion that *standards* of
> >> rationality
> >> will vary from one culture another. But I don't think he
> >> followed
> >> his own pointers, and, as I've said above, it is a pretty
> >> radical
> >> conclusion to come to."
> >>
> >> I was first thinking about different standards of
> >> rationality as
> >> noted in the quote below, between formal and dialectical
> >> logic.
> >> Both are tied to "Western" countries, through dialectical
> >> thinking
> >> can also be tied to "Eastern" countries, so maybe the
> >> issue is one
> >> of "industrialized" countries?
> >>
> >> "A child who has mastered the higher forms of thinking, a
> >> child
> >> who has mastered concepts, does not part with the more
> >> elementary
> >> forms of thinking. In quantitative terms, these more
> >> elementary
> >> forms continue to predominate in many domains of
> >> experience for a
> >> long time. As we noted earlier, even adults often fail to
> >> think in
> >> concepts. S When applied to the domain of life experience,
> >> even the
> >> concepts of the adult and adolescent frequently fail to
> >> rise higher
> >> than the level of the pseudoconcept. They may possess all the
> >> features of the concepts from the perspective of formal
> >> logic, but
> >> from the perspective of dialectical logic they are nothing
> >> more
> >> than general representations, nothing more than complexes."
> >> (emphasis added, Vygotsky, 1987, p. 160)
> >>
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >> But the issue in your quote has surfaced several times as
> >> well in
> >> my work with Indigenous students and scholars, and we have
> >> ended in
> >> the place noted in your quote above. Particular examples
> >> include
> >> the complexity and unity of some Indigenous cosmological
> >> systems,
> >> their symbolic representation through the medicine wheel, for
> >> example, and the narratives, signs, gestures, practices,
> >> writings
> >> that accompany these cosmological systems.
> >>
> >> Can this be considered another cultural form of
> >> rationality (seems
> >> dialectical in a sense as well ...)?
> >>
> >> I know this is different from the question you posed in
> >> the follow
> >> up email, but isn't "demonstrably weaker" a matter of
> >> cultural,
> >> historical, political, economic positioning ... assessed by a
> >> particular dominant group at a particular time on the basis
> of
> >> their own potentially culturally irrelevant assessments?
> >>
> >> Is part of your question also asking for a standard that
> >> exists
> >> outside of culture?
> >>
> >> Just thoughts here ... jen
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Hi Peter,
> >>
> >> I am glad to see you join in the discussion, since I know
> >> you've
> >> done interesting research on inner speech.
> >>
> >> I am certainly willing to grant that patterns of social
> >> interaction will become patterns of self-regulation and
> >> thereby
> >> parts of patterns of individual thinking. It also makes
> >> sense to
> >> me, and in my opinion LSV clearly states the view, that
> >> the higher
> >> psychological processes are cultural processes. I think he
> >> goes so
> >> far as to say that reasoning is cultural.
> >>
> >>
> >> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> But, importantly, that is not the same as saying that
> >> reasoning
> >> *varies* across cultures. We *all* live in culture, and
> >> one can
> >> say that reasoning is cultural and still maintain that
> >> reasoning
> >> is universal. Are we willing to take another step, and
> suggest
> >> that in specific cultures the ways that people reason will be
> >> different, because the specific conventions of each
> >> culture are
> >> involved? That is a big step to take, because the rules of
> >> logic,
> >> to pick what is usually taken to be one component of
> >> reasoning,
> >> are usually considered to hold regardless of local
> >> conventions.
> >>
> >> One way to take this step, of course, is to say that
> >> people in
> >> cultures reason in different ways but then to add an
> >> evaluative
> >> dimension. Those people in that culture reason differently
> >> from
> >> the way we do, but that is because their reasoning is less
> >> adequate than ours. They are more childlike, more primitive.
> >> *This* move has often been made, and I can find many
> >> passages in
> >> LSV's texts where he seems to be saying basically this.
> >> That's not
> >> a move I find interesting or appealing, and it's not what I
> am
> >> proposing.
> >>
> >> On the contrary, it seems to me that much of LSV's
> >> writing can be
> >> read as pointing to the conclusion that *standards* of
> >> rationality
> >> will vary from one culture another. But I don't think he
> >> followed
> >> his own pointers, and, as I've said above, it is a pretty
> >> radical
> >> conclusion to come to.
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >> On Jun 27, 2012, at 9:33 AM, Peter Feigenbaum wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Martin--
> >>
> >> If you grant that interpersonal speech communication is
> >> essentially a cultural invention, and that private and inner
> >> speech--as derivatives of interpersonal speech
> >> communication--are
> >> also cultural inventions, then Vygotsky's assertions about
> >> inner
> >> speech as a tool that adults use voluntarily to conduct and
> >> direct such crucial psychological activities as analyzing,
> >> reflecting, conceptualizing, regulating, monitoring,
> >> simulating,
> >> rehearsing (actually, some of these activities were not
> >> specifically asserted by Vygotsky, but instead have been
> >> discovered in experiments with private speech) would imply
> >> that
> >> these "higher mental processes" are themselves cultural
> >> products.
