Re: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms

[Robert Lake <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu>]

Happy MLK day to David K. and Everyone!

Does pluralism equate with a reduction to the lowest common denominator or
does it mean  an interdependent yet distinct set of approaches that welcomes
difference without expecting each practitioner to be a "jack of all trades"?

RL
On Sun, Jan 16, 2011 at 10:08 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:

> I'm with him; with the other David K. The generic approach really demands
> too much Jack-of-all-tradesmanship of the teacher, and the Jack of all
> trades, while very useful in pioneer times, is ultimately a master of none.
>
> Yes, in Chapter ONE of T&S Vygotsky is defining the problem and the
> approach. But even there he doesn't exactly want to let a hundred flowers
> blossom and a hundred schools of thought content. The problem he addresses
> is quite specific, and within this problem there is really only legitimate
> method, and it's not the tried and true method of analysis into elements
> that forms the basis of the extant genre.
>
> In Chapter TWO Vygotsky is even less eclectic, if possible. He BEGINS by
> saying that Piaget (actually Claparede) associates himself with Freud,
> Blondel, and Levy-Bruhl as a great pioneer of an entirely new field. But
> then he says that this is not at all an enviable position: Freud, Blondel,
> and Levy-Bruhl created their psychologies from problem to paradigm, and this
> is exactly what is wrong with them, and why their psychologies inevitably
> end up with that peculiarly metaphysical smell imparted by an overambitious
> bottom-upmanship. (It's a familiar problem for painters: when you frame the
> painting according to the subject you end up making your picture too small,
> but when you want to include enough background to make sense of it, you
> always end up making your picture too big.)
>
> When LSV talks about "general" psychology and the necessity to "unify"
> psychology, he's not just making the point that individual psychology has to
> be seen, contra Wundt, as an instantiation of social psychology. He's also
> calling for what in applied linguistics has come to be called "theory
> culling", the falsification and the destruction of some entirely wrong
> paradigms (e.g. Bergson, elan vital, Mach, Freud, Levy-Bruhl, Blondel, and
> Piaget too.).
>
> I think he would say that "general psychology", in which he would include
> sociology (see Chapter Four) and semiology, must become the hyperdigm. What
> we now call psychology is really what he calls "individual psychology", and
> that is the paradigm. Education would be a hypodigm of psychology dealing
> with teaching/learning and microgenetic change.
>
> One way to look at this is to think of the subordination of paradigms to
> hyperdigms and their superordination to hypodigms in terms of the TIME
> variable. Social psychology, the hyperdigm, is really the study of
> sociogenesis, the functional differentiation of societies and their
> resultant structure, just as biology is the study of biogenesis, the
> evolutionary differentiation of species, and the resulting structures.
>
> Individual psychology, for Vygotsky, is the study of ontogenesis,
> functional differentiation between and within individuals, and the
> psychological structures that come out of this, and of course the
> hypodigm, education, is the study of microgenesis. That's OUR cue;
> it's where we (teachers) come in!
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
> --- On Sun, 1/16/11, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
>
>
> From: David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" <
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Sunday, January 16, 2011, 10:43 AM
>
>
> Andy,
>
> The question of whether you, Vygotsky, I, or anyone else thinks multiple
> paradigms are a good idea needs to be separated from the question of
> whether psychology is preparadigmatic in the sense of questing toward
> paradigmatic consensus. Kuhn's sociology of science analysis does not
> imply that every, or indeed any, particular scientist interprets their
> work in terms of this sociological imperative. But in the case of
> psychology, we can see certain historical processes that are not easy to
> account for otherwise. I'm thinking, particularly, of the dynamic of
> paradigmatic ambitions presented as solid (or immanent) accomplishments,
> only to be beaten back by proponents of other schools. Think for
> Skinner's (1958) attempt to extend behavioral psychology from unmediated
> response conditioning to verbal behavior beaten back by Chomsky's (1959)
> famous book review, or the counterattack of Anderson, Reder, and Simon
> (1996) in the face of defections by notable cognitivists like Brown,
> Collins, and Duguid (1989), Greeno (1993), Hirst and Manier (1995)
> dissatisfied with cognitivist attempts to account for the problem of
> "context." I argue this kind of discourse is not characteristic of
> paradigmatic science, but instead supports the thesis that psychology is
> preparadigmatic.
>
> If, as you suggest, multiple paradigms--not competing, but co-existing
> peacefully--is a happy steady-state for psychology, then we'd expect a
> genres approach for education to have arisen long ago as an alternative
> to saddling educational practitioners with the need to grapple with
> dialectical syntheses across paradigms. On the other hand, if
> preparadigmatic psychology is ever questing toward paradigmatic
> consensus, then expect psychologists to resist a genres approach through
> many different sorts of explanations, including, possibly, denying the
> preparadigmatic status of their science.
