Re: [xmca] inner speech model

[Nancy Mack <nancy.mack@wright.edu>]

Per requests here is a link for the inner speech model as a pdf.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/55053687/Inner-Speech-Model-Nancy-Mack#

Nancy 





----- Original Message -----
From: David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>
Date: Monday, May 9, 2011 5:32 pm
Subject: Re: [xmca] last on concepts
To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

> Martin:
>  
> At first my heart sank a little when I saw your quick reply last 
> night; I was afraid that this was going to turn into one of 
> those interminable dog-chasing-tail eddies that sometimes turns 
> up in a very twisted thread, you know, where I say that the 
> social and the psychological are both distinct and linked, and 
> you say, aha, but you know they are linked as well as being 
> distinct, and I reply but no, they are distinct as well as 
> linked. And so on.
>  
> Not so. The case I wanted to make was that Vygotsky considers 
> the social and the psychological to be linked, to be essentially 
> two distinct forms of the same historico-cultural substance, 
> related as are history and culture, body and mind. 
>  
> As you say, the proof is right there in Chapter Two:
>  
> Попытаемся теперь в кратких словах описать этот путь развития на 
> интересующем нас отрезке. Схематически рассуждая можно сказать, 
> что наша гипотеза обязывает нас представить весь ход развития в 
> следующем виде. Первоначальной функцией речи является функция 
> сообщения, социальной связи, воздействия на окружающих как со 
> стороны взрослых, так и со стороны ребенка. Таким образом, 
> первоначальная речь ребенка чисто социальная; социализированной 
> ее было бы назвать неправильно, поскольку с этим словом 
> связывается представление о
>  чем-то изначально несоциальном и становящемся таковым лишь 
> в процессе своего изменения и развития. 
>  
> (Let us attempt now to briefly describe the course of 
> development over the interval which interests us (that is, the 
> internalization of self-directed speechDK). Speaking 
> schematically, we may say that our hypothesis requires us to 
> present the overall motion of development in the following 
> manner (that is, in the opposite manner from Piaget, who really 
> does portray the overall motion of development as from the 
> psychological to the sociologicalDK). The function of 
> communication and social connection is the initial function of 
> speech, and for the adult on the one hand and the child on the 
> other this means action on the people in one’s environs (i.e. it 
> is at first sociological pure and simpleDK). Thus the initial 
> speech of the child is purely social; to call it socialized 
> would be to name it incorrectly, since this term is connected 
> with the idea that something is originally not social, becoming 
> such only in the process of its change and
>  development. (i.e. the child’s speech is social from the 
> outset and the psychological is really, functionally and only 
> then structurally, a subset of this social stuff--DK)” 
>  
> And of course nowhere do we see this so beautifully (if 
> schematically) expressed as in the general genetic law, which 
> uses “intermental” and “intramental” to show how there are only 
> two modifications of the same substance (to use Spinoza’s 
> terminology). 
>  
> Sakagawa and Moro argued that Spinoza’s rejection of separate 
> mental faculties for pleasure and for moral right, his larger 
> philosophical monism, and his “anthropological” concern for a 
> political rather than a religious ethics are, taken together, 
> the real, historical, and traceable origins of the general 
> genetic law. 
>  
> I think that Vygotsky owes three other debts to Spinoza’s Ethics 
> which are worth mentioning. The first is that will is 
> essentially intellect; it is the voluntary transformation, the 
> volitional selection, and free, active mastery of behavior. The 
> second is that will cannot act directly upon behavior but must 
> be mediated through the hierarchization of emotions; a child can 
> no more direct his own behavior than a shadow can carry a stone. 
> The third is that the only way to overcome a negative tendency 
> in one’s behavior is with the free, voluntary use of a higher, 
> stronger, positive one. 
>  
> In the guise of “catharsis”, this idea becomes the very 
> centerpiece of Vygotsky’s early work on esthetics as well as 
> Vygotsky’s ethics. Catharisis is the moment when two tendencies 
> with a common genetic root and a same psychological substance 
> (e.g. Hamlet kills the king and Hamlet does not kill the king) 
> at least converge, and this merger is, of course, enabled by 
> their common root.   
>  
> There’s a marvelous example of catharsis in John Adams’ crazy 
> opera about Nixon’s trip to Peking. The Nixons are watching the 
> ballet “The Red Detachment of Women”. The heroine Chinghua, 
> brutally beaten, runs away from the family to which she is 
> indentured and is discovered by red guerillas, who sing:
>  
> Flesh rebels
> The body pulls
> Those inflamed souls 
> That mark its trials
> Into the war! War! War! War!
