Re: [xmca] The strange situation

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Goldberg was trained by Luria, so the dynamics you describe have a familiar
ring.
mike


On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 4:10 PM, Monica Hansen <
monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu> wrote:

> Thanks for this reference, Eric.
>
> I am juggling a few balls in the air right now and would be interested in
> comparing this and other references to metacognitive process and/or
> structure.
>
> I am considering the use nonverbal components of a learning activity and
> how
> they can support/activate/mediate the transfer of implicit (unconscious)
> knowledge to explicit(conscious/declarative) knowledge. For me this echoes
> concept development. I have been trying to assemble an understanding of the
> development of neuroanatomical structures underlying memory, activation and
> use.
>
> Has anyone come across references to Elkhonon Goldberg's work on function
> of
> the frontal lobes, novelty and routinization, or ambiguity and choice in
> conjunction with implications for instruction and assessment in the
> classroom setting?
>
> In his book the New Executive Brain (2009) he discusses the relationship
> between the two hemispheres of the brain as being dynamic and
> "characterized
> by a gradual shift in the locus of cognitive control over a task from right
> hemisphere to left hemisphere." He is careful to point out that what is
> novel to one person is not novel to another, and that what is novel changes
> over time. Also he is not speaking of a literal transfer of information
> from
> one side to the other but discusses how activation of images in both
> hemispheres work together in accessing prior knowledge. He does not imply
> an
> oversimplification. And of course this is all driven by components of time,
> motivation, and attention which shift with the individual. Goldberg reminds
> us that neurobiology is not static, and criticizes diagnostic and
> assessment
> tools that treat the matter of the mind as such.
>
> Still thinking about concept development...all our words and terms for
> aspects of concept development...levels of abstraction
>
> Monica
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
> Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 8:45 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] The strange situation
>
> Yes Nancy:
>
> Thank you for the clarification on that.  Valsiner refers to it as the
> "process structure of semiotic mediation in Human Development," but does
> not specifically bring up metacognition I believe.  I have not read the
> article in a while but he spells it out in the following:
>
>
> Process structure of semiotic mediation in human development. Human
> Development, 44, 84-97
>
> for those interested,
> eric
>
>
>
>
> Nancy Mack <nancy.mack@wright.edu>
> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> 03/26/2010 10:19 AM
> Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>
>
>        To:     "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>        cc:     "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>        Subject:        Re: [xmca] The strange situation
>
>
> I see this as the development of metacognition. One of Vygotsky's major
> philosophical themes is survival and adaptation. Humans develop thought
> patterns that respond to the experience and make adaptations enough to
> compute or communicate or plant in order to survive. The next level of
> thought is a reflection on that experience in which the abstraction is
> made that can be applied to another experience.
>
> For the most part, learners will just do the instrumental task without
> reflection unless there is some motivation to reflect metacognitively.
>
> I am more convinced than ever that learning without metacognitive
> reflection is not of much value for self-control or adaptation.
> Metacognition will get the learner to the higher psychological functions
> of thought.
>
> Nancy
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
> Date: Friday, March 26, 2010 10:12 am
> Subject: Re: [xmca] The strange situation
> To: lchcmike@gmail.com, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
> > As always I will venture into the possibility of being
> > irrelevant; but
> > consider the following:
> >
> > Vygotsky (1934/1999) writes,
> > Adolescence, therefore, is less a period of completion than one
> > of crisis
> > and transition. The transitional character of adolescent
> > thinking becomes
> > especially evident when we observe the actual functioning of the
> > newly
> > acquired concepts. Experiments specially devised to study the
> > adolescent's
> > operations with concepts bring out, in the first place, a
> > striking
> > discrepancy between his ability to form concepts and his ability
> > to define
> > them. The adolescent will form and use a concept quite correctly
> > in a
> > concrete situation, but will find it strangely difficult to
> > express that
> > concept in words, and the verbal definition will, in most cases,
> > be much
> > narrower than might have been expected from the way he used the
> > concept.
