Re: [xmca] those pesky emotions, are they adjectives? - was ZPD in a new light

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

I agree in principle with the need to treat emotions as processes and as
co-constituted in interfunctional relations of the whole
person-in-environment, Colin. That is what I like to much about the focus on
motion in e-Motional that Larry (?) picked up from watching the digital
images and sounds of the kids written about by Beth and Robert.

As to perezhivanie, good luck on coming up with a one true meaning.
It is polysemic in Russian, never mind in attempts to translate it into
English, ranging (at least) from something akin to intense suffering ( think
of the characters and emotional atmosphere of *Crime and Punishment*) to
something more akin to Dewey's notion of experience (as if we could get
agreement on THAT term!!).

mike

On Sat, Feb 13, 2010 at 5:14 PM, C Barker <C.Barker@mmu.ac.uk> wrote:

> I wonder if I might throw in my own two pennyworth on thequestion of
> sharing emotions and indeed on emotions (or ‘the emotional’)
> generally.
>
> There’s seemingly a strong tendency to think aboutemotions as if they can
> discussed separately from other aspects of
> action,activity, sociality, etc. Associated with this is a further
> tendency, which isonly to notice ‘emotions’ (or ‘the
> emotional’) when it *changes* from one stateto another. We tend to think of
> ‘emotions’ as if they are, as it were,
> ‘things’(with, in grammatical terms, ‘noun status’) and to think of them,
> moreover, asif they only happen *sometimes*.
>
> If I understand his approach correctly, this was notVygotsky’s view. He
> focused on ‘inter-functional relations’, in which each
> aspectof consciousness was seen as inter-dependent with the others –
> whether it becognition, emotion, memory, attention, etc. His
> position would lead him toagree with Theodor Sarbin (1986) in his
> opposition to a ‘faculty psychology’, inwhich different aspects
> of consciousness and action are treated apart from eachother.
>
> What we shouldn’t think is that there are ‘emotional’ and‘non-emotional’
> forms of action, including speech. For ‘calm’ action or
> speech isas much emotional as that which is fearful or angry or distressed.
> All of humanexperience has an ‘emotional’ quality,
> just as (Vološinov) every word is spokenwith an ‘evaluative accent’.
>
> I wonder about the translation of that Russian term – perezhivanie– which
> was apparently the focus of the later Vygotsky’s
> attention, and which seems to be translated as ‘emotionalexperience’ (for
> example in the essay ‘The problem of the environment’ in
> vander Veer & Valsiner 1994). I don’t know Russian, but why is the word
> ‘emotional’put before ‘experience’ here? If we just
> translated Vygotsky’s word as ‘experience’would it make any difference –
> provided that we remembered that there is noexperience
> which doesn’t have its ‘emotional accent’?
>
> There are, to besure, *some* experiences which have the quality of
>  ‘dramatic collision’, as Nikolai Veresov veryinterestingly
> suggests Vygotsky has in mind when discussing what sets people offinto
> potentially ‘changing their minds’ about something. They
> certainly have an‘emotional’ quality, but so too do ‘undramatic’
> experiences: e.g. the bus iscoming, I put out my hand, it stops,
> I get on, I pay my fare, I take a seat - ateach step, there are tiny
> quivers we hardly notice in all the ‘normality’, andthere is
> little ‘development’ here. Just microscopic active testings of the
> world,which on this occasion turns out to meet our learned
> expectations, butnonetheless involve our active pursuit of our goals and
> motives.
>
> Suppose wetreated ‘the emotional’ as an inherent quality of all human
> action, and ingrammatical terms only used the emotional
> *adjectivally or adverbially*, todescribe one of its qualities…. Would we
> lose anything? (Or perhaps we wouldn’tgain anything
> either?)
>
> The advantage ofthus insisting on the ‘grammatical’ status of the emotional
> might be that it wouldtake away the temptation, found
> in some accounts of the emotional, to try toform *lists* of emotions, or to
> try to explain complex human activities interms of the
> interplay of a few ‘emotions’.
>
> I write this asone whose main interests lie not in the study of schooling
> or workplacerelations, but rather in ‘social movements’.
> In this field, to which I alwaysfeel that CHAT could contribute quite a lot
> if there were more possibleintersections, the
> temptation I described in the previous paragraph is aliveand all too well.
