Re: [xmca] The Ubiquity of Unicorns: conversation

["linda bausch" <lindabausch2001@aol.com>]

Yeah I do. What0time canhe get in tomirrow
Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

-----Original Message-----
From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2009 11:44:42 
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Subject: Re: [xmca] The Ubiquity of Unicorns: conversation

How would you make the connection, Eric?
mike

On Tue, Nov 3, 2009 at 6:23 AM, <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:

> Hello All:
>
> Enlivening thread!  I believe Luria's combined motor method is too
> important of a tool to ignore when discussing the concept of conversation
> development.
>
> what do other's think?
> eric
>
>
>
>
> "Paula M Towsey" <paulat@johnwtowsey.co.za>
> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> 11/03/2009 03:44 AM
> Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>
>
>        To:     <lchcmike@gmail.com>, "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'"
> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>        cc:
>        Subject:        RE: [xmca] The Ubiquity of Unicorns: conversation
>
>
> About Mike's question from Sunday:
> "...The topic seems of great importance, and not unrelated to the once and
> future thread of the "Vygotsky blocks" methodology.  Any private speech
> observed there, Paula?"
>
> Because participants are encouraged to "think out aloud" as they go ("you
> know, like little children do when they say "I'm putting this one here
> because..." or "I think this one goes here because...", okay?"), I think
> this casts a very big (woolly) blanket over being able to distinguish
> between what would perhaps have been private speech and what would not
> have
> been.  Because in effect what we're doing to participants is introducing
> an
> "outside" interlocutor in a rather artificial way: I use the qualifier
> "outside" here to differentiate the term's use for this contrived
> situation
> in particular from where, as I understand it to be in private speech, the
> self is the interlocutor (but correct me here if I need it please?).  So
> even if someone says "Okay... Let's see... maybe I could try putting...",
> it
> seems to me to be more a case of musing out aloud in a way where the
> participant is possibly making private speech more coherent because there
> is
> an "outside" interlocutor.
>
> And then if I've got Mike's very magic "thread" as he intends, it's about
> word meaning and this question of a unit of analysis:  it is here that I
> think the "thinking out aloud" by participants helps to make more explicit
> the way in which they are making use of the various elements of this
> richly
> structured experimental situation (the two kinds of stimulus means and the
> stimulus objects). The blocks are specifically designed to reveal the
> processes involved in coming to understand what the words cev, bik, mur,
> and
> lag mean through the activity of solving the problem of why different
> blocks
> belong together.  And yet, if the participants don't talk, it is very,
> very
> difficult to work out from their actions alone what is going on.
>
> Back to Peter now for more enlivening...?
> Paula
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of mike cole
> Sent: 01 November 2009 02:40 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] The Ubiquity of Unicorns: conversation
>
> As usual, tardy to the party. Very interesting comments on private speech,
> thanks for starting it Peter.
>
> A couple of questions for different xmcaonaughts:
>
> What about Peter's observation, Nacho?
> "Personally, I don't know of one private speech researcher who uses LSV's
> concept of word meaning when analyzing speech data--and to me, that
> suggests
> something is very wrong." That beautiful new book you have published on
> private speech is devoid of an interest in meaning? Really?
>
> And Peter, what about Andy's comment, which also struck me, that when you
> talk about your data, your unit of analysis appears to be the utterance, a
> la Bakhtin. And Bakhtin makes central to his analysis the idea that words
> are always characterized by addressivity. Seems like grist for your mill.
> But utterance is absent from your jpeg figure, and Bakhtin from your
> discussion thus far. And does conversation start with the first
> recognizable
> word spoken by the child? All Samoan children are said by their parents to
> have as their first word, shit (or so ethnographers have claimed). What
> would that imply for addressivity of first words, I wonder.
>
> Someone asked about availability of published work for folks to read;
> might
> you post your article from the Robbins et al book? And, of course, we
> would
> be glad to post a video session and transcript. The topic seems of great
> importance, and not unrelated to the once and future thread of the
> "Vygotsky
> blocks" methodology.  Any private speech observed there, Paula?
>
> Thanks again for the enlivening discussion.