> > The same discrepancy occurs also in adult thinking, even at very
> > advanced
> > levels. This confirms the assumption that concepts evolve in
> > ways
> > differing from deliberate conscious elaborations of experience
> > in logical
> > terms. Analysis of reality with the help of concepts precedes
> > analysis of
> > the concepts themselves. (p. 141)
> > Vygotsky clearly distinguishes between what an adolescent knows,
> > what an
> > adolescent can verbalize and how that same adolescent may
> > perform
> > activities that validate that knowledge.
> > Describing an experiment conducted by Vygotsky and his
> > colleagues will
> > illustrate the correlation of psychological tool use to a
> > person's
> > cognitive development. The study can be referred to as the
> > "forbidden
> > color" experiment. It consists of two trials. The experimenter
> > provides
> > the subject with the direction that they are forbidden from
> > using certain
> > hues to describe colored geometric figures being displayed. In
> > one trial
> > the subject is given cards to remind them of the forbidden hue,
> > in the
> > other they must describe the displayed figure without cards. The
> > results
> > of the study showed that preschool age students made as many
> > mistakes with
> > the cards as without, that adolescents made many more mistakes
> > during the
> > trial without the cards and that adults were similar in the
> > amount of
> > mistakes made with the memory aids as without the cards
> > (Vygotsky, 1997b).
> > Vygotsky concluded that the use of the cards by the adolescents
> > showed
> > their dependence on the provided psychological tools. The impact
> > of this
> > conclusion on the assessment of an adolescent's abilities is
> > staggering,
> > especially for a transition teacher who must assess a student's
> > community
> > based abilities. If the adolescent is depending upon provided
> > external
> > psychological tools as opposed to internalized psychological
> > tools, then
> > it is discriminatory to assess the adolescent's community-based
> > abilities
> > via school-bound instruments. Having a student fill out a
> > questionnaire
> > and interviewing the mother over the phone about her son's
> > abilities is a
> > far cry from observing the same student plan a meal, shop for a
> > meal and
> > cook a meal.
> > I have always considered Seth Chaiklin's idea of the zpd being
> > the
> > measurement of a child's potential growth.  So perhaps the
> > following idea
> > is not zpd but similar and very relevant:  Zoped: a
> > culturally based
> > activity that provides an opportunity for individuals to apply
> > scientific
> > concepts to everyday experiences via the assistance of somebody
> > more
> > experienced with the scientific concepts related to the goals of
> > the
> > culturally based activity.
> >
> > what do other's think?
> >
> > eric
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> > Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > 03/25/2010 10:49 AM
> > Please respond to lchcmike; Please respond to "eXtended Mind,
> > Culture,
> > Activity"
> >
> >
> >
> > To:     "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>        cc:
> >
> > Subject:        Re: [xmca]
> > The strange situation
> >
> >
> > I will not err by entering into this discussion until I am sure
> > I am not
> > being irrelevant. Two brief comments that I think are probably not
> > irrelevant.
> >
> > 1. A lot of work has been done along lines initiated by eleanor
> > r in the
> > 1970's. I will check for an update of the current thinking along
> > lines she
> > started and see what I can find.
> >
> > 2. It may be worth people's while to remember that Davydov had
> > his own
> > criticism of Vygotsky's notion of scientific concept which
> > clearly does go
> > back to Hegel. For a summary of the discussion, see Engestrom,
> > Ch. 4  at
> >
> > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/ch4.htm
> >
> > mike
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 8:08 AM, Steve Gabosch
> > <stevegabosch@me.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Thank you VERY much for this, David.  You have just
> > completely
> > re-oriented
> > > me to Ch6sect6 - I feel like I woke up and turned a light on
> > and
> > discovered
> > > I had only been getting 1/3 of it, and now I am getting 2/3 of that
> > > difficult and fascinating section.  This was extremely
> > helpful.  I am
> > > finding that the more I set aside what I thought I knew about
> > concept> formation from Ch5, the more I understand Ch6.
> > >
> > > What is your take on the relationship between the
> > pseudoconcept of Ch5
> > and
> > > the preconcept of Ch6?
> > >
> > > - Steve
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Mar 24, 2010, at 10:02 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> > >
> > >  Andy, Steve:
> > >>
> > >> Take a look at these. The translations are my own but the
> > page numbers
> > >> suggest the corresponding bits in your Minick translation.