>  
> Arm this soldier! 
> Rise up in arms!
> Arm this soldier!
> Rise up in arms! Arms! Arms! Arms!
>  
> This reiteration of word meanings that are simultaneously 
> physical and mental, and both psychological and social 
> (“inflamed souls”, “war”, “arms”), is stood on its head in the 
> plot. The Nixons are watching a ballet, but Pat Nixon confuses 
> it with a real war, and she takes to the stage, followed by 
> Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, who apparently shoots two of the actors 
> (maybe including Henry Kissinger, who is playing the villain). 
> So this particular chorus, in addition to being beautifully 
> sung, captures both the dualistic confusion of the body-mind 
> problem, as well as its connection to the social-psychological 
> problem and its monistic, yea, Spinozistic resolution. 
>  
> (It also references a very funny joke about Stanislavsky and 
> Brecht which Chinese opera singers sometimes tell. But that is 
> the stuff of another catharsis, or at least another cup of coffee.)
>  
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
> 
> --- On Mon, 5/9/11, Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> From: Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] last on concepts
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Monday, May 9, 2011, 2:15 PM
> 
> 
> Yes, Nancy, thanks for this.  I have also had similar thoughts 
> to  
> Colin's.
> 
> - Steve
> 
> 
> 
> On May 8, 2011, at 1:11 PM, C Barker wrote:
> 
> > Dear Nancy,
> >
> > I rather like your diagram.
> >
> > One thing that strikes me is that the top and the bottom 
> planes are  
> > where the thinking/ speaking person connects with their 
> social  
> > relations: most of our significant motives derive from our 
> social  
> > relations, and external speech is addressed (mostly) to others....
> >
> > Colin Barker
> >
> > ________________________________
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-
> bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] on  
> > behalf of Nancy Mack [nancy.mack@wright.edu]
> > Sent: 08 May 2011 19:27
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] last on concepts
> >
> > Hi,
> > I am not sure if this will come through.
> > I have attached my diagram of Vygotsky's planes of inner speech.
> > I imagine thoughts moving around like a pinball machine.
> >
> > Nancy
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
> > Date: Saturday, May 7, 2011 12:09 am
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] last on concepts
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >
> >> Martin, David,
> >>
> >> My computer is in the shop for repairs - a bottle of water got
> >> away from me - so I have not been able to participate or keep up
> >> with this discussion, which has an interesting center 
> question -
> >> how did Vygotsky explain the relationship between word meaning,
> >> concept, and generalization?
> >>
> >> Martin lists the five planes Vygotsky uses to describe the
> >> complex transformations from word to thought (or thought to
> >> word).  In Ch 7 sections 7.2 thorugh 7.5 (end) he analyzes the
> >> five planes in the order from exterior toward the interior - (1)
> >> the plane of the external aspects of speech, (2) the semantic
> >> plane, (3) the plane of inner speech, (4) the plane of thought
> >> itself, and (5) the plane of motivation.
> >>
> >> Vygotsky used a memorable metaphor at the end of Ch 7, which
> >> fits into some of the points both Martin and David make -
> >> Vygotsky likened thoughts (the fourth plane) to a cloud which
> >> showers words, and motivation (the fifth plane) to the wind that
> >> sets the cloud in motion.
> >>
> >> A question I've been pondering is: which of these five planes
> >> correspond to the notions 'word meanings', 'concepts', and
> >> 'generalizations'?  Martin brings this very question up.
> >>
> >> It seems reasonable to eliminate the first and last planes as
> >> candidates for "planes" within that which the three notions
> >> represent exist.
> >>
> >> Vygotsky makes it very clear that the first plane, the external
> >> aspects of words, (such as sounds), are quite different from
> >> word meanings.  Likewise, he differentiates the "first" plane
> >> from all the "inner" planes of thinking and speech.  He explains
> >> that the semantic plane is the first of the inner planes (making
> >> it the second plane overall, going from out to in).
> >>
> >> And it also seems reasonable to eliminate the last or fifth
> >> plane, motivation.  Vygotsky saw motivation as affect and
> >> volition, and other processes that set the cloud of words into
> >> motion.
> >>
> >> It does not appear that Vygotsky viewed word meaning, concept or
> >> the generalization as existing on the first or fifth "planes."
> >> Do others also see it this way?
