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Re: [xmca] The Interpersonal Is Not the Sociocultural
Larry,
The passage you've cited from my paper about transfer reflects my enduring interest in how schools not only teach kids forms of knowledge and ways of thinking, they also turn kids into particular kinds of person. I worked for several years at the Far West Laboratory for Educational Research and Development, which gave me the opportunity to visit schools throughout the Lab's region, in California, Nevada and Utah. Sitting in classrooms as an observer the importance of social life became very evident.
Let me see if I understand your question correctly. Mike has raised the issue of whether what goes on in a school classroom can really be considered a zoped, given in particular the kinds of emotion that kids experience there, and in the transfer paper I have suggested that what gets recognized in the classroom is a narrow kind of achievement (Andy may notice that I was borrowing from Hegel here!). On the basis of these suggestions you are asking if the way zopeds are focused on academic/scientific discourse is not in fact another example of this kind of narrow focus.
I suppose my response would be that yes, we need in our discussions of scientific concepts to contextualize science more than we have. I'm a big fan of science, and I certainly consider myself a scientist, but what we call science has a history, and presumably a future in which it will be something different. It is not the only way to know the world, and it has its limitations. It operates hand in hand with a specific mode of production. It is not an end in itself, and teaching kids to think scientifically should not be considered the only endpoint to their development.
Martin
On Mar 31, 2010, at 11:41 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
> Hi Mike
> I wanted to pick up on your comment about the kinds of emotions kids experience in classrooms and link it to comments on the zoped and scientific concepts. My linkage is through Martin Packer's article "The Problem of Transfer and the Sociocultural Critique of Schooling " IN the Journal of Learning Sciences, 2001, Vol. 10 issue4
> Kinds of emotions I believe is intimately connected to issues of social RECOGNITION. Packer in his article wrote that in modern school contexts
> "recognition is provided to children through an [axis of achievement-Parsons 1959] that rewards achievement-motivation. This is the way teachers gratify children's DESIRE FOR CONNECTION AND RECOGNITION, not meeting these needs DIRECTLY, but transmuting them. Put very crudely and incompletely living AS an ABSTRACTION prepares children to be citizens in a modern ABSTRACT society, sorting them along the axis of achievement."
> Packer (or should I say Martin?) also writes that in classrooms these abstractions exist within communities of particular moral normative practices. Martin states that in schools students
> "engage with abstractions, entities understood in terms of apparently INDEPENDENT DECONTEXTUALIZED properties. These ABSTRACTIONS cannot exist in their own right, however." Martin points out that traditional classrooms produce a "MEDIATED OBJECTIFYING ATTITUDE to what has previously been grasped with IMMEDIACY [Serpell & Hatano, as cited in Packer]
> Martin points out these NORMATIVE assumptions about the purposes of schools construct IMPERSONAL RELATIONS in teacher/student interaction. [and minimal intersubjectivity]
>
> My question is, "Does the focus of ZOPEDS as perpetuating "scientific" and "academic" discourse perpetuate and CONSTITUTE particular dialogical EGO-ALTER relational contexts that are also detached, decentered, abstracted, and preoccupied with achievement forms of CONNECTION AND RECOGNITION. As our concepts get abstracted and DECENTERED do our "communities also become places of DECENTERED atomized persons who are searching for fundamental needs for recogintion within normative school environments that privlege DISENGAGED INDIVIDUALS aquiring "skills" that are PORTABLE and can be TRANSFERRED from one decentered modern place of production to other decentered places of production [including universities]
>
> It is these types of linkages which makes me value "SOCIAL RECOGNITION within dialogical intersubjective "circles of connection" as a RESPONSE to our current institutional arrangements.
>
> Larry
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Date: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:43 pm
> Subject: Re: [xmca] The Interpersonal Is Not the Sociocultural
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
>> Have these very stimulating ideas been taken up by Minerva or
>> the Owl,
>> David?
>>
>> I turns out that in the past week, while not observing Iguanas,
>> I have been
>> reading Brothers Karamazov. Perezhivanie land. And thinking
>> about issues of
>> learning outside of schools, historically or culturally "before
>> schools,"where issues of emotion, broadly construed, come to the fore.
>>
>> I have been excoriated by Russians for thinking that the idea of
>> a zoped
>> extends beyond schooling, but this line of discussion and the
>> way it has
>> been re-posed in the discussion brings starkly to mind the kinds
>> of emotions
>> that kids ordinarily experience in classrooms. How often, under what
>> conditions, could these emotions be considered conducive to
>> development or
>> the creation of a zoped?
>>
>> Sometime, but can we generalize about the conditions?