>
> David
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 7:12 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>
> I certainly don't see the problematic you pose, David, as indicating a
> need for us to "grow up" and actually I find "genre" as you present it,
> a very fruitful way of characterising the problem. Shortly before your
> earlier message arrived I had been reading LSV's "Thinking and Speech,"
> Chapter 1. I can't for the life of me find a suitable succinct quote,
> but as I recall it, he was saying that Psychology was, as you say, not
> yet able to form a unified theory, and that (something like) every new
> observation or problem launched a new theory. Now, I don't read Vygotsky
>
> as attempting to create a master theory. On the contrary he argues
> against this, as I see it. His piece about the "unit" in that chapter
> says that we have to form a concept of the class of phenomena or
> *problem* that we want to solve and unfold a theory from there, as
> opposed to subordinating that definite class of problem to a more
> general one which lacks the special characteristics of the special
> probem we want to solve.Confusion has arisen I think from trying to read
>
> LSV's theory of the relation of thinking and speaking as a grand theory
> of consciousness.
>
> So it seems to me that in any very general field of phenomena multiple
> genre are quite OK, fruitful and just as useful as they are in everyday
> life. (Imagine trying to get by in everyday life with one genre!) Only
> each "genre" needs to have a clear concept of the class of problems that
>
> it covers. That's why I raise the question of stepping back one step
> from a genre and ask: how does this genre frame the phenomena, as a
> problem, as a unit or concept of its subject matter.
>
> I think if we do that the messy competition between currents of thinking
>
> could be presented in a way which was productive.
>
> What do you think?
> Andy
>
> David H Kirshner wrote:
> > Larry and Andy,
> >
> > Thanks for kind words.
> >
> > Andy, I don't have the philosophical background to be able to address
> > your question as formulated. But I read the intent of the question as
> > probing the utility of the paradigm construct, and hence the genres
> > solution: If all differences of opinion are ultimately paradigm
> > differences, then shouldn't we just grow up, accept differences in
> > framing as inevitable, and get on with debating issues and acting on
> the
> > basis of our best judgment following from the debate? Why should we
> > regard differences of opinion that emerge in psychological framings of
> > learning as different from other disagreements, and requiring its own
> > new kind of solution, namely a "genres" solution?
> >
> > Let me address that concern directly. Take as a major instance the
> > difference between sociogenetic and ontogenetic (i.e., individualist)
> > approaches to learning. These approaches construe the world of
> learning
> > in very different terms, each highlighting certain questions as
> crucial,
> > while other questions are incidental. Not coincidently, each can
> answer
> > certain questions, to wit the ones it considers important, much more
> > effectively than the other questions.
> >
> > We have the following usual choices: Adopt one perspective based on
> the
> > promise that it (eventually) will be able to answer the full set of
> > questions adequately; or construct a new theory as a dialectical
> > synthesis of the original two. (I think socioculturalists straddle the
> > two choices by sometimes claiming they are sociogenetic and other
> times
> > that they are inherently dialectic.)
> >
> > In the behaviorist era and subsequently the cognitive area, the first
> > choice was more appealing. The desire to be "scientific" (i.e.,
> > uni-paradigmatic), in conjunction with shameless hawking by
> proponents,
> > gave those approaches some time to adequately address the concerns of
> > the other school. As neither succeeded in unifying the field, in this
> > post-cognitive era, we opt more for dialectical approaches.
> >
> > The problem is that these dialectical alternatives, rather like the
> > particle/wave dialectic of quantum physics, don't really help us make
> > sense of the world in a way that is actionable. Our intuitions about
> > learning are not able to encompass both sides of the dialectic in such
> a
> > way as to constitute a synthesis. As a result, a dialectic approach
> puts
> > on the table the diverse and discordant pieces that somehow have to be
> > coordinated. Paul Cobb (1994) addressed this problem of constructivist
> > and sociocultural approaches in a widely read ER piece recommending
> > precisely that: a coordination of perspectives.
> >
> > Well, obviously a coordination of perspectives is exactly what is
> > needed. The issue at hand is who does the coordinating? In Cobb's
> > approach--as in all other academic approaches that have been
> offered--it
> > is the researcher's challenge to figure out the coordination. In this
> > way, the work of coordination can take place in the academy in concert
> > with efforts to forge a dialectical synthesis that eventually could
> > serve to unify the science of learning under a single theorization.
> This
> > is why a genres approach is so disruptive. A genres approach says,
> > instead, let's focus within each paradigm on figuring out what that
> > framing has to offer teaching. Then leave it to teachers, to the world
> > of professional practice, to figure out how (or if) to coordinate.
> >
> > For the researcher, this genres approach is a disaster. It constructs
> > what is most important for researchers--an eventual dialectical
> > synthesis that unites the field--as irrelevant to the world of
> practice.