> mike
> On Fri, Oct 30, 2009 at 10:08 AM, Peter Feigenbaum
> <pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu>wrote:
>
> > Steve--
> >
> > I am very gratified to see that you grasp the full thrust of my work on
> > conversation
> > as it relates to word meaning. You are the first to do so!  I feel
> > vindicated and
> > validated! Thank you.
> >
> > To be honest, when I first started down this path in 1981, I was working
> on
> > instinct--
> > it felt right, but I was largely unconscious of the direction I was
> taking.
> > But in 2004
> > I had an epiphany, and since that moment, all of the pieces have been
> > falling into
> > place, and I have become able to consciously articulate the consequences
> of
> > taking this particular stance. For many years I have had to cope with a
> > fair degree
> > of disorientation due to the fact that private speech is at the center
> of
> > so many
> > philosophical knots. It was the shift of focus to conversation that
> finally
> > made
> > sense of so many issues, and that holds out the promise of making sense
> of
> > others (that I have yet to return to).
> >
> > The epiphany came in the form of an old "Snow White" refrain: "Mirror,
> > mirror on
> > the wall, who's the fairest of them all?". Periodically, I would ask
> > myself: "Why do
> > children talk out loud to themselves?", and the answer that returned was
> > always
> > "Because they are learning how to think." But on this one, surprising
> > occasion,
> > the answer that came back was: "Because they are learning how to talk."
> It
> > was
> > at that moment that I realized that LSV never made explicit the obvious
> > next step:
> > after thinking becomes verbal, speaking becomes intelligent--because
> inner
> > speech is then recruited for the purpose of talking! Once it became
> clear
> > that
> > inner speech--the mechanism for directing one's attention--was available
> > for
> > children to use in all realms of their lives, it was obvious that
> language
> > acquisition
> > would become a major beneficiary of this new mental faculty. So Vygotsky
> > deserves TWO Nobel prizes in psychology--one for conceptualizing how
> > thinking becomes conscious, and the other for conceptualizing how
> children
> > master their native tongue. What a genius he was!
> >
> > Far be it from me to reign you in!  Because I only became conscious of
> this
> > path a few years ago, I have yet to see its limitations or
> constraints--nor
> > do I think
> > about them, for I am still uncovering all of the possibilities that this
> > perspective
> > affords. If you would be so kind as to humor me, let me point out a few
> of
> > the
> > problem areas that I believe this new conversational focus sheds light
> on--
> > besides the conceptual integration it provides, as you have so
> delightfully
> > noted.
> >
> > 1) By looking at the development of word meaning from a conversational
> > vantage
> > point, Vygotsky's claims about the transformation of private speech take
> on
> > a new significance. I used to look at private speech as *causing* the
> > transformation
> > of thinking from unconscious and impulsive to conscious and deliberate,
> but
> > in
> > fact, it is the development of word meaning that *causes* private speech
> to
> > change! Naive social speech, private speech, inner speech, mature
> > (intelligent)
> > social speech--these do not cause development per se, but instead are
> the
> > external
> > forms in which the development of word meaning manifests itself. This,
> in
> > turn,
> > prompts the question: Just what IS word meaning, and what causes it to
> > develop?
> > Sagely, Vygotsky (Chapter 7, again) points us to the answer: words
> develop
> > in
> > one direction, while meaning develops in the opposite direction. To be
> > concrete
> > about it, a child's first word does NOT correspond to its dictionary
> > (lexical)
> > meaning, as you might expect, but to its global, undifferentiated
> > (conversational)
> > meaning. In other words, the forms and functions of words and meanings
> are
> > "sprung" in an incompatible way from the start, and so development is
> > merely the
> > "unwinding" action brought about by the initial tension. This needs a
> > visual (I hope
> > this diagram comes through everyone's email system):
> >
> > (Embedded image moved to file: pic14204.jpg)
> > The first stage (infancy) in the development of word meaning  takes
> place
> > in
> > the form of social speech with a caregiver, and is represented in the
> > diagram
> > as the relationship between "word" and "topical" meaning". A child's
> first
> > word
> > is a whole turn at talk, but all the child has available to express this
> > thought is a
> > single word. As the tension on both sides of this equation exerts
> pressure
> > on the
> > child, the relationship between "sentence" and "propositional" meaning
> > takes
> > center stage. The child's focus alternates between the relationship of
> word
> > to
> > sentence, and the relationship of topical to propositional meaning. The
> > third
> > stage, which I believe corresponds to the abbreviation of private speech
> > (its final form before becoming abbreviated inner speech), moves the
> focus
> > to the relationship between conversation and lexical meaning. The
> process
> > of abbreviation, which is tied to predication, involves the child in
> > understanding
> > how individual word meanings (lexical meanings) are related to the whole
> > flow
> > of conversation. The child must consider which words need to be uttered
> in
> > order to move the topic of conversation along, and which do not need to
> be
> > voiced. "Clots" of words are the result.