>> Does Franklin in the blocks.... an example from a preschool, count?
>> And in the second language learning conditions that you so eloquently
>> and intricately seek to instruct us with?
>>
>> This line of discussion seems important, even if i cannot tie it
>> to all the
>> threads swirling around xmca's version of Pandora.
>>
>>
>> mike
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 4:37 PM, David Kellogg
>> <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
>>> A while ago someone (perhaps the author himself) circulated
>> Michael G.
>>> Levykh's remarkable "The Affective Establishment and
>> Maintenance of
>>> Vygotsky's Zone of Proximal Development" (Eductional Theory 58
>> [1]: 83-101)
>>> on this list, but I didn't get around to reading it until this
>> weekend.>
>>> It seems to me that the paper makes three points that are
>> germane to the
>>> "Play" thread (and also to Beth and Robert's paper, if that is
>> still under
>>> discussion), but FAILS to make one point which I think is
>> really important
>>> enough to change the subject line (besides which the "Owl of
>> Minerva" is
>>> really a joke that probably only Andy fully understands even
>> though I was
>>> the one who originally made it; I often make jokes that I
>> don't really
>>> understand, just to see if I will laugh).
>>>
>>> First of all, Michael's paper points out that the fashion for
>> "extending"> the ZPD in an "affective" direction is just
>> reinventing the wheel; the ZPD
>>> never excluded affective factors in the first place, and in
>> the first
>>> chapter of Thinking and Speech we are clearly told that
>> affective factors
>>> are part parcel of every meaningful word and gesture. They are
>> an enabling
>>> condition--nay, a precondition--not only for communicative
>> speech but also
>>> for reflective verbal thinking.
>>>
>>> Secondly, Michael's paper differentiates between shared
>> emotions and
>>> private ones, and argues that it's really not enough to have
>> the latter in
>>> our classrooms. So there is an important sense in which every
>> successful> class is an artwork, that is, a work of social
>> emotion. He gives an example
>>> from my own field, foreign language learning, on pp. 98-99
>> (and in fact the
>>> example he gives, of learners (re)producing some of Carolyn
>> Graham's jazz
>>> chants in a doctor's ofice, is both positive and a negative
>> example of
>>> this).
>>>
>>> Thirdly, Michael's paper applies this idea of shared emotion
>> to the
>>> distinction between "obuchenie" on the one hand and the various
>>> misinterpretations, both teaching-learning (Soviet) and
>> learning-leaning
>>> (Western) given Vygotsky's teachings on teaching. The key and
>> unexplored> precondition that differentiates "obuchenie" from
>> the mistranslation
>>> "instruction" is the creation of shared emotion. The key and
>> unexplored> precondition that differentiates "obuchenie" from
>> the mistranslation
>>> "learning" (which Mike points out in his MCA editorial) is the
>> sharing of
>>> propositional ATTITUDES and not simply the sharing of propositions.
>>>
>>> This is powerful stuff, and reading it I was quite envious,
>> because I
>>> always fancied that I was going to be the one who argued that
>> Vygotsky had
>>> in mind a whole 'nother side to his work, a set of higher EMOTIONAL
>>> functions that included concepts such as fairness, justice,
>> solidarity,> altruism...you know, the sort of emotional function
>> that makes it more
>>> necessary to develop somebody else's idea than to be first in
>> line to take
>>> credit for a new one.
>>>
>>> These higher emotional functions, that have both an ethical
>>> (altruistic) and an aesthetic (realist) element are as much
>> the foundation
>>> of moral and artistic education as logical memory or
>> conceptual thinking are
>>> the foundations of science and mathematical education. They
>> are also every
>>> bit as much culturally produced and socially shared.
>>>
>>> But I am not at all convinced that they are esssentially
>> interpersonal,> that is, that they can arise from what we in
>> Korean call the "Neo-Na"
>>> (I-thou) or "Jugeoni-Padgeoni" (Give and Accept) relationship
>> between> individuals, not even generalized into an abstract
>> universal. I don't think
>>> that they can simply be arrived at by a kind of Piagetian
>> reversibility in
>>> relations (wash my back and I'll wash yours, as we say in the Korean
>>> sauna).
>>>
>>> Even Bakhtin, who in many places seems to utterly reduce the
>> sociocultural> to the interpersonal, emphasizes that it is the
>> JOURNEY to the other's point
>>> of view, and above all the RETURN which is transformative. In
>> Moby Dick,
>>> Starbuck remonstrates with Ahab, protesting that the whale is
>> only a dumb
>>> creature, and to hate the animal is blasphemous, because it
>> means treating
>>> it as man's equal. Ahab responds by making Vygotsky's
>> distinction between
>>> empirical, everyday concepts and scientific ones:
>>>
>>> "Hark ye yet again--the little lower layer. All visible
>> objects, man,are
>>> but as pasteboard masks. But in each event--in the living act,
>> the undoubted
>>> deed--there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth
>> the mouldings
>>> of its features from behind the unreasoning mask.If man will
>> strike, strike
>>> through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except by
>> thrusting> through the wall?"