> ‘Shame,’ Fear’, Anger’ and a few more ‘powerful
> emotions’ areoften allotted powerful degrees of causal influence. Their
> ‘noun status’ isvery strong here, along with a very
> mono-causal style of analysis.
>
> If we stuck totreating the emotional as adjectival or adverbial, we could
> include a widerrange of emotional expression in the way
> we talk about human interaction thanwe probably could if we insisted that
> emotions are ‘nouns’. Consider thefollowing sentence:
> ‘He raised his eyebrows suggestively; she smiled backarchly.’ There are
> emotional qualities being described in these non-verbal
> ‘utterances’,but would our understanding be enriched if we tried to define
> emotions called ‘suggestiveness’or ‘archness’?
>
> I don’t evenknow if any of this will make sense to any of you xmca-ers, or
> even if anyonewill think there is anything worth
> further consideration, but I’ll be interestedto read any responses.
>
> I have tried tospell out the ideas here slightly more extensively in a
> couple of papersdiscussing the emotional quality of some
> developments within the Polish ‘Solidarity’movement in1980 and 1981 (along
> with much else about that movement, whose
> 30thanniversary occurs this summer). One of these appeared in 2001, in a
> bookcalled Passionate Politics, and the other is due to
> appear in 2010 in aweb-based journal called Interface. They can be accessed
> at http://sites.google.com/site/colinbarkersite/along
> with several efforts at exploring CHAT and social movements.
>
> Colin Barker
>
> *
>
> Hi Mike
> I also am unsure about the genesis of the sharing of emotion as the CORE of
> theemotional bond.  However Fonagy's  account (and the
> tradition heworks within) does gesture or point in the direction of shared
> emotion ascentral to human sociality.  If sociality is
> central to the developmentalprocess (in both its vertical and horizontal
> dimensions) as seems likely inmany different accounts
> elaborated on CHAT then processes which are central tosociality become
> central issues to elaborate.
> Theory of Mind has elaborated the centrality of intentionality to
> ourunderstanding sociality.  Sociocultural theory has elaborated
> thecentrality of triadic communication (including objects and artifacts)
> tosociality.  The linguistic turn, dialogical theory,
> semiotics, havedocumented the centrality of  language, speech acts, and
> narrative(Bruner) to the creation of sociality.
> All these Discourses are pointing in the direction of communication
> andlanguage as central to sociality.
> The metaphors of "places" locations" "spaces"" Zo-ped's" "contexts" speaks
> to our being SITUATED ascentral to sociality.
> History and the temporal dimension of sociality is also a central analytic
> unitof sociality.
> However, how we account for emotions within sociality seems to vary
> acrossthese other accounts of sociality.  Often emotions are
> seen as a"by-product" of these other processes and accounts of
> sociality.Therefore, I believe the place of emotion in our accounts
> is often on theperiphery of our perspectives rather than having a central
> place in sociality.Fonagy and others who are exploring
> the genesis of  the sharing of emotionare bringing emotions onto center
> stage of the human sciences. I believe sincewe experience
> emotions as intrapsychic phenomena they are often viewed asvalidating an
> encapsulated view of the person when a social account of
> theperson is being elaborated that puts sociality at the center of our
> accounts.
> If scholars such as Fonagy, Stern, Scheff, etc. are successful in
> re-directingour gaze towards emotion as a central to our
> accounts of sociality then theyhave contributed to the ongoing fallible
> accounts in the community ofinquirers.
> My reading of the Zo-ped in the posted article was influenced by the
> emotionalclimate when the children shifted from a magisterial
> to a socratic style ofdialogue.  The transformation in their communication
> experience was also atransformation in their emotions
> and in the transformation of the Zo-ped.
> Larry
>
>
>
> > I have been reading moll/tomasello et al, Larry, and will check the
> > Fonagy/Sharp ref. Thanks. But I am
> > still uncertain about the genesis of the sharing of emotion, the
> > core of the
> > emotional bond that appears by
> > this account to be central to hu> central, so
> > will keep at it.