> >
> > 2) Dialectical materialism: What does this Marxist form of philosophical
> > explanation bring to the problem? Although I have been a student of
> Marxism
> > even longer than I have been a student of Vygotsky's theory, I was
> unable
> > to
> > formulate the connection between them--until recently. I believe the
> very
> > same
> > diagram above applies to Marx and Engels' explanation of the development
> > of human society--if you make some substitutions. For Marx and Engels,
> it
> > is
> > the forms and functions of *labor (economic) activity* and *civil
> > (political)
> > activity* that are "sprung" in an incompatible way from the start,
> causing
> > society to morph from primitive communism to slave society, to feudal
> > society,
> > to capitalist society, and (hopefully) to socialist society and
> eventually
> > to
> > advanced communism. I don't expect everyone to agree with this
> > interpretation,
> > and I understand that introducing politics into the discussion is a
> risky
> > business,
> > but I think it's hard to ignore (and useful to acknowledge) the
> parallels
> > between
> > Marx and Engels' stages and Vygotsky's stages of primitive social
> speech,
> > impulsive private speech, regulative private speech, abbreivated private
> > speech, and (hopefully) inner speech and eventually advanced
> (intelligent,
> > rational) social speech. Of course, the role of dialectical logic in
> > Vygotsky's
> > theory is much more involved than what I have outlined here, but my aim
> is
> > simply to draw attention to the "feedback" effect of Vygotsky's theory
> on
> > our
> > understanding of Marx and Engel's theory. My experience thus far is that
> > each
> > of these two very special theories can be helpful in understanding the
> > other.
> >
> > 3) The relevance of Bahktin and Voloshinov's analyses to LSV's theory:
> > If we make an analogy between initiating and responding in conversation
> > to throwing and catching a ball, then we can see the design of an
> > individual
> > "utterance" in a new light. In playing "catch" with a ball, each
> > participant
> > must first catch the ball before he or she can throw it back. Thus, a
> > "turn"
> > at catch involves first catching, then throwing. These moves are done in
> > a smooth transition, constituting a "turnaround". Likewise, in
> > conversation,
> > a "turn" at talk involves first listening, then responding. This, too,
> is
> > performed
> > (by competent communicators) in a smooth fashion. Listening flows right
> > into speaking, enabling the conversation to move forward. Thus, each
> > utterance by a speaker actually consists of *both* listening and
> > *speaking*.
> > Just waiting patiently for one's turn at talk--without listening to the
> > other--does
> > not constitute communication with speech. One must listen (and reflect?)
> > before speaking, or else "responding" doesn't occur.
> >
> > This leads to the notion that every utterance is linked both backwards
> and
> > forwards. Every initiation responds to some thought (even ones that
> start
> > up
> > a conversation), and every response constitutes a new initiation--a
> > furthering
> > of the ongoing conversation. Bahktin claimed that the relationship
> > *between*
> > utterances in conversation eventually develops into a relationship
> *within*
> > an utterance. Every utterance "anticipates" a response--the voice of the
> > "other" is contained in every utterance. (I must confess that I am only
> now
> > beginning to look at the relationship of Bahktin's work to this new
> > approach,
> > so I may be off-base). (No pun intended)
> >
> > That's way more than enough for now. I don't want to dominate this
> > discussion.
> >
> > But thanks for listening and responding, XMCA-ers!  You're marvelous!
> >
> > Best wishes,
> > Peter
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >             Steve Gabosch
> >             <stevegabosch@me.