>>>
>>> Ahab realizes that by his own argument, he could be committing
>> another type
>>> of blasphemy; the white whale might be SUPERhuman rather than
>> subhuman, and
>>> he, Ahab, might be engaged in a personal war with God.
>>>
>>> So, like a dextrous politician, Ahab shifts his argument: "Now it's
>>> personal", he tells Starbuck.
>>>
>>> "Talk not to me of blasphemy,man; I'd strike the sun if it
>> insulted me. For
>>> could the sun do that,then could I do the other; since there
>> is ever a sort
>>> of fair play herein, jealousy presiding over all creations."
>>>
>>> The word "jealousy" brings him up short. And then he ends,
>> rather lamely,
>>> thus:
>>>
>>> "But not my master, man,is even that fair play. Who's over me?
>> Truth hath
>>> no confines."
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>
>>>
>>> --- On Sun, 3/21/10, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl of Minerva
>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> Date: Sunday, March 21, 2010, 3:41 PM
>>>
>>>
>>> Larry,
>>>
>>> This is what is called, in hermeneutic theory, the
>> characteristic of
>>> "projection." All understanding of an object, event, or
>> situation, and hence
>>> all interpretation (which is the articulation of
>> understanding) is its
>>> projection, in three senses. First, in terms of a practical
>> project. Second,
>>> as a projectile has been thrown forward from the past into the
>> future.> Third, it is projected onto a background (rather as a
>> film is 'projected' in
>>> a screen), so that what shows itself is always in the terms (loosely
>>> speaking) that this background makes possible.
>>>
>>> I don't know whether this will rid you of puzzlement! But yes
>> it's better
>>> than crosswords.
>>>
>>> Martin
>>>
>>> On Mar 21, 2010, at 5:11 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
>>>
>>>> Martin, Andy, Luiz
>>>> Thank you for your reflections on tnis topic which I have to
>> admit leaves
>>> me more puzzled than ever (but it is more interesting than
>> doing crossword
>>> puzzles.
>>>> I wanted to add a few more thoughts from Ingrid Joseph's
>> notions on this
>>> topic and the dimension of TIME in self-development.
>>>> She points out that polyvalent symbolic networks are dynamic
>> and FUTURE
>>> oriented as social PERSPECTIVES and TIME are dynamically interwoven.
>>>> The PRESENT as-IS functions as an intersection BETWEEN as-
>> WAS and future
>>> as-if-could-be states. STABILITY of meaning is provided by the
>> fact that
>>> that the past is projected into the future, whereas CHANGE
>> results from the
>>> TRANSFORMATION of the past by the future as-if-could-be.
>> Ingrid states,
>>> "possible futures are nourished by the past, but at the same
>> time the past
>>> is changed by the ANTICIPATED future" (Crites 1986 as
>> quoted by Ingrid,
>>> 1998 p. 192) Through this DOUBLE MOVEMENT in the present
>> AS-IS, the present
>>> moves towards its immediate future, and becomes a NEW PRESENT.
>> and the
>>> process begins again.
>>>>
>>>> If the role of either past (as-was) or future (as-if-could
>> be) becomes
>>> DOMINANT in a one sided manner, sel-development becomes
>> blocked and movement
>>> becomes stuck (emotions also become stuck)
>>>> Food for continuing thought
>>>>
>>>> Larry
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message -----,
>>>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
>>>> Date: Sunday, March 21, 2010 11:51 am
>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl of Minerva
>>>> To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>
>>>>> Big topic, Andy, and I can't afford to get distracted from
>>>>> trying to figure out LSV on concepts! But it has to be said that
>>>>> science is hermeneutic too. There is not a single science that
>>>>> is not concerned with understanding traces, signs, indices, even
>>>>> symbols. That's to say, science is all about "taking something
>>>>> *as* something" (as Heidegger put it) and so "saying something
>>>>> of something," (as Aristotle had it, in his On Interpretation).
