5. You do know language came into being because of collective
labour . And please have another look at V's last two paragraphs
of T&S . And please think of what a syntax of a thought might be
with children . And please consider yourself reviewing the lecture
you're going to deliver *in* your mind before putting it in its
sound/acoustic version . And historical genesis as well . Now may
you , in your turn , tell me what kind of existence a
consciousness has for which you are seeking an appropriate
definition ?
I wonder if sleep will reign !
Friendly Yours
Haydi
--- On *Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden /<ablunden@mira.net>/* wrote:
From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material
quality of the man-sign"
To:
Cc: "Culture ActivityeXtended Mind" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 11:54 AM
Haydi, I firmly believe that there is no value in flying on
to 101
questions if the very first one remains unsolved.
Going to your third: the problem under discussion was this:
Martin referred to a series of "representational systems"
being all
"material"; I pointed out that Martin had already said that
*everything*, even consciousness, was material so the
statement that
these representational systems were material was a "motherhood
statement", i.e., a tautology.
So I responded "show me a representational system which is
*not*
material" which is a problem for Martin because he says that
everything is material. You then said that you could name a
representational system which was not material, namely,
language.
I responded to you that language was always material, and
you now
say "no, language is an non-material entity which is "put
into a
body." I suspect that you are relying on the concept of the
'ideal'
which is a social category, not an opposite to "material."
Let's just deal with this. I don't accept that there is a
language
which is non-material which can then be "put into" a body.
Can you
explain to me what kind of existence language has before it
is put
into material.
I won't try to anticipate your answer, but I wonder if this
will
lead us back to our original problem: consciousness.
Andy
Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> Andy
> First there were other argumentations .
> Second : to your question : Consciousness itself .
> Third : This was just a telegraphic note but the problem
persists . Embodiment is to put something in a body . Then
we have
two things . The cover and the covered . In principle , the
necessity of putting that something -- ideal -- in a body is
that
itself is not of the same genus . That's for you to expect
ideals be
buried there in the mysterious hidden box yet not quite well
known ,
indefinable ! at times , stopped , deceased , so life is
also defunct .
> I can also give *subjectivity , subjectness* ; can you
show me a
palpable thing called *subjectivity* and it's
representational ,
secondary , derived . Haydi
>
> --- On *Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden /<ablunden@mira.net
<http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net
>>/*
wrote:
>
>
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net
>>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the
material
> quality of the man-sign"
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>
> Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 9:57 AM
>
> Haydi, you can't talk of "Language *aside from* the
modality in
> which it is embodied" and then say "language is not
material." Of
> course, anything "aside from" its materiality is
immaterial.
Show me
> a representational system which is *not* "embiodied."
>
> Andy
>
> Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> > Dear Andy
> > Language itself aside from the modality in which
it is
> formed/embodied and as it is consisted of signs is
ideal for the
> folowing reasons : 1. We have read on many occasions
that it's a
> formant of the Cs . When you are dealing with the Cs
as something
> catogirically distinct from the material which is
quite quite
true ,
> why is it you could accept a formant of this something
categorically
> distinct from *material* could be all the way
*material* .
This is
> just where Martin finds the opportunity to argue for a
doubling of
> *materiality* . A statue as such is ideal the same
way real
talers
> as well as Gods are ideal for Marx (previous post) .
Real
talers or
> money paper are things palpable , corporeal , stuffy ,
substantial ;
> yet they are for Marx ideal ; the yardstick is that
they are
> representations for something *esle* . The talerness
of the
talers
> and the statueness of a statue need a social thinking
body to be
> recognized as such . Aside from the social thought/
Cs , the whole
> things become just use values , valueless , lacking
any exchange
> value as for Marx . And we shouldn't forget the second
> > condition Lenin mentions either . As of
language , the
ink , the
> carbon or the acoustics with which it is embodied
does not
make it
> *material* the same way *stone* , *bronze* , *cement* ,
*plastics*
> of a staue do not make the *form* -- not contrasting
content
here --
> of the statueness *material* ; the form now indicates
Lincoln
, now
> Lenin , now so and so . But the stone , etc. remain
the same
all the
> time . This latter part you name categorically
*material* to this
> day distinct from the *ideal* as Cs is . A clock
consists of many
> many parts , that is , many corporals , materials ,
use values ;
> but all these should be organized in such a way to
represent
> something else , time measurement . The palpability
or the
visuality
> of the clock should not take us where we could say
it's something
> material . See what of the three divisions of Peirce
fits this .
> When you take the ideality of the language away from
it , the
whole
> sentence/text/book becomes ink
> > spilt/scattered over the paper out of neglect .
Your
example of
> *carved in stone* incidentally helps us to get the
gist quite
easily
> ; you , in fact , take some materiality away from the
stone
so that
> a language becomes eligible for the readers . What
remains as
some
> markings or signs no longer have any materiality ;
the remaining
> stone frame does not have anything to do with the
language
carved in
> it . This is also true with the braille texture .
It's the
> organization/ordinance of the texture which is a
language not the
> stuff therefrom . When you and Mike are on the screen
lipreading
> each other in non-acoustics silence , you , in fact ,
have a
> telepathy version of language ; you're this way
exchanging your
> mentalities with no materiality at hand . The
computer is
modality
> for your vision not for the language you are using .
And
lastly ,
> because a word is a sign , something for something
else , in
itself
> ! just a yelling or a marking denoting nothing as
referring
to the
> objects of the world which you so philosophically /
inexaustively
> are defending !
> > Best
> > Haydi
> > --- On Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net
>
> <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net
>>
wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net
>
> <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net
>>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of
the material
> quality of the man-sign"
> > To: "Haydi Zulfei" <haydizulfei@yahoo.com
<http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=haydizulfei@yahoo.com
>
> <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=haydizulfei@yahoo.com
>>
> > Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 12:26 AM
> >
> >
> > Language is a material representational system,
Haydi.
> >
> > Language may be in speech (vibrations in the air),
text
(markings
> on a surface or optical projections on a screen or
carved in
stone)
> or texture (as in Braille), but there is no mental
telepathy
version
> of language that I know of.
> >
> > Why do you think the written and spoken word is
not material?
> >
> > Andy
> > Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> >> Now you ask Martin to tell you a representational
system
which
> is not *material* . I tell you *language* is a system
which
is not
> material.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
_______________________________________________
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<http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
> --
>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev,
Meshcheryakov,
> Ilyenkov $20 ea
>
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>
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>
>
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea
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