Re: [xmca] guess who

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Nick V can answer for himself. Reading Mead now in the context of a
communication course is very thought provoking. A good deal i am struggling
with. The following may be of use to the discussion.

These quotes and the entire essay on the self are to be found at.

http://mail.google.com/mail/#inbox/124ad49b8085d7cd

The selection is meant only to index the complexity of ascribing to Mead any
sort of Watsonian style behaviorism and to note places where he provides an
interesting point of translation between LSV and others of interest on this
discussion group.
mike
-----------------


It is the characteristic of the self as an object to itself that I want to
bring out. This characteristic is represented in the word "self," which is a
reflexive, and indicates that which can be both subject and object. This
type of object is essentially different from other objects, and in the past
it has been distinguished as conscious, a term which Indicates an experience
with, an experience of, one's self. It was assumed that consciousness in
some way carried this capacity of being an object to itself. In giving a
behavioristic statement of consciousness we have to look for some sort of
experience in which the physical organism can become an object to itself.
(p. 21 of my edition).
The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only
indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of
the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the social
group as a whole to which he belongs. For he enters his own experience as a
self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject
to himself, but only in so far as he first becomes an object to himself just
as other individuals are objects to him or in his experience; and he becomes
an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals
toward himself within a social environment or context of experience and
behavior in which both he and they are involved.

We are finding out what we are going to say, what we are going to do, by
saying and doing, and in the process we are continually controlling the
process itself. In the conversation of gestures what we say calls out a
certain response in another and that in turn changes our own action, so that
we shift from what we started to do because of the reply the other makes.

The conversation of gestures is the beginning of communication. The
individual comes to carry on a conversation of gestures with himself. He
says something, and that calls out a certain reply in himself which makes
him change what he was going to say


