David,
The quotes we are discussing from Ilyenkov's Introduction to
Problems of Dialectical Logic are part of a set of three
paragraphs. The three paragraphs in question are copied below for
reference.
The most interesting and relevant paragraph, I think, is the
third, where Ilyenkov speaks about the object or subject matter of
his book, thinking, and succinctly summarizes some of his
essential theses on thinking.
************************
On the first two of the three paragraphs ...
I happened to find on the internet a clearer translation of the
Hegel quote that the one that appears in the Ilyenkov text. It is
copied below. Seeing the whole quote seems to help grasp what
Hegel was saying and what point Ilyenkov was making.
I think Ilyenkov is offering the following three-step reasoning in
these first two of the three paragraphs in question. Please let
me know if something does not logically match:
1. Just as Hegel pointed out ... that it is the final result of
philosophizing that is salient whereas the way of carrying it out
is inessential ... so too, those that view dialectics as just a
method for deriving a perspective (whether this perspective had
already been arrived at or not) ... are using dialectics in the
manner of a sophist, and are thereby using dialectics in a way
that is "empty of content," as though they are "swimming at random".
2. Real dialectics requires more than just trying to apply the
dialectical method. It also requires having a clear idea of the
object (the subject matter) being analyzed.
3. Ilyenkov therefore feels obliged to reveal the object (subject
matter) of his book to the reader.
My take on these two paragraphs is that Ilyenkov seems to be
making clever uses of Hegel and some other phrases to make his
point. Perhaps he is telling an "inside joke" or two - I'm not
sure. An irony that may be intended is that he refers to the well-
known quote (copied below) from Hegel that argues a real
philosophical work can't be summarized, but Ilyenkov then goes
ahead and provides a succinct summary of the subject matter of his
book anyway! But I would need help to understand more about
Ilyenkov's specific references to delve any further. Perhaps
others could help with these paragraphs.
*******************************
The third paragraph is much more interesting, to my mind, because
this is where Ilyenkov's central theses about thinking, the
central subject of his book, are succinctly summarized. This
paragraph contains three sentences, which we can number (letter)
a, b, c. Let's look at sentences (b) and (c) first.
* sentence (b)
EVI:
(b) "In other words Logic must show how thought develops if it is
scientific, if it reflects, i.e. reproduces in concepts, an object
existing outside our consciousness and will and independently of
them, in other words, creates a mental reproduction of it,
reconstructs its self-development, recreates it in the logic of
the movement of concepts so as to recreate it later in fact (in
experiment or in practice)."
This is a complex sentence. Despite this, it is actually a
forthright statement of several of Ilyenkov's general theses about
human thinking.
But to be as clear as possible, let's make sure we are really
getting his points by break this long sentence into parts. See if
my translation matches the sentence (b) logically.
1. Logic must show how thought that is scientific and reflective
develops.
2. Thought that is scientific and reflective reproduces objects
existing outside of and independently of human consciousness and
will in concepts.
3. Such thought creates mental reproductions of such objects,
reconstructs their self-development, recreates them in the
movement of concepts, and recreates these objects later, in
experiment or in practice.
****************
* sentence (c)
As seen in (b), EVI has been talking about scientific thinking.
Sentence (c) offers his conclusion about what Logic is:
EVI:
(c) "Logic then is the theoretical representation of such
thinking."
Ilyenkov is saying, as far as I can tell, that
1. Dialectical logic is the representation, in theoretical terms,
of scientific thinking.
***************
* sentence (a)
This final sentence takes more work to figure out. This seems to
be the one most troublesome to you, David.
EVI:
"Our ‘object’ or ‘subject matter’ in general, and on the whole, is
thought, thinking; and dialectical Logic has as its aim the
development of a scientific representation of thought in those
necessary moments, and moreover in the necessary sequence, that do
not in the least depend either on our will or on our consciousness."
Again, let's carefully translate this long sentence into smaller
parts. See if my reasoning makes sense to you.