> > >>
> > >> "We have first of all succeeded in discovering that generality
> > >> (differences in generality) does not coincide with the
> > structure of
> > >> generalization and its different stages such as we found them
> > in our
> > >> experimental study on the formation of concepts: syncretic images,
> > >> complexes, preconcepts, and concepts. (roughly, p. 225 in
> > your Minick)"
> > >>
> > >> You can see from this that "preconcepts" is NOT a general
> > term
> > including
> > >> syncretisms, complexes any more than "rose" is a general term
> > including>> daisies and daffodils.
> > >>
> > >> "In the first place, concepts of different generality are
> > possible in a
> > >> same generalization structure. For example, in the structure
> > of
> > concepts by
> > >> complexes it is possible for concepts of different levels of
> > generality
> > to
> > >> exist: flower, and rose. In truth, we must state a
> > reservation from the
> > very
> > >> outset, that is to say that the relationship of
> > generalization
> > "flower-rose"
> > >> will be different in each structure of generalization, for example,
> > >> different in the structure of complexes from in the structure of
> > >> preconcepts." (225)
> > >>
> > >> We can see from this that LSV does NOT consider a preconcept
> > to be a
> > >> complex.
> > >>
> > >> "Thanks to the analysis of the real concepts of the child, we
> > have been
> > >> able to study some less well-known properties of syncretic
> > formations,>> complexes, and preconcepts and to establish what
> > in each of these
> > spheres of
> > >> thinking is shown to be different in the relationship with
> > the object
> > as
> > >> well as the apprehension of the object by thought, that is to
> > say, how
> > the
> > >> two fundamental elements which characterize concepts are
> > revealed to be
> > >> different from one stage to another." (228)
> > >>
> > >> Once again, "preconcepts" are not the preconceptual
> > functional
> > equivalents
> > >> of concepts (that is, they are not a hypernym for syncretic
> > heaps and
> > >> complexes). But here Vygotsky suggests that there are two
> > processes and
> > not
> > >> one at work in concept formation.
> > >>
> > >> One is indeed a form of activity: it's a relationship with
> > the object,
> > >> e.g. ostension, indication, and naming. But the other is "the
> > apprehension
> > >> of the object by thought", the way in which the object is
> > represented>> (reflected/refracted/semiotically reproduced) by
> > the mind.
> > >>
> > >>  "What we have managed to establish here with respect to
> > the passage
> > from
> > >> the preconcepts of the schoolchild to the concepts of the
> > adolescent is
> > the
> > >> same thing that we managed to establish in the preceding
> > study with
> > respect
> > >> to the passage of generalized perceptions to general
> > representations,
> > that
> > >> is to say syncretic formations and complexes." (230)
> > >>
> > >> This appears to be a direct reference to Chapter Five. In
> > 1931, LSV
> > >> considered this to be a study of concept formation in
> > ADOLESCENTS. But
> > now
> > >> he appears to have changed his mind: the previous chapter is
> > concerned
> > with
> > >> the passage from generalized perceptions to general
> > representations,
> > and is
> > >> thus a matter of preschoolers. This is quite consistent with
> > what Paula
> > did
> > >> with three year olds to eight year olds.
> > >>
> > >> "Just as in that case it turned out that a new stage in the
> > development
> > of
> > >> generalizations can only be attained by the transformation,
> > not the
> > >> annulment, of the preceding stage, by the generalization of
> > the objects
> > >> already generalized, not by proceeding anew from the
> > generalization of
> > >> single objects, in the same way here the study has shown that
> > the
> > transition
> > >> from preconcepts (of which the typical example is the
> > arithmetical
> > concept
> > >> of the school child) to the true concepts of the adolescent
> > (of which
> > the
> > >> typical example is the algebraic concept) happens through the
> > generalization
> > >> of objects which have already been generalized."
> > >>
> > >> And here we see why! The generalized perception is the
> > PRECONDITION of
> > the
> > >> general representation. And the general representation is the
> > precondition
> > >> of the concept. The example he gives us is numbers.
> > >>
> > >> Of course, at the very lowest level, numbers really are the
> > result of
> > the
> > >> activity of the perceptible and perceptual activity of
> > counting. But
> > take
> > >> away the objects, and the number remains as a generalized
> > representation.