> > Our theoretical musing no longer are projected into the world of
> > educational practice as relevant, they become just our private
> concern,
> > with possible long-term payoff for the world, but no immediate
> > relevance. For teachers, the genres approach finally provides for
> > emancipation from the intellectual tyranny of theory. Because the
> > individual paradigms are grounded in accessible metaphors for
> learning,
> > it becomes possible to articulate pedagogical principles in ways that
> > are coherently available to teachers. And then it becomes the purview
> of
> > professional practice to determine how best to coordinate the genres
> of
> > teaching.
> >
> > This is truly a moral dilemma for researchers.
> >
> > David
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2011 6:51 PM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> >
> > Thank you David for your truly enlightening post.
> >
> > Can I ask this question: when two subjects are engaged in a dialogue
> > over some issue, and are positing the issue in two different genres,
> is
> > it true to say that they are explicitly or implicitly asserting
> > different frames. For example, if two parties are arguing over whether
>
> > to increase unemployment benefit, they may disagree over the frame
> being
> >
> > lazy people ripping off the community or disadvantaged people who
> > deserve the support of the community. So isn't there always a frame
> > around a genre where rational contest is possible? Every specialism
> > exists within a lingua franca of shared concepts, doesn't it?
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > David H Kirshner wrote:
> >
> >> Larry, Andy, Michael, and Monica.
> >>
> >> Sorry for the delay in responding. Let me first address the
> technology
> >> tie-in, and then turn to the pedagogical question about how to deal
> >>
> > with
> >
> >> the multi-paradigmatic theorization of learning.
> >>
> >> I'm sympathetic to the perspective that it is "the current
> >>
> > technologies
> >
> >> being used and developed which transforms our guiding metaphors [for
> >> learning] and not the internal debates among scholars." If we look at
> >> the whole ball of wax, psychology certainly does seem a chaotic
> tangle
> >> that may well be led by technological happenstance rather than by
> >> intellectual coherence. But the proliferation of new schools and new
> >> approaches based on technological developments should not obscure the
> >> kinds of processes of development that go within each paradigmatic
> >> school. Certainly, paradigmatic differences are not settled by
> debate.
> >> As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is inescapably
> >>
> > sociological
> >
> >> rather than purely intellectual. What about within a paradigm? As
> >> sociohistorical institutions schools of research persist over time
> >> because of mutually shared projects that often are experienced as
> >> intellectually coherent. Certainly technological developments can
> >> influence the basic understandings pursued within a school. For
> >> instance, psychologists moved on from the telephone switchboard
> >>
> > metaphor
> >
> >> of cognitive processing to the serial digital computer metaphor which
> >> afforded much more dynamic possibilities for theorization, but with
> >>
> > much
> >
> >> basic conceptual continuity. I don't think it's "wrong" to regard
> >>
> > intra
> >
> >> paradigmatic development as led by technological developments.
> >>
> > However,
> >
> >> I imagine most of the time, for example in thinking about our own
> >> progress as sociocultural or CHAT researchers, we find it useful to
> >>
> > view
> >
> >> progress in terms of intellectual coherence. In any case, in my work
> >>
> > in
> >
> >> harvesting insights from the diverse branches of psychology for the
> >> purpose of framing a multi-paradigmatic pedagogy, I find it useful to
> >> regard the work within paradigms as progressing through rational
> >>
> > debate
> >
> >> (or at least attempting to).
> >>
> >> A Multi-paradigmatic Pedagogical Framework:
> >>
> >> How do we advance pedagogical theory taking seriously the
> >> multi-paradigmatic status of learning theory?
> >>
> >> Let me warn that this is a theme I've pursued before on xmca without
> >> much uptake--I think for very good reasons. The path leads to
> >> delegitimization of education as a co-participant with psychology in
> >>
> > the
> >
> >> scientific enterprise. Alternatively, it leads to the repudiation by
> >> education of psychology's scientific pretensions. Given how deeply
> >> enmeshed educational and psychological communities are with one
> >>
> > another
> >
> >> (e.g., xmca) this is not an easy or appealing path for either party.
> >>
> >> The first step on this path is the hardest to take, though it is
> >>
> > simple
> >
> >> to articulate. If we accept that learning is diversely conceived
> >>
> > across
> >
> >> varied paradigms, and we also regard the purpose of teaching as
> >> promoting learning, then there is only one sensible path to take if
> >>
> > one
> >
> >> desires pedagogical theory to be grounded in learning theory: A
> genres
> >> approach to pedagogical theorizing, with each genre of teaching
> >> addressing learning in a particular paradigmatic sense. To date, a
> >> genres approach has not been advanced. However, there are two
> >> alternative approaches that have been attempted, in each case with
> >> disastrous consequences. One method is to focus on a single paradigm
> >>
> > and
> >
> >> deny the legitimacy of any others (e.g., the behaviorist era in
> >> education). The other is to fashion a holistic vision of "good
> >>
> > teaching"
> >
> >> that somehow is to address learning in its various interpretations.