>>>>>
>>>>> Martin
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mar 20, 2010, at 9:11 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> A while ago I was obliged to deal with the work of Roy
>>>>> Bhaskar. What Bhaskar does is insist on the ontology of natural
>>>>> science in every aspect of life, including for example, literary
>>>>> criticism and cultural anthropology. The editor makes a nice
>>>>> point with an anecdote: he is at a seminar on J-P Sartre. A
>>>>> student in the audience calls out "Do you really think that
>>>>> someone called J-P Sartre existed?" Obivously an inappropriate
>>>>> application of relativism, which then opens the way for his own
>>>>> dogmatism.>
>>>>>> I was drawn to the conclusion that it is dogmatism to insist
>>>>> on one true ontology (here I mean ontology the general,
>>>>> classical, not the Sartrean sense) for all activities at all
>>>>> times. Natural science is an activity which by its very nature
>>>>> must assume that there is a natural world out there whose
>>>>> properties and forms can be known. This is not true of any
>>>>> activity where reality is in a significant degree formed by and
>>>>> interconnected with, human activity and in the case of the
>>>>> natural sciences breaks down in certain circumstances at certain
>>>>> times.>
>>>>>> So I don't accept that naturalistic ontology is a *myth* of
>>>>> the natural sciences. It is an essential part of natural
>>>>> science. But it is not universal. It is just as dogmatic to
>>>>> insist on hermeneutic relativism in natural science as it
>> is to
>>>>> insist on naturalistic realism in hermeneutics, etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>>>> Larry,
>>>>>>> Yes, it has for a long time been part of the myth of modern
>>>>> science that it discloses things as they 'really are,' not as
>>>>> they 'appear' to be. LSV falls into this way of speaking
>> (or at
>>>>> least his translators do). The most powerful analyses of
>>>>> science, philosophical, historical and sociological, in my
>>>>> opinion, show that it is thoroughly enchanted. Science involves
>>>>> seeing (and thinking of) things 'as if.' So Kuhn explained
>>>>> paradigms in terms of 'seeing as' - a duck or a rabbit. So every
>>>>> introduction I have seen of gravity in relativity theory uses
>>>>> the image of space sagging like a rubber sheet around masses,
>>>>> even though this image is inadequate once one gets deeper into
>>>>> the math. Seeing space 'as if' it were rubber is a necessary
>>>>> step into this branch of science. Each science has/is its own
>>>>> imaginary.>> Martin
>>>>>>> On Mar 20, 2010, at 10:20 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
>>>>>>>> Luiz
>>>>>>>> That was an interesting thread you sent on play and games
>>>>> and the tension between the concepts.
>>>>>>>> It is a fascinating topic.
>>>>>>>> I want to bring into the conversation a fascinating
>>>>> perspective on the place of the fictional and imaginary in play
>>>>> (and other activity).
>>>>>>>> First for some context.
>>>>>>>> I've always been curious about the antinomy often reflected
>>>>> in the tension between imagination/reality and the
>> literature on
>>>>> modernity as the disenchantment of the world and the
>> reaction to
>>>>> this privleging the as-IS reality over the as-IF reality.
>>>>> There is a counter literature on finding ways to re-enchant
>> the world.
>>>>>>>> Often science is seen as the villan who is responsible for
>>>>> the loss of the as-IF reality, as children move beyond playful
>>>>> imagination into the real world.
>>>>>>>> Piaget's notions of animism as indicating immature thinking.
>>>>>>>> INGRID E. JOSEPHS takes a radically different
>> perspective on
>>>>> the tension between the imaginary as-IF constructions and the
>>>>> figure-ground type relation to as-IS reality.
>>>>>>>> She wrote an article in HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1198, Volume 41,
>>>>> pages 180-195 which explains very clearly this alternative
>>>>> interpretation of the as-IS and as-IF dialectic and how it
>>>>> infuses meaning with e-motion and explains the process of
>>>>> Vygotsky's internalization and Mead's I-ME dialectic.
>>>>>>>> Following is a quick summary of Ingrid's perspective on the
>>>>> imaginary in our devlopment.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Symbol formation implies a TRANSCENDENCE of the here-and-now
>>>>> as-IS world by construction of the imaginary as-IF world.
>>>>> Ingrid's standpoint is an extension of Hans Vaihinger's
>> [1911-
>>>>> 1986] "philosophy of the "AS-IF" as his notion of FICTIONALISM
>>>>> as an independent version of PRAGMATISM. (as an aside Alfred
>>>>> Adler said this book transformed his life).
>>>>>>>> Vaihinger believed as-If thinking was foundational for
>>>>> scientific reasoning.