> > >> And when we take away the number, and deal only with the
> > realtion of
> > number,
> > >> the concept remains.
> > >>
> > >> "The preconcept is the abstraction of the number, detached
> > from the
> > object
> > >> and, founded on this abstraction, the generalization of the
> > numerical>> properties of the object. The concept is the
> > abstraction detached from
> > the
> > >> number and, founded on it, the generalization of any relation
> > between>> numbers. But the abstraction and generalization of
> > ideas differs
> > >> fundamentally from the abstraction and the generalization of
> > things. It
> > is
> > >> not a pursuit of movement in the same direction or its
> > culmination, it
> > is
> > >> the beginning of a movement in a new direction, a transition
> > to a new
> > and
> > >> higher plane of thinking. (230)"
> > >>
> > >> This of course returns us to a point that Vygotsky made in
> > the very
> > first
> > >> chapter and returns again to in the very last: the
> > "dialectical leap"
> > is not
> > >> simply from inanimate to animate, but from perception to thinking.
> > >>
> > >> There is a qualitative difference between the abstraction and
> > >> generalization of perceptions and the abstraction and
> > generalization of
> > >> thoughts; they are distinct processes, and the word
> > "activity" applies
> > much
> > >> more accurately to the former than the latter.
> > >>
> > >> David Kellogg
> > >> Seoul National University of Education
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> --- On Wed, 3/24/10, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] The strange situation
> > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> Date: Wednesday, March 24, 2010, 9:30 PM
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Steve, briefly and without references, my take was:
> > >>
> > >> * *preconcepts* are a family name for all the thought-forms
> > prior to
> > true
> > >> concepts and so includes potential concepts, pseduoconcepts,
> > complexes.
> > etc.
> > >>
> > >> * *potential concepts* are, as far as I can, see the highest
> > type of
> > >> pseudoconcept, marked by its "transferability" to different
> > sensory
> > fields.
> > >> Here the attributes have been completely isolated from their
> > substratum.
> > >>
> > >> * *complex* is a family name for a whole group of forms
> > including both
> > >> pseudo- and potential concepts.
> > >>
> > >> Andy
> > >>
> > >> Steve Gabosch wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> David, thanks again for these extremely useful files of your
> > translations
> > >>> of T&S from Meccaci, Seve, Prout, and your Korean
> > team.  I am in awe
> > of the
> > >>> work you did, and are still doing.
> > >>>
> > >>> I thought where we got stuck last year was on that pesky
> > creature from
> > Ch
> > >>> 5, the 'potential concept,' not the clearer concept,
> > 'pseudoconcept'.
> > I
> > >>> think Vygotsky leaves no doubt that the pseudoconcept is a
> > complex.  I
> > am
> > >>> still struggling with precisely what a potential concept is.
> > >>>
> > >>> Both complicated concepts, potential concept and
> > pseudoconcept, seem
> > to
> > >>> be subsumed into the Ch 6 term 'preconcept'.  That move
> > gives us a
> > simpler
> > >>> term, but leaves many questions unanswered.  It leaves
> > us little
> > choice but
> > >>> to investigate concept formation ourselves.
> > >>>
> > >>> Martin, I would be most interested, when you have the time,
> > if you
> > took
> > >>> your recent very excellent questions and reframed them, or
> > more
> > precisely,
> > >>> sharpened them, in light of Ch 6.  I think some
> > important work can be
> > done
> > >>> analyzing Ch 5 in terms of Ch 6 - and looking at Ch 6,
> > especially
> > section 6,
> > >>> in terms of Ch 5.
> > >>>
> > >>> Apparently about 3, 4 or 5 years did separate the main
> > writing of
> > these
> > >>> two chapters, as you and Paula suggest.  On one hand,
> > there is an
> > explosion
> > >>> of ideas in Ch 6 sect 6 that are barely touched on or
> > anticipated in
> > Ch 5.
> > >>>  On the other hand, the rich, specific ideas in Ch 5
> > are
> > insufficiently
> > >>> dealt in light of the new, general ideas in Ch 6 sect
> > 6.  Vygotsky
> > left that
> > >>> challenge to us as well.