> >             com> To
> >              Sent by:                  "eXtended Mind, Culture,
> Activity"
> >             xmca-bounces@webe         <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >             r.ucsd.edu cc
> >
> > Subject
> >              10/29/2009 10:58          Re: [xmca] The Ubiquity of
> >             PM                        Unicorns: conversation
> >
> >
> >             Please respond to
> >              "eXtended Mind,
> >                 Culture,
> >                 Activity"
> >             <xmca@weber.ucsd.
> >                   edu>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Peter, I am very happy to see how well developed the empirical and
> > practical side of your work is!  Have you published any of your
> > studies, have more writings on your theory, etc.?  I am actually quite
> > excited by your work.
> >
> > Your argument for viewing the conversation as a unit of word-meaning
> > (in the Vygotskyan sense of "meaning through language use") seems
> > compelling.  I like this idea quite a bit, and find myself wanting to
> > go with it, try it out, test it, play with it, see how far it goes.
> > Once this simple and obvious relationship is pointed out, as you are
> > doing so clearly and concisely, a lot of connections seem to fall
> > right into place.  They are the same old connections, of course, but
> > more dialectical, more dynamic, more far-reaching.  For me, anyway ...
> >
> > For example, this concept makes me want to ask the reverse question:
> > how can word-meaning be conceived **other** than in conversation?  And
> > how can the **parts** of conversation - parts of words, words, word-
> > sequences, sentences, sentence-sequences - or utterance-sequences in
> > general - as well as gestures, facial expressions etc. etc. - be
> > conceived other than as just that - as parts of **conversations**?
> > (This suggests that the conversation could actually be **the**
> > structural unit of word-meaning - with everything else being parts of
> > conversations - in the way we usually think of parts of sentences.  Am
> > I taking this too far?)  These are not new questions, of course, but
> > ones that your work revives in a new light.
> >
> > This line of thinking makes me want to take this a step further - or
> > "upward" - how can a particular conversation be conceived other than
> > in its particular social, cultural and historical as well as
> > psychological "context" (its concrete reality)?  This idea, of course,
> > has been deeply explored by Bakhtin and others.  Have you had a chance
> > to relate your thinking on this to Bakhtin, Volosinov, etc.?
> >
> > Thinking of word-meaning this way is one of those ideas that has "been
> > there" all along, but so big that I know that I for one never quite
> > apprehended it in this way.  I have always thought of a conversation
> > as some kind of combination, sequence or interchange of "word-
> > meanings" - not a "word-meaning" in and of itself.  This in some ways
> > is a mind-boggling concept.  We think of our words as being in our
> > conversations, but it is harder to conceptualize the opposite being
> > the case - that it is our conversations that are in our words, and
> > that our words and word-meanings actually mean nothing apart from and
> > outside our conversations.  Obvious, understood already in many ways,
> > but also new and dizzying for me.
> >
> > This viewpoint - and perhaps I am taking this too far and someone is
> > going to have to rein me in - this view of word-meaning places, the
> > dialogue, or the conversation, as the transmission mechanism, the
> > concrete link between 1) the meanings of social relations and culture
> > (the interpsychological) and 2) psychological meanings (the
> > intrapsychological).  I like putting conversation in the middle like
> > that.
> >
> > On one hand, of course, this is not at all a new idea.  How else do we
> > communicate?  Hello?  On the other hand, by viewing conversation as
> > the **necessary** form that word-meaning takes - that is, that
> > conversation IS word-meaning - this insight opens up new possibilities
> > for harnessing Vygotsky's theory of word-meaning as a powerful lens
> > into two simultaneous realms - 1) human social relations and
> > activities, which are inherently language-based, and 2) individual
> > psychology (the higher mental functions), which, according to
> > Vygotsky, is also inherently language-based.
> >
> > This seems to be exactly what your research is trying to do, Peter.
> > You are showing how to look at the totality of an activity in a given
> > situation - in this case, children playing while talking out loud - to
> > see and show how human action and human meaning-making are a
> > dialectical unity - using Vygotsky's classical theory of word-meaning
> > as a lens into **everything** that is simultaneously happening - or,
> > at least, that which is happening that you can figure out how to
> > record and analyze!
> >
> > An interesting reverse question to ask here about what you have
> > observed in your studies so far: what are some of the **limitations**
> > of Vygotsky's concept of word-meaning in trying to understand what
> > these children are doing, thinking, saying, feeling?  Above, I speak
> > almost as though it can explain "everything".  Can it?  Probably not!