> >>
> > This
> >
> >> is the current Zeitgeist in educational theorizing, and I'll devote a
> >> couple of paragraphs, below, to explaining its multifaceted ill
> >>
> > effects
> >
> >> on education, the most immediate and debilitating of which is
> systemic
> >> de-intellectualization of pedagogy. For if teaching practice is to be
> >> understood in terms of learning theory, it can only be in terms of a
> >> single theory at a time, given the multi-paradigmatic character of
> >>
> > this
> >
> >> branch of knowledge.
> >>
> >> I have been teaching an Education doctoral course on the genres
> >>
> > approach
> >
> >> for about 15 years, and I've ALMOST NEVER succeeded in making this
> >>
> > first
> >
> >> step comprehensible. So entrenched in our discourse are the ideas of
> >> holistic pedagogy--"good teaching" as a set of practices that
> >>
> > addresses
> >
> >> learning conceived as a complex and multifaceted whole--that the
> >> language of genres just doesn't register for my students. Typically,
> >> when I present a framework for teaching for Skills, Concepts, and
> >> Dispositions as distinct genres of teaching, this gets assimilated
> >>
> > into
> >
> >> a "learning styles" frame in which the different pedagogical
> >>
> > approaches
> >
> >> provide different routes to learning conceived as a complex and
> >> multi-faceted whole. Indeed, our discourse typically intermixes these
> >> learning goals as we talk of "understanding the skill," "practicing
> >>
> > the
> >
> >> concept," or "inculcating thinking skills." Students almost never
> come
> >> to grasp the motive of differentiating, rather than integrating,
> these
> >> notions of learning as a comprehensible agenda.
> >>
> >> The cost we pay for maintaining an integrative or holistic discourse
> >> about "good teaching" in education is staggeringly high. First, is
> the
> >> impossibility of articulating pedagogical principles, which, as
> >> discussed above would require that learning be conceived locally,
> >> relative to the independently conceived notions of learning. Because
> >>
> > in
> >
> >> the standard discourse "good teaching" is somehow simultaneously to
> >> address learning in its many various senses, we end up instead with
> >> generalities and platitudes, with intractably dense dialectical
> >>
> > analyses
> >
> >> attempting to span disparate local theories, and with vignettes that
> >>
> > are
> >
> >> meant to illustrate good teaching, but that don't articulate its
> >> principles. In short, we provide almost no usable intellectual
> >>
> > resources
> >
> >> that can serve to guide development of teaching practice.
> >>
> >> Second is the politicized character of our pedagogical discourse
> >> stemming from the interpenetration of values issues with issues of
> >> efficacy. Given the varied notions of learning that motivate
> >>
> > educators,
> >
> >> it is to be expected that values issues will arise as to which
> sort(s)
> >> of learning ought to be pursued with students. But since our
> discourse
> >> constructs good teaching as a holistic set of practices, there's no
> >> discursive space for this variation. One's opponent's construction of
> >> good teaching is not just wrong on values, but also misguided about
> >>
> > what
> >
> >> is effective practice (e.g., the Reading Wars and the Math Wars). A
> >> discourse framed in genres of teaching would enable values issues to
> >>
> > be
> >
> >> separated from issues of efficacy, thereby protecting the
> professional
> >> integrity of the field of teaching practice.
> >>
> >> Finally, with so little to offer professional teaching practice,
> >> learning theory is easily subject to being dismissed as irrelevant.
> If
> >> Teaching is defined in terms of promoting Learning, then learning
> >>
> > theory
> >
> >> ought to be THE theoretical discourse through which teaching practice
> >>
> > is
> >
> >> articulated. We see our growing irrelevance in the current prominence
> >>
> > of
> >
> >> "brain" perspectives on teaching--which is what started this
> >>
> > thread--but
> >
> >> also in other cognitive mechanisms approaches like "learning styles"
> >> research, as well as in pedagogical framings based on critical
> theory,
> >> values theory, philosophical commitments, or metaphysical or
> spiritual
> >> bases. In the end what we have is an open-ended pedagogical discourse
> >>
> > in
> >
> >> which each new proposal for "good teaching" can create its own
> >>
> > universe
> >
> >> of discourse within which it is to be analyzed and evaluated. The
> >> marketplace of pedagogical ideas resembles much more a bazaar than a
> >> professional knowledge base. A genres approach, while featuring a
> >> theoretically heterogeneous set of framings for learning, nonetheless
> >> would enable us to capture the essential interests that motivate the
> >> pedagogical enterprise within a finite and determinate set of
> >> theoretical approaches.