>>>>>>>> Ingrid makes a further distinction between static
>>>>> nondevelopmental and dynamic/developmental accounts of as-
>>>>> IF. "BEING as-if" is static, whereas "BEING-AS-IF-
>> COULD-
>>>>> BE" is dynamic. She points out this is similar to Bretherton's
>>>>> distinction of AS-IF and WHAT-IF. In dynamic notions, the
>> as-IF
>>>>> is a step in the process of forward oriented preadaptation to
>>>>> the next MOMENTARY context. Development is based on as-IF types
>>>>> of apperception as each person participates in their own
>>>>> development. Rather than being MORE adaptive or BETTER Ingrid's
>>>>> position is that developmental transformations cannot be
>>>>> prejudged before the act. Whether it is better or worse is an
>>>>> evaluative question.
>>>>>>>> In summary imagination always begins in the known world of
>>>>> present and past and then one's horizon of understanding is
>>>>> stretched into the realm of the as-IF.. Ingrid points out this
>>>>> notion of as-IF is close to Cole's [1992, 1995] notions of
>>>>> personal duration. Ingrid states, "In imagination, not only do
>>>>> present, past, and future become MUTUALLY RELATED (and
>>>>> constructed), but both the person and world are
>> transformed." p.184
>>>>>>>> Now to the more specific topic of SYMBOLIC PLAY that is
>>>>> being explored on this thread. Piaget understood play as pure
>>>>> assimilation that is necessary until developmentally the child
>>>>> can transcend this immature level of reality and with
>>>>> development SUBORDINATE the as-IF reality by the rational
>>>>> logical, and DECENTERED modes of entering reality.
>> The as-
>>>>> If is not ascribed any PRODUCTIVE future oriented function in
>>>>> development. In contrast the position Ingrid (and Cole,
>>>>> Vygotsky, Mead,) are elaborating is that the AS-IF-COULD-BE
>>>>> operates throughout the lifespan.
>>>>>>>> [Note] I'm emailing this section because my software
>>>>> sometimes crashes
>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>>>>> From: Wagner Luiz Schmit <mcfion@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> Date: Thursday, March 18, 2010 8:11 pm
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl of Minerva
>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> >>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I even didn't had time to read all e-mails (lots and lots
>>>>> of work to
>>>>>>>>> do), but games and development is exactly what i want to
>>>>> study in my
>>>>>>>>> doctorship.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Do you heard about narratology David? this was used to
>>>>> study and analisegames for a while, and them other thing called
>>>>> ludology emerged...
>>>>>>>>> Take a look at this article:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> LUDOLOGY MEETS NARRATOLOGY:
>>>>>>>>> Similitude and differences between (video)games and
>> narrative.> >>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> http://www.ludology.org/articles/ludology.htm
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> this is my two cents contribution to the discussion... and
>>>>> i'm very very
>>>>>>>>> interested too in this rational/irrational discussion
>>>>> too... but i don't
>>>>>>>>> have much to contribute now... Only that William James
>>>>> already was
>>>>>>>>> debating this =P (being a teacher of history of Psychology
>>>>> is very
>>>>>>>>> usefull)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Wagner Luiz Schmit
>>>>>>>>> INESUL - Brazil
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Em Ter, 2010-03-16 às 18:13 -0700, David Kellogg escreveu:
>>>>>>>>>> Sorry, everybody!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> One of my grads tried to find the point at which a
>>>>>>>>> story definitively passes over into a game, and I said it
>>>>> was a little like trying to find the point where talk
>>>>> definitively passes over into talk. It is there, but we always
>>>>> find texts in talk, and talk in texts, no matter which side of
>>>>> the divide we may find ourselves on.
>>>>>>>>>> I meant to write "it's a little like trying to find the
>>>>> point
>>>>>>>>> where talk passes over into TEXT". Halliday remarks
>>>>> somewhere that scientific linguistics didn't really start until
>>>>> the invention of the tape recorder.
>>>>>>>>>> I was always puzzled by that remark until I realized that
>>>>>>>>> until the invention of the tape recorder, TEXT was
>>>>> synonymous with writing and TALK was synonymous with
>> speech, and
>>>>> only people like Bakhtin and Vygotsky knew that there was a much
>>>>> deeper, underlying difference having to do with pastness and
>>>>> presentness, finalizeability and unfinalizedness.
>>>>>>>>>> (When we look at Piaget's work on conservation it is quite
>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>> while before we realize how dependent on VISUALS it is. For
>>>>> the child, sound is not conserved at all, and of course neither
>>>>> is time. It is only with the discovery of language that the
>>>>> child can imagine the conservation of sound at all.)
>>>>>>>>>> I think that the distinction between text and
>> discourse is
>>>>>>>>> really the fast moving line between stories and games that
>>>>> we want: the story is past and the game is present, the
>> story is
>>>>> finalizedness and the game is unfinalized and inherently
>>>>> unpredictable. So the story is a text, and the game is an
>>>>> ongoing discourse.
