Re: [xmca] last on concepts

[Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com>]

Martin

The Chomskians were doing syntax and not pragmatics. It is illegitimate to
criticise something for what it was not purporting to be or do.
Pragmatically, I do believe we have the whole *structure* in mind at one
time.

By the way, those very tree structures can help us make decisions about
pedagogic text.  I  draw surface structure tree structures on sentences in
children's pedagogic text, and it is a slow process, but you get to show
people,  through the complexity of the sentence structure, what kind of
processing load you might inadvertently putting on the (little) readers. (I
also do vocabulary analysis and discourse structure (cohesion and coherence
etc.) in the broader analysis, obviously.)

Carol

On 7 May 2011 01:24, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:

> That's an interesting proposal, David. How do you deal, though, with the
> way LSV writes of "the complex flow from the first, vaguest moment of the
> origins of a thought until its final completion in a verbal formulation"
> (#27), and the "motion from thought to word and vice versa, from the word to
> the thought. This relation is represented in light of psychological analysis
> as a developing process, which traverses a number of phases and stages";
> "This flow of thought is accomplished as internal motion through a whole
> series of planes, the passage from thoughts in words to words in thought"
> (#29)?
>
> This sounds to me like passage in time. When he insists that to put a
> thought into words is to transform it, reorganize it, and embody it - "In
> transforming itself into language, the thought is reorganized and modified;
> the idea is not expressed, but finalized in the word" (#32) - this sounds to
> me not merely a logical realization, but a temporal process - a "motion from
> thought to speech" (#41).
>
> Indeed, he emphasizes that speech itself necessarily unfolds in time
> because thought has to mark the words of an utterance with emphasis in order
> to make them comprehensible: " it is obvious that the speech utterance
> cannot immediately emerge in its entirety" (#45); "Thought impresses logical
> stress down on the words of the phrase, marking in this way the
> psychological predicate, without which any phrase becomes incomprehensible.
> Speaking requires a passage from the internal plane to the external, while
> understanding assumes reverse motion, from the external plane of speech to
> the internal" (#52).
>
> Whereas a Chomskian grammar has all the words of an utterance prepared
> simultaneously, and the fact that they are emitted in sequence is merely an
> artifact of performance (if we had screens instead of mouths one could
> imagine the whole grammatical structure being displayed at once), in LSV's
> account of the microgenesis of speaking from thinking the words need to
> unfold in time in order that pacing and emphasis can distinguish what he
> calls the "psychological structure" of the sentence from its "grammatical
> structure" (#35).
>
> Martin
>
> On May 6, 2011, at 3:17 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>
> > I think that the "five planes" are not modular in the Fodor sense. I
> think they represent non-reducible options rather than discrete moments of
> time or planes in space.
> >
> > When Halliday talks about the "stratification" of gesture into language
> proper, he speaks of three planes: soundings (roughly, phonology), wordings
> (roughly, lexicogrammar), and meanings (pragmatics, semantics, thinking).
> >
> > I have some problems with collapsing semantics and pragmatics like this.
> But I have no problem with Halliday's basic argument, which is that the
> relationship between sounding, wording, and meaning is not causality: it's
> REDUNDANCY.
> >
> > It's not the case that a sound 'causes" a word or that a word 'causes" a
> meaning. Instead, the relationship of a sound and a word is REALIZED in
> meaning; it REDOUNDS in an ideal form we call meaning.
> >
> > Jay Lemke points out that there is no one to one correspondence between
> any two planes, because if there was the existence of that separate plane
> would be entirely unnecessary. That means that a sounding does not
> correspond to a particular wording which in turn corresponds to a specific
> meaning.
> >
> > What happens instead is that a sounding realizes a particular
> correspondance of wording and meaning. Or, if you like, a correspondence of
> sounding and wording realizes a particular meaning.
> >
> > I think that's why Vygotsky emphasizes, not the kind of "time" or "space"
> dimension we would normally associate with his use of planes, but instead
> that, for instance, a particular motive does NOT correspond to a specific
> thought, but can be differently realized in different thoughts, a particular
> thought does NOT correspond to a particular inner speech form, but can be
