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Re: [xmca] Concept of Activity



Firstly Larry, let me apologise for my last merssage. It was 2am and I was heading for bed, and this morning I can hardly parse what I wrote. Anyway.

I see that you are using "mind" in the very general sense of the entirety of relations between a living creature and their environment. That's OK but that's a very broad topic. As you point out, I have found that historically, "activity" entered philosophy as an attribute of living nature. A N Leontyev retains that meaning. On the other hand, since Fichte (i.e. 200 years ago), the term "activity" has been used as a concept for understanding specifically human phenomena. That was pre-Darwin, so "human" was a very distinct category at the time. Doubtless there is value in this idea of continuity between human beings and animals. But it also leads to confusion. For example, an "operation" in Leontyev's terms, is something we do without thinking, but which we can make conscious in the event of something drawing our attention to it. It is only this capacity to become conscious which distinguishes an operation from the autonomous functions of the body, like our heart beating. So if we use the concept of activity to cover everything a baby mouse does, this somewhat upsets the idea we have of "activity" when we're talking about something humans do.

All words tend to have this elasticity. I see it as part of the dynamism of concepts, rather than a pragmatic thing about how people freely choose to use them. As a concept "activity" refers on the one hand to deliberate or purpose actions of an organism - which can only be a person, so let's just say a person - in relation to a person using an artefact. Now, all actions of a person use artefacts and are relative to other people, so why restrict it in this way? Because "joint artefact-mediated" are not so much qualifiers attached to the thing we are talking about, but qualifiers attached to a concept, that is, how we grasp activity.

Another thing about activity, it first entered the ideas of Marx and Vygotsky as a substance, that is, a fundamental concept in their theories, in terms of which everything else had to be understood, within their theories, insofar as their were worked out consistently. Once Leontyev started looking for a unit of activity, an entirely different meaning and usage of "activity" arose, namely "an activity" as a unit of "activity" and a new ambiguity entered Activity Theory. I find that this elasticity is too much and causes confusion. This is because I am not happy with any of the definitions of "an activity" that have come along, and the lack of awareness that this is a different concept from "activity" makes it heavy going to clarify this problem.

So that's activity. "Concepts" is a new issue. "Concept" has all the same problems of meaning. I personally don't see "concept" as something a non-human mammal can have, because it is not a stage towards the participation in a form of human life. But I can elaborate if you like.

I haven't answered any of your questions, Larry, but have I cleared up anything?

Andy

Larry Purss wrote:
Hi Andy
 
As I mentioned I "think out loud" and through discourse try to clarify my point of view. In reading your article on the concept of activity I interpreted activity as existing within a cultural space of artifacts such as the deaf and blind girl who uses a spoon experiencing her first activity which transforms her relations to material and social reality. The spoon structures her biological actions  and tranforms these BASIC acts which become activities.
 
Andy, lets try substituting the term "mammals" for "organisms" to approach the level of sensory-motor perceptual acts [actions] as primary and basic interactions with the world that are directed, intentional enactments.  When we attempt to culturally "interpret" or "read" these mammalian biological, perceptual actions AS IF they are activity  we are entering into language games with concepts and cognition. The "embodied mind" tradition [see D. Hutto]  suggests using terms such as "knowing" and "cognition" for this level of cultural activity.  Now moving up the evolutionary scale, a case can be made that "embodied mind" in its earliest formation [at birth] is not cognitive but BECOMES cognitive with development as a process of activity [in the interdisciplinary sense you articulate as both psychological and social]
 
Andy, the term organism may be too general a term for biological life forms that confuse my main point. By moving up to the level of "explaining" the actions of dogs by giving reasons for actions [creating conceptual explanations] using terms such as "perceptually directed intentionality" enters into a discourse tradition. This "embodied mind" discourse is being elaborated by usinf terms such as "embodied mind" or "primary intersubjectivity" as suggesting acts that are clearly actions but can they be considered activity [from the perspective of the new born HUMAN infant?
 