On Sun, Nov 1, 2009 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> In February, Nikolai Veresov
> http://communication.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2009_02.dir/0100.html
> posted xmca on this question. See
> http://www.marxists.org/subject/psychology/works/veresov/consciousness.htm
> where he says "'Methods of reflexological and psychological investigation'
> represented the reflexological concept of human consciousness and Vygotsky
> called himself a bigger reflexologist than Pavlov."
>
> On the notion of "social behaviorism" I tend to agree with you exactly, but
> http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Social_Psychology/Identity is an example of
> Mead being defined as "social behaviorism," even though he is _so_ different
> from Watson etc.
>
> But I would be more interested in hearing responses to your original
> response Mabel, about interactionist theories.
>
> Andy
>
> Mabel Encinas wrote:
>
>>
>> Hi, Andy.
>> I agree with you about the fact that Vygotsky is criticising reflexology
>> in the excerpt I quoted (below). I disagree though that Vygotsky was seen as
>> a reflexologist either then or later (it might be that someone has
>> considered so). Vygotsky was definitely not a reflexology. He openly
>> criticises the simplification that Pavlov does to psychology and the
>> physiological reductionism of his approach, and he is very much interested
>> in consciousness, a field that is completely out of the focus of
>> reflexology. Then, I do not agree with your point that the quote I include
>> has to do with behaviourists, as they do not consider consciousnes (self or
>> any other) something that could/should be scientifically studied. Could you
>> please tell me why do you think so?
>>  Thank you.
>>  Mabel
>>
>>
>>
>>  > Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2009 23:22:59 +1100
>>  > From: ablunden@mira.net
>>  > To: liliamabel@hotmail.com
>>
>>  > Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
>>  >
>>  > Mabel, it is a very interesting quote, but my thesis is that
>>  > in that speech Vygotsky is conducting an immanent critique
>>  > of reflexology. I am sure that everyone present at the time,
>>  > as well as every interpreter since believes that he was at
>>  > the time a reflexologist. But evidently a reflexologist who
>>  > didn't believe in reflexology. Already in the excert you
>>  > quote we see the unmistakeable reflection of the American
>>  > social behaviorists!!
>>  >
>>  > By the way, since you have this volume, check out pp. 325-28
>>  > on the question of consciousness./
>>  >
>>  > Andy
>>  >
>>  > Mabel Encinas wrote:
>>  > > Hi.
>>  > >
>>  > > I agree with your point, Andy, and actually I think that the concept
>> of
>>  > > mediation is related (or subsumed) to the concept of practice. In my
>>  > > view that is what is missing in interactionist theories (and more
>>  > > generally in communicative theories). Practice implies the
>>  > > transformation of the world/and the subjects, not only their meaning
>> as
>>  > > such.
>>  > >
>>  > > On the other hand, I agree, Larry, with the importance of the present
>>  > > moment and its affective load, although I do not know Stern's work
>> and I
>>  > > do not work with psychoanalisis. What is intriguing to me is that
>>  > > Vygotsky sets the 'self' perception in quite another way, Tony (and
>> this
>>  > > is related to the subject of consciousness recently held here, in
>> which
>>  > > unfortunately I could not participate). He says in Vol 3. of the
>>  > > Collected works (p. 77):
>>  > >
>>  > >
>>  > > … the mechanism of social behavior and the mechanism of
>>  > > consciousness are one and the same. Speech is, on the one hand, the
>>  > > system of the ‘reflexes of social contact’ and, on the other hand,
>>  > > the system of the reflexes of consciousness par excellence, i.e., an
>>  > > apparatus for the reflection of other systems.
>>  > >
>>  > > The key to the problem of another person’s Ego, of the knowledge of
>>  > > another person’s mind lies here. The mechanism of knowledge of the
>>  > > self (self-consciousness) and knowledge of others is the same. The
>>  > > usual theories about the knowledge of another person’s mind either
>>  > > accept that it cannot be known, or they try to build a plausible
>>  > > mechanism with the help of various hypotheses. In the theory of
>>  > > /Einfühlung/ and in the theory from analogy the essence of such a
>>  > > mechanism is the same: we know others insofar as we know ourselves.
>>  > > When I know another person's anger, I reproduce my own anger.
>>  > >
>>  > > In reality it would be more correct to put it the other way around.
>>  > > We are conscious of ourselves because we are conscious of others and
>>  > > by the same method as we are conscious of others, because we are the
>>  > > same vis-à-vis ourselves as others are vis-à-vis us. */I am
>>  > > conscious of myself only to the extent that I am another to myself
>>  > > /*(I added emphasis in this previous sentence, as you might not have
>>  > > html). i.e. to the extent that I can again perceive my own reflexes
>>  > > as stimuli. In principle there is no difference in mechanism
>>  > > whatsoever between the fact that I can repeat aloud a word spoken
>>  > > silently and the fact that I can repeat a word spoken by another:
>>  > > both are reversible reflex-stimuli.
>>  > >
>>  > > That is why the acceptance of the hypothesis proposed will lead
>>  > > directly to the sociologizing of all consciousness, to the