> >>
> >> This leaves us the second, third and fourth planes (the semantic
> >> plane, inner speech, thoughts themselves) to sort out how
> >> Vygotsky conceived them in relationship to the three terms we've
> >> been pondering - word meanings, concepts and generalizations.
> >>
> >> One possibility is that Vygotsky saw these three terms as not
> >> corresponding to the same planes.  For example, perhaps his use
> >> of the term 'word meanings' corresponded to processes that occur
> >> in all three of these planes, but used the terms concepts and
> >> generalizations to refer to only one or two of the planes.  If
> >> this is so, we need to find places where he says something like
> >> this.  This would be a strong argument in favor of
> >> differentiating 'word meaning' from 'concept' and 'generalization'.
> >>
> >> Another possibility is that Vygotsky believed that all three
> >> terms relate to processes found in all three planes, but do so
> >> in qualitatively different ways.  If that is the case, we need
> >> to find places where Vygotsky explains how concepts,
> >> generalizations and word meanings refer to **different aspects**
> >> of what he called the (2) semantic plane, (3) inner speech, and
> >> (4) thoughts themselves.  This would provide an interesting
> >> argument for differentiating the 'concept' from 'word meaning'.
> >>
> >> Still another possibility is that Vygotsky saw the relationships
> >> between the planes and the processes these terms refer to
> >> differently depending on the **direction** of the movement
> >> between thought and word - from out to in (understanding) or
> >> from in to out (speaking).  Again, evidence would need to be
> >> found to support this.  If it is indeed found that it was
> >> Vygotsky's intention, for example, to think of the concept,
> >> generalization and word meaning as "synonymous" going from
> >> thought to word, but **not** synonymous when going from word to
> >> thought ... that would be an interesting twist, wouldn't it?
> >>
> >> There are undoubtedly other possible combinations.  I'll mention
> >> one more - the most obvious, because Vygotsky explicitly says
> >> this - that he saw the three terms as referring to essentially
> >> the same process, going both directions, and therefore saw these
> >> terms, insofar as they are referring to processes taking place
> >> in "inner" planes (as psychological processes related to verbal
> >> thinking), as "synonymous."  There is pretty solid evidence for
> >> this interpretation, but that does not mean we should not
> >> carefully consider other possibilities, such as the above or 
> others.>>
> >> ********
> >>
> >> I think Martin's point about word meanings are progressively
> >> "replaced" by sense needs to be closely examined.  Vygotsky
> >> explains that sense is a particular form of word meaning.  It is
> >> not the opposite of word meaning, it is not a process that
> >> replaces word-meaning altogether.  It is an extremely important
> >> aspect of meaning.  And he does emphasize that sense becomes
> >> more predominant over external, social meanings as we go further
> >> inside
> >> But do we want to say that sense entirely **replaces** social
> >> meaning in plane 3, inner speech, or thought, plane 4?
> >>
> >> Also, the idea that word-meanings altogether completely
> >> disappear at the level of thought is not one I have so far seen
> >> Vygotsky suggesting.  Please point me to what I am missing.  He
> >> uses the example of observing a boy on a street  His point is to
> >> compare how different his observation is within the third plane
> >> (inner speech, with details) from the thought plane, which took
> >> in the scene as a whole.  But is Vygotsky actually saying that
> >> word meaning - and therefore verbal thinking - disappears
> >> entirely in the fourth plane, the plane of thought, (or did not
> >> yet appear in any way), that words are now altogether not at all
> >> involved in the process of thinking?
> >>
> >> Sorry if this message is rambling - I've run out of time on this
> >> store computer - no time to edit ... LOL
> >>
> >> - Steve
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Martin,
> >>
> >> On May 06, 2011, at 04:54 PM, David Kellogg
> >> <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> Vygotsky uses the word "moment" a lot, even when he is talking
> >> about space or logic. For example, he says that there are three
> >> "moments" in a particular data set in Tool and Sign, even though
> >> they clearly overlap.
> >>
> >> Vygotsky also uses "stage" and "step" a lot, even when he is
> >> talking about temporally overlapping processes. For example, he
> >> differentiates the association, the collection, the chain, the
> >> diffuse complex, and the pseudoconcept as stages of a particular
> >> step, even though in many of his examples (e.g. his gloss of
> >> Idelberger and the first words of Charles Darwin's grandson)
> >> they are superimposed.
> >>
> >> In Chapter Seven, Vygotsky uses the rather obvious remark that
> >> an expression like "the victor at Jena" means the same person as
> >> "the vanquished of Waterloo" to point out that object reference
> >> and meaning do not coincide. But what he means is exactly what
> >> Halliday and Jay Lemke mean: they are in fact simultaneously.
