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Re: [xmca] Word Meaning and Concept



On 14 June 2011 18:23, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:

> Huw & Andy:
>
> How different are your interpretations?
> Andy  points out that "Vygotsky says in several places that the word is the
> sign for or carrier of the concept" and goes on to say that meaning is
> action.
>

I'd say that meaning may be derived from the interpretation of action (or
some other readable phenomena).

>
> Is this what you are saying, Huw, or that meanings are instruments of
> action?
>

We can intend a meaning and attempt to embody it in some action or
expression.  Likewise a meaning, or understanding, can guide our action.

I think these answers are consistent with the notion of meaning as a
mentally held representation that has some implication (such as a
proposition).

Huw


> mike
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 13, 2011 at 8:21 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 13 June 2011 04:42, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> That is to compacted and complicated for me to be able to gloss to
>>> myself,
>>> David.
>>> I am struggling with the polysemy of both "meaning" and "concept" in this
>>> discussion to make sense of their relationship very well. Ditto sign and
>>> symbol, although Huw's
>>> note about signs and shadows nudged me along. I noted that Anton referred
>>> in
>>> a recent note to "tool and sign/symbol" and wondered what he meant, but
>>> was
>>> too preoccupied to ruminate.
>>>
>>> Here is a thought I had while ruminating. Might it be appropriate to say
>>> that meaning is a tool of human processes of concept formation ?
>>>
>>>
>> Yes, I think so.
>>
>> Re nudges, you might like to consider that analog phenomena occurs in
>> parallel (all at once), whilst the non-analogical aspects of speech and text
>> are sequential.  In other words, speech is a serialized description of a
>> plan.
>>
>> Words, word meanings, predicates and propositions serve the function of
>> (sequential, serialized) description.  Describing is a particular kind of
>> action, or activity.  Concepts are used to regulate (coordinate) action.
>>
>> In this context, I think it would be useful to distinguish word meanings
>> from sentence meanings, such as the child's utterance of "Dog!", i.e.
>> "There's a dog!"
>>
>> Huw
>>
>>
>>> mike
>>>
>>> PS- There was a fascinating segment on the American Evening TV Program,
>>> 60
>>> minutes, this evening.. A controversy about "The N word" , the banning of
>>> Huck Finn, and the success of a book which substitutes the word "slave"
>>> for
>>> the word "nigger." One proponent of the argument for using slave was
>>> teacher
>>> who is shown in class discussing "the n word", asking her class, "why do
>>> we
>>> say the N word instead of 'n-i-g-g-e-r' spelling it out?"
>>>
>>> Now THERE is an example of the power of the book!! At least I am not
>>> alone
>>> in my
>>> confusions about such matters.  :-))
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jun 11, 2011 at 8:17 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
>>> >wrote:
>>>
>>> >  This is Evald Ilyenkov, "The Concept of the Ideal', in "The Ideal in
>>> Human
>>> > Activity", Pacifica, CA: MIA, p. 268:
>>> >
>>> > "The meaning of the term 'ideal' in Marx and Hegel is the same, but the
>>> > concepts, i.e. the ways of understanding the 'same' meaning are
>>> profoundly
>>> > different. After all the word 'concept' in dialectically interpreted
>>> logic
>>> > is a synonym for understanding the essence of the' matter, the essence
>>> of
>>> > phenomena which are only outlined by a given term; it is by no means a
>>> > synonym for 'the meaning of the term' which may be formally interpreted
>>> as
>>> > the sum total of 'attributes' of the phenomena to which the term is
>>> > applied."
>>> >
>>> > Ilyenkov then goes on to discuss Marx's cuckoo-like propensity "not to
>>> > change the historically formed 'meanings of terms'" but to propose very
>>> > different understandings thereof, and thus to change the very concept.
>>> >
>>> > Three questions:
>>> >
>>> > a)  In addition to the ONTOGENETIC argument against the equation of
>>> meaning
>>> > and concept (viz. that if meaning were already equivalent to concept
>>> then
>>> > meaning could not develop into a concept), can't we make a SOCIOGENETIC
>>> one?
>>> > Doesn’t this sociogenetic argument explain both the cultural adaptation
>>> of
>>> > concepts over time (e.g. “quantity” into “operator” in math, “grammar”
>>> into
>>> > “discourse” in linguistics) and the cuckoo like exaptation of other
>>> people’s
>>> > terms to express quite different concepts by Marx and by Vygotsky (e.g.
>>> > "egocentric", "pseudoconcept", etc.)?
>>> >
>>> > b) Viewed sociogenetically, isn't this distinction between conceptual
>>> > essence and word meaning the same as the distinction between
>>> signification
>>> > value and sense value? That is, from the point of view of Johnson's
>>> > dictionary (or the Kangxi dictionary, or the Port Royal grammar, or any
>>> > other state codification of meaning) the state-ratified meaning of
>>> words is
>>> > their essence and the other, vernacular uses are simply senses, folk
>>> values,
>>> > the range of phenomena to which hoi polloi apply the words?
>>> >
>>> > b) Isn't the OPPOSITE true when we look at the matter microgenetically?
>>> > That is, from the point of view of interpersonal meaning making, the
>>> essence
>>> > of the phenomenon to which I apply the term in the given instance is
>>> the
>>> > self-legitimated, auto-ratified, individually-approved sense value and
>>> the
>>> > signification value is simply the range of conventional meanings, the
>>> range
>>> > of conventional phenomena to which the word is applied and misapplied
>>> by
>>> > others?
>>> >
>>> > David Kellogg
>>> > Seoul National University of Education
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > __________________________________________
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>>
>>
>
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