> > mike
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 9, 2010 at 9:06 PM, Larry Purss  wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Ana
> > > I wanted to thank you for sharing your thoughts on the Zo-ped
> > and its
> > > possible elaboration in the Ferholt and Lecusay article. I
> > also sense that
> > > the zo-ped as a metaphor of a "zone" or "space"can be
> > elaborated to capture
> > > the transformations in interpersonal and epistemological
> > issues built
> > > jointly in practices.  The article elaborates the zone as
> > a "location" in
> > > which all the participants "cross borders" and ALL
> > participants are
> > > transformed from the joint activity.  The article also
> > speaks to
> > > communicative activity as having the potential to be
> > SYMMETRICAL or
> > > ASYMMETRICAL and that the quality of communication is
> > different depending on
> > > the symmetrical or asymmetrical quality of "recognition"
> > (power).  And
> > > finally the article elaborates the centrality of emotion (e-
> > MOTION) within
> > > the Zo-ped. These 3 variables do point to the need to deepen
> > the analysis of
> > > this "zone" as functioning at an ontological level oftheory
> > elaboration.> It is for this reason I want to bring in other
> > Discourses which are looking
> > > at the notion of "shared space" as foundational to our
> > exploration of our
> > > being human.
> > > Peter Fonagy and Carla Sharp In the Journal "Social
> > Development, (17, 3,
> > > 2008) are also discussing the centrality of shared space in their
> > > developmental model. Sharp and Fonagy in this article are
> > reviewing various
> > > notions of the construct of the "meeting of minds"Following
> > is a review of
> > > their perspective.
> > > They review Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, and Moll's
> > position on the
> > > meeting of minds as SHARED or WE intentionality. Tomasello et
> > al suggest
> > > that only humans are biologically adapted for participating in
> > collaborative> activities and shared goals (joint
> > intentions)  However, in addition to the
> > > capacity to UNDERSTAND goals, intentions, and perceptions (the
> > theory of
> > > mind construct) a "meeting of minds" adds the MOTIVATION to
> > SHARE these ToM
> > > understandings in INTERACTION WITH OTHERS. Tomasello
> > emphasizes that at the
> > > foundation of this meeting of minds is the MOTIVATION to SHARE
> > EMOTIONS with
> > > others. It is the motivation to share EMOTIONAL STATES with
> > others that
> > > distinguishes us from apes, who are unable to share these
> > PSYCHOLOGICAL> states with one another. Tomasello et al conclude
> > that as humans we are
> > > hardwired to want to be part of a WE. As a species this enables
> > > collaboration, which is necessary for survival.
> > > Sharp and Fonagy in their attempt to operationalize the
> > mechanisms which
> > > facilitate a meeting of minds are exploring its ontology in the
> > > species-specific social interactions in the early parent-infant
> > > relationship.
> > > Sharp and Fonagy add to Tomasello's insights (the capacity to
> > UNDERSTAND> intentions and the MOTIVATION to SHARE PSYCHOLOGICAL
> > states) by reviewing
> > > Gergely and Csibra's perspective on the meeting of minds.
> > Gergely suggests
> > > an ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE relevant information is a third
> > prerequisite for
> > > negotiating and co-ordinating all levels of JOINT
> > COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES
> > > by communicating relevant information. This LEARNING mechanism
> > ensures the
> > > transmission of knowledge by making the latter MANIFEST or
> > MARKED to the
> > > observer. The emergence of this communicative capacity for
> > human pedagogy
> > > leads to shared intentionality and the meeting of minds. Sharp
> > and Fonagy
> > > summarize there thoughts on the meeting of minds by stating
> > > "Therefore, while Tomasello and colleagues view the meeting of
> > minds as a
> > > mere by-product of a species-specific MOTIVATION to co-operate
> > and share
> > > mental states with each other Gergely and colleagues explain
> > it by appealing
> > > to a species-unique capacity for cultural learning through the
> > communication> of relevant knowledge" (p.749)
> > > This summary of various perspectives of the co> speaks to the
> > > centrality of understanding intentionality, the motivation (e-
> > motion) to
> > > share psychological states, and the human impulse for pedagogy
> > in the
> > > forming of ZONES or SPACES of WE PARTICIPATION. Ferholt and
> > Lecusay's> article invited multiple perspectives on the
> > construct of the Zo-ped and I
> > > believe the notion of "meeting of minds" speaks to the same
> > phenomena as the
> > > constructs of "interillumination" in the Ferholt andLecusay
> > article, the
> > > construct of  "intersubjectivity" as elaborated by D.