> >> But they are logically separate.
> >>
> >> Now, how does all this work out in PRACTICE? Of course, you are
> >> right. It all takes time in the real world. I think that's why
> >> Vygotsky is always distinguishing between the phasal aspects of
> >> language (in which he includes lexicogrammar and even object
> >> reference) and the semantic aspects (which are hierarchical and
> >> choice driven rather than linear and time driven)
> >>
> >> David Kellogg
> >> Seoul National University of Education
> >> --- On Fri, 5/6/11, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] last on concepts
> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> Date: Friday, May 6, 2011, 4:24 PM
> >>
> >>
> >> That's an interesting proposal, David. How do you deal, though,
> >> with the way LSV writes of "the complex flow from the first,
> >> vaguest moment of the origins of a thought until its final
> >> completion in a verbal formulation" (#27), and the "motion from
> >> thought to word and vice versa, from the word to the thought.
> >> This relation is represented in light of psychological analysis
> >> as a developing process, which traverses a number of phases and
> >> stages"; "This flow of thought is accomplished as internal
> >> motion through a whole series of planes, the passage from
> >> thoughts in words to words in thought" (#29)?
> >>
> >> This sounds to me like passage in time. When he insists that to
> >> put a thought into words is to transform it, reorganize it, and
> >> embody it - "In transforming itself into language, the thought
> >> is reorganized and modified; the idea is not expressed, but
> >> finalized in the word" (#32) - this sounds to me not merely a
> >> logical realization, but a temporal process - a "motion from
> >> thought to speech" (#41).
> >>
> >> Indeed, he emphasizes that speech itself necessarily unfolds in
> >> time because thought has to mark the words of an utterance with
> >> emphasis in order to make them comprehensible: " it is obvious
> >> that the speech utterance cannot immediately emerge in its
> >> entirety" (#45); "Thought impresses logical stress down on the
> >> words of the phrase, marking in this way the psychological
> >> predicate, without which any phrase becomes incomprehensible.
> >> Speaking requires a passage from the internal plane to the
> >> external, while understanding assumes reverse motion, from the
> >> external plane of speech to the internal" (#52).
> >>
> >> Whereas a Chomskian grammar has all the words of an utterance
> >> prepared simultaneously, and the fact that they are emitted in
> >> sequence is merely an artifact of performance (if we had screens
> >> instead of mouths one could imagine the whole grammatical
> >> structure being displayed at once), in LSV's account of the
> >> microgenesis of speaking from thinking the words need to unfold
> >> in time in order that pacing and emphasis can distinguish what
> >> he calls the "psychological structure" of the sentence from its
> >> "grammatical structure" (#35).
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >> On May 6, 2011, at 3:17 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
> >>
> >>> I think that the "five planes" are not modular in the Fodor
> >> sense. I think they represent non-reducible options rather than
> >> discrete moments of time or planes in space.
> >>>
> >>> When Halliday talks about the "stratification" of gesture into
> >> language proper, he speaks of three planes: soundings (roughly,
> >> phonology), wordings (roughly, lexicogrammar), and meanings
> >> (pragmatics, semantics, thinking).
> >>>
> >>> I have some problems with collapsing semantics and pragmatics
> >> like this. But I have no problem with Halliday's basic argument,
> >> which is that the relationship between sounding, wording, and
> >> meaning is not causality: it's REDUNDANCY.
> >>>
> >>> It's not the case that a sound 'causes" a word or that a word
> >> 'causes" a meaning. Instead, the relationship of a sound and a
> >> word is REALIZED in meaning; it REDOUNDS in an ideal form we
> >> call meaning.
> >>>
> >>> Jay Lemke points out that there is no one to one
> >> correspondence between any two planes, because if there was the
> >> existence of that separate plane would be entirely unnecessary.
> >> That means that a sounding does not correspond to a particular
> >> wording which in turn corresponds to a specific meaning.
> >>>
> >>> What happens instead is that a sounding realizes a particular
> >> correspondance of wording and meaning. Or, if you like, a
> >> correspondence of sounding and wording realizes a particular 
> meaning.>>>
> >>> I think that's why Vygotsky emphasizes, not the kind of "time"
> >> or "space" dimension we would normally associate with his use of
> >> planes, but instead that, for instance, a particular motive does
> >> NOT correspond to a specific thought, but can be differently
> >> realized in different thoughts, a particular thought does NOT
> >> correspond to a particular inner speech form, but can be
> >> differently realized in different inner speech forms, a
> >> particular inner speech form does NOT correspond to a particular
> >> word but can be differently realized by different words.
