RE: [xmca] 2nd person perspective

["monica.hansen" <monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu>]

Thanks, Larry. This is fascinating and parallel to my current work. This work by Thompson adresses that ravine of incommensurability I was raving about before. I will try to keep up by skimming.

________________________________________
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Larry Purss [lpscholar2@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2012 12:46 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] 2nd person perspective

Monica
Here are the articles by Tobias Schlicht & Evan Thompson

Tobias describes 4 types of intentionality.  The distinction between his
1st and 2nd types [dyadic intentionality &  triadic joint attenion] I found
helpful.  However, reading  Tobias 4th level,  positing cognitive  mental
representations, can be challenged. Acquiring the skill of positing beliefs
and desires ABOUT objects [as propositional] may not be internal cognitive
mental activity [in the head] but actually be skillful  "narrative
compositions" ABOUT mental beliefs and desires.  [ I can send articles by
Daniel Hutto on this distinction, who is still working within an enactive
model.]

Monica, I'm also attaching Evan Thompson's first 60 pages of his new book
*Mind In Life* which is extending his work with Varela and Rosch.
I would be interested in others who may know more about the 3 types of
phenomenology [static, genetic, and generative] as they may help me tease
out the place of subjectivity and agency in cultural historical theory.

Larry
On Tue, Mar 20, 2012 at 12:07 PM, monica.hansen <
monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu> wrote:

> I am interested in the paper on enactive apporoach. Larry. Incidentally,
> am working on a critical discourse analysis right now discussing use of
> point of view as indication of agency in participants' poetry in content
> literacy class.
>
> Consciousness and understanding are two very different phenomena. Of
> course they are related in mental functioning, the how of it being still
> much debated in scientific communities. Did anyone see the articles about
> free will in yesterdays online Chronicle of Higher Ed? I have often
> wondered if the initial focus of understanding learning shouldn't have been
> aimed at attention all along, rather than what generally pass for higher
> level cognitive abilities. The phenomenon we call attention is more messy
> and less easily defined; it is also more inricately interwoven in aspects
> of the social interrelationtionships, more so than aspects of the
> individual (as consciousness is). The work being done on joint attention
> then yields some interesting analyses at all ages.
>
> Monica
> ________________________________________
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] on behalf
> of Larry Purss [lpscholar2@gmail.com]
> Sent: Monday, March 19, 2012 11:20 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] 2nd person perspective
>
> Martin
>
> My understanding of Reddy's 2nd person approach is informed by my
> understanding of the  "enactive" approach to consciousness and
> intentionality.
> Infants are first aware that they are the focus of mother's intentional
> directedness towards them. This experience of primary intersubjectivity
> calls forth infant expressions that are intentionally directed at mother.
> >From an enactve standpoint this context of "joint attention" is a form of
> consciousness and is best characterized as an ACT of attending rather than
> a form of information exchange. Focal attention is a continuous process
> EXECUTED by a human agent at 2 months of age. The alternation of attention
> between the object and the other subject is an active engagement involving
> coordinated joint attention.
>
> Martin, within the theory of enactive embodied expression, sensorimotor
> intentionality IS a form of consciousness because it is a form of  ACTING
> intentionally sharing joint attention.
> The term *understanding* does not apply at this sensorimotor level of
> agentic action [within enactive theory]
>
> The developmental emergence of 1st and 3rd person forms of intentionality
> [and forms of consciousness] develop from being immersed in this 2nd person
> *form of life*.
>
> Evan Thomson who worked with Varela suggests there 3 distinct approaches to
> understanding phenomenology as it applies to enactive approches.
>
> 1] STATIC - consciousness constitutes [brings to awareness or discloses]
> the world. Objects are taken as GIVEN synchronically.
> 2] GENETIC - Intentional structures and objects EMERGE through time [NOT
> given] For example HOW implicit and prereflective experiences develop
> attentive and reflective experiences.  Experience has a SEDIMENTED
> structure in relation to the living body and time-consciousness.
> 3] GENERATIVE - whereas for genetic phenomenology time-consciousness and
> the lived body are key concepts, for generative phenomenology the guiding
> thread is *the life world*. The focus shifts to our cultural, historical,
> and intersubjective constitution of the human world.
>
> These ideas from E. Thompson are in his book "Mind In Life"
>
> If interested I can attach a 6 page article on "Enactive Social Cognition"
> or the first chapter of E. Thompson's new book extending his work with
> Varela and Rosch.
>
> Larry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 2:26 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>
> > Larry, Rod, Monica et al.
> >
> > I've been reading Reddy's article, and while I think she's completely
> > correct in her identification of a complex and subtle relatedness during
> > the first year of life, or even the first months (I've always been a fan
> of
> > Colwyn Trevarthen's work), I'm having trouble getting some things clear.
> >
> > Reddy writes that "the self is emotionally aware of being an object to
> > others before it is an object to itself." We are talking, then, about at
> > least two forms of self-consciousness - namely consciousness of self as
> an
> > object to other people, plus consciousness of self as an object to
> oneself.
> > Add to that the consciousness that a child comes to have of self as an
> > agent, a subject....
> >
> > Recognition of self in a mirror seems to be Cs of self as an object, no?
> > Secondary emotions such as shame would be evidence for Cs of self as an
> > agent (and hence as having responsibility for some action or event) - or
> > would they be evidence of Cs of self as an object in the eyes of others
> > (who hold one accountable)? Or both?
> >
> > See, I'm hopelessly confused! Has anyone figured out Reddy's position? Or
> > have a coherent account of when children acquire these different forms of
> > Cs? Add to the mix the fact that for LSV the crisis at 12m is the child
> > differentiating biologically from the mother, while the crisis at 30m is
> > the child differentiating psychologically. Each of these is evidently a
> new
> > kind of self/other distinction. Do they align with Reddy's account?
> >
> > Martin
> >
> > On Mar 18, 2012, at 7:31 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
> >
> > > David and Monica
> > >
> > > The central question is still how we get from empathy to objectivity;
> >  from
> > > 2nd person to 3rd person perspectives.
> > >
> > > David, I will pause at the recognition that 2nd person lived experience
> > may
> > > be a basic form of experience and therefore a central mode of
> interaction
> > > throughout the life span. That re-cognition is a difference which may
> > make
> > > a difference.
> > >
> > > David, you wrote
> > >
> > > "Neither unit is "activity" in the sense used by activity theorists;
> > > neither has an outcome in production. Neither inheres in a purely
> > "you-me"