>>  > > acceptance that the social moment in consciousness is primary in
>>  > > time as well as in fact. The individual aspect is constructed as a
>>  > > derived and secondary aspect on the basis of the social aspect and
>>  > > exactly according to its model.
>>  > >
>>  > >
>>  > > I think this is not a trivial difference, but I guess this difference
>>  > > and the issue of practice, are at the core of the distinction between
>> a
>>  > > sociocultural approach and interactional approaches.
>>  > >
>>  > > Mabel
>>  > >
>>  > >
>>  > >
>>  > > > Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2009 17:24:34 +1100
>>  > > > From: ablunden@mira.net
>>  > > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>
>>  > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
>>  > > >
>>  > > > Larry, I too am interested in the relation between CHAT and
>>  > > > the "intersubjective" people because intersubjective
>>  > > > theories are found in American Hegel interpretation and in
>>  > > > Critical Theory along with appropriations of psychoanalysis
>>  > > > and American Pragmatism, but the ones I've read find very
>>  > > > unsatisfactory. I would like to see Critical Theorists in
>>  > > > particular paying attention to CHAT.
>>  > > >
>>  > > > The main problem I have with the intersubjective stuff I've
>>  > > > read is that they lack any concept of mediation, by which I
>>  > > > mean the use of artefacts in thinking and communicating.
>>  > > > They mistakenly imagine that individual "subjects" can
>>  > > > communicate directly without mediation. What do you mean
>>  > > > when you say "mediated"
>>  > > >
>>  > > > Andy
>>
>>  > > >
>>  > > > Larry Purss wrote:
>>  > > > > The topic of the social construction and development of the self
>> in
>>  > > Mead and the parallels with cultural historical theories of
>>  > > intersubjectivity is fascinating. I have just finished reading
>> "Daniel
>>  > > Stern's book "The Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday Life"
>> He
>>  > > is a member of the "Boston Change Process Study Group" which is
>>  > > exploring the potential for change enacted in the moment to moment (2
>> to
>>  > > 10 second) intersubjective spaces created in enactements. This work
>> is
>>  > > embedded in the larger focus on intersubjectivity being elaborated
>>  > > within "relational psychoanalysis". One of the historical roots of
>> this
>>  > > approach comes from Harry Stack Sullivan and "interpersonal
>>  > > psychoanalysis" Sullivan's work was a conversation between Mead's
>> theory
>>  > > of the relational self and psychoanalysis. This conversation is today
>>  > > transforming all branches of psychoanalytic theory and practice and
>>  > > there are many books and journal articles focusing on
>>  > > "intersubjectivity" and the quality of
>>  > > > "mutual" recognition to facilitate change. This perspective can be
>>  > > applied to learning and developmental theory to emphasize Mead's
>> project
>>  > > of the social self.
>>  > > > > I work in school systems and try to use this intersubjective
>>  > > relational lens to deepen my understanding of "mediated learning" as
>> a
>>  > > process of "implicit relational knowing" (see Daniel Stern) as well
>> as
>>  > > explicit relational knowing and practices. Intersubjectivity as
>>  > > experienced in the moment to moment enactments that are elaborated
>>  > > within the interactions of mediated learning are grounded in
>> affective
>>  > > attunement as foundational to cognitive learning.
>>  > > > > I hesitate to bring "psychoanalytic" models to this website
>> because
>>  > > of the reaction to traditional Freudian models of reified psychic
>>  > > structure and all that baggage. However I happen to be intrigued by
>> both
>>  > > "mediated learning" and "intersubjectivity" as ways to look at the
>> micro
>>  > > units of analysis.
>>  > > > > As an aside Daniel Stern was one of the researches, with Jerome
>>  > > Bruner, and others who studied "baby talk" and the development of
>>  > > language in moment to moment transactions. Twenty years later Daniel
>>  > > Stern and the Boston Change Process Study Group are still working at
>>  > > this micro unit of the present moment and the creation of
>>  > > intersubjective spaces.
>>  > > > > Stern (p.43 "The Present Moment") quoted William James as he
>>  > > described the stream of consciousness as like a bird's life made up
>> of
>>  > > an alteration of flights and perchings. Stern's book elaborates the
>>  > > present moments are like the perchings. The flights are the spaces
>>  > > between moments of consciousness. These "flights" are inaccesible and
>>  > > ungraspable. "Consciousness is thus free to switch focus from one
>>  > > present moment to the next, and the sense of the self as experiencer
>> is
>>  > > never felt to be interrupted, even though the perchings are
>>  > > discontinuous. These present moments are the stuff of subjectivity
>>  > > during ordianary mental states" (p.43)
>>  > > > > Mediated learning in the ZPD can be enriched by exploring Mead's
>>  > > and Stern's and other scholars who are exploring intersubjectivity
>> and
>>  > > the development of the self.
>>  > > > >
>>  > > > >
>>  > > > >
>>  > > > > ----- Original Message -----
>>  > > > > From: Tony Whitson <twhitson@UDel.Edu>
>>  > > > > Date: Saturday, October 31, 2009 7:12 pm
>>  > > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
>>  > > > > To: lchcmike@gmail.com, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>  > > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>  > > > > Cc: Ben DeVane <ben.devane@gmail.com>