> > >>>
> > >>> - Steve
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> On Mar 24, 2010, at 5:35 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>>  Martin, Steve:
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Last night I showed a picture of an iguana to my graduate
> > seminar and
> > >>>> asked what it was. Everybody said it was an ALLIGATOR. This
> > is
> > strange,
> > >>>> because the word "iguana" exists as a loan word from
> > English in
> > Korean, and
> > >>>> in fact everybody confirmed that they knew the word, but
> > the word
> > >>>> "alligator" does not exist in Korean and instead we use a
> > Chinese
> > loan word
> > >>>> (literally, "evil fish").
> > >>>>
> > >>>> What this means is that my grads have the WORD but not the
> > CONCEPT of
> > >>>> Iguana--it is an example of a concept for others but not
> > for myself.
> > This is
> > >>>> not the only situation where that is true, of course. For
> > example,
> > the words
> > >>>> "Miss" and "Mister" also exist in Korean as loan words, but
> > they are
> > quite
> > >>>> impolite and used to refer to social inferiors (bar girls,
> > prostitutes,
> > >>>> secretaries or waiters or male underlings of one kind or
> > another).
> > Here too
> > >>>> the concept of the English polite form of address exists as
> > a word
> > but not
> > >>>> as a concept.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Last year I suggested to Steve that in Chapter Six Vygotsky
> > uses the
> > >>>> word "preconcept" to refer to this situation, and that
> > therefore the
> > word
> > >>>> "preconcept" is used in preference to "pseudoconcept" in
> > Chapter Six.
> > Steve
> > >>>> objected that Chapter Five clearly says that a
> > pseudoconcept is not a
> > >>>> concept at all, but a complex, while Chapter Six says that
> > it is
> > indeed a
> > >>>> concept, although not a concept for myself.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> I'm still unconvinced. As Steve says there really IS a
> > shift of
> > opinion
> > >>>> on a number of issues in Chapter Six (the carry over from
> > one
> > structure of
> > >>>> generalization to another, for example, and also the issue
> > of whether
> > >>>> concepts can be taught to pre-adolescents). The word
> > "pseudoconcept",
> > which
> > >>>> is so misleading that it even confuses LSV himself
> > sometimes, is not
> > LSV's
> > >>>> coinage; he took it from the Sterns,who took it from
> > somebody else.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> So it seems to me that "pseudoconcept" in Chapter Five is a
> > concept
> > for
> > >>>> others (for the Sterns), and it only becomes a concept for
> > LSV
> > himself in
> > >>>> Chapter Six!
> > >>>>
> > >>>>  David Kellogg
> > >>>> Seoul National University of Education
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Attached is OUR re-reading of Chapter Six, here in
> > Seoul.Sorry about
> > the
> > >>>> Korean!
> > >>>>
> > >>>> --- On Wed, 3/24/10, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> > >>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
> > >>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] The strange situation
> > >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>>> Date: Wednesday, March 24, 2010, 12:57 PM
> > >>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Thanks, Steve,
> > >>>>
> > >>>> I've been putting off re-reading chapter 6, but I have to
> > bite the
> > >>>> bullet soon. I was thinking that trying to figure out what
> > LSV had
> > come up
> > >>>> with and written about in chap 5 (and Paula has pointed out
> > that he
> > seems to
> > >>>> have had this figured out by 1930) would itself be
> > valuable. But you
> > make a
> > >>>> cogent argument.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Martin
> > >>>>
> > >>>> On Mar 24, 2010, at 1:39 PM, Steve Gabosch wrote:
> > >>>>
> > >>>>  These are really, really good questions,
> > Martin.  All worth very
> > >>>>> serious exploration.
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> My take on Chapter 5, after doing some study of it, and
> > Chapter 6,
> > last
> > >>>>> year with David Ke. and Paula T., and some discussion here
> > on xmca,
> > is that
> > >>>>> Ch 5 might be best understood in terms of Chapter 6,
> > especially
> > section 6
> > >>>>> starting on pg 224 of Vol 1.  Here Vygotsky gets to
> > his major
> > theoretical
> > >>>>> discussion of systems of concepts, and critiques the
> > limitations of
> > the
> > >>>>> block experiments on page 228 and 229.
