Thanks, Martin, Emily, and Michael for questions (copied below).
I'll try, briefly, to explain my "take" on the Learning Sciences.
First, I was wrong. How People Learn doesn't take the production system
as central. The course I'm teaching relies on other authors who do
(e.g., Schools for Thought, by John Bruer). Still, I would argue that
production systems (or other similar computational formalisms) underlie
the learning sciences movement, even though the politics of what one can
claim explicitly is rather dense and convoluted.
Production rules are condition-action pairs specified within a
computational system--i.e., with sufficient clarity and precision that a
serial digital computer can check the condition and execute the action.
Complex architectures of such productions are used to simulate expertise
in a variety of domains. More impressively--this work really is
impressive--some production systems can improve their performance by
refining their own production rules through experience--i.e., learn.
However, expertise always comes down to fluent performance of routine
tasks--i.e., skills. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Production_system)
Probably the best known production system model of learning is the ACT
system of John Anderson. In many books, including "The Atomic Components
of Thought" (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), Anderson makes it clear that
production rules are, well, the atomic components of thought--completely
central to all cognitive activity.
Doubtless, many will remember Anderson's 1996 attack of situated
cognition in Educational Researcher. Jim Greeno rose to the defense of
situativity theory in a 1997 response, which Anderson and colleagues
vigorously rebutted in the same issue. Finally, Anderson, Greeno, and
co-authors collaborated on a let's-bury-the-hatchet piece focused on
their commonalities of perspective. Somewhere before the final article
of the series, Tony and I contributed a critique of what we saw as the
limitations of the construal of situated cognition operative in that
conversation.
What made Jean Lave's 1988 book have such impact on the learning
sciences community was her devastating critique of cognitivist efforts
to account for transfer. Indeed, it was in the context of that buzz that
Greeno defected from cognitivism to situativity.
Jean's work, as well as that of many others, made it clear that
fundamental change would be needed to account for "context" which, in a
strict cognitivist treatment (e.g., within a production system), has to
be decomposed into discrete symbols that can enter into the cognitive
architecture. So, surely, there was, and continues to be a strand of the
learning sciences that is open to a radical rethinking the nature
cognitive theory. But I think Greeno's reconciliation with Anderson et
al. signals a willingness of many to construe situated cognition as an
effort to shore up cognitivism, rather than to challenge it.
So, move forward a few years and you have Bransford et al., representing
the learning sciences establishment in education, embracing the rhetoric
of situated cognition, and putting forward a "soft" version of cognitive
science that doesn't mention production systems or any other
computational fundamentals. What are we to make of this warm and fuzzy
approach?
For me the answer is that cognitive science is doing what it has to do
to be a dominant force in education without fundamentally changing its
stripes. The main clue is that the only really coherent guidance offered
in How People Learn is toward expertise as fluent performance (see
below). There really is no theorization that I can discern to support
the rhetoric of concept development, scaffolding, metacognition, or
collaborative dispositions. This is a reasonable course of action on the
part of cognitivists. They do have something solid to build on in the
impressive accomplishments of information processing models of
cognitition. They do hope the cognitivist net they are casting can catch
the sorts of expertise educators value. Short of abandoning ship,
there's really no alternative to building up from where you are.
David
__________ How People Learn (p. 49)___________
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309070368
The issue of retrieving relevant information provides clues about the
nature of usable knowledge. Knowledge must be "conditionalized" in order
to be retrieved when it is needed; otherwise, it remains inert
(Whitehead, 1929). Many designs for curriculum instruction and
assessment practices fail to emphasize the importance of conditionalized
knowledge. For example, texts often present facts and formulas with
little attention to helping students learn the conditions under which
they are most useful. Many assessments measure only propositional
(factual) knowledge and never ask whether students know when, where, and
why to use that knowledge.
Another important characteristic of expertise is the ability to retrieve
relevant knowledge in a manner that is relatively "effortless." This
fluent retrieval does not mean that experts always accomplish tasks in
less time than novices; often they take more time in order to fully
understand a problem. But their ability to retrieve information
effortlessly is extremely important because fluency places fewer demands
on conscious attention, which is limited in capacity (Schneider and
Shiffrin, 1977, 1985). Effortful retrieval, by contrast, places many
demands on a learner's attention: attentional effort is being expended
on remembering instead of learning. Instruction that focuses solely on
accuracy does not necessarily help students develop fluency (e.g., Beck
et al., 1989; Hasselbring et al., 1987; LaBerge and Samuels, 1974).