> differently realized in different inner speech forms, a particular inner
> speech form does NOT correspond to a particular word but can be differently
> realized by different words.
> >
> > It's not that the planes are really separated in either time or space;
> it's that they they are LOGICALLY separated because each plane involves some
> choice and because previous choices enter into that plane as a done deal;
> the process of redundancy is now realized in a product. Motive and thought
> are joined and then realized in inner speech, and then motive, thought, and
> inner speech are joined and realized as the word.
> >
> > That's how I understand it, anyway! And that's why it seems right to me
> to see a concept as a historical extension of this process. The invention of
> concepts is the sociocultural continuation of the same process of
> psychological stratification, abstraction, and selection that precipitates
> "meaning" out of "sense",and the learning of concepts is the reverse
> movement in psychology.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Seoul National University of Education
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >  A word does not stand for a meaning; instead, a meaning it stands for "a
> wording standing for a meaning". A meaning is not represented by a
> >
> >  at ANY level, because if there was that  l in the A separate comment on
> the five planes. I
> >
> > --- On Thu, 5/5/11, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] last on concepts
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Date: Thursday, May 5, 2011, 7:25 PM
> >
> >
> > This whole concepts thing is still nagging at me, and making me grumpy
> with my students!
> >
> > LSV describes the microgenesis of thinking in two places in T&S: chapter
> 7, and sections 6 and 7 of chapter 6. And he does so in apparently
> completely different ways! Chapter 7 is all about movement among the five
> planes from thought to word or vice versa, with concepts not mentioned even
> once, I believe. Chapter 6 is about acts of thought, concepts in relations
> of generality, and words are mentioned in only one or two paragraphs, of
> such grammatical complexity that I am currently looking for a native Russian
> speaker to disambiguate them for me.
> >
> > So what is the relationship between the two passages? The key, I believe,
> is that in both chapters LSV makes the claim that thinking is always
> relating two things (in chapter 7 he writes: "all thinking tends to unite
> one thing and another"; in chapter 6 it is: "every thought establishes a
> link between parts of reality, represented [представленным] in some way in
> consciousness"). In chapter 7 it's clear when he says this that he's talking
> about the penultimate plane, that of "thought itself." (The five planes are
> as follows: (1) outer form of the word; (2) inner form of the word; (3)
> inner speech; (4) thought itself; (5) motivation.) So it seems to me the way
> to interpret the sections in chapter 6 is that they too are dealing with
> this plane. And that means that concepts operate on the plane of thought
> itself (or that thinking itself operates with concepts), at a point where
> words have "disappeared" or "died," depending on ones
> > translation (or not yet been born, if one is moving in the opposite
> direction, from thought to speech).
> >
> > This is more evidence, in my view, that concepts are not word-meanings.
> Natalia asked me in a side message if I did not think that words in inner
> speech have inner form. It's a good and a tricky question, and on reviewing
> the text I would say that I think LSV considered inner speech to contain
> 'inner form,' but that this 'meaning' is progressively replaced by sense -
> which can, he argued, become separated from words. By the time we get to
> thought itself words are no longer involved in the processes of thinking.
> >
> > Of course, that still leaves a lot of details to be worked out about
> concepts and the relations of generality they form.
> >
> > Martin
> >
> > By the way, there are five difficult paragraphs that I would welcome help
> on. Perhaps the most opaque to me is this one:
> >
> > 316. Если самое значение слова принадлежит к определенному типу
> структуры, то только определенный круг операций становится возможным в
> пределах данной структуры, а другой круг операций становится возможным в
> пределах другой структуры. В развитии мышления мы имеем дело с некоторыми
> очень сложными процессами внутреннего характера, изменяющими внутреннюю
> структуру самой ткани мысли. Есть две стороны, с которыми мы всегда
> сталкиваемся в конкретном изучении мышления, и обе имеют первостепенное
> значение.
> >
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-- 

*Visiting Lecturer
*Wits School of Education
*Research Fellow*
Linguistics Dept: Unisa
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