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> He explains that the block experiment "ignored the fact
> > that **each
> > new
> > >>>>> stage in the development of generalization depends on the
> > generalizations
> > >>>>> found in the preceding stages.**"  pg 229.  He
> > was critical of the
> > block
> > >>>>> experiment not revealing connections or transitions
> > between the
> > stages of
> > >>>>> concept development.  He felt he was able to reveal
> > these
> > connections with
> > >>>>> the experiments described in Chapter 6.
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> It is important to emphasize that he does not at all
> > **reject** the
> > >>>>> work described in Chapter 5 - the syncretic heap,
> > complexes, and
> > what he now
> > >>>>> calls preconcepts (was pseudoconcepts), and true concepts,
> > are still
> > intact
> > >>>>> - but he **adds** a whole new level of theorizing that he
> > saw as
> > crucial -
> > >>>>> suggestions for solutions to "the central problem" of his
> > research
> > in
> > >>>>> Chapter 6, involving systems and relationships of
> > generality, the
> > law of
> > >>>>> concept equivalence (any concept can be represented
> > through other
> > concepts
> > >>>>> in an infinite number of ways), measures of generality,
> > systems of
> > concepts,
> > >>>>> etc.  Vygotsky's most advanced thinking about concept
> > formation is
> > here in
> > >>>>> this section.  And some of your very good questions
> > are addressed.
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> This is why I think that Chapter 5 needs to be seen as
> > something of
> > a
> > >>>>> building block toward section 6 in Chapter 6, and that it
> > might be
> > easier to
> > >>>>> read Chapter 6 sect 6 first and work backwards, or work
> > them
> > together as one
> > >>>>> study.  And don't forget that Vygotsky's publisher or
> > maybe even
> > Vygotsky
> > >>>>> himself got longitude and latitude backwards in the globe
> > metaphor
> > when he
> > >>>>> explains the law of concept equivalence! (pg 226)  LOL
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> Chapter 6 as a whole, of course, has much material on
> > everyday vs
> > >>>>> scientific concepts, as well as the oft-quoted passages on
> > the zone
> > of
> > >>>>> proximal development, so that difficult section 6 in Ch 6
> > kind of
> > gets
> > >>>>> overshadowed, and maybe a little disconnected from Chapter
> > 5.  The
> > two need
> > >>>>> to be dialectically joined, I believe, to really grasp
> > what Vygotsky
> > was
> > >>>>> trying to do in both chapters.  And there is also
> > some discussion on
> > pg 189
> > >>>>> in section 2 in Chapter 6, and maybe a few other places in
> > that
> > chapter,
> > >>>>> about complexes and so forth, that may also shed some
> > helpful light
> > on some
> > >>>>> specifics in Chapter 5.
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> - Steve
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> On Mar 23, 2010, at 1:25 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>  I am taking the liberty of recycling this subject
> > heading, after
> > >>>>>> having spent some time re-reading the posts over the
> > weekend. I
> > seem to have
> > >>>>>> played a large part in hijacking this thread some time
> > last year,
> > with my
> > >>>>>> obsession over the meaning of the term 'reflection.'
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> So this message is partly penance, but it also me trying
> > to make
> > sense
> > >>>>>> of LSV's block task and what it tells us about his views
> > of
> > concepts, and
> > >>>>>> their development. I find myself with the following questions:
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> 1. It seems to be the case that in chapter 5 LSV doesn't
> > mention
> > the
> > >>>>>> distinction between everyday concepts and scientific
> > concepts. Is
> > it at all
> > >>>>>> possible that what in chapter 6 he calls "everyday
> > concepts" are
> > what he
> > >>>>>> refers to in chapter 5 as complexes? I suspect not, but
> > the
> > question seems
> > >>>>>> worth asking.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> 2. LSV seems to offer not one but two explanations of how
> > the child
> > >>>>>> (or rather the adolescent) forms concepts. The first
> > explanation is
> > that
> > >>>>>> concepts arise from the advanced application of the
> > processes of
> > >>>>>> generalization and abstraction, specifically that the
> > word is now
> > used
> > >>>>>> functionally for voluntary control of attention,
> > permitting a
> > mastery of
> > >>>>>> these processes. The second explanation is based on the
> > phenotypical
> > >>>>>> identity and functional similarity of concepts and
> > pseudoconcepts.