> > LOL  So what are the **limits** of this lens into human activity?
> > (For example, it probably does not explain roles, personalities,
> > membership in social classes ...)
> >
> > To the extent that this approach is successful at viewing certain
> > multiple levels of human activity at once, one can legitimately ask:
> > how can this be so?  I find myself answering that question with
> > another:  isn't this **precisely** what Vygotsky accomplished when he
> > discovered word-meaning as a basic unit of analysis?  To show how to
> > view the **convergence** of the social and the individual?  To see
> > both realms at the same time at the place they meet and transform one
> > another and together become something new?  This is probably why I
> > like this idea so much, it seems to expand Vygotsky's approach to do
> > exactly what we want it to.
> >
> > If we only apply the concept of word-meaning to "words," perhaps we
> > are setting our sights too low, and only on certain details, missing
> > the larger picture.  But if we step back and include **the
> > conversation** along with words and sentences, new possibilities seem
> > to emerge.  Maybe someone will shoot me down here and point out how I
> > am going off the deep end with this (or more likely, just leave me be
> > with my false hopes!) - but I think you are on to something, Peter.
> > (Maybe you think I am going too far, too!  LOL)
> >
> > Another question: have you tried to apply Leontiev's activity theory
> > (conditions-based tasks and operations, goal-based actions and action-
> > sequences, lifestyle-motivated activities and activity systems, etc.)
> > to your work on word-meaning and conversation?  I am not aware of
> > anyone who has applied these concepts to the dynamics of conversation,
> > conversation analysis, etc.  I wonder if they could be applied ...
> >
> > One last question.  Sorry about so many questions!  Not all need to be
> > answered all at once - there is always lots of time, no rush here, of
> > course.  My last question: have you given thought to how this
> > expansion of the Vygotskyan concept of word-meaning could be applied
> > to Vygotsky's work on concept formation (syncretic formations,
> > concrete complexes, systematic concepts, etc.) - or perhaps, the other
> > way around - how Vygotsky's work on concept formation might apply to
> > your work on word-meaning?
> >
> > - Steve
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Oct 29, 2009, at 5:03 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >
> > > I see you use utterance as a unit of analysis. In the previous mail
> > > you referred to using "conversation", but utterance is surely the
> > > unit of which conversation is made up. Do you have Bakhtin's idea in
> > > mind for "utterance" at all? Otherwise the notion of "turn taking"
> > > in private speech is very challenging, isn't it?
> > >
> > > All sounds fascinating,
> > > Andy
> > >
> >
> > Hi, Andy.
> >
> >
> > My method of eliciting the speech involves children playing a game
> > with a challenging cognitive component. I videotape each child
> > (usually 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds) individually-- with me in the room,
> > at a distance, as a possible resource for interpersonal speech if the
> > child is feeling motivated enough to seek it out. The child is given
> > instructions about how the game works, what the objective is, and is
> > told "it's a new game, and I want to know what you think of it, and
> > whether other kids would like it." The game I have tended to use is a
> > Piagetian task in which a child is asked to connect some straight and
> > curved wooden tracks together in such a way that they fit between two
> > fixed endpoints glued to a large gameboard placed on the floor. The
> > children can crawl on the board and move the tracks around. The
> > objective is to "build as many roads as possible with the tracks" that
> > I provide them. To make the entire experience more fun (especially for
> > the younger children), I also affixed to the board a miniature
> > "school" area, a miniature "amusement park and zoo" area, a "lake"
> > area, and a "mountain" area. These areas are situated so that the
> > tracks can be constructed between the areas, and therefore create a
> > very enticing fantasy-play opportunity. This was a conscious decision,
> > for my aim is to elicit every type of private speech use--
> > particularly, "word play", "emotional expression", "descriptions of
> > ongoing activity", "planning", "monitoring action", and the like. I
> > want to have numerous examples of the full range of private speech
> > productions, from the most impulsive to the most regulatory, so that I
> > can examine the conversational structures and functions developmentally.
