Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Yes, this is the way to go.
But intersubjectivity is not impossible, but the circumstances are rare.
ask me when you see me.
mike

On Fri, Jul 9, 2010 at 5:04 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:

> Michael,
>
> This is the famous and familiar 'chicken-sexing' phenomenon. Experts are
> able to tell the sex of day-old chickens, and can't explain why. The best
> chicken sexers come from Japan, where the  Zen-Nippon Chick Sexing School
> has 2-year long courses.
>
> But I don't follow your argument. You seem to be saying, since they can't
> explain what they do in words, they have no concepts. But they must have
> something, so they have percepts.
>
> You are apparently equating a concept with a 'cultural label' that is
> 'stuck' on an object, as though we could only recognize a barrel if it were
> labelled 'barrel,' if not literally then metaphorically.  That seems a
> rather simplistic view of what concepts do. And actually the chicken sexers
> do employ cultural labels - as do your fish sorters, I presume. The chicken
> sexers say to themselves, 'male chick,' 'female chick.' They simply can't
> introspect the characteristics they have identified which have enabled them
> to attach the label. Your fish sorters are saying, 'good fish, 'bad fish,'
> or something similar. Obviously these are cultural-historical distinctions,
> right?
>
> Martin
>
> On Jul 9, 2010, at 6:14 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>
> > See, even without the notion of "barrel", you perceive a shape and do not
> run into it. This shape, prior to all cultural labels you might stick to it
> or recognize it as part of cultural-historical activity, is some shape that
> exists for you in your practices. In two papers, one in Journal of
> Pragmatics and the other in Social Studies of Science, I describe phenomena
> for which there are no words or concepts and yet people act toward it. For
> example, fish culturists sort fish. They can't tell you the difference
> between the ones that go to the right, down into the bucket, or into the
> left channel. They ask you to "just look." So they can see it, but not tell
> it. Similarly, in ecological field work, the participants could see
> differences but not tell them, that is see that something is not a rock pile
> even though the definition of a rock pile said it was one.
> >
> >
> > How do you describe or name what they see as difference but for which
> there is no concept, no "notion" to name and tell the difference? In such
> cases, "percept" may well do the trick. There are two percepts, they are
> different, yet there are no cultural-historical concepts to name, theorize,
> conceptualize . . .
> >
> > As you see from the title of one paper, I used the term "perceptual
> gestalts" . . . . Don't know whether that resolves your problem, but was
> useful and the best solution for me.
> >
> >
> > Roth, W.-M. (2005). Making classifications (at) work: Ordering practices
> in science. Social Studies of Science, 35, 581-621.
> > Roth, W.-M. (2004). Perceptual gestalts in workplace communication.
> Journal of Pragmatics, 36(6), 1037-1069.
> >
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Michael
> >
> > On 2010-07-09, at 3:43 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
> >
> > "Describe" in what respect, Michael?
> >
> > On Jul 9, 2010, at 4:01 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> >
> >> Martin, the percept might describe the forms that appear in perception?
> What do you think? Michael
> >>
> >>
> >> On 2010-07-09, at 9:46 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
> >>
> >> Eric,
> >>
> >> For me, the question that needs to be answered is why we need to
> introduce a new term, "percept." We can all talk about 'perception,' as an
> active process of interaction with the world, right? What is gained when we
> start to talk about 'percepts,' as though there are some little entities
> floating around somewhere? Haven't we turned a process into an entity?
> >>
> >> The university has a good selection of DVDs, and I recently checked out
> the first season of the cable TV channel Showtime's series The Tudors, which
> recounts how Henry VIII's need for a male heir led to the rupture between
> England and the Catholic Church. It's not exactly aiming for historical
> accuracy, but I was then motivated to check out Elton's history of the
> period and it turns out the series does a pretty good job of touching on
> most of the important events.
> >>
> >> Everyone in the show is a fashion statement, including Cardinal Wolsey
> who, as played by Sam Neil, is both cunning and likable. He shows up each
> time in a different outfit, wearing a variety of official headgear, each in
> that rich cardinal red.
> >>
> >> One morning I was fixing breakfast and reached out for the salt shaker.
> It's made of transparent plastic with a lid, something we picked up at the
> supermarket. But the lid is bright red, and (and here's the point; thanks
> for your patience!) as I picked it up, for a second or two what I saw was a
> little cardinal.
> >>
> >> That seems to me a nice example of what Mike has been exploring, the
> active and ongoing character of perception, in which conceiving and
> perceiving are intimately linked. I see the object *through* and *in terms*
> of a concept (though we're still none to sure what that is!), in this case
> the concept of cardinal that had been enriched by watching the TV show. The
> process is not entirely within me as an individual, because the salt shaker
> did its part.
> >>
> >> To me, saying that I "have" a "percept" doesn't help me understand this
> process. The percept would be -  what, a little red cardinal? or is the
> percept the salt shaker, and I impose a concept of cardinal on it? but isn't
> 'salt shaker' a concept too?? Putting all of this stuff inside the
> individual leads to an infinite regress, not a satisfactory explanation (or
> even description) of what is going on.
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >> On Jul 9, 2010, at 10:43 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
> >>
> >>> Percept would be preference?  I don't know exactly but people do not
> >>> operate upon appropriated concepts 100% of the time.  Do they?
>  Certainly
> >>> children do not.  Currently I am not exactly sure what the question is
> >>> that needs to be answered.
> >>>
> >>> Perhaps the percept in the 'not-wanting-to-listen-to-dylan" for me
> would
> >>> be I would prefer listening to the radio seeing as he never gets any
> air
> >>> time or perhaps it would be that I am stuck inside of mobile with the
> >>> memphis blues again?
> >>>
> >>> That certainly is a great question.  Others with
> >>> thoughts/percepts/concepts?
> >>>
> >>> eric
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> From:   Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
> >>> To:     "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>> Date:   07/09/2010 09:14 AM
> >>> Subject:        Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
> >>> Sent by:        xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> OK, Eric let's suppose you woke up this morning not wanting to listen
> to
> >>> Dylan. What is the percept in that situation? Dylan? His music? Your
> >>> temporary dislike? The fact that yesterday you felt differently?
> >>>
> >>> Martin
> >>>
> >>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 8:04 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Martin:
> >>>>
> >>>> I understand your misgivings about placing construction within but
> >>> perhaps
> >>>> this makes sense:  concepts are appropriated from the social/cultural
> >>>> arena but percepts are individually based.  My percepts about music
> may
> >>>> run counter to yours and there are even days I don't want to listen to
> >>> Bob
> >>>> Dylan.  However, I have an appropriated concept of music that is
> >>> probably
> >>>> extremely similar to yours.  Does this make sense?  I know this
> >>>> internal/exteranl debate has raged for years and won't end anytime
> soon
> >>>> but some things do indeed happen within.  I still have to think though
> >>>> that cracking this code between everyday and scietific could assist in
> >>>> understanding human development.
> >>>>
> >>>> eric
> >>>>
> >>>
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