_____________________________________________
Anderson, J. R., Greeno, J. G., Reder, L. M., & Simon, H. A. (2000).
Perspectives on learning, thinking, and activity. Educational
Researcher, 29, 11-13.
Anderson, J. R., & Lebiere, C. (Eds.) (1998). The atomic components of
thought. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Anderson, J. R., Reder, L. M., & Simon, H. A. (1996). Situated learning
and education. Educational Researcher, 25(4), 5-11.
Anderson, J. R., Reder, L. M., & Simon, H. A. (1997). Situative versus
cognitive perspectives: Form versus substance. Educational Researcher,
26(1), 18-21.
Greeno, J. G. (1997). On claims that answer the wrong question.
Educational Researcher, 26(1), 5-17.
Kirshner, D. & Whitson, J. A. (1998). Obstacles to understanding
cognition as situated. Educational Researcher, 27(8), 22-28.
Lave, J. (1988). Cognition in practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Martin:
Fascinating discussion - but could someone provide me with some
clarification of the 'production' model (of schooling? of cognition?)
and the formation model (of knowledge? of the learner? Bildung)?
And is the claim that learning science is hegemonic with respect to
other perspectives (such as Piaget or LSV), or wrt schooling
(curriculum)?
And 'dissipation' of situative perspectives... In the sense of being
dispersed and lost? Seems to me everyone in cog sci is jumping on the
situated bandwagon. More co-opted than dissipated?
hanging on to this thread for dear life...
Emily:
When you stated:
" So the text is largely a promissory note for how a cognitive science
approach encompasses all of these rich traditions, whereas inspecting
the actual contribution of cognitive science research leads to little
more than an unpacking of how skills develop through repetitive
practice."
Is the latter part of the sentence (from 'whereas' on) your comment on
the text or on cognitive science in general?
In either case, it seems to be a very narrow view on 'all' cognitive
science research. I assume it is based on some works in particular?
Michael Evans:
The thread has given me a lot to think about and I'll need to digest
before responding fully - I must say that I'm not getting the exact
reading of this literature as David and Tony, particularly if you move
past Bransford work, which is represented early in the Sawyer edited
handbook...I do agree that there is a degree of re-branding going on,
but I'm naive enough to sense there's a legitimate project going on here
in terms of bringing together several disciplines including cognitive
science - again, the handbook has contributions from educational
psychology, mathematics & science education, computer science, and
educational anthropology...
As I noted previously, what concerned me about the literature was a lack
of deference to the debt many of the authors owe to Vygotsky, much less
so to Piaget...
Again, I appreciate the creation of this thread and hope to contribute
more once I've had a chance to think more about it...
__________ How People Learn (p. 49)___________
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309070368
The issue of retrieving relevant information provides clues about the
nature of usable knowledge. Knowledge must be "conditionalized" in order
to be retrieved when it is needed; otherwise, it remains inert
(Whitehead, 1929). Many designs for curriculum instruction and
assessment practices fail to emphasize the importance of conditionalized
knowledge. For example, texts often present facts and formulas with
little attention to helping students learn the conditions under which
they are most useful. Many assessments measure only propositional
(factual) knowledge and never ask whether students know when, where, and
why to use that knowledge.
Another important characteristic of expertise is the ability to retrieve
relevant knowledge in a manner that is relatively "effortless." This
fluent retrieval does not mean that experts always accomplish tasks in
less time than novices; often they take more time in order to fully
understand a problem. But their ability to retrieve information
effortlessly is extremely important because fluency places fewer demands
on conscious attention, which is limited in capacity (Schneider and
Shiffrin, 1977, 1985). Effortful retrieval, by contrast, places many
demands on a learner's attention: attentional effort is being expended
on remembering instead of learning. Instruction that focuses solely on
accuracy does not necessarily help students develop fluency (e.g., Beck
et al., 1989; Hasselbring et al., 1987; LaBerge and Samuels, 1974).
_____________________________________________
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Martin Packer
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2009 7:01 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Learning Sciences / Science of Education
Fascinating discussion - but could someone provide me with some
clarification of the 'production' model (of schooling? of cognition?)
and the formation model (of knowledge? of the learner? Bildung)?
And is the claim that learning science is hegemonic with respect to
other perspectives (such as Piaget or LSV), or wrt schooling
(curriculum)?
