RE: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit

[ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org]

David:

Nice post, regardless of the curse words.  My example was not intended to 
provide distaste but was the first example that came to mind where a child 
speaks a word they have obviously heard but are unfamiliar with its usage 
(except for perhaps hearing it as an exclamation of excitement). 
Linguistic chops aside I believe that the child using the profanity is an 
expansion of their developmental level.

Pertaining to Vygotsky I believe that the ZPD is a growth of his view that 
the child begins by imitating and that the growth occurs as that imitation 
is expanded (ala engstrom) into ever exceeding levels of conceptual 
understanding.  George Carlin did not curse in his comedy acts because of 
a lack of esteem but rather as an ever expanding conceptual understanding 
of both language and the human condition.

eric

p.s.  I see persistant cursing in the adolescent as a lack of vocabulary 
rather than esteem

p.p.s  sometimes two cents gets u nuthin and somtimes it meets the need, 
don't know which one this post is though






David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
02/22/2010 08:01 PM
Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"

 
        To:     Culture ActivityeXtended Mind <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
        cc: 
        Subject:        RE: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit


Warning: this posting contains some foul language, which is semantically 
meaningless and syntactically vacuous, but obeys very interesting 
phonological regularities, and for, I think, a very good reason.
 
eric
 
When I say "fuck you" (which I only do in linguistic circles, for reasons 
that will soon be apparent), I do not actually have any sexual act in mind 
at all, and the semantic meaning cannot actually be performed as the 
imperative that it syntactically appears to be (you cannot actually fuck 
yourself, even if you are linguist; it takes two, figuratively, to tango). 

 
However, foul language DOES have phonological rules. One of the earliest 
linguistics papers I read as an undergraduate at the University of Chicago 
was called about why you can say "fan-fucking-tastic" but you cannot say 
"fantast-fucking-tic". Or, to give it a transparent Bowdlerization, 
why Eliza Doolittle, in "My Fair Lady" sings:
 
Oh, so, loverly sittin' abso-bloomin'-lootely still
I would never budge till spring, crept, over me window-sill!
Someone's 'ead restin' on my knee...warm an' tender as 'e could be
Oo tykes good care of me, Oww--wouldn't it be loverly?
 
Why "Abso-blooming-lutely still" and not "Ab-blooming-solutely still" or 
"Absolute-blooming-ly still"?
 
You know Wittgenstein spends a big part of "Philosophical Investigations" 
trying to debunk the Vygoskyan model of the concept, and the example he 
hits upon is that of "games". Games, according to Wittgenstein, have no 
single trait in common, either internal or external, and are best thought 
of as a family where everybody resembles each other to some extent or 
another but there is no underlying common essence. 
 
I think Vygotsky would be perfectly happy to say that games and play in 
general are preconceptual, a potential concept rather than an actual one, 
and the idea of "family resemblances" is exactly what Vygotsky uses to 
describe complexes (in Chapter Five of Thinking and Speech). But play IS a 
potential concept, that is, a concept for others (scientists and 
thinkers) and potentially one for myself (children and other players). 
 
Vygotsky points out that all forms of play have not one but TWO things in 
common: the imaginary situation, and the abstract rule. It's just that at 
the beginning of development one is explicit and the other is implicit, 
and by the end of development the roles are reversed. 
 
We can call these ROLE play and RULE play ("guileless deceit" and 
"gratuitous difficulty" were really just my attempts to describe how they 
might feel from the user's point of view.) But let me add one MORE 
element. At the very beginning of development, the period that Vygotsky 
calls "pseudo-play"--there is a form of play that is really just ROTE 
repetition. 
 
So foul language does not have any "role play", that is, no role to play 
in communication or reflection, and it doesn't have any "rule play", that 
is, no rules at the semantic or syntactic level. Yet it clearly is 
intimately linked to our emotional life, and it obeys phonological rules. 
Why is this?
 
It seems to me that foul language is a linguistic fossil of ROTE play, 
of the period Vygotsky calls "pseudoplay", that is, play for others but 
not for myself. Vygotsky notes that most of this is repetitious activity 
of a sensorimotor sort (the sort of nose-scratching and ear-pulling and 
hair-twisting that my undergrads do when I rabbit on for too long). Foul 
language seems very similar to me, and I think it's no accident that 
mindless foul language is often a symptom of Asperger's.
 
Why should we call it play at all? Well, of course, Vygotsky doesn't. But 
it seems to me that there are two ways in which it is LINKED to 
play. First of all, mindless repetition DOES lead to the creation of a 
kind of ideal, potential, model of an action; when children color for 
example, they do so by repeating and ordering the kinds of motions they 
use for scribbling. Secondly, there is a sense in which role play involves 
repeating the SPEAKER but varying the SPEECH in much the same way that 
rote play involved repeating the SPEECH. 
 