> > The
> > >>>>>> latter are actually complexes, but they look like
> > concepts and so
> > when child
> > >>>>>> and adult interact the adult takes them to be concepts.
> > The child
> > is in a
> > >>>>>> sense then using concepts without knowing it, and LSV
> > appeals to
> > the
> > >>>>>> familiar Hegelian process of in-itself, for-others, for-
> > self, to
> > explain how
> > >>>>>> this "internal contradiction"is the "basic genetic
> > prerequisite"
> > for the
> > >>>>>> rise of true concepts.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> I'm not suggesting that these two explanations are
> > incompatible or
> > >>>>>> mutually exclusive. But LSV does not seem to try to bring
> > them
> > together.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> 3. In other words, this second explanation is another
> > case of
> > >>>>>> "internalization," and the application of the general
> > genetic law
> > of
> > >>>>>> cultural development. But LSV adds that this "peculiar
> > genetic
> > situation" in
> > >>>>>> the move from pseudoconcepts to concepts should be
> > considered the
> > general
> > >>>>>> rule rather than the exception in children's intellectual
> > development. Does
> > >>>>>> this not suggest that this same kind of process occurs as
> > the child
> > moves
> > >>>>>> from heaps to complexes?
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> 4. Generalization and abstraction are the two "channels"
> > in the
> > >>>>>> development of concepts - LSV refers to them also as
> > "complexing"
> > and
> > >>>>>> "segregating." The first is very familiar by the time we
> > get to
> > chapter 5:
> > >>>>>> he has been writing about the way a word is a
> > generalization since
> > the start
> > >>>>>> (this is where as David has pointed out we find the
> > quotation from
> > Sapir.)
> > >>>>>> But abstraction seems to appear out of nowhere. Is there
> > a
> > treatment of
> > >>>>>> abstraction/segregating elsewhere in the book that I have
> > missed?>>>>>>
> > >>>>>> 5. LSV seems to get to the end of chapter 5 without ever
> > telling us
> > >>>>>> exactly what a concept it.  He suggests that it
> > involves hierarchy,
> > and
> > >>>>>> connections that are abstract, essential, and
> > homogeneous. He
> > proposes that
> > >>>>>> particular and general are linked. He adds that "most
> > important" is
> > "the
> > >>>>>> unity of form and content," for this is what makes
> > thinking in
> > concepts a
> > >>>>>> "real revolution." Can anyone pull these somewhat diverse
> > (complexive?)
> > >>>>>> characteristics together for me? Do they harmonize with
> > the
> > treatment of
> > >>>>>> concepts (of both kinds) in chapter 6?
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> 6. Finally, less a question than an observation. LSV
> > writes at the
> > >>>>>> close of chapter 5 of the way that "Concept thinking is a
> > new form
> > of
> > >>>>>> intellectual activity, a new mode of conduct, a new
> > intellectual
> > mechanism.
> > >>>>>> The intellect is able to find a new and unprecedented
> > modus
> > operandi in this
> > >>>>>> particular activity and a new function becomes available
> > within the
> > system
> > >>>>>> of intellectual functions which is distinctive both in
> > its
> > composition and
> > >>>>>> structure as well as in the way it functions." I take
> > this as a
> > clear
> > >>>>>> indication that for LSV a concept is not simply a new
> > kind of
> > mental
> > >>>>>> representation. It is, as Rosch proposes, a new way of
> > relating to
> > the
> > >>>>>> world.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Any guidance through this thicket will be gratefully accepted!
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Martin
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > >>>>>> xmca mailing list
> > >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> _______________________________________________
> > >>>>> xmca mailing list
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> > >>>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>> _______________________________________________
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> > >>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>> <Chapter six
> > all.doc>_______________________________________________>>>> xmca
> > mailing list
> > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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> > >>>>
> > >>>
> > >>> _______________________________________________
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> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >> --
> > >>
> > -----------------------------------------------------------------
> > -------
> > >> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > >> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
> > Ilyenkov
> > $20
> > >> ea
> > >>
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> > >>
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