Re: [xmca] (no subject)

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Haydi I couldn't resist adding this quote from Eugene Halton in his article
"Pragmatic E-Pistols" [see Greg's post with the link to the journal] On
page 41 Eugene is writing to William James to "externalize his inner
dialogue.

William, as you said it so well when you said, Our intelligence cannot wall
itself up alive, like a pupa in its chrysalis.  It must at any cost keep on
SPEAKING terms with the universe that ENGENDERED it."  Here, it seems you
are of a piece with Peirce's semiotic realism.  Being on speaking terms
with the engendering universe may very well entail an ENGENDERING
CONSCIOUSNESS ALIVE IN AWARENESS to the moment, creatively ATTUNING to what
you called, as I first heard it from philosopher Bruce Wilshire, the
"much-at-once", rather than HABITUALLY CALCULATING.

Temprality is implicit in the above quotation.

Larry

On Tue, Jan 17, 2012 at 4:26 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Haydi
> I appreciate how you have responded to Mike's question on temporality from
> an activity perspctive.  I want to highlight one section:
>
> This world , while still an objective , material entity , is
> not “the physical world” in the sense which that carries for the science of
> physics, which studies the interactions of things : this is the lived
> world .
> It is the lived world , in fact , which is the SOLE stimulator and source
> of
> CONTENT for the creature living in it . That is our PRIMARY ontological
> picture
> . … we are not yet apeaking of the various forms of IDEATIONAL mediations
> involved in th initiation and regulation of concrete activity on the part
> of an
> actual , concrete person
>
> Do you accept that the word "phenomena" could be exchanged for "content"
> and retain the meaning you are developing in the above paragraph
> on "activity"?
>
> With the change from "content" to "phenomena" I then "read" the above
> paragraph as distinguishing the two alternative "streams" within
> phenomenological theory [the strem which posits "self-conscious" as PRIOR
> [transcendental phenomenology] and "consciousness" as the prior phenomena
> of the lived world [ BETWEENNESS or relational as a phenomenology of
> immanence]] and the world's humanness expressed as self-consciousness]
>
> As I understand the exploration of the tension between these two
> alternative ways of locating phenomena in human TEMPORALITY [our HUMAN
> ontological form of temporality] the dialogue between CHAT and Continental
> philosophy can be engaged.
>
> Thanks, Haydi for deepening this discussion on temporality.
>
> For another post is the question of "character formation" and
> "personality" development within activity conceived as immanence.  The book
> "Bound by Recognition" [thans Greg] and the Kyoto Sschool and Gadamer and
> John Shotter are pointing to a model that is less "techne" and more
> "phronesis" as practical knowledgability or skill leadind to alternative
> "stances" or "dispositions" in how we dwell in the world as auto*bio*graphy.
>
> Larry
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jan 17, 2012 at 3:18 AM, Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>wrote:
>
>> Dear Mike
>>
>> Larry himself
>> (though after having put up some confusion as to the main stream of
>> Vasilyuk's line of discussion to the effect that he magnifies the CLASSICAL
>> at the cost of THE MODERN) came up with his justification concerning the
>> ‘ontogenesis’ of the child
>> learning activity which is not something you’re not familiar with .
>>
>> Now the format
>> does not allow me to act as Larry did . I wonder while you apparently had
>> or
>> have the very book at your disposal , why you didn’t continue from where
>> Larry
>> stopped . The gist of the matter relates to the ‘fisrt thesis’ . On this
>> side ,
>> the living being ; on that side , things in themsleves ; and in between
>> the
>> contentless vacuum . Then it remains for the ‘reflecion’ to step in and
>> push to
>> a start for the future act .
>> The counter
>> argument which is at least partially support for the activity theory ,
>> comes next
>> .
>>
>> [[The cognitive
>> image provides the basis for all CLASSICAL psychology and is the source
>> of its
>> fundamental ontological postulates (“immediacy”, “conformity” , identity
>> of
>> consciousness  and MIND , SELF-IDENTITY
>> of the individual) and of its methodological principles]]
>>
>> [[The way in
>> which activity is understood , within the “isolated individual” ontology
>> , is
>> directly defined by the “postulate of conformity” , according to which any
>> activity of the subject is of an INDIVIDUAL-ADAPTIVE nature . If subject
>> and
>> object (or , strictly speaking,individual and thing) are laid down in the
>> PRIMARY ontological figuration as separate and independent one of another
>> ,
>> then the “conformity” of activity –introduced at the next stage(refuted by
>> Vasilyuk-mine)—can be seen as based on either one of two quite OPPOSITE
>> mechanisms]]
>>
>> He then comes
>> up with his explanation of either case . As for the isolate individual he
>> says
>> :
>>
>> [[… Even the
>> emotion-based variant of this idea (the basis of action is feeling) still
>> retains the main cognitivist thesis : activity is sanctioned by MENTAL
>> REFLECTION (rational or emotioanl)]]
>>
>> [[… The second
>> possibility , characteristic for reflexology and behaviourism , is given
>> its
>> most clear-cut expression in B.F.Skinner’s radical behaviourism . … Here
>> any
>> and every subject is thoght of on the model of an animal , and an animal
>> at a
>> pretty low evolutionary level at that .]]
>>
>>
>> Which of these
>> ontologies , then , is to be counterposed to the “subject-object”