I think this is why Vygotsky and Voloshinov were both so struck by 
the variation-and-repetition of foul language in Dostoevsky's diary. There 
is some debate about whether Vygotsky got the example (which is quoted 
almost exactly) from Voloshinov, or whether they both took it from an 
article on "dialogic speech" by Jakubinsky. It seems to me that 
since Voloshinov and Vygotsky were BOTH working at the Herzen Pedagogic 
Academy in Leningrad at exactly the same time (1933-1934), the former 
seems very likely. 
 
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education 
 
PS: I had a grad student, an EXTREMELY conscientious teacher and mother 
who had a tendency to want to study anything that cropped up in class. She 
discovered, through a foreign co-teacher, that some of the kids had 
learned a variety of swear words (from movies) and were using them, and 
she determined to make this her thesis topic. 
 
Her initial thesis was that kids swear because they "lack self-esteem". 
Like many working hunches, this turned out to be very well founded, 
although couched in a language I would call a little too hardworking and 
not quite hunchy enough (viz, if we help the kids feel better about 
themselves they will stop swearing). 
 
When I started looking at examples, I noticed that the kids tend to swear 
in situations where they can't really follow or understand, and swearing 
was a kind of emphatic, parodic, almost satirical expression of the 
MEANINGLESSNESS, that is, the rote quality, of English in class.
 
Unfortunately, my grad found it almost impossible to discuss the actual 
examples she gathered, so we had to broaden the topic to include 
dispreferred and negative language quite generally. But I still get quite 
a thrill from looking at the data that has absolutely nothing to do with 
its (nonexistent) semantic or syntactic properties.
 
dk

--- On Mon, 2/22/10, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:


From: ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>
Subject: RE: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Monday, February 22, 2010, 8:02 AM


Such a wonderful discussion occuring pertaining to development and the 
consequent study!

The stretching of an experience by play does appear to touch on how 
emotions pertain to development.  I just consider the different 
experiences i had as a child and have observed as both teacher and parent 
and know that without emotions then an experience is devoid of meaning. 
Associating "more" with food makes perfect sense when attached to emotion 
and so the context and the societal sense of a situation feed people's 
responses to the play world and these responses are satiated in emotion. 
New words are tried out more freely in the play world and the 8 year-old 
learns that f*** shouldn't be stated with such clarity, at least in some 
company.   Would the forbidden utterance be an example of your Guiless 
Deceit David?

eric




Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
02/22/2010 04:27 AM
Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"


        To:     "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>, 
"lchcmike@gmail.com" <lchcmike@gmail.com>
        cc: 
        Subject:        RE: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless 
Deceit


I wish I could remember where I read about a study which illustrated the 
cultural construction of 'meaning' through an account of children's use of 

the word 'more'. Researchers were rather puzzled by the fact that young 
children often pointed to a smaller quantity of objects when asked to 
point to the one which was 'more' - after a while they realised that for 
these children 'more' was particularly associated with mealtimes (can I 
have some more?) and in this context 'more' was usually less (second 
portions being smaller than first portions). I think this shows how 
concepts are inextricably bound up in the language practices of speakers 
so that the distinction between children 'knowing' about conservation of 
volume and knowing how to use the word 'more' is delightfully complicated. 

Some people are willing to argue about whether a tomato is a fruit or a 
vegetable as if there is an objective truth out there which could rule on 
the matter.

The question about frustration v. humiliation reminds me of an interesting 

paper from 'Early Years' (Licht, Simoni and Perrig-Chiello 2008 - 28,3 
235-49) entitled 'Conflict between peers in infancy and toddler age: what 
do they fight about' in which the authors argue that many conflicts 
between under 2 year olds which have traditionally been understood as 
conflicts about ownership can better be understood in terms of frustration 

at interruption of an activity (e.g. when one child takes away something 
another child was examining or playing with). Vasu Reddy has also argued 
(with Colwyn Trevarthen) that very young infants display forms of 'pride' 
and 'shame' in their social interactions and perhaps these emotions can be 

understood in terms of satisfaction when experiences correspond with 
mental models, theories or plans and frustration when they don't - though 
these 'personal' responses will also be shaped by cultural patterns of 
behaviour which children will experience both directly, in responses to 
their actions, and indirectly, observing other people's reactions to other 

people's actions.

I too am a bit ambivalent about the playworlds approach - at first it felt 

to me like an intrusion into a space which children should be allowed to 
own but I can see how it could serve as a form of boundary space between 
this more (but not entirely) child-owned space and the more public space 
of social interactions with unfamiliar others. There seems to be a form of 

trajectory by which children 'develop' from a foetus which can only 
function with the support of a womb to infants who can only function with 
the support of familiar others, to children who can only function in a 
supportive, familiar community (a village), to adults who can function in 
progressively wider, more public communities, dealing with people with 
whom they have progressively less shared history. The 'higher' levels of 
development may not be accessible to all (not all adults feel comfortable 
giving a presentation to a room full of strangers) but the 'lower' levels 
remain highly important!