> > > relationship which can be and often is carried out without any use of
> > word
> > > meaning or any self-reflection. But, as Rod points out, both are
> > > inextricably bound up with the "activity" of using verbal meanings upon
> > > yourself."
> > >
> > > The last sentence,
> > > "both are inextricably bound up with the activity of USING verbal
> meaning
> > > upon yourself."
> > >
> > > seems to be a central point.
> > >
> > >  As I understand Wittgenstein he is making this exact point. Using
> verbal
> > > meanings is "another form" of interaction [distinct from 2nd person
> > > engagements] that also follow specific rules of engagement.  These 3rd
> > > person narrative genres are culturally and historically situated and
> > appeal
> > > to our current notions of "common" sense. The "contents" used to
> compose
> > > these 3rd person narrative accounts that we learn to "tell ourselves"
> use
> > > 2nd person lived experiences as basic phenomena to be explained.
> > > However, we come to confuse the 2nd person and 3rd person forms of life
> > > which may actually evolve within different rules and patterns of
> > > engagement. 2nd person and 3rd person perspectives may share a family
> > > resemblance but not dentity.
> > >
> > > This in no way diminishes 1st person or 3rd person narratives. It is
> > merely
> > > an attempt to also draw attention to the basic ways 2nd person lived
> > > experiences contribute to our compositions of forms of life. [Not unity
> > but
> > > composition which implies aggregates] 1st, 2nd, and 3rd person accounts
> > > may intertwine but not within a systematic pre-determined sequence.
>  Each
> > > type of account may follow its own path of development and whether 1st,
> > > 2nd, or 3rd person perspectives are priviledged and legitimated may be
> > > culturally and historically constituted.
> > >
> > > Very tentative speculations on my part but it does at least introduce
> > some
> > > doubt about 2nd person lived experience as possibly continuing to be a
> > > central form of life throughout the life span.
> > >
> > > Larry
> > >
> > > On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:42 PM, monica.hansen <
> > > monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > >> I like what you write, David, at the end of this post. It is more
> like a
> > >> movie because multiple modes of perception and the experience of
> > >> consciousness of self ARE more like a movie than a book. Images are
> > >> multimodal, not just visual. They are direct links to our feelings and
> > >> emotions. Words are just a subset of possible signs for meaning.
> > >>
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> ]
> > On
> > >> Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > >> Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 3:40 PM
> > >> To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> > >>
> > >> Larry:
> > >>
> > >> Three things I noticed in perusing the article:
> > >>
> > >> a) Like you, I noticed that the "you-me" relationship is "one possible
> > >> perspective" on the development of reflected upon experience.
> > >>
> > >> b) But I also noticed, with faint annoyance, that the author seemed to
> > be
> > >> be claiming universality, despite clear evidence in her own data (e.g.
> > >> "Show mommy the potty, Nanny") that her conclusion might be very child
> > >> specific.
> > >>
> > >> c) I noticed, with some relief, a minimum of 'theory of mind"
> > >> discussion. I guess we are finally getting it through our thick skulls
> > that
> > >> a theory of mind is going to develop as long as the mind that
> > >> contemplates and the mind that is contemplated does so.
> > >>
> > >> Let's assume that Reddy is right, and that the "you-me" interaction is
> > the
> > >> essential source of all joint intersubjectivity in later life. That
> > still
> > >> leaves us an essential problem--and for Brecht, and for Chinese opera,
> > as
> > >> well as for my ruminations on murders witnessed but not experienced,
> it
> > is
> > >> the essential problem--of how we get from empathy to objectivity, from
> > the
> > >> second to the third person.
> > >>
> > >> I think Rod is right. On the one hand, Vygotsky refers to word meaning
> > as
> > >> the microcosm of consciousness in the conclusion to "Thinking and
> > Speech"
> > >> and on the other he clearly lists "perizhvanie" as the unit of child
> > >> consciousness in "The Problem of the Environment" (p. 342 of the
> > Vygotsky
> > >> Reader).
> > >>
> > >> Neither unit is "activity" in the sense used by activity theorists;
> > >> neither has an outcome in production. Neither inheres in a purely
> > "you-me"
> > >> relationship which can be and often is carried out without any use of
> > word
> > >> meaning or any self-reflection. But, as Rod points out, both are
> > >> inextricably bound up with the "activity" of using verbal meanings
> upon
> > >> yourself.
> > >>
> > >> And that, to me, explains why when we observe some horrific incident
> and
> > >> we immediately notice, whether with relief or with guilt, the
> > unmistakeable
> > >> fact of our own non-involvement, we often say "It was just like a
> movie"
> > >> but we never say "It was just like a book".
> > >>
> > >> David Kellogg
> > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> --- On Sun, 3/18/12, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> Date: Sunday, March 18, 2012, 6:23 AM
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Rod, David, Peter
> > >>
> > >> The relationship between perezhivanie and reflecting on  *second hand*
> > >> experience.  How does this relationship manifest?  What  sequences
> >  unfold
> > >> in this process.
> > >> Rod, a year ago you recommended a book by V. Reddy who was exploring
> the
> > >> negotiation of feelings as well as understandings within what is
> > referred
> > >> to as primary intersubjectivity developing within  2nd person
> > communicative
> > >> expressions.
> > >>
> > >> I recently came across this 6 page summary of V. Reddy's *2nd person*
> > >> perspective on lived experience as the basic process from which
> emerges
> > the