>>  > > > >
>>  > > > >> Mead was also my first guess (and it really was a guess, since I
>>  > > > >> haven't
>>  > > > >> actually read Mead)
>>  > > > >>
>>  > > > >> But I thought the more interesting thing about the provocation
>>  > > > >> is that
>>  > > > >> even though it seemed like exactly what I would expect from
>>  > > > >> Mead, I could
>>  > > > >> not be certain, because there are a number of others we are
>>  > > > >> interested in
>>  > > > >> who could just as well have said the same. That's what I find
>>  > > > >> most
>>  > > > >> interesting in this.
>>  > > > >>
>>  > > > >> And I do think this is part of Hegel's legacy, such that even
>>  > > > >> Lacan could
>>  > > > >> have said much the same as this, although with somewhat
>>  > > > >> differing
>>  > > > >> implications.
>>  > > > >>
>>  > > > >> On Sat, 31 Oct 2009, mike cole wrote:
>>  > > > >>
>>  > > > >>> Got it first try. Mead got his PhD with Dilthey. My own guess
>>  > > > >> is that this
>>  > > > >>> goes back to at least Hegel, but others would know better.
>>  > > > >>>
>>  > > > >>> (Dishes done, snuck away)
>>  > > > >>> mike
>>  > > > >>>
>>  > > > >>> On Sat, Oct 31, 2009 at 7:51 PM, Ben DeVane
>>  > > > >> <ben.devane@gmail.com> wrote:
>>  > > > >>>> We just got done reading Mead in our pragmatism reading group
>> here,
>>  > > > >>>> and it sounds very Meadish (Vygotsky crossed with Dewey), so
>>  > > > >> that's my
>>  > > > >>>> guess. Honest I didn't look it up on Google.
>>  > > > >>>>
>>  > > > >>>> I really enjoyed the Holland & Lachicotte, and Edwards
>>  > > > >> chapters on the
>>  > > > >>>> parallels between Mead and Vygotsky in the Cambridge
>>  > > > >> handbook. Highly
>>  > > > >>>> recommended for anyone unfamiliar with Mead's work.
>>  > > > >>>>
>>  > > > >>>> -Ben
>>  > > > >>>>
>>  > > > >>>>
>>  > > > >>>> On Sat, Oct 31, 2009 at 8:09 PM, mike cole
>>  > > > >> <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>  > > > >>>>> In preparing for class just now i fell across this sentence.
>>  > > > >> Obvious who
>>  > > > >>>>> wrote it without looking it up on google?
>>  > > > >>>>>
>>  > > > >>>>> “*The self is something which has a development*, it is not
>>  > > > >> initially>> there
>>  > > > >>>>> at birth, but arises in the process of social experiences
>>  > > > >> and activity,
>>  > > > >>>> that
>>  > > > >>>>> is, develops in the given individual as a result of his
>>  > > > >> relations to that
>>  > > > >>>>> process as a whole and to other individuals within that
>> process”
>>  > > > >>>>>
>>  > > > >>>>> My own relations are saying get the hell off the computer,
>>  > > > >> the doorbell
>>  > > > >>>> is
>>  > > > >>>>> ringing and the goblins are on the move. So off i go.
>>  > > > >>>>> mike
>>  > > > >>>>> _______________________________________________
>>  > > > >>>>> xmca mailing list
>>  > > > >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>  > > > >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>  > > > >>>>>
>>  > > > >>>>
>>  > > > >>>>
>>  > > > >>>> --
>>  > > > >>>> ***********************
>>  > > > >>>> Ben DeVane
>>  > > > >>>> Ph.D Candidate
>>  > > > >>>> Games+Learning+Society Research Group
>>  > > > >>>> University of Wisconsin-Madison
>>  > > > >>>> ***********************
>>  > > > >>>>
>>  > > > >>> _______________________________________________
>>  > > > >>> xmca mailing list
>>  > > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>  > > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>  > > > >>>
>>  > > > >> Tony Whitson
>>  > > > >> UD School of Education
>>  > > > >> NEWARK DE 19716
>>  > > > >>
>>  > > > >> twhitson@udel.edu
>>  > > > >> _______________________________
>>  > > > >>
>>  > > > >> "those who fail to reread
>>  > > > >> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
>>  > > > >> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
>>  > > > > _______________________________________________
>>  > > > > xmca mailing list
>>  > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>  > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>  > > > >
>>  > > >
>>  > > > --
>>  > > >
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>  > > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>  > > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
>>  > > > Ilyenkov $20 ea
>>
>>  > > >
>>  > > > _______________________________________________
>>  > > > xmca mailing list
>>  > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>  > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>  > >
>>  > >
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>  > > Windows Live Hotmail: Your friends can get your Facebook updates,
>> right
>>  > > from Hotmail®.
>>  > > <
>> http://www.microsoft.com/middleeast/windows/windowslive/see-it-in-action/social-network-basics.aspx?ocid=PID23461::T:WLMTAGL:ON:WL:en-xm:SI_SB_4:092009
>> >
>>  >
>>  > --
>>  >
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>  > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>  > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
>>  > Ilyenkov $20 ea
>>  >
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Windows Live: Make it easier for your friends to see what you’re up to on
>> Facebook. <
>> http://www.microsoft.com/middleeast/windows/windowslive/see-it-in-action/social-network-basics.aspx?ocid=PID23461::T:WLMTAGL:ON:WL:en-xm:SI_SB_2:092009
>> >
>>
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20
> ea
>
>
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