And 'dissipation' of situative perspectives... In the sense of being
dispersed and lost? Seems to me everyone in cog sci is jumping on the
situated bandwagon. More co-opted than dissipated?
hanging on to this thread for dear life...
Martin
On Sep 15, 2009, at 7:29 PM, Tony Whitson wrote:
David,
Your message is powerfully corrobarative.
It arrived as I was preparing documents for inclusion in the web
page I'll be posting in response to this thread. One of those
documents is a very slightly expanded version of a proposal for AERA
this year on Learning Sciences / Science of Education as a hegemonic
project.
In terms of HOW PEOPLE LEARN, Piaget, Vygotsky -- and how Dewey,
Lave, etc. get contortedly forced into that framework, see my
"Curriculum & the post-(cognitivist) synthesis,"
at http://wp.me/p1V0H-1O . (If you vaguely remember having seen this
before, it's because I skipped ahead to this page when you appeared
in my classroom a couple years ago.)
I find this article very helpful for understanding what's happening
here:
Lave, J. (1991). Situating learning in communities of practice. In
L. B. Resnick, J. M. Levine & S. D. Teasley (Eds.), Perspectives on
socially shared cognition (1st ed., pp. 63-82). Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
I will include that in the page for tonight.
Emily, my own answer (obviously not speaking for David) is that
David nails the problem with his reference to the production model.
The difference between production and formation is absolutely
crucial. I think Cognitive Science is generally oblivious to that
difference. Some Cog Sci is clearly productionist. There's nothing
to preclude Cog Sci from recognizing formation as distinct from
production, but often in its obliviousness it remains equivocal and
ambiguous at best. Given that in U.S. English discourse education as
formation has pretty much disappeared from the language, writing
must be done deliberately to preclude texts from being read as
productionist texts, and I don't see that happening in the Cog Sci
literature, even where the author(s) might be themselves thinking
that they're writing about formative activity.
On Tue, 15 Sep 2009, Duvall, Emily wrote:
David,
When you stated:
" So the text is largely a promissory note for how a cognitive
science
approach encompasses all of these rich traditions, whereas inspecting
the actual contribution of cognitive science research leads to little
more than an unpacking of how
skills develop through repetitive practice."
Is the latter part of the sentence (from 'whereas' on) your comment
on
the text or on cognitive science in general?
In either case, it seems to be a very narrow view on 'all' cognitive
science research. I assume it is based on some works in particular?
~em
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-
bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of David H Kirshner
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2009 3:45 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: RE: [xmca] Learning Sciences / Science of Education
Tony,
I'm co-PI on a grant to replicate the University of Texas secondary
teacher education program, which is largely focused on the learning
sciences literature. This semester, I'm teaching an intro course,
Knowing and Learning, that uses How People Learn as its main text,
and
presents the orthodoxy of production systems as the organizing
framework
for thinking about learning and teaching--at the same time
extolling the
need for group work, project based instruction, and the like. What
becomes increasingly clear as I go through the literature is the
hegemonic character of the learning sciences, at least in relation to
educational matters. The insights into learning extolled in the
literature derive in large part from Piagetian constructivist
research
and from Vygotskyan sociocultural research. So the text is largely a
promissory note for how a cognitive science approach encompasses
all of
these rich traditions, whereas inspecting the actual contribution of
cognitive science research leads to little more than an unpacking
of how
skills develop through repetitive practice.
The sociological process of hegemonic discourse is itself an
interest of
mine at this time. I'm recalling our discussion of a couple of
years ago
about the possibility of a new edition of our situated cognition
reader
organized as a response to the dissipation of situative perspectives
within the learning sciences. I'm increasingly interested in
understanding that process.
David
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-
bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Tony Whitson
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2009 3:07 PM
To: mcole@ucsd.edu; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [xmca] Learning Sciences / Science of Education
This is something that I'm very interested in. I'm planning a paper
for
a
narrow audience this winter, and a more ambitious paper for a wide
audience in Winter 2011. If others would be interested in a 2011 AERA
symposium, let's talk.
I'll see if I can put together a post tonight with some fragments &
bibliography that people might be interested in.
Meanwhile, I think there is a short answer, which of course is not
the
complete answer:
I think a good deal of the impetus behind "Learning Sciences" comes
from
the political hostility to Education faculty in favor of
positive(istic)
psychology, as in Reid Lyons' statement that "If there was any
piece of
legislation that I could pass, it would be to blow up colleges of
education".
