Andy, I'm showing my biases here but I think that the linguistic relativity arguments (esp. Sapir and Whorf) are some of the best for showing mediation. The problem is that doing it right requires some sophistication in another language that is considerably different from one's own language. You can make interesting arguments when you only consider words to word translations but the problem with this is that there are many ways of indicating concepts by other means, particularly pragmatic or grammatical. Whorf's best work makes the relativity argument through an analysis of grammatical categories. Unfortunately, these are much tougher to describe to people without some language training (and I think that David Ke has, through the years, given excellent examples of deep structural differences between, for example, Korean and English). Then the question is how do you establish that this difference in language makes a difference in thought a) without begging the question by presupposing a universal categorical distinction to begin with (e.g., using Munsell color chips to force speakers to create color groupings even if the color terms in their language include other features that are not present in the flat/textureless color chips) or b) presupposing the lack of a universal categorical distinction (e.g., arguing that the languages are incommensurate to begin with and thus no meaningful comparisons can reasonably be made)? Both positions need to be avoided but this is extremely difficult to do in practice. Benjamin Whorf has some easier pieces that do a pretty good job of making the relativity argument using data that are fairly accessible. I've attached one of Whorf's easier essays, Languages and Logic, but be sure to take the examples slowly - it is easy to miss the nuance of language differences. It is a response to logical positivism but also has a healthy argument regarding the relationship of language and thought (and note on p. 239 where he says that there is something like "mind" prior to language - to the point of calling language a "superficial embroidery" on the mind; but also pay close attention to his qualification of "superficial" that follows!). (and for those familiar with Kant, I think you'll see that there is good reason to think of Whorf as neo-Kantian). Anyway, this is one of my favorite pieces and it has all the bits of the argument but without asking too much linguistic sophistication of a monoglot reader (like myself!). Maybe it will provide some ideas of how to argue for the primacy of language (even if it is a "superficial" primacy!). Happy to chat more or address this reading or offer up more Whorf if there is an appetite. But best to digest slowly and in small pieces. -greg On Wed, Oct 19, 2011 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: > Vygotsky says, Eric, that a concept becomes more and more independent of > its name as it develops. So if a concept never figures in the language at > all, then it is safe to say that the concept does not exist for them. But as > Aristotle said: "There is no need of justice between friends," and the same > goes for family, and perhaps among the Hmong. > > Everything that Vygotsky says about concepts has to be taken as about "the > process of development of concepts." So for Vygotsky, *there are not two > types of concept*! "Scientific" and "spontaneous" are just two ideal types > of development process, but the outcome is the same when fully developed. > > And BTW, a word is both an action (subjective and objective) and an > artefact. Speech is the action of uttering of words. \ > > Andy > > ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote: > >> Ah yes Andy: >> >> We get back to that question always on the back burner: what is a concept >> in relation to mediation and activity? >> >> It is interesting to not that the Hmong language has no word for >> 'justice'. Without the word is the concept present? >> >> eric >> >> >> >> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> >> To: Arturo Escandon <arturo.escandon@gmail.com> >> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >> Date: 10/19/2011 08:42 AM >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Cultural memory >> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> >> >> >> >> Thanks Arturo. >> I think this thread has established that all kinds of artefacts >> (including the land, and the voice) play a role in maintaining >> normativity but no clear case can be made that voice alone is >> insufficient. The only way that the centrality of mediation can be >> established is by the results produced by analysis of artefact-mediated >> actions, as against the approaches which regard words and things as >> incidental to "intersubjective" communication. >> >> The difficulty arose in the course of giving an account of concepts. >> Account of concepts (a variety of normativity) given by >> intersubjectivists is easily geared to childhood, a domain of activity >> which is entirely within the scope of interpersonal interactions using >> voice, gesture and body. >> >> Mmmm >> Andy >> >> Arturo Escandon wrote: >> > Hi there. >> > >> > I believe Polynesians qualify up to a certain point. Look at the links >> > between people form Tahiti, Rapa Nui and Aotearoa in terms of >> > normative before they were alphabetised by Western colonizers. >> > >> > The problem of course is that most ancient cultures had very similar >> > normatives (as J. Frazer explores in The Golden Bough), at least in >> > terms of normative for king succession, mixing roles of king and >> > priest, gender roles and taboos, and so forth. The question would be >> > to focus on a particular area of normative where you could find >> > radical differences. Yet, succession normative is always accompanied >> > by what Bourdieu called the 'august apparel', e.g. the scepter, the >> > crown, feathers, bodily paint, even the use of animal skins, etc. >> > Taboos are linked to contaminating magic (mediated by artefacts, human >> > tissue, hair, etc.). So I do not see how can someone get rid of >> > cultural tools other than speech in the analysis of normative. >> > >> > Best >> > >> > Arturo >> > >> > >> > >> > On 15 October 2011 08:54, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: >> > >> I need some help. I am having a discussion with a supporter of >> Robert >> >> Brandom, who was at ISCAR, but is not an Activity Theorist. on the >> question >> >> of cultural memory. >> >> >> >> One of my criticisms of Robert Brandom is that he does not theorise any >> >> place for mediation in his theory of normativity. He supposes that >> norms are >> >> transmitted and maintained down the generations by word of mouth (taken >> to >> >> be an unmediated expression of subjectivity), and artefacts (whether >> texts, >> >> tools, buildings, clothes, money) play no essential role in this. >> >> >> >> I disagree but I cannot persuade my protagonist. >> >> >> >> I challenged him to tell me of a (nonlierate) indigenous people who >> managed >> >> to maintain their customs even after being removed from their land. My >> >> protagonist responded by suggesting the Hebrews, but of course the >> Hebrews >> >> had the Old Testament. Recently on xmca we had the same point come up >> and >> >> baseball culture was suggested, and I responded that I didn't think >> >> baseball-speak could be maintained without baseball bats, balls, >> pitches, >> >> stadiums, radios, uniforms and other artefacts used in the game. >> >> >> >> Am I wrong? Can anyone point to a custom maintained over generations >> without >> >> the use of arefacts (including land and texts as well as tools, but >> allowing >> >> the spoken word)? >> >> >> >> Andy >> >> -- >> >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> >> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1> >> >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/* >> *> >> >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>< >> http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857> >> > >> >> >> >> >> ______________________________**____________ >> >> _____ >> >> xmca mailing list >> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> -- >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1> >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/**> >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>< >> http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857> >> > >> >> >> ______________________________**____________ >> _____ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >> >> > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1> > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857> > > ______________________________**____________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Sanford I. Berman Post-Doctoral Scholar Department of Communication University of California, San Diego
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