>> EPISTEMOLOGICAL schema found in CLASSICAL psychology ?       <<The
>> ontology of “the lived world”.>>
>>
>> Only within the
>> framework of this ontology can A.N.Leontiev’s idea of motivation ,
>> outlined
>> above , be properly appreciated and given its rightful place within the
>> activity theory of pyschology .
>>
>> [[As activity
>> itself is a unit of life , so its main constituent CAUSE –the object of
>> activity—is a unit of the world . … An object is thus not simply a THING
>> lying OUTSIDE the life-circuit of the SUBJECT , BUT a THING ALREADY
>> ABSORBED
>> INTO THE SUBJECT’S *BEING* , which has become an ESSENTIAL FEATURE of
>> that being , has been SUBJECTIVISED by life process even BEFORE BEFORE any
>> special IDEAL appropriation (COGNITIVE , EXPLORATORY , INFORMATIONAL ,
>> ETC.)
>> takes place . … This world , while still an objective , material entity ,
>> is
>> not “the physical world” in the sense which that carries for the science
>> of
>> physics, which studies the interactions of things : this is the lived
>> world .
>> It is the lived world , in fact , which is the SOLE stimulator and source
>> of
>> CONTENT for the creature living in it . That is our PRIMARY ontological
>> picture
>> . … we are not yet apeaking of the various forms of IDEATIONAL mediations
>> involved in th initiation and regulation of concrete activity on the part
>> of an
>> actual , concrete person – that will all transpire later , that is NOT
>> what we
>> start from but what we will come to , “ascending from the abstract to the
>> concrete .]]
>>
>>
>> Best
>>
>> Haydi
>>
>>
>>
>> ________________________________
>>  From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> Sent: Monday, 16 January 2012, 10:49:43
>> Subject: [xmca] (no subject)
>>
>>
>> Larry. Thanks for your earlier posting selecting from the Vasiliuk text. I
>>
>> know too little about the realm of ideas
>>
>> into which you took this passage to comment. -- But I found the passage
>>
>> very helpful. Here is the passage again.
>>
>>
>> Andy, Thanks for sending out Chapter ll of Vasilyuk's book.
>>
>> On page 87, I appreciated how he articulated the "ontology of the isolated
>>
>> individual." I quote:
>>
>>
>> For the latter [ontology of the isolated individual], the situation taken
>>
>> as primary for subsequent theoretical development is one where you have,
>> on
>>
>> the one hand, a separate being isolated from the world, and, on the other
>>
>> hand, objects, or more precisely things, existing "in themselves".  The
>>
>> SPACE BETWEEN, empty and contentless, only keeps them APART from one
>>
>> another. Subject and object are both thought of as existing from the
>>
>> BEGINNING and as INTRINSICALLY definite, PRIOR TO and independently of any
>>
>> practical connection between them; they are independent natural ENTITIES.
>>
>> Activity, which brings about a practical connection between subject and
>>
>> object is STILL IN THE FUTURE; in order [for activity] to commence, it
>> must
>>
>> be sanctioned while the PRIMARY situation OF SEPARATION between subject
>> and
>>
>> object still prevails."
>>
>>
>> This is the classical psychological understanding of the source of
>> activity
>>
>> as DERIVED and IN THE FUTURE. In the ontolology of the isolated
>>
>> individual's  most highly rationalized FORM can be REDUCED to a view that
>>
>> activity is BASED on a cognitive calculation thesis.  Reflection PRECEDES
>>
>> the activity within the subject's mind and only after does the activity
>>
>> take place.
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------
>>
>> Larry suggest this passage as a jumping off point into a discussion of
>>
>> terms such as "personality" and
>>
>> "character" . I hope to keep learning from that discussion, but meantime,
>> I
>>
>> would like some advice on
>>
>> the productivity of thinking about alternative formulations in terms of
>> the
>>
>> way they deal with temporality.
>>
>>
>> We see very clearly in this passage a characterization of what Goethe
>>
>> attributes to those scientists who
>>
>> first declare a "first" from which seconds and thirds can be deduced. He
>>
>> uses the weaving metaphor
>>
>> to capture the properties of the life process which have been exterminated
>>
>> as the scientist murders while
>>
>> dissecting. So far as I can tell, the weaving metaphor is a lot more
>> useful
>>
>> to thinking about life processes, so long as
>>
>> we think of weaving as the constant creation of a variety of strands.
>>
>>
>> There is an argument about the ontology of the individual that focuses on
>>
>> the issue of being able to reflect upon
>>
>> the world BEFORE acting on it; reflection before action. If I understand
>>
>> correctly the views of people such as Vladimir Zinchenko, a student of
>>
>> Leontiev's, based upon a variety of evidence from his research on
>>
>> stabilized images on the retina and the microgenesis of action, both point
>>
>> toward a kind of "simulation" theory of mind, one which can operate far
>>
>> more rapidly than the events they are a part of and constituting. It is
>>
>> implied by the very folk cultural notion that
>>
>> we all should remember to "stop and think" when things are not flowing
>>
>> smoothly our way.
>>
>>
>> It seems to me that it is premature to turn away from kind of claim. It
>>
>> goes well beyond any narrow discussion
>>
>> of obscure Russians doing obscure stuff. Its sits right in the middle of
>>
>> some influential contemporary developmental theories concerning "theory of
>>
>> mind" that are the foundation of forms of education and therapy ubiquitous
>>
>> in society.
>>
>>
>> There are probably some issues of morality of concern at this level, as
>>
>> well.
>>
>>
>> mike
>>
>>
>> To begin with
>>
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