This has created an environment in which an Educational Psychologist
(like
John Bransford, for example) would lose out in the funding for
competition
to a Learning Scientist (like John Bransford, for example).
Folks in Seattle, Nashville, etc. see little cost in a name change
that
keeps the dollars flowing. I'm not concerned about the name change,
so
much, but I have continuing concerns about the enterprise in general.
On Tue, 15 Sep 2009, Mike Cole wrote:
Thanks Em-- And I googled Goswami neuromyths. Also very
enlightening.
Goswami did early work with Ann Brown, former collaborator with us
at
LCHC.
Now if we go back a step and look at the people who created the
label
of
learning sciences, and their backgrounds, the shift from
"developmental
psychology" to developmental sciences, the appearance recently of
the
handbook of cultural developmental science, ......... what a
tempest!
Must
be a teapot in there somewhere. Simultaneous, fractilated paradigm
shifts?
Does anyone have the luxury of being able to organize a science
studies
interrogation of these movements? Seems really worthwhile.
mike
On Tue, Sep 15, 2009 at 12:16 PM, Duvall, Emily <emily@uidaho.edu>
wrote:
Thanks Mike... :-)
In general I like Goswami's work; I find her discussion of
neuromyths compelling and have had my grad students do additional
research on some of them. I am also particularly interested in ways
to
try to negotiate across different fields. I've attached my favorite
Goswami and a nice intro to neuroeducation.
As a side note: Monica (Hansen, who frequently shows up on
the
list serve and is one of my doc students) and I took a neuroscience
journal club/ seminar last spring and found ourselves trying to
make
sense of the work that is done with regard to education. We are
taking
another seminar right now and some of the folks who were in last
year's
class are presenting journal articles in their field, but are
trying
to
make the links to human experience, particularly education. It's
been
interesting to discover how open minded the students and faculty
are...
one of the computational neuroscience faculty has taken up some
Vygotsky
reading as well as neuroeducation... of course Luria's work is a
door
opener and a point of mutual interest.
~em
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Mike Cole
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2009 9:41 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Neuroscience connections to learning and
relearning
No one picked up on your interest in neuroeducation, Emily. A lot
of
what I
read in this area strikes me as almost entirely without any
appreciation
of
education, or human experience, as a culturally mediated,
co-constructed
process. Do you have a favorite general ref you could point us to
that
you
resonate to??
mike
On Sun, Sep 13, 2009 at 8:50 AM, Duvall, Emily <emily@uidaho.edu>
wrote:
I thought some of you might one or both of these article summaries
interesting. The first really speaks to the new field of
neuroeducation
with regard to cellular learning... the nice thing about the
summary
is
it gives you an overview of learning at the cellular basis... very
clear
and easy to understand. Plus an introduction to astrocytes... :-)
The second piece actually discusses re-learning, which has been a
topic
lately.
What I personally find so interesting is the role of experience in
learning and relearning... I found myself thinking back to Shirley
Brice
Heath's work... it would be fun to go back to her work and look at
her
study through a neuroeducation lens.
1. Star-shaped Cells In Brain Help With Learning
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/09/090911132907.htm
Every movement and every thought requires the passing of specific
information between networks of nerve cells. To improve a skill or
to
learn something new entails more efficient or a greater number of
cell
contacts. Scientists can now show that certain cells in the
brain --
the
astrocytes -- actively influence this information exchange.
2. Forgotten But Not Gone: How The Brain Re-learns
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/11/081117110834.htm
Thanks to our ability to learn and to remember, we can perform
tasks
that other living things can not even dream of. However, we are
only
just beginning to get the gist of what really goes on in the brain
when
it learns or forgets something. What we do know is that changes in
the
contacts between nerve cells play an important role. But can these
structural changes account for that well-known phenomenon that
it is
much easier to re-learn something that was forgotten than to learn
something completely new?
~em
Emily Duvall, PhD
Assistant Professor Curriculum & Instruction
University of Idaho, Coeur d'Alene
1000 W. Hubbard Suite 242 | Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
T 208 292 2512 | F 208 667 5275 emily@uidaho.edu |
www.cda.uidaho.edu
He only earns his freedom and his life, who takes them every day
by
storm.
-- Johann Wolfgang Goethe
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Tony Whitson
UD School of Education
NEWARK DE 19716
twhitson@udel.edu
_______________________________
"those who fail to reread
are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
-- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
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Tony Whitson
UD School of Education
NEWARK DE 19716
twhitson@udel.edu
_______________________________
"those who fail to reread
are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
-- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
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