Also, it may be no bad thing to give young children clear signals about 
the 'oddness' of the cultural context of being at school - always a 
playworld but not always acknowledged as such!

All the best,

Rod

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On 
Behalf Of David Kellogg
Sent: 22 February 2010 00:52
To: lchcmike@gmail.com; Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
Subject: Re: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit

First of all, I have a rather stupid question. In the "conservation" 
studies that Piaget does, when we ask children whether there is more 
liquid in the taller glass or the shorter glass, how do we know what the 
question actually means to the children?

Isn't it possible that it might mean "the level is higher"? When I myself 
check the the mark on the side of a well I usually just think the level is 

higher. If you asked me in an unguarded moment, I might say, lazily, that 
somehow there is more or less water in the well (rather than talk about 
the water table).

I might think that a higher tide mark means that somehow there is "more 
tide", and if my wife checks the oil or the transmission fluid in the car 
using a dipstick, I doubt if she considers whether the transmission fluid 
is conserved (perhaps it is hiding somewhere in the engine)?

So I often wonder, when we think about issues of face, and menace, and 
even risk, whether these concepts really mean what we mean when we use 
them. When children worry about "losing face", isn't it the FRUSTRATION 
component which is dominant and the HUMILIATION component that is 
secondary? When they consider "risk", is it the consequences of failure 
that primarily weigh upon them (as they do with us) or is it instead other 

the initial outlay of bother and effort that is their prime concern?

Of course, at the adult end of development, kids are like us. One of us, 
Kim Yongho, created some "avatars" out of children's photographs, and 
found that the third and fourth graders were very happy to have these used 

in class, but fifth and sixth graders really hated it. Their humiliation 
is like our humiliation and the consequences of ridicule fall heavily on 
their consciousnesses. But that's not what we've got in this article; far 
from it.

In some ways, Gunilla Lindqvist's whole concept of "playworlds" is the 
very opposite of what we see in the data. Instead of having a tightly 
circumscribed activity, with a clear beginning and end, in which the 
principles of an imaginary situation (guileless, shared deceit) and of 
abstract rules (gratuitious difficulty) hold sway, a kind of carefully 
bounded "carnival" space where things are turned upside down without in 
any way impinging on normal relations, Lindqvist actually takes the kids 
out of doors and has stuff hidden for them to find, and even members of 
staff dressed as characters hiding in the woods.

When I first read this, I was pretty shocked, because it seemed to me that 

it's precisely the DELINEATION of gratuitous difficulty from the normal 
everyday sort that makes it play, and the DIFFERENTIATION of guileless 
deceit from the manipulative sort that makes it a fictioin as opposed to a 

lie. It seemed to me that the whole idea of "playworlds" erases this 
boundary.

Now I am not so sure. It seems to me that in Vygotsky a "social situation" 

(whether it's the "social situation of development" or the "environment" 
[среды]) is really a RELATION rather than a physical environment of some 
kind. After all, children don't seem to link play acting to any particuar 
physical site; it's a way of being rather than a place to be.

Or rather it's a bunch of different ways of being. Gratuitous difficulty 
has to reconstruct guileless deceit before it can fully supplant and take 
over its functions, including its developmental functions.

So school-age children who, in their guileless deceit, successfully play 
cops and robbers or cowboys and indians or (as my wife did as a girl, 
Americans vs. communists), are more developed than preschoolers who stick 
to "socialist realism" ("house", "school", "hospital", or, as one of my 
students who grew up over a butcher shop used to, "meat market" games). 
Requiring toys and props and friends to do this represents a lower 
developmental moment than being able to do it  with nothing but a piece of 

paper and a pencil.

But in the same way, gratuitous difficulty represents a higher 
developmental moment than guileless deceit, and soccer, which requires 
physical mediation, represents a lower developmental moment than chess 
(which can actually, at a very high level, be played with nothing but a 
piece of paper).

Not better. But in a developmental sense higher, in the sense that the 
child who can do the higher can do the lower with great ease, but the 
child who can do the lower may not be able to do the higher at all.

And also in the sense that if I really think about the well and the tide 
and the dipstick in the transmission fluid I can see conservation at work, 

but it would take billions of physically mediated measurements to prove it 

(and any mismeasurement, at least according to Karl Popper, would force me 

to start again from zero!)