> >
> >
> > The analysis of the videotapes starts with a written transcript of the
> > speech stream. This transcript is then used in conjunction with the
> > videotaped speech and behavior, and serves as the place to record the
> > codings that are then imposed on the data. The first cut is to segment
> > the stream of speech into utterance units. Here we start to get quite
> > conceptual already; how shall we define the boundaries? In general,
> > the conventions for doing speech analysis are borrowed from
> > linguistics, but when it comes to segmenting the flow of speech,
> > developmental psychologists seem to have invented their own
> > conventions that best suit their psycholoinguistic needs. My
> > impression is that most analysts have adopted a set of criteria that
> > more or less coincides with sentence boundaries. For my purposes, this
> > is very helpful, for it divides the data neatly into two types: 1)
> > single sentences, sentence fragments, phrases, single words, and even
> > nonverbal behavior (such as facial expressions)--all of which are
> > located within an utterance's boundaries; and 2) conversation--
> > connections between the utterance under investigation and other
> > (adjacent and non-adjacent) utterances--if any. Since utterance
> > boundaries are a matter of convention, I would like to see researchers
> > make a collective, considered decision about how to slice and dice
> > linguistic data, so that we can best serve our research agendas. In my
> > case, the agenda is to test LSV's claims about the development of word
> > meaning.
> >
> >
> > Once the data are segmented into utterance units, each unit can be
> > "tagged" with attributes along the following lines: 1) Is it private
> > speech or social speech? (direction of gaze, loudness, pitch,
> > intonational contour, content, relation to ongoing action--all of
> > these are relevant to making the decision); 2) Is it task-relevant,
> > supportive of fantasy play, supportive to self-regulatory action,
> > etc.? (evidence for these functions are marshalled as well); and, in
> > my own approach (which very few private speech researchers seem to
> > share), I ask: 3) Is the utterance in question part of a
> > conversational sequence? (form, function, and content relationships to
> > other utterances and to ongoing activity are considered); and 4) What
> > conversational acts (speech acts) can be inferred from the deployment,
> > production, and performance of the utterance? (words chosen,
> > grammatical structure, literal propositional meaning, inferred
> > meanings of individual words from sentential context, conversational
> > context, and context of ongoing activity; other inferred meanings of
> > the proposition from conversational context and context of ongoing
> > activity, etc.).
> >
> >
> > Naturally, all of this takes training, time, funding, and persistence--
> > none of which are going to happen unless researchers are convinced
> > that these (more extreme) measures are warranted.
> >
> >
> > So....if YOU were going to investigate LSV's concept of word meaning,
> > dipping into the stream of conversation (or monologue, or narration)
> > at various points in time to examine the key qualities that will allow
> > you to determine the level of development of a child's activity of
> > communicating (interpersonally or personally) with speech, I ask you:
> > doesn't conversation have to be included in such an investigation? Is
> > it possible to investigate LSV's claims about word meaning if the data
> > are limited to just words, phrases, and sentences? How about the
> > social, interpersonal "exchange" property? Words and phrases are just
> > structures, but without conversation to breathe life into them, what
> > have you got?
> >
> >
> > As you can tell, I have several axes to grind!
> >
> >
> > Thus, conceptual explorations of word meaning need to be tempered
> > against the practical and pragmatic concerns involved with
> > implementing and applying the concept to data. I am convinced that
> > both theory and practice need one another for either one of them to
> > develop.
> >
> >
> > Now that I've laid bare the methodology for obtaining the data that
> > then become the empirical "facts" about word meaning, I would
> > appreciate any help or suggestions you might have for improving or
> > deepening the conceptual structure of this methodology, so that the
> > "facts" we seek might be more in line with LSV's conception.
> >
> >
> > Sorry to be so verbose.
> >
> >
> > Peter
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >> WHat experimental technique do you use, Peter, to observe
> > >> private speech?
> > >> Andy
> >
> > >> Peter Feigenbaum wrote:
> > >>> Steve--
> > >>>
> > >>> Thanks for the warm welcome.
> > >>>
> > >>> I thought my response to the ongoing discussion would be useful,
> > >>> but I can see that it will take more work on my part to demonstrate
> > >>> the relevance of what I'm proposing.
> > >>>
> > >>> I should also add that my orientation to LSV, private speech, and
> > >>> word meaning is not just conceptual, but also practical. While I
> > >>> truly
> > >>> enjoy the erudite philosophical discussions on this listserve, and
> > >>> find
> > >>> them helpful in sharpening up crucial concepts, there is research
> > >>> to be
> > >>> done to verify these ideas, and that enterprise involves making
> > >>> concrete
> > >>> decisions about conceptual possibilities.