>>>>>>>>>> I think, Andy, that in a game the problem is not autnomy
>>>>> per
>>>>>>>>> se. It's autonomy for a purpose, and purposes are
>> almost by
>>>>> definition not only beyond the self but even beyond the present
>>>>> moment (and this is why Mike is so right to point out that EVERY
>>>>> act of culture or even private imagination has an implicit
>>>>> notion of "the good life" in it).
>>>>>>>>>> Similarly, I don't think Vygotsky ever prizes volition for
>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>> own sake; it's always the freedom to produce and to create
>>>>> and to imagine "the good life" and to master the irrational
>>>>> forces which deprive life of that meaning, including those found
>>>>> within the self. It is in that sense that, yes, life is a game:
>>>>> it is meaningful through and through and to the very end.
>> Not, I
>>>>> think, what the existentialists had in mind!
>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Wittgenstein claimed that there is no overt over-arching
>>>>>>>>> and external trait between games (e.g. a common functional
>>>>> "motive" or a "goal"). When we read Vygotsky's play
>> lectures, we
>>>>> find TWO common points: viz. gratuitous difficulty and
>> guile-
>>>>>>>>> less deceit, the abstract rule and the imaginary situation.
>>>>>>>>>>> But one is always hidden when the other is abroad.
>>>>>>>>> After all, Wittgenstein's argument was only that there is
>>>>> no CLEARLY VISIBLE over-arching trait. And Vygotsky's reply is
>>>>> that if the essence of things were visible on the surface, as
>>>>> overt motive, or aim, or goal, why then no scientific
>>>>> explanation would ever be required for anything. His explanation
>>>>> of play is not an empiricist-functionalist but a historical,
>>>>> genetically, deterministic one, and the owl of Minerva flies
>>>>> only at nightfall.
>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>>>>>>> --- On *Mon, 3/15/10, Andy Blunden
>>>>> /<ablunden@mira.net>/*
>>>>>>>>> wrote:> >
>>>>>>>>>>> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Dialects of
>>>>>>>>> Development- Sameroff
>>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,
>>>>>>>>> Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Monday, March 15, 2010, 5:33 PM
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Way out of my depth in discussing
>>>>>>>>> play, but here is my take
>>>>>>>>>>> on "what is the motivation for play?"
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I don't think we can or want to
>>>>>>>>> ascribe a motivation for
>>>>>>>>>>> participating in play *in general*.
>>>>>>>>> I.e., the question of
>>>>>>>>>>> "why does a child play?" cannot
>>>>>>>>> sensibly be answered by the
>>>>>>>>>>> child. But this still leaves the
>>>>>>>>> question of the motivation
>>>>>>>>>>> for any particular play activity:
>>>>>>>>> what is it that is
>>>>>>>>>>> motivating a child when they play?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It seems to me that every action a
>>>>>>>>> child takes can be
>>>>>>>>>>> explicable in terms of its being
>>>>>>>>> part of a project, and the
>>>>>>>>>>> "Why are you doing that?" question
>>>>>>>>> gets the same kind of
>>>>>>>>>>> answer as it would for an adult at work.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A different kind of explanation is
>>>>>>>>> required for why a child
>>>>>>>>>>> is drawn to participate in what is
>>>>>>>>> after all an "imaginary"
>>>>>>>>>>> project, then gun does not fire
>>>>>>>>> bullets, the money is not
>>>>>>>>>>> coin of the realm, etc. I think in
>>>>>>>>> answering the question at
>>>>>>>>>>> that level we look at problems the
>>>>>>>>> child faces in being
>>>>>>>>>>> exlcuded from the real world and
>>>>>>>>> their attempts to overcome
>>>>>>>>>>> that. I don't know. But from the
>>>>>>>>> beginning a child it trying
>>>>>>>>>>> to extricate themselves from the
>>>>>>>>> trap of childishness.
>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Your helixes/helices seemed
>>>>>>>>> appropriate to the discussion, Martin.
>>>>>>>>>>>> XXX-history is cultural-
>>>>>>>>> historical genesis. And, as Steve suggested,
>>>>>>>>>>>> the twisted rope of many
>>>>>>>>> strands may be at the end of the rainbow of
>>>>>>>>>>>> promises.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been pondering David
>>>>>>>>> Ke's question about the
>>>>>>>>>>>> object/objective/motivation
>>>>>>>>> for play. It came together in my
>>>>>>>>>>> thinking with
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yrjo's metaphor of being
>>>>>>>>> always "just over the horizon" and its dual
>>>>>>>>>>>> material and ideal nature,
>>>>>>>>> most recently mentioned by
>>>>>>>>>>> Wolf-Michael. Might it
>>>>>>>>>>>> be the dream of being
>>>>>>>>> coordinated with a world entirely
>>>>>>>>>>> consistent with
>>>>>>>>>>>> one's own dreams? A world,
>>>>>>>>> extending, as Leslie White put it,
>>>>>>>>>>> that extends
>>>>>>>>>>>> from infinity to infinity,
>>>>>>>>> in both directions?