> >>
> >> Genres: Why Not?
> >>
> >> One excellent reason to dismiss the genres approach is because it is
> >>
> > so
> >
> >> obvious. After all, it is immediately apparent that learning is
> >> diversely conceived in varied psychological paradigms. So
> >>
> > theorizations
> >
> >> of good teaching that really come to grips with learning theory would
> >> need to be constructed locally, relative to a specific notion of
> >> learning. Surely, if a genres approach had any merit it would have
> >>
> > been
> >
> >> adopted, or at least explored, a long time ago.
> >>
> >> The alternative is that there are powerful interests arrayed against
> >> recognizing and dealing with the preparadigmatic status of
> psychology.
> >>
> > I
> >
> >> propose that the genres approach has not previously been advanced
> >> because it is in psychologists' self interest that it not be.
> >>
> >> To understand these interests, we need to delve a bit into how
> >> preparadigmatic science functions. Preparadigmatic science consists
> of
> >> multiple schools each in competition with the others to the unify the
> >> field under its own banner. However, paradigmatic differences are
> >>
> > never
> >
> >> settled by debate. As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is
> >> inescapably sociological rather than purely intellectual. Viewed
> >>
> > through
> >
> >> divergent paradigmatic lenses, different aspects of observed
> phenomena
> >> become highlighted as problematic. So one paradigm cannot invalidate
> >>
> > the
> >
> >> perspectives of another. Instead, a paradigm succeeds against others
> >>
> > by
> >
> >> addressing the concerns of the other paradigms in ways that are
> >> sufficiently appealing and powerful as to attract established
> >> researchers from other schools, and especially new researchers just
> >> entering the field. Like old soldiers, old paradigms never die, they
> >> just fade away.
> >>
> >> Viewed in this way, we see that psychologists must lead double lives.
> >> Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that of
> >> most other scientists. They are involved in deliberate and careful
> >> elaboration and extension of the basic perspectives that initiated
> the
> >> school. However, externally, they are hucksters extraordinaire.
> Claims
> >> are exaggerated. Hoped for/planned developments are presented as
> faits
> >> accomplis. After all, one wins in the broader game by attracting
> >> researchers, especially neophyte researchers, to your school.
> >>
> >> One could castigate psychologists for being duplicitous or dishonest,
> >> but I think this freights individual psychology too heavily. What we
> >> have is best viewed not as individual misrepresentation, but a
> >> discursive form reflecting the sociological imperative of
> >> preparadigmatic science to achieve paradigmatic consensus. The ironic
> >> result is that across the broad diversity of psychology, there is
> only
> >> one tenet espoused by learning theorists of every persuasion: a
> single
> >> perspective (eventually) encompasses all of the relevant phenomena of
> >> learning. Thus a genres approach to pedagogy, building on discrete
> >> accomplishments across paradigmatic divisions, would subvert
> >> psychologists' active self-interest in promoting the problem of
> >> paradigmatic division as (imminently) solved.
> >>
> >> But what about educators? If psychologists prefer to deny the
> >> preparadigmatic status of their field, why is it that educators
> >>
> > haven't
> >
> >> pressed on with a genres approach on their own? Again, a sociological
> >> perspective can help, this time explaining the client status of
> >> Education with respect to Psychology. One of the first preoccupations
> >>
> > of
> >
> >> Psychology, dating back to its emergence as a scientific enterprise,
> >>
> > was
> >
> >> investigation of the transfer of training assumptions of faculty
> >> psychology (e.g., Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). These early studies
> >> found the prevailing belief in broad transfer of learning to be
> >> unwarranted. Through preceding centuries, the classical
> (Aristotelian)
> >> theory of faculty psychology, and its associated theory of
> >> mental-disciplines, had served as the basis for pedagogical thought.
> >>
> > So,
> >
> >> psychology's attack upon transfer of training effectively dislodged
> >>
> > the
> >
> >> existing foundations for educational practice. As a result, education
> >> attached itself to the new science, not as a separate and independent
> >> field of inquiry, but as a client discipline, dependent upon
> >>
> > psychology
> >
> >> for our legitimacy and intellectual authority. In that role, we have
> >> tended to see the world as the psychologists do. We have not
> construed
> >> psychology independently, as we would need to do to adopt a genres
> >> approach.