> > >> derived 3rd person perspectives which are *borrowing* the processes
> > >> previously lived through within  2nd person engagements.
> > >> The article uses charts which clearly distinguish her perspective from
> > >> more cognitively oriented accounts
> > >>
> > >>> From Reddy's perspective, these borrowed 2nd person processes are
> > >> profoundly transformed within language games [Wittgenstein's term]
> > >> acquired as culturally informed skilled practices expressing the
> giving
> > of
> > >> reasons.  Reddy posits the skill of offering justifications in the 3rd
> > >> person as derived from 2nd person *I-YOU* encounters previously lived
> > >> through. Derived justifications  borrow the content from 2nd person
> > lived
> > >> through experiences and use this derived content within the activity
> of
> > >> giving reasons.
> > >>
> > >> I also noticed she posits two *basic* movements within our emotional
> 2nd
> > >> person engagements: *hiding* & *revealing* our selves. As I understand
> > >> Reddy's position these basic intersubjective orientations continue to
> > play
> > >> out  within more complex cultural-historical  informed engagements.
> > >> Reddy's 2nd person perspective offers one possible approach into the
> > >> relationship between perhezivanie and activity.
> > >>
> > >> Larry
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:45 AM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> > >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> Many thanks for this, David - a really valuable clarification of  the
> > >>> relationship between  perezhivanie and activity. I wonder what you
> > >>> would  have to say about the extent to which your second  type of
> > >>> reflection is
> > >>> actually  a culturally mediated process of mediation. In other words,
> > >>> when we practise the activity of reflecting on a 'second-hand'
> > >>> experience,  in order to colour it with the  'body and vitality' of
> our
> > >>> own spontaneous  concepts, are we 'borrowing' processes which we have
> > >>> picked up, absorbed or  internalised from our  experiences of
> engaging
> > >>> with others (and negotiating  the sharing of feelings as well as
> > >>> understandings)?  When we reflect in  tranquility on observed second
> > >>> hand (second body) experiences do we not  have to draw on
>  internalised
> > >> sociocultural processes to be able to do this?
> > >>>
> > >>> All the best,
> > >>>
> > >>> Rod
> > >>> ________________________________________
> > >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> > >>> Behalf Of David Kellogg [vaughndogblack@yahoo.com]
> > >>> Sent: 18 March 2012 03:33
> > >>> To: xmca
> > >>> Subject: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> > >>>
> > >>> We have been worrying about how to correctly render the word
> > >> "переживаний"
> > >>> in Korean, and above all how to link it to "activity" (because it is
> > >>> clear to me that Vygotsky saw the one as a reflection upon the
> other).
> > >>> At the same time, I have been following the news from Syria, where I
> > >>> witnessed, in the early nineteen eighties, a similar bloody uprising
> > >>> against the current leader's father.
> > >>>
> > >>> It has been estimated that by the time a child is twelve or thirteen
> > >>> years old the child has witnessed, on television, several hundred,
> > >>> possibly many thousands, of simulated murders. We didn't have a
> > >>> television when I was a kid, but when I first witnessed real murders
> > >>> as a twenty-year-old I remember thinking that it was "like a movie".
> > >>>
> > >>> Of course, when you say that, what it means is that you are
> undergoing
> > >>> the visual experience of observing something but that the acutal
> > >>> переживаний, the lived experience or the feeling of what is happening
> > >>> to you, is somehow missing. It means almost the same thing as when
> you
> > >>> say that something is a dream (I still dream a lot about Syria, and
> > >>> sometimes I dream things that are very disturbing, but I know that
> the
> > >>> dreams feel very different from the way the reality felt).
> > >>>
> > >>> Here, it seems to me, we have an almost complete contrast of the two
> > >>> meanings of reflection. For on the one hand, the scene that you see
> > >>> before your eyes is a clear reflection; when you say that you feel
> > >>> like a particularly gruesome or traumatic scene is like a movie or
> > >>> like a dream, you do not in any way have the sense of watching a
> movie
> > >>> or dreaming. What you mean is that you are seeing the sights but not
> > >>> feeling the feelings of what happens to you; you are lacking the
> > >> переживаний.
> > >>>
> > >>> And it seems to me that there are two ways to interpret that lack
> that
> > >>> corresond to the two meanings of the word "reflection". One is to say
> > >>> that you are not feeling and thinking the experience because you are
> > >>> too busy directly experiencing it, reflecting it like a mirror or a
> TV
> > >>> screen or a flickering image on the back of your dreaming eyelids.
> > >>>
> > >>> But the other is that you are not participating in the experience,
> and
> > >>> that your first reaction is that you yourself are neither the
> murderer
> > >>> nor the murdered one. In other words, it is an experience, but it is
> > >>> not an activity. And an experience that is not an activity is not a
> > >>> lived
> > >>> experience: it is like a movie or like a dream.
> > >>>
> > >>> It's that SECOND meaning of reflection, which I am almost sure really
> > >>> is a type of activity, even though it involves no actions and only
> > >>> indirectly involves verbal meanings, that converts an experience
> which
> > >>> is not an activity, into переживаний, or what Wordsworth would call
> > >>> emotion reflected upon in tranquility.
> > >>>
> > >>> David Kellogg
> > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> __________________________________________
> > >>> _____
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> > >>> _____
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> > >>>
> > >>
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