> >> Even if the *contents* of inner speech thinking happen to
> >> bear no
> >> discernible cultural imprint, the process of production
> >> nonetheless does.
> >>
> >> Of course, you may not agree that interpersonal speech
> >> communication is a cultural invention. But if you do go along
> >> with the idea that every speech community follows (albeit
> >> implicitly) their own particular conventions or customs for:
> >> assigning specific speech sounds to specific meanings (i.e.,
> >> inventing words); organizing words into sequences (i.e.,
> >> inventing grammar--Chomsky's claims not withstanding); and
> >> sequencing utterances in conversation according to rules of
> >> appropriateness (i.e., inventing rules that regulate "what
> >> kinds
> >> of things to say, in what message forms, to what kinds of
> >> people,
> >> in what kinds of situations", according to the cross-cultural
> >> work of E. O. Frake), then reasoning based on the use of
> >> speech
> >> must be cultural as well.
> >>
> >>
> >> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >> My guess is that you are looking for evidence that cultures
> >> reason differently. While there may be evidence for such a
> >> claim,
> >> I only want to point out that the tools for reasoning are
> >> themselves manufactured by human culture.
> >>
> >> Peter
> >>
> >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> >> Associate Director of Institutional Research
> >> Fordham University
> >> Thebaud Hall-202
> >> Bronx, NY 10458
> >>
> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 <tel:%28718%29%20817-2243>
> >> Fax: (718) 817-3203 <tel:%28718%29%20817-3203>
> >> e-mail: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> >> <mailto:pfeigenbaum@fordham.**edu <pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu>>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu
> >> <mailto:packer@duq.edu>> <packer@duq.edu
> >> <mailto:packer@duq.edu>>
> >>
> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> >> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> >> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> >>
> >>
> >> Date: 06/26/2012 05:06 PM
> >> Subject: [xmca] Culture & Rationality
> >> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Thank you for the suggestions that people have made about
> >> evidence that supports the claim that culture is
> >> constitutive of
> >> psychological functions. Keep sending them in, please! Now
> >> I want
> >> to introduce a new, but related, thread. A few days ago I
> gave
> >> Peter a hard time because he wrote that "higher mental
> >> processes
> >> are those specific to a culture, and thus those that embody
> >> cultural concepts so that they guide activity."
> >>
> >>
> >> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >> I responded that I don't think that LSV ever wrote this
> >> - his
> >> view seems to me to have been that it is scientific
> >> concepts that
> >> make possible the higher psychological functions (through
> >> at time
> >> he seems to suggest the opposite).
> >>
> >> My questions now are these:
> >>
> >> 1. Am I wrong? Did LSV suggest that higher mental
> >> processes are
> >> specific to a culture and based on cultural concepts?
> >>
> >> 2. If LSV didn't suggest this, who has? Not counting
> >> Peter! :)
> >>
> >> 3. Do we have empirical evidence to support such a
> >> suggestion?
> >> It seems to me to boil down, or add up, to the claim that
> >> human
> >> rationality, human reasoning, varies culturally. (Except who
> >> knows what rationality is? - it turns out that the Stanford
> >> Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not have an entry for
> >> Rationality; apparently they are still making up their
> minds.)
> >>
> >> that's all, folks
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >> ______________________________**____________
> >> _____
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>
> >> ______________________________**____________
> >>
> >>
> >> > _____
> >>
> >>
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>
> >> ______________________________**____________
> >> _____
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>
> >> --
> >> ______________________________
> >>
> >> Jennifer A. Vadeboncoeur, Ph.D.
> >> Associate Professor
> >> The University of British Columbia
> >> Faculty of Education
> >> 2125 Main Mall
> >> Library Block 272B
> >> Vancouver BC V6T-1Z4
> >> http://leap-educ.sites.olt.**ubc.ca/<
> http://leap-educ.sites.olt.ubc.ca/>
> >>
> >> phone: 1.604.822.9099 <tel:1.604.822.9099>
> >> fax: 1.604.822.3302 <tel:1.604.822.3302>
> >>
> >> ______________________________**____________
> >> _____
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>
> >> ______________________________**____________
> >> _____
> >> xmca mailing
> >> listxmca@weber.ucsd.eduhttp://**
> dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/
> >> **xmca <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >> <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> ------------------------------
> >>
> >> *Andy Blunden*
> >> Joint Editor MCA:
> http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> >> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/**<http://home.mira.net/~andy/**>
> >
> >>
> >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> >>
> >> ______________________________**____________
> >> _____
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> ______________________________**____________
> >>
> >> _____
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> ------------------------------**------------------------------*
> >> *------------
> >>
> >>
> >> *Andy Blunden*
> >> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <
> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/* <http://home.mira.net/~andy/*>
> >> *>
> >>
> >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> >>
> >> ______________________________**____________
> >> _____
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > --
> > ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> > ------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<
> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> >
> > ______________________________**____________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
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