>>>>>>>>>>>> probably not, just wondering.
>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 2:55
>>>>>>>>> PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>> <http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=packer@duq.edu>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't mean to detract
>>>>>>>>> from the discussion with my playful
>>>>>>>>>>> helices. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>> haven't found time yet to
>>>>>>>>> read Sameroff's article, so I don't
>>>>>>>>>>> know if he is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposing that there is an
>>>>>>>>> antimony between nature and nurture
>>>>>>>>>>> in human
>>>>>>>>>>>>> development, or in our
>>>>>>>>> *conceptions* of development. I took Mike
>>>>>>>>>>> to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> suggesting, in his recent
>>>>>>>>> message, that when we pay attention to
>>>>>>>>>>> culture we
>>>>>>>>>>>>> can transcend that
>>>>>>>>> antimony, since culture is a 'second nature' that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> provides nurture, and since
>>>>>>>>> culture is the medium in which human
>>>>>>>>>>> brains and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> bodies grow, and since all
>>>>>>>>> nurture offered to the growing child
>>>>>>>>>>> is mediated
>>>>>>>>>>>>> by culture, and since
>>>>>>>>> culture has been transforming human nature
>>>>>>>>>>> throughout
>>>>>>>>>>>>> anthropogenesis through its
>>>>>>>>> selective evolutionary pressures.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Eric, yes, I should have
>>>>>>>>> added phylogenesis, not just biological
>>>>>>>>>>> evolution.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> What then is the "XX-
>>>>>>>>> genesis" term for history?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mar 14, 2010, at 9:55
>>>>>>>>> PM, Larry Purss wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems the double or
>>>>>>>>> triple helix is a significant way of
>>>>>>>>>>> trying to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> configure dynamic
>>>>>>>>> processes. However, what the particular
>>>>>>>>>>> specific double
>>>>>>>>>>>>> helix referred to in the
>>>>>>>>> article is pointing to is a very
>>>>>>>>>>> specific tension
>>>>>>>>>>>>> BETWEEN two specific
>>>>>>>>> constructs "Nature" and "nurture". The
>>>>>>>>>>> current debates
>>>>>>>>>>>>> raging about neuroscience
>>>>>>>>> on the one side and the tension with
>>>>>>>>>>> relational
>>>>>>>>>>>>> notions of development on
>>>>>>>>> the other hand (ie the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-other-
>>>>>>>>> object/representation triangle) suggest a dialectical
>>>>>>>>>>> tension
>>>>>>>>>>>>> which the article says may
>>>>>>>>> be INHERENT to development. To me
>>>>>>>>>>> this is asking
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a question about how the
>>>>>>>>> mind constructs significant social
>>>>>>>>>>> representations.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> What is specific
>>>>>>>>> about this particular double helix is the
>>>>>>>>>>> HISTORICAL
>>>>>>>>>>>>> salience of this SPECIFIC
>>>>>>>>> ANTIMONY through centuries of dialogue
>>>>>>>>>>> and theory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> My question is "Is there
>>>>>>>>> significance to the extended duration
>>>>>>>>>>> of this
>>>>>>>>>>>>> specific antimony through
>>>>>>>>> centuries. Does this historical
>>>>>>>>>>> engagement with
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the specific notions of
>>>>>>>>> nature and nurture have relevance for CHAT
>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussions. This is
>>>>>>>>> not to say other double or triple helix
>>>>>>>>>>> models may not
>>>>>>>>>>>>> have more explanatory power
>>>>>>>>> but that is not the specific
>>>>>>>>>>> question asked in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the article. The question
>>>>>>>>> being asked specifically is if this
>>>>>>>>>>> specific
>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature/nurture antinomy is
>>>>>>>>> inherent to the notion of
>>>>>>>>>>> development? Other
>>>>>>>>>>>>> double or triple helix's
>>>>>>>>> could be conceptualized within the
>>>>>>>>>>> nature/nurture
>>>>>>>>>>>>> antinomy but the question I
>>>>>>>>> believe is being asked is how relevant a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> dialectical (or
>>>>>>>>> alternatively dialogically) nature/nurture
>>>>>>>>>>> antinomy is to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> our primary (ontological??)