David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education

--- On Sun, 2/21/10, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:


From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Sunday, February 21, 2010, 10:40 AM


I would add, Rod, in this case, part of what is unusual owing to the 
nature
of the play world this scene is linked to is that the teacher is also a 
risk
taking co-player, in this sense/con-text a peer in the "safe space" of the
play where he takes risks that at times made the researcher's practically
drop their teeth!! All very difficult to get into a single article.
mike

On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 3:52 AM, Rod Parker-Rees <
R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:

> I wonder how gratuitous the gratuitous difficulties introduced in play
> really are - if we see play as being (among other things) a way of
> organising, calibrating and revising our 'mental models' or theories 
about
> how the world works, these added difficulties can be seen as a strategy 
for
> testing the range of applicability of the model or of monitoring how it
> works in new situations. Bruner wrote about how adults 'up the ante' in
> their interactions with developing children, adjusting their level of
> support as children are able to take over more of a shared task and this
> aspect of play may be a way by which children can up their own ante. It 
is
> now easier to recognise that the relationship between child and adult is 

not
> 'one-way' - that even babies play a part in educating their parents,
> training them to develop mutually acceptable ways of interacting and one 

of
> the advantages of introducing 'guileless deceit' into play is that it
> affords opportunities for 'dressing up' in social practices associated 
with
> negotiation of interests. If maternal love serves to modify aspects of
> mothers' social monitoring (the 'love is blind' argument made by Fonagy,
> Gergely and Target  on p. 298 of their article 'The parent-infant dyad 
and
> the construction of the subjective self') this may provide a 'safe 
space' in
> which infants can play their way into social processes and indeed babies 

do
> appear to take on much more active, co-creating roles when playing with 
more
> familiar partners. Even playing at deceit may be considerably more risky
> when one's partner is less well known - familiarity provides a degree of
> security which allows social risk taking to be thrilling rather than
> frightening.
>
> In the context of the playworlds paper, these children (and their 
teacher)
> are having to work out a space between friendship and the more formal,
> managed relationships between children and teacher to identify how much
> scope there really is for children to shape the future course of their
> activity. The question for me is how children can be helped to make the 
step
> from negotiation of play planning among peers to this more sophisticated 

way
> of 'playing the game', which involves awareness of the teacher's 
interests
> and constraints so that these can be negotiated. It seems to me that a
> factor which would support this transition would be the degree to which 
the
> children know the teacher, not only as a teacher (role-holder) but also 
as a
> person - what he likes and dislikes, how he reacts to teasing and
> challenging, how willing he is to respond to children's suggestions etc.
> Playing social games is supported by familiar 'more competent others' 
and
> develops skills which allow us to engage in interactions with less 
familiar,
> less congenial 'adversaries'.
>
> All the best,
>
> Rod
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] 
On
> Behalf Of David Kellogg
> Sent: 20 February 2010 21:55
> To: xmca
> Subject: [xmca] Gratuitous Difficulty and Guileless Deceit
>
> Very well, let me try to take the play discussion in a rather new
> direction. So far we've mostly discussed how play manages to highlight 
the
> different e-motions of very young children and mostly speculated about 
how
> this might be developmental.
>
> In some ways it seems to me that the article is rather poorly suited to
> this view. First of all, the actual data is not play per se but only
> preparation for play. One can easily imagine this play taking place 
without
> this preparation and therefore it doesn't seem a necessary component.
>
> Secondly, even if we accept the preplay discussion as a necessary stage 
of
> this form of play, it's not clear to me how e-motion is a necessary part 

of
> the resolution of the discussion. One can easily imagine the discussion
> being resolved without reference to friendship or best friends, etc.
>
> But take the following dialogue, from our third grade textbook:
>
> Minsu: I like apples.
> Julie: I don't like apples.
> (Minsu's mother turns the plate so Julie can see some fresh Keobong 
grapes)
> Julie: Grapes! I like grapes.
> Minsu: I don't like ...
>
> When we ask the kids to continue the dialogue (either as "volleyball" or
> "pingpong" they will go like this for hours. They will not stick to the
> concept of 'fruit' either (we don't teach the word fruit, because it
> presents a very difficult plural in English). They will extend the use 
of
> the verb to virtually any field of experience, at hand or not.
>
> In fact, the verb "like" turns out to be BY FAR the preferred verb in 
third
> grade; the verb which is most likely to be used when we put the kids in
> teams or groups and ask them to improvise on ANY dialogue. This is 
strange,
> because it's not at all frequent in the material we teach.
>
> So I want to suggest two ways in which play per se requires emotion and 
in
> particular requires not only emotion but the mastery of emotion. The 
first
> we can call the principle of Gratuitious Difficulty, that is, the
> introduction of extraneous problems and unnecessary rules whose only
> apparent purpose is to complicate the game, rather like the introduction 

of
> obstacles between the hero and the goal in a story.
>
> The second we can call the principle of  Guileless or Guiltless Deceit,
> that is, the introduction of a conceit, or an imaginary situation which 
is
> shared but also contested in some way. I want to suggest that these two
> principles are common to all forms of play, but not the preplay activity
> which the article is concerned with.
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
>
>
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