Larry
 
On Fri, Jan 7, 2011 at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
Jeez Larry, give me a change here. Can you tell me in sentences? And things like "all acts or actions [organisms] are embodied", I just just parse. What is the meaning of the word "organism" in square brackets after "actions". I just can't understand what you are saying.
Andy

Larry Purss wrote:
Hi Andy
 Varela is the scholar often credited with introducing the approach that I am trying to "understand" as "embodied.  I want to say that I also am not clear about  these distinctions, but will use this forum to "think out loud". Andy, all acts or actions [organisms] are embodied. Therefore a dog pursuing a cat up a tree is anembodied act.  We as humans can account for this act by creating a narrative that gives"reasons" for this activity [a clear cultural historical act [general] activity as a special case of acts]  As a language game we can "explain" and "interpret" the dog's acts AS IF they were activities and needs when in fact they are embodied actions [a different case of embodied acts]  Giving reasons for acts [actions/wants AND activity/needs] is clearly a language game but the act of the dog chasing the cat is not a representational cognitive activity altothough giving a reason for the act is clearly an activity [cultural/historical]  The dogs actions [more generally acts] can be "explained" or "understood" as perceptual actions at a sensory-motor level.  It is at this level of DIRECT perception that Varela is exploring.
 Turning our attention to new born infants.  They have intentional acts and actions which are intentional, DIRECTED and embodied [as I agree are all activity [as well as actions and acts]. However the infant does not act for "reasons" when RESPONDING to SIGNIFICANT others [significant as outlined in attachment and intersubjectivity accounts].  Her acts or actions are at the perceptual sensory-motor level of responding intentionally and purposefully.  At this HUMAN level of responding perceptually AND DIRECTLY [mediated by significant other its possible to consider the mother acting as activity while the infants acts are considered acts or actions. These acts or actions when observed by a significant other are INFERRED to be activities of the infant but I suspect the infants embodied acts needs further elaboration and Varela's scholarship is one discourse language game attempting to elaborate how to understand direct on-line human acts and actions within sociocultural activity.
 Andy, if the infants human acts and actions are not activities [from the perspectives of the infant] then developmentally we must explain how primary enactments become activities [from the infants perspective.  This is a question of transformations but the continuing place of "embodied" [as primary and basic] acts may continue to exist in a transformed structure as the infant develops the capacity to participate in activities.   Andy this direct perceptually based "stuff" or "essences" is considered not like dogs chasing cats or acting for reasons.  It is posited to be human but ontologically socially situated RESPONDING [intentional & purposeful but not with content]
 I'm not sure where Varela's perspectives of "embodied mind" fit or can be bridged with cultural historical accounts. However, it is a sociocultural developmental account.  Whether it is a coherent account or just another shape-shifting language game I'm not sure.  It does seem to attempt to bridge phenomenological continental philosophy with analytic accounts
 Larry
 

 On Fri, Jan 7, 2011 at 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:

   Larry, I will just make a series of points which may clarify
   something.

   I know that "embodied" notions of enactment is referring to some
   current of thought which you are asking me to comment on, but I
   really don't know what an act which is not embodied would be.
   Perhaps you could clarify that for me?

   I think the "activity theory notions of wants and needs" is in
   need of further thought. I don't think it is sufficient to (kind
   of) simply say that "we all do things for a reason."

   I don't know what alternative notions of substance or essence you
   have in mind. I know that most people use the word "substance" in
   the naive realist sense of "stuff" and "essence" in the sense
   which is the object of feminist criticism.You would have to spell
   out what you have in mind. I use these words in quite a different
   sense.

   I don't understand what you mean by counterposing "just cultural
   language game" to "biological components of wants."

   And I don't understand the distinction you are imputing to me
   between "object-oriented activity" that is perceptual and "activity."

   Sorry, Larry. To get through my thick head you need to be very
   specific.

   Andy

   Larry Purss wrote:

       Andy, what is your thoughts on "embodied" notions of
       enactment.  This
       tradition talks about DIRECT "on-line" pre-conceptual
       pre-linquistic
       expressions of INTENTIONALITY without understanding [as
       interpretive].
       Where do the concepts of "embodied mind" as PERCEPTUALLY based
       sensory-motor
       directedness, fit  within activity theory notions of wants and
       needs?  This
       seems to be a question which points to alternative notions of
       substance or
       essence?  Is it just a cultural language game or is there a
       biological
       component of  wants involved.  Or is it another special case of
       object-oriented activity that is perceptual but not activity
       as you define
       it?
       I hope this question is clear ?

       Larry
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