> >>
> >> Marshalling Preparadigmatic Psychology for Educational Purposes:
> >>
> >> I'm going to conclude this post with a description of how
> >>
> > psychological
> >
> >> theory gets appropriated and reworked in genres scholarship. (This
> >> really is where the psychologists get mad.) I mentioned, above, that
> >> "Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that of
> >> most other scientists." Similar, but not identical. I want to argue
> >>
> > that
> >
> >> paradigmatic science develops more organically based on insights that
> >> bubble up from within the paradigm, in comparison with
> preparadigmatic
> >> science that is more teleologically driven by a felt need to address
> >> concerns that have emerged in other schools. For instance,
> >>
> > cognitivists
> >
> >> exploring the computational metaphor might eventually have decided,
> on
> >> their own, to extend from decontextualized problem solving to
> >>
> > encompass
> >
> >> social and cultural context. But the need to be positioned as
> >> competitive with sociogenetic approaches like sociocultural
> psychology
> >> forced this development earlier. In this respect, we can see a
> >> trajectory of preparadigmatic science that is not quite parallel with
> >> paradigmatic science. Preparadigmatic schools tends to evolve from
> >> simple and powerful, but local, initial insights toward complex and
> >> opaque interpretations intended to bridge disparate intuitions. And
> >>
> > then
> >
> >> again, some preparadigmatic schools--e.g., social constructivism and
> >> perhaps situated cognition theory, in psychology--initially are
> formed
> >> as a synthesis of diverse perspectives precisely in order to be
> >> competitive players in the preparadigmatic game, but without a clear
> >>
> > and
> >
> >> simple local insight. The result is that use of psychology to inform
> a
> >> genres approach must be highly selective, calling only on those
> >>
> > theories
> >
> >> that most effectively highlight a single metaphorical notion of
> >> learning, often relying on earlier, more narrow, versions of the
> >>
> > theory
> >
> >> over contemporary forms.
> >>
> >> In my own "crossdisciplinary"* effort to found a genres approach for
> >> education that builds on insights from diverse psychological schools,
> >> I've found it convenient to identify the metaphors for learning that
> I
> >> see as framing education's diverse interests, and then to hunt around
> >> for psychological approaches that help to fill out that metaphorical
> >> interpretation. In this approach, I am guided by the perspective that
> >> psychology often draws from our culturally shared metaphors for its
> >> basic images and intuitions (Fletcher, 1995; Leary, 1994; Olson &
> >> Bruner, 1996; Sternberg, 1997). For instance, my "habituation"
> >>
> > metaphor
> >
> >> for learning-as-skill-attainment draws somewhat on behaviorist
> >> psychology, but also on a branch of cognitive theory known as
> >>
> > "implicit
> >
> >> learning theory." My "construction" metaphor for
> >> learning-as-concept-attainment draws somewhat on the Piagetian based
> >> radical constructivist, but also on the conceptual change literature.
> >>
> > My
> >
> >> "enculturation" metaphor for learning-as-disposition-attainment draws
> >> partly on sociocultural theory, but also on social psychology. For
> >> although sociocultural theory is predominantly sociogenetic Vygotsky,
> >> along with those who have undertaken to extend his legacy, resisted
> >>
> > the
> >
> >> complete social determinism that I see as needed to articulate a
> >> coherent "enculturation pedagogy." As Penuel and Wertsch (1995) put
> >>
> > it:
> >
> >> "Sociocultural processes on the one hand and individual functioning
> on
> >> the other [exist] in a dynamic, irreducible tension rather than a
> >>
> > static
> >
> >> notion of social determination. A sociocultural approach ...
> considers
> >> these poles of sociocultural processes and individual functioning as
> >> interacting moments in human action, rather than as static processes
> >> that exist in isolation from one another" (p. 84). (Emphasizing
> social
> >> determinism, my prototypical exemplar of enculturational learning is
> >> "proxemics" drawn from social psychology, the study of how individual
> >> comes to embody the "personal body space" conventions of their
> >>
> > national
> >
> >> culture.)
> >>
> >> I think this serves to establish how psychological science is
> >>
> > marshaled
> >
> >> within a genres agenda. Resisting what is everywhere present in
> >> psychology--the attempt to develop a comprehensive account of
> learning
> >> that suffices for all purposes--the genres approach seeks after
> >>
> > partial
> >
> >> accounts that correspond with what I see as coherently forming the
> >> discrete interest of educators in teaching skills, concepts, and
> >> dispositions. It's not "wrong" for socioculturalists to agree, as did
> >> Larry a couple of posts ago, "that we must account for processes at
> >>
> > the
> >
> >> neurological level from a CHAT perspective." Indeed, such initiatives
> >> are vital to enable CHAT/sociocultural psychology to remain viable,
> >>
> > and
> >
> >> perhaps eventually prevail, within the competitive game of
> >> preparadigmatic psychology. But the broader designs of the various
> >> schools will not help us, today, to support educational practice. The
> >> psychology of TODAY is a preparadigmatic psychology, and that reality
> >> must be embraced in order to discern and support the discrete agendas
> >> for learning that motivate education.