>>>>>>>>> notions of Development as a social
>>>>>>>>>>>>> representation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When I read the article,
>>>>>>>>> it seemed to capture the tension we are
>>>>>>>>>>>>> exploring about the place
>>>>>>>>> of neuroscience in our theories of
>>>>>>>>>>> development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> For some scholars one side
>>>>>>>>> or the other side is in ascendence and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> historically one side or
>>>>>>>>> the other is in ascendence. What the
>>>>>>>>>>> article is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> asking is if we must
>>>>>>>>> "INTEGRATE" what is often seen as in
>>>>>>>>>>> opposition and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> realize nature/nurture is
>>>>>>>>> in a figure/ground type of relational
>>>>>>>>>>> pattern
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (like the ying/yang visual
>>>>>>>>> representation) and the movement
>>>>>>>>>>> BETWEEN the two
>>>>>>>>>>>>> positions is basic to
>>>>>>>>> development.> > >>> Do others
>>>>> have thoughts on the specific question Arnie has
>>>>>>>>>>> asked in his
>>>>>>>>>>>>> article about the
>>>>>>>>> historical dynamic of the nature/nurture
>>>>>>>>>>> antinomy in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> developmental theories as
>>>>>>>>> well as in ontological and cultural
>>>>>>>>>>> historical
>>>>>>>>>>>>> development. This question
>>>>>>>>> speaks to me about the possible
>>>>>>>>>>> relevance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Moscovici's theory of
>>>>>>>>> social representations.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One alternative answer is
>>>>>>>>> to generate other double or triple
>>>>>>>>>>> helix models
>>>>>>>>>>>>> which may become social
>>>>>>>>> representations over time as they are
>>>>>>>>>>> debated in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> community of inquiry but
>>>>>>>>> the article as written is pointing to a
>>>>>>>>>>> very
>>>>>>>>>>>>> salient social
>>>>>>>>> representation within our Western tradition. Does
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> recognition of its
>>>>>>>>> historical roots change how we view this
>>>>>>>>>>> particular
>>>>>>>>>>>>> antinomy?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----
>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: Martin Packer
>>>>>>>>> <packer@duq.edu> >
>>>>>
>> <http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=packer@duq.edu>>> >
>>>>>> Date: Sunday, March 14, 2010 4:59 pm
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca]
>>>>>>>>> Dialects of Development- Sameroff
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind,
>>>>>>>>> Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>> <http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>>> > >>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's right, Steve,
>>>>>>>>> though I'm pretty sure I didn't see this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> title until after I made
>>>>>>>>> the diagram. And of course Lewontin is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> referring to different
>>>>>>>>> factors. And, also, of course, collagen
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually does have a
>>>>>>>>> triple-helix structure, which Francis Crick
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thought was more
>>>>>>>>> interesting than the double helix of DNA, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which got very little
>>>>>>>>> attention.> > >>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mar 14, 2010, at 7:53
>>>>>>>>> PM, Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the triple helix
>>>>>>>>> metaphor: Richard Lewontin used it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the title of his
>>>>>>>>> 1998/2000 collection of essays _The Triple
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helix: Gene, Organism and
>>>>>>>>> Environment_. His core theme
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> regarding biological
>>>>>>>>> development is that solely considering the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interaction between gene
>>>>>>>>> and organism makes for bad
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> biology. The
>>>>>>>>> environment has decisive influence as well.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - Steve
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mar 14, 2010, at
>>>>>>>>> 10:20 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mar 14, 2010, at
>>>>>>>>> 1:04 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What do others think
>>>>>>>>> of the double helix (and/or the other
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> visual images in the
>>>>>>>>> article). How central is the double helix
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (either as an "is Like"
>>>>>>>>> or "IS" objectification) to your notions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the human sciences?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ...and I am pretty sure
>>>>>>>>> I stole, I mean appropriated, this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from someone; I've
>>>>>>>>> forgotten who...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <PastedGraphic-2.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>> <http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> >
>>>>>>>>>
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >>>>>>
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>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>>>>>>>
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >>>>>>
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>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>>>>>>
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >>>>>>
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>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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>>>>>>>>>>> -- ----------
>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------
>> ----
>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>>>>>>>>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel,
>>>>>>>>> Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
>>>>>>>>>>> Ilyenkov $20 ea
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________>
>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> -- ----------------------------------------------------
>> ----
>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>> ------------
>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>>>>>>>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev,
>>>>> Meshcheryakov,
>>>>>>>>> Ilyenkov $20 ea
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------------------
>> ----
>>>>> ---------
>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>>>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
>>>>> Ilyenkov $20 ea
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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