> > Stern and Bahktin's
> > > construct of"dialogical voices" try to elaborate.  They
> > all speak to the
> > > notion of a WE intentionality and shared consciousness from
> > which emerges a
> > > sense of agency vitality, and pleasure (as Ferholt and Lecusay
> > capture at
> > > the end of the article as the chilren DANCE down the field.
> > >
> > >
> > > I could have posted this response to the overstimulation
> > thread or the
> > > parent-infant thread but chose this thread as the dialogue
> > which is
> > > exploring zones and spaces of development and learning.
> > The notion of
> > > development and learning WITHIN zones is pregnant with potential.
> > > Larry
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: Ana Marjanovic-Shane
> > > Date: Tuesday, February 9, 2010 12:41 pm
> > > Subject: [xmca] ZPD in a new light
> > > To: Xmca
> > >
> > > > Dear all,
> > > >
> > > > I would like to share some of my thoughts regarding Ferholt and
> > > > Lecusay's paper: "Adult and Child Development in the Zoneof
> > > > Proximal Development: Socratic Dialogue in a Playworld".
> > > >
> > > > Ferholt’s and Lecusay’s paper introduces a new way of looking
> > > > at Vygotsky’s concept of the Zone of Proximal Development
> > (ZO-
> > > > PED), possibly transforming that concept into something rather
> > > > new and different from the original one. It does it in three
> > > > ways: It introduces a possibility that developmental
> > > > transformations in social interactions between adults and
> > > > children can happen not only to children, but to adults, too.
> > > > Second, they focus not only on the cognitive changes, i.e.
> > > > changes in understanding of certain concepts, logical arguments
> > > > and/or situations, rather they introduce the analysis of the
> > > > quality of the relationships in terms of caring and power
> > > > distribution between the participants: from authoritative and
> > > > asymmetrical to democratic and symmetrical power relations
> > > > between adults and children. And finally they look at the
> > > > extremely powerful transformations in the emotional ZPD that can
> > > > lead to aesthetic and cathartic transformations of all the
> > > > participants in the relationships to each other and to the event
> > > > in which they all grappled with very hard interpersonal, logical
> > > > and epistemological issues and were able to jointly build a
> > > > novel, unexpected and gratifying solution.
> > > >
> > > > Their paper truly poses new questions about the very concept of
> > > > ZPD and the nature of development that takes place in the
> > > > interaction between children and adults and between children and
> > > > the wider culture. It also, through the vividness of the event
> > > > they describe, breathes life back into our, sometimes too
> > > > abstract and too decontextualized manipulations of units of
> > > > analysis with which we build our conceptual systems.
> > > >
> > > > Let me start with their idea that development happens to all
> > > > the participants in the ZPD, including children and adults. It
> > > > is very interesting to note the way Vygotsky described ZPD
> > in in
> > > > two very different ways in his two articles: “Interaction
> > > > between Learning and Development” and “The Role of Play in
> > > > Development” — both published next to each other in the Mind and
> > > > Society” In the “Leaning and Development” he develops the idea
> > > > that ZPD is the “distance between the actual developmental level
> > > > as determined by independent problem sol> > > and finished
> development] and the level of potential development
> > > > as determined through problem solving under adult guidance
> > or in
> > > > collaboration with more capable peers” [Ana: current learning
> > > > and the “potential”, i.e. future development] (Vygotsky,
> > Mind in
> > > > Society, 1978, page 86). And on page 88, he states: “human
> > > > learning presupposes a specific social nature and a process by
> > > > which children grow into the intellectual life of those around
> > > > them.”
> > > > In “The Role of Play in Development” Vygotsky defines ZPD as
> > > > follows. I will give a little wider quote to situate it in his
> > > > full context:
> > > > “Looking at the matter from the opposite perspective [to the
> > > > theories that consider play as the pure search for pleasure,
> > > > that Vyg. critiques], could one suppose that a child’s behavior
> > > > is always guided by meaning, that a preschooler’s behavior
> > is so
> > > > arid that he never behaves spontaneously simply because he
> > > > thinks he should behave otherwise? This strict subordination to
> > > > rules is quite impossible in life, but in play it does become
> > > > possible: thus play creates a zone of proximal development of
> > > > the child. In play a child always behaves beyond his average
> > > > age, above his daily behavior; in play it is as though he
> > were a
> > > > head taller than himself. As in the focus of a magnifying glass,
> > > > play contains all developmental tendencies in a condensed form
> > > > and is itself a major source of development.