The first part of the sentence seems easy enough and requires
little rework.
See 1. below.
Part 2. is trickier. I suggest we make two small translating
maneuvers to get to daylight.
Maneuver one. Lets find a substitute term for "moments." I used
the term "existence" the other day. It served the purpose up to a
point, but I have a better term now. In googling around the
internet to try to find a useful ballpark definition of the
Hegelian term "moment", I found something Lenin wrote in the
margin notes in his Philosophical Notebooks.
"The word “moment” is often used by Hegel in the sense of moment
of connection, moment of concatenation." See http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch02.htm
Knowing Ilyenkov's respect for Lenin's work in philosophy, he
probably more or less agreed with this observation. So here is
maneuver one: substitute "connections" for "moments."
Maneuver two. This one involves adding a phrase to clarify just
precisely **what** is being connected. We know from the sentence
that **thoughts** are one side of the answer. What is on the
other side? Well, we know, from reading Ilyenkov, a consistent
materialist, what he would be referring to when he speaks of
"necessary connections" between thought and [ ? ] He would be
referring to the necessary connections ... between thought and the
**world of objects**.
See 2. below.
We can use these same ideas to translate the next part of the
sentence, too, pertaining to sequences.
See 3. below.
We now come to the part of Ilyenkov's sentence that includes the
phrase "not depending on our will and consciousness". What is
Ilyenkov saying here?
We already know from the next sentence (b), (translated above),
that Ilyenkov states quite explicitly that human thought reflects
objects in the world that exist outside of and independently of
human consciousness and will. Now that we have deciphered part 2.
and 3. of the sentence, and made those two translating maneuvers,
it all falls into place.
So here is 1., 2., 3., 4.:
1. The object or subject matter of this book is thought, thinking.
2. Dialectical logic has as its aim the development of a
scientific representation of thought when thought appears in its
necessary connections with the world of objects.
3. Moreover, dialectical logic aims to understand these
connections between thought and the world of objects in their
necessary sequences.
4. The necessary connections between thought and the world of
objects, and the sequences of these connections, do not in the
least depend on our consciousness and will.
**************************
So that's my take on these three paragraphs, especially the third
one.
Let's compare takes. The problem seems to lie in determining
**what** it is that Ilyenkov is claiming is independent of human
will and consciousness:
Your comments:
Ilyenkov seems to be saying that our goal is the representation
of thinking (a process, and not, as he says later, a kind of
mental organ). We have to represent this process as an objective
process. We do that by representing it as a set of determined,
definite steps and stages, like any other objective process. We
do that by representing it as determined, definite, defined steps
and stages WHICH ARE INDEPENDENT OF HUMAN WILL AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
For me, that is, dk, that is a step too far. That brings us right
back to the entirely pre-scientific era of philosophy.
Why would dialectical logic want a representation of thinking
that is independent of human will or human consciousness? That's
the task of religion, of metaphysics, and of teenage vampire
literature.
What is the difference between your take and mine?
On one hand, I am pretty sure that Ilyenkov is saying that the
**connections between thoughts and the world of objects** are
independent of human will and consciousness. (Connections in the
sense of an Hegelian 'moment', of course).
On the other hand, you seem pretty sure that Ilyenkov is saying
that the **steps and stages of thinking** are independent of human
will and consciousness.
If Ilyenkov were indeed saying what you seem to think, I would
agree with you that he is way off base. But that is not what he
is saying. Nowhere does Ilyenkov say that **thinking** and its
stages are independent of human will and consciousness. This is
simply a misunderstanding of Ilyenkov.
What he is saying, as I read it, is that the "moments" or, in
English, the "connections" between thoughts and the world of
objects are independent of will and consciousness.
This, of course, is VERY different from saying that THOUGHTS are
independent of will and consciousness.
But this raises an interesting question. Does the claim that
Ilyenkov does seem to be making - that the **connections** between
thoughts and objects are independent of consciousness and will -
hold water? I