[xmca] The semiotic hierarchy: Does consciousness emerge from meaning?

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

HI Mike,

I have been reflecting on your comments on the instrumental/semiotic
distinction in ways of interpreting Vygotsky.  Tony pointed out the
distinction between techne and the practical.
I asked a question if there are different "forms" of consciousness and if
Shotter's exploring "con-scientia" [with knowing or knowing with others is a
particular form of consciousness?

These lines of inquiry circle around our notions of "meaning" "sense" and
"consciousness".

I was wondering how others respond to the particular way Jordan Zlatev is
making the distinction between "meaning" and "consciousness" within a
semiotic hierarchy which has emerged in evolutionary  development.  My
purpose in asking this question is in trying to understand the relational
intertwinings between different forms of consciousness [and consciousness of
being conscious]

I will try to DESCRIBE how Zlatev makes the distinction between meaning and
consciousness. [without discussing transitions or emergence   of
consciousness from meaning which Zlatev attempts to explain in his
article] Zlatev's project is to intertwine phenomenological and
representational lines of thought.

Zlatev defines "meaning" as the relationship between a living form
[organism] and its environment determined by "value".  All living forms
express value that can be either innate or learned. Only living systems have
the properties of self-organization, and an INTRINSIC value system.  Meaning
is seen to be co-extensional with life.  However the organism/subject [at
this level of hierarchy] is NOT YET an EXPERIENCING subject.  Zlatev gives
as an example von Uexkull's description of a tick's relation to the "smell"
of the animal which "directs" the ticks behaviour.  Zlatev states, the
smell "is INTRINSICALLY meaningful for the tick, but this is not a suffcient
reason to grant the tick subject ive EXPERIENCE. This account assumes a
BASIC PRE-conscious biological level of meaning that expresses a biological
VALUE. that explains why an "umwelt" is INTRINSICALLY meaningful for a
subject/organism.  For Zlatev this meaningful biological directedness is
PROTO-INTENTIONAL due to its intrinsic value system  Zlatev proposes this
meaningful system of organism/umwelt may be a plausible ground for the
emergence of "consciousness" [as primitive sentience] Zlatev labels this
level of
proto-consciousness "level 1".

Level 2 sees the emergence of affective and perceptual consciousness which
IS INTENTIONAL [directed toward] what is perceived. Thus, the biological
level and meaningful values] is extended to what Zlatev calls "phenomenal
value". This perceptual phenomenal value has GESTALT structure with a figure
[theme], ground [against which the figure is profiled], and MARGINS.  The
margins are not related to what is being focused on [but to which
consciousness can refocus.] while attention is focused elsewhere. For Zlatev
"higher animals" [mammals and birds] have some form of phenomenal
CONSCIOUSNESS and level 2 meaning. At this level 2 level of emerging
consciousness [as distinct but not separate from biolological value]
spontaneous DIRECTLY perceived "co-feeling" develops.   Importantly. in
Zlatev's model cultue [in the anthropological sense] is not yet involved
since level 2 does not involve a sign function.

I will end at this description of 2 levels of meaning [1st
level proto-consciousnes]   Zlatev goes on to describe level 3 [signs] and
level 4 [language] but for now I'm wondering what others think of Zlatev's
notion of a developmental hierarchy where biological meaning values precede
experiential phenomenological consciousness as another FORM of meaning that
becomes conscious.  This level humans share with higher animals.

Back to Shotter's notion of" con-scientia" or consciousness with others [as
an intersubjective WAY of knowing]  From Merleau-Ponty's perspective this
PARTICULAR way of knoing is INTRINSICALLY known with-IN the relational form
of consciousness and is intertwined with signs and language.  Once
phenomenological consciousness emerges into sign consciousness [level 3 in
Zlatev's  hierarchy] and then language develops [level 4] there is an
intertwining between all 4 distinct but not separate forms of expression.
However, with John Shotter, I intuitively think/feel level 2 consciousness
is central to understanding human gestalten [as Andy's exploration of
Goethe's living forms]

Back to Fernando Rey's article.  Vygotsky has explicitly described level 3
and level 4 and the intertwining between thought/language [sedimented] and
thinking/speech [generative, anticipatory, calling and response] and also
implicitly pointed to level 2.  However, in the West, level 2 has been lost
from viiew and Fernando Rey is attempting to re-direct our attention  back
to the intertwining between sense and meaning.

I am not saying that Zlatev's notion of meaning and Vygotsky's notion of
meaning hold any similarities or overlap.  Meaning is such an elusive
concept.  What I am attempting to show is that John Shotter's approach to
where he is directing our attention [con-scientia] does have merit for
exploring Fernando's question of the intertwining of sense
[affective-volitional tendencies]  and meaning.

Larry
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