> >>
> >> *I use the term crossdisciplinary in contrast with interdisciplinary
> >>
> > to
> >
> >> signal the coordination, rather than integration, of existing
> >> theoretical frameworks.
> >>
> >> David
> >>
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> >> Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 7:35 AM
> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> >>
> >> David
> >> Another quick thought on the competing models of learning and how
> >>
> > these
> >
> >> models become common sense or taken for granted folk psychological
> >>
> > ways
> >
> >> of
> >> orienting to the world. The  power of metaphors to conventionalize a
> >> cultural imaginary seems to be  central to this transformative
> process
> >> that
> >> develops various cognitive models at the implicit or tacit level.
> >>
> > Andy
> >
> >> points to the historical processes that lead to a particular metaphor
> >> structuring our cognition [the zeitgeist]. As I read his comments
> >> he suggests it is the current technologies being used and developed
> >> which
> >> transforms our guiding metaphors and not the internal debates among
> >> scholars.  If technological transformation  "constitutes"
> >>
> > metaphorical
> >
> >> transformation [stronger term than influences] then how do we
> >> consciously
> >> engage with these transformative technological processes to influence
> >> the
> >> zeitgeist [as a dialogue among models] ? At the level of common sense
> >> folk
> >> psychological metaphors of learning are university debates leading
> the
> >> way
> >> or charting where the technology has taken us?
> >> The underlying question is, How do we get teachers to incorporate
> >> alternative models of learning and cognition which run counter to
> >>
> > common
> >
> >> sense
> >>
> >> Larry
> >>
> >>
> >> On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Michael Glassman
> >> <MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu>wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> Hi David,
> >>>
> >>> I sort of feel like the human relationship with information has
> >>>
> >>>
> >> changed in
> >>
> >>
> >>> very fundemental ways over the last ten years.  Phenomena like the
> >>>
> >>>
> >> Web,
> >>
> >>
> >>> Google, FaceBook, the Open Source movement have moved incredibly
> >>>
> >>>
> >> quickly.
> >>
> >>
> >>>  Some academic urban legends are rising up, such as the idea that
> the
> >>> computer in some way changes the structure of wiring of the brain
> >>> (absolutely no evidence, or even proto-evidence for this I can.)
> But
> >>>
> >>>
> >> I
> >>
> >>
> >>> think it is a combination of fear and confusion.  You have first
> >>>
> >>>
> >> amendment
> >>
> >>
> >>> lawyers like Floyd Abrams arguing against free speech on the
> >>>
> > Internet.
> >
> >>>
> >>>
> >> You
> >>
> >>
> >>> have brutal authoritarians like Putin signing executive orders
> making
> >>> Russian government completely Open Source by 2015 (my guess is he
> has
> >>>
> >>>
> >> no
> >>
> >>
> >>> idea what Open Source actually is).  The whole thing is mind
> >>>
> > boggling.
> >
> >>> I think of cognitivist, behaviorists socio cultural theorists, etc,
> >>>
> >>>
> >> etc.
> >>
> >>
> >>> arguing over who bats next, not realizing that the rules of the game
> >>>
> >>>
> >> are
> >>
> >>
> >>> completely changing.  Changing in ways we don't even have a
> >>>
> > vocabulary
> >
> >>>
> >>>
> >> to
> >>
> >>
> >>> talk about yet.
> >>>
> >>> Michael
> >>>
> >>> ________________________________
> >>>
> >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of David H Kirshner
> >>> Sent: Tue 1/11/2011 10:45 PM
> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>> Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Larry,
> >>>
> >>> Here's my sociology of science account of the rise of brain studies
> >>>
> > as
> >
> >>>
> >>>
> >> a
> >>
> >>
> >>> substitute for learning theory.
> >>>
> >>> 1. In Kuhnian terms, psychology is a preparadigmatic science. For
> >>> instance, learning is variously studied in behavioral, cognitive,
> >>> developmental, and sociocultural schools that conceive of learning
> in
> >>> fundamentally distinct ways.
> >>>
> >>> 2. The grand motive of preparadigmatic science is establishment of
> >>> paradigmatic consensus. Each school is in competition with the
> others
> >>>
> >>>
> >> to
> >>
> >>
> >>> unify the field under its umbrella by coming to accommodate the
> >>> interests of the other schools while still preserving the essence of
> >>>
> >>>
> >> its
> >>
> >>
> >>> own unique perspective. Most often this competition is implicit, but
> >>> periodically it leads to open conflict as in Chomsky's repudiation
> of
> >>> Skinner's effort to account for "Verbal Behavior," or in the flare
> up
> >>>
> >>>
> >> in
> >>
> >>
> >>> the late '90s between James Greeno and John Anderson and company
> over
> >>> cognitivist efforts to account for the situated character of
> >>>
> > learning.