> >>>
> >>> It's not that the planes are really separated in either time
> >> or space; it's that they they are LOGICALLY separated because
> >> each plane involves some choice and because previous choices
> >> enter into that plane as a done deal; the process of redundancy
> >> is now realized in a product. Motive and thought are joined and
> >> then realized in inner speech, and then motive, thought, and
> >> inner speech are joined and realized as the word.
> >>>
> >>> That's how I understand it, anyway! And that's why it seems
> >> right to me to see a concept as a historical extension of this
> >> process. The invention of concepts is the sociocultural
> >> continuation of the same process of psychological
> >> stratification, abstraction, and selection that precipitates
> >> "meaning" out of "sense",and the learning of concepts is the
> >> reverse movement in psychology.
> >>>
> >>> David Kellogg
> >>> Seoul National University of Education
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> A word does not stand for a meaning; instead, a meaning it
> >> stands for "a wording standing for a meaning". A meaning is not
> >> represented by a
> >>>
> >>> at ANY level, because if there was that  l in the A separate
> >> comment on the five planes. I
> >>>
> >>> --- On Thu, 5/5/11, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
> >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] last on concepts
> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>> Date: Thursday, May 5, 2011, 7:25 PM
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> This whole concepts thing is still nagging at me, and making
> >> me grumpy with my students!
> >>>
> >>> LSV describes the microgenesis of thinking in two places in
> >> T&S: chapter 7, and sections 6 and 7 of chapter 6. And he does
> >> so in apparently completely different ways! Chapter 7 is all
> >> about movement among the five planes from thought to word or
> >> vice versa, with concepts not mentioned even once, I believe.
> >> Chapter 6 is about acts of thought, concepts in relations of
> >> generality, and words are mentioned in only one or two
> >> paragraphs, of such grammatical complexity that I am currently
> >> looking for a native Russian speaker to disambiguate them for me.
> >>>
> >>> So what is the relationship between the two passages? The key,
> >> I believe, is that in both chapters LSV makes the claim that
> >> thinking is always relating two things (in chapter 7 he writes:
> >> “all thinking tends to unite one thing and another”; in chapter
> >> 6 it is: “every thought establishes a link between parts of
> >> reality, represented [представленным] in some way in
> >> consciousness”). In chapter 7 it's clear when he says this that
> >> he's talking about the penultimate plane, that of "thought
> >> itself." (The five planes are as follows: (1) outer form of the
> >> word; (2) inner form of the word; (3) inner speech; (4) thought
> >> itself; (5) motivation.) So it seems to me the way to interpret
> >> the sections in chapter 6 is that they too are dealing with this
> >> plane. And that means that concepts operate on the plane of
> >> thought itself (or that thinking itself operates with concepts),
> >> at a point where words have "disappeared" or "died," depending
> >> on ones
> >>> translation (or not yet been born, if one is moving in the
> >> opposite direction, from thought to speech).
> >>>
> >>> This is more evidence, in my view, that concepts are not 
> word-
> >> meanings. Natalia asked me in a side message if I did not think
> >> that words in inner speech have inner form. It's a good and a
> >> tricky question, and on reviewing the text I would say that I
> >> think LSV considered inner speech to contain 'inner form,' but
> >> that this 'meaning' is progressively replaced by sense - which
> >> can, he argued, become separated from words. By the time we get
> >> to thought itself words are no longer involved in the processes
> >> of thinking.
> >>>
> >>> Of course, that still leaves a lot of details to be worked out
> >> about concepts and the relations of generality they form.
> >>>
> >>> Martin
> >>>
> >>> By the way, there are five difficult paragraphs that I would
> >> welcome help on. Perhaps the most opaque to me is this one:
> >>>
> >>> 316. Если самое значение слова принадлежит к определенному
> >> типу структуры, то только определенный круг операций становится
> >> возможным в пределах данной структуры, а другой круг операций
> >> становится возможным в пределах другой структуры. В развитии
> >> мышления мы имеем дело с некоторыми очень сложными процессами
> >> внутреннего характера, изменяющими внутреннюю структуру самой
> >> ткани мысли. Есть две стороны, с которыми мы всегда сталкиваемся
> >> в конкретном изучении мышления, и обе имеют первостепенное 
> значение.>>>
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