> > > > Though the play-development relationship can be compared to the
> > > > instruction-development relationship, play provides a much wider
> > > > background for changes in needs and consciousness. Action in the
> > > > imaginative sphere, in an imaginary situation, the creation of
> > > > voluntary intentions, and the formation of real-life plans and
> > > > volitional motives — all appear in play in the highest level of
> > > > preschool development. The child moves forward essentially
> > > > through play activity” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 102-103).
> > > >
> > > > In both instances, Vygotsky’s perspective focuses on an
> > > > individual child’s relationship to abstract concepts
> > > > (instructional settings) and to abstract rules of behavior in
> > > > different imaginary (or future life) situations (play settings).
> > > > What the child learns is given by the “adults” or “more capable
> > > > peers”, and it pre-exists in the form of rules, values, and
> > > > roles in the culture into which the child is growing.
> > > >
> > > > However, although in both activities (instruction and play),
> > > > the child is interacting with others, Vygotsky does not
> > focus on
> > > > the nature of that interaction and the quality of the
> > > > relationships in that interaction. The ZPD described like that,
> > > > stays on the level of a drawing board, a plan for future
> > > > research, and poses a big question rather than it answering it.
> > > >
> > > > What Ferholt and Lecusay are doing in their study is to start
> > > > to conceptualize some answers to the questions that Vygotsky
> > > > posed in his descriptions of the ZPD. They took the notion from
> > > > the realm of the abstract and admittedly rather sketchy concept
> > > > and situated it in the real life moment to start looking at and
> > > > understanding the very dynamic of the live interpersonal social
> > > > relationships that happen both in guidance (instruction) and in
> > > > play, and that are the setting of the learning and development.
> > > > The main aspect of this relationship that they discuss is the
> > > > relationship of power that contains both the ontological and the
> > > > epistemological components: a) how the teacher-children
> > > > relationship grows from a dominant (Magisterial dialogue) to a
> > > > democratic one (Socratic Dialogue); and b) how this change in
> > > > the interpersonal relationship, the willingness, so to
> > speak, of
> > > > the teacher to LISTEN to to voices of the children and> > > equal
> power — leads to the creation of a new vision - both for
> > > > the children and for the teacher!
> > > > The ontological aspect of this situation shows that the
> > > > transformations happening in the ZPD are transformations in the
> > > > quality of the teacher-children relationship! And that means
> > > > that ZPD has a potential to change the adults as well as the
> > > > children. Therefore, on one hand, the children seem to be
> > > > experiencing development at least as a progressive growth in
> > > > their conceptualizations, language they use, ability to take
> > > > into account multiple points of view and multiple feelings
> > > > arising between themselves. On the other hand, the teacher was
> > > > experiencing the development not only of his teaching and
> > > > guiding strategies, but also of his understanding and accepting
> > > > of the children as FULL human beings and not just"humans-in-
> > > > preparation”. This lead to his pedagogical orientations to be
> > > > transformed from authoritative, teacher run philosophy to a more
> > > > collaborative understanding of education, i.e. to the community
> > > > of learners orientation.
> > > > In that sense, Ferholt and Lecusay’s work is a step away from
> > > > Vygotsky’s progressivist philosophy in which development is seen
> > > > as having only one trajectory — a progress from less mature to
> > > > more mature forms of behavior and thinking. (See Bakhurst,
> > > > “Vygotsky’s demons”, 2007 in The Cambridge Companion toVygotsky).
> > > >
> > > > Their study also poses many new questions. For instance, what
> > > > is the quality of the ZPD, and can it exist at all, if there is
> > > > no transformation of the interpersonal relationships and no
> > > > transformations of the teachers? What is learned and in what
> > > > ways can it lead to transformational development in more
> > > > traditional settings in which the only authority belongs to the
> > > > teacher?
> > > >
> > > > The quality of the relationships in terms of the emotional
> > > > transformations of all the participants and the sense of
> > > > aesthetic catharsis are not less important issues, but I
> > want to
> > > > leave them for another posting.
> > > >
> > > > Ana
>
>
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