> >
> >>> 3. The dominant paradigm in any period always is the one to most
> >>> strenuously pursue hegemonic designs on the field. The cognitivists'
> >>> embracing of the rhetoric of situativity has cost them dearly: they
> >>>
> > no
> >
> >>> longer can forefront the technical machinery of information
> >>>
> > processing
> >
> >>> theory and artificial intelligence computer simulation as their
> >>>
> >>>
> >> central
> >>
> >>
> >>> technical method and theoretical thrust. This is really a crisis
> >>>
> > point
> >
> >>> for cognitivists. They gained prominence through the Information
> >>> Processing approach, and are coasting along on their reputation.
> >>> Embracing brain science enables them to maintain the surface
> features
> >>>
> >>>
> >> of
> >>
> >>
> >>> dynamic "science," while providing a convenient disguise for the
> fact
> >>> that there's no longer a central metaphor for learning that is being
> >>> elaborated and developed by that community.
> >>>
> >>> 4. Projecting this forward a decade or so, we have the likelihood of
> >>> diminishment of the importance of the cognitivist umbrella, and
> >>>
> >>>
> >> renewed
> >>
> >>
> >>> opportunity for the other schools to push toward the front of the
> >>>
> >>>
> >> pack.
> >>
> >>
> >>> ...should be lots of fun.
> >>>
> >>> David
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>
> > [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >
> >>> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> >>> Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2011 7:37 AM
> >>> To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> >>>
> >>> Mike,
> >>>
> >>> The band wagon may not be a strong enough metaphor.  The image of a
> >>> steam
> >>> roller seems more accurate.  I mentioned earlier that the term ZPD
> is
> >>> now a
> >>> recognized term in many school settings [as scaffolding].  However
> >>>
> >>>
> >> this
> >>
> >>
> >>> alternative metaphor of mind as computer or mind  as brain is a far
> >>>
> >>>
> >> more
> >>
> >>
> >>> powerful metaphor in schools. Often school staffs are fascinated
> with
> >>> these
> >>> explanations and believe that neuroscience is finally getting to the
> >>> "heart"
> >>> of the matter [couldn't resist the contradictary metaphor]. Brain
> >>> science as
> >>> an explanation of learning is becoming   the dominant narrative in
> >>> many school debates.  I was wondering if there are any "simplified'
> >>> articles
> >>> for a general audience that engage with these neuro/brain metaphors
> >>>
> >>>
> >> that
> >>
> >>
> >>> would lead to school staffs possibly having a dialogue [by
> >>>
> > introducing
> >
> >>> dought]  I have shared a few articles with interested staff who love
> >>> ideas
> >>> but they were too "theoretical" for a staff discussion.
> >>>
> >>> With this steam roller comes the call for justifying your practice
> in
> >>> schools by using "best practices" which are "evidence based".  This
> >>> evidence often is dominated by evidence from neuroscience
> >>>
> >>>  I have attempted to introduce sociocultural perspectives into the
> >>> debate in
> >>>  response to the neuro/brain social representations of learning but
> I
> >>> would
> >>> appreciate an  article for a general audience that I could hand out
> >>>
> > to
> >
> >>> start
> >>> a dialogue among school staffs.
> >>>
> >>> Mike, I believe this frame of reference is not a "fad" or a "band
> >>>
> >>>
> >> wagon"
> >>
> >>
> >>> but is developing into a "conventionalized" metaphor which most
> >>> educators
> >>> may use to explain "learning" in  schools.  Fad indicates a
> >>>
> > transitory
> >
> >>> phenomena and neuroscience seems a longer lasting  phenomena.
> >>>
> >>> I am looking for an article that does not refute or contradict the
> >>> neuroscience explanations but rather LINKS the  ideas to
> >>>
> > sociocultural
> >
> >>> concepts.
> >>>
> >>> One of the principals in a school I work in is attending this
> >>> conference,
> >>> and principals do have influence in school cultures.  I hope to
> >>> influence
> >>> her.
> >>>
> >>> Larry
> >>>
> >>> On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 8:07 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> >>>
> > wrote:
> >
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> The bandwagon is visible coming over the horizon!
> >>>> Check it out at http://www.learningandthebrain.com/brain28.html.
> >>>> Join for just the price of a click and a clack.
> >>>> mike
> >>>> __________________________________________
> >>>> _____
> >>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> __________________________________________
> >>> _____
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>> __________________________________________
> >>> _____
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> __________________________________________
> >>> _____
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >> __________________________________________
> >> _____
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma?
> <http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>
>
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>


-- 
*Robert Lake  Ed.D.
*Assistant Professor
Social Foundations of Education
Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
Georgia Southern University
P. O. Box 8144
Phone: (912) 478-5125
Fax: (912) 478-5382
Statesboro, GA  30460

 *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
midwife.*
*-*John Dewey.
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