> > >>>
> > >>> As for your synopsis of my ISCAR presentation, you did a fine job.
> > >>> All I
> > >>> would add (and this was not spelled out sufficiently in my
> > >>> presentation)
> > >>> is a fuller description of the properties that emerge when
> > >>> speaking and
> > >>> thinking "converge". As I see it, that momentous convergence that
> > >>> LSV
> > >>> points to is none other than the momentous activity of a child
> > >>> uttering
> > >>> her first meaningful word. Several aspects of that new activity
> > >>> need to
> > >>> be made explicit.
> > >>>
> > >>> First, it's not just thinking and speaking that converge inside a
> > >>> child's
> > >>> head; the whole activity is a convergence of infant and caregiver as
> > >> well.
> > >>> That is, a child's first word is spoken "to someone", and therefore
> > >>> constitutes the very first instance of the infant engaging in
> > >> interpersonal
> > >>> conversation--even though the infant is unaware of the rules and
> > >>> conventions for conducting this new activity. Fortunately, adults
> > >>> step in
> > >>> and do the work of creating a state of mutual involvement until
> > >>> the child
> > >>> is competent enough to do so on her own.
> > >>>
> > >>> Which leads to the second point: if conversational activity is
> > >>> born with
> > >> a
> > >>> child's first meaningful word, then tracking the growth and
> > >>> development
> > >> of
> > >>> conversational understanding and skills needs to be a central aim of
> > >>> Vygotskian research. Since the convergence of speaking and
> > >>> thinking is
> > >>> also the same event in which word and meaning come together as one
> > >>> to form a new activity, tracking conversational development is
> > >> intertwined
> > >>> with the development of word meaning.
> > >>>
> > >>> To respond to your first question--is word meaning an activity of
> > >> "meaning
> > >>> through language use" or does it refer to a particular
> > >>> psycholinguistic
> > >>> structure--the answer is: both. Speech communication, word
> > >>> meaning, and
> > >>> conversation are, in my view, conceptually interchangeable. These
> > >>> terms
> > >>> all refer to the activity of making meanings with speech sounds.
> > >>> Thus,
> > >>> particular speech structures are woven into the activity. That's the
> > >> great
> > >>> thing about "activity"--it's a material process involving material
> > >>> structures,
> > >>> and from it can come "ideas" and "idealizations"!
> > >>>
> > >>> If Vygotsky's claims about word meaning and its development are to
> > >>> be
> > >>> tested using empirical data, then the concept of word meaning
> > >>> needs to be
> > >>> translated and transposed so that it can take the form of an
> > >>> empirical
> > >>> methodology--while retaining its basic features. Personally, I
> > >>> don't know
> > >>> of
> > >>> one private speech researcher who uses LSV's concept of word meaning
> > >>> when analyzing speech data--and to me, that suggests something is
> > >>> very
> > >>> wrong. So I have been focused on augmenting the concept of word
> > >>> meaning
> > >>> in order to create a corresponding method that can capture word
> > >>> meaning
> > >>> and its development from a data-analytic perspective. That involves
> > >> making
> > >>> certain conceptual choices, particularly regarding the linguistic
> > >>> units.
> > >>>
> > >>> Your suggestion that there could be any number of linguistic units
> > >>> that
> > >>> might
> > >>> be proposed is certainly valid. My justifications for choosing
> > >>> words,
> > >>> sentences,
> > >>> and conversation as the three major levels in the organization of
> > >>> speech
> > >>> communication are based on both conceptual and pragmatic grounds. We
> > >>> need a method of studying this phenomenon developmentally from a
> > >>> data
> > >>> perspective, and this scheme seems tome to be the most workable one.
> > >>>
> > >>> Does that help clarify my viewpoint?
> > >>>
> > >>> Peter
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> -----xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu wrote: -----
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>> From: Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
> > >>> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >>> Date: 10/28/2009 07:19AM
> > >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] The Ubiquity of Unicorns: conversation
> > >>>
> > >>> Welcome, Peter! I liked your presentation and paper at ISCAR 2005 a
> > >>> lot, and am very glad to see you getting involved here on xmca.
> > >>>
> > >>> Your post outlines a very interesting concept, extending Vygotsky's
> > >>> concept of word-meaning to the linguistic unit of conversation.
> > >>>
> > >>> I took a quick re-look at your 2005 paper, A Dialectical Model of
> > >>> Vygotsky's Theory of Speaking and Thinking.  I like the way you
> > >>> describe Vygotsky's three stages of thinking/speech development, and
> > >>> the way you propose a fourth that completes the full developmental
> > >>> "cycle".
> > >>>
> > >>> Here is a quick synopsis of your paper (in my clumsy terms).  As you
> > >>> describe them, each of these stages takes two 'forms', so to
> > >>> speak, a
> > >>> speaking form and an intellectual (thinking) form.
> > >>>
> > >>> The paper describes  Vygotsky's three stages of speaking/thinking
> > >>> as:
> > >>> 1) interpersonal speech, which combines the speaking form of
> > >>> external
> > >>> social speech dialogues, and the intellectual form of implicit
> > >>> practical thinking;
> > >>> 2) personal speech, which combines the speaking form of external
> > >>> private speech monologues and the intellectual form of explicit
> > >>> verbal
> > >>> thinking; and 3) personal speech, which combines the speaking form
> > >>> of
> > >>> internal inner speech monologues and the intellectual form of
> > >>> explicit
> > >>> verbal thinking.
> > >>>
> > >>> To these stages outlined by Vygotsky, you suggest a fourth stage:
> > >>> 4) interpersonal speech, which combines the speaking form of inner
> > >>> speech/social speech with internal monologues and external
> > >>> dialogues,
> > >>> and the intellectual forms of explicit and implicit verbal thinking
> > >>> and practical thinking.
> > >>>
> > >>> In this post, you extend Vygotsky's concept of word-meaning beyond
> > >>> the
> > >>> word and the sentence to the conversation as a unit of analysis.  A
> > >>> key element that emerges in the second and third stages of speaking/
> > >>> thinking development - that element being the monologue, or inner
> > >>> speech - creates the basis for the fourth stage.  And the
> > >>> monologue is
> > >>> also a key element of how you are looking at conversation.  Very
> > >>> interesting analysis!
> > >>>
> > >>> Please correct the rough edges of my synopsis - and where I am off-
> > >>> base.
> > >>>
> > >>> As for considering conversation a "third level" linguistic unit,
> > >>> following the word and the sentence, I have a naive question.  The
> > >>> term "word-meaning" that Vygotsky uses in Russian - znachenie
> > >>> slova -
> > >>> as I understand it (via Holbrook Mahn's paper at a recent AERA
> > >>> conference), means something more like "meaning through language
> > >>> use"
> > >>> rather than "individual-word-meaning".  In this sense, Vygotsky may
> > >>> not have been referring specifically to any linguistic unit when he
> > >>> spoke of word-meaning.  Yes?  No?
> > >>>
> > >>> As for linguistic units, I have another naive question.  Apologies
> > >>> for
> > >>> using non-technical terms here.  We have things like parts of words,
> > >>> words, phrases, combinations of phrases, sentences, and then perhaps
> > >>> sequences of directly related sentences.  And then, of course, we
> > >>> have
> > >>> conversations.  And the distinctions can get a lot more complicated
> > >>> than that when we look at syntax.  This leads me to ask: what
> > >>> permits
> > >>> us to say that "words" are one level, "sentences" are a second
> > >>> level,
> > >>> and that "conversations" are a third?  Are we skipping any necessary
> > >>> levels?  Or creating a level that we shouldn't?
> > >>>
> > >>> I don't mean to undermine the idea of that different structural
> > >>> levels
> > >>> contain, transmit and transform meaning in qualitatively different
> > >>> ways.  Units smaller than sentences, complete sentences, and
> > >>> conversations are clearly on very different levels.  My question is:
> > >>> how can it be demonstrated and explained that these three levels are
> > >>> the right ones for this job?
> > >>>
> > >>> It would be very sweet and simple if this were the case ...
> > >>>
> > >>> - Steve
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> On Oct 27, 2009, at 8:34 AM, Peter Feigenbaum wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>>> Greetings, fellow members of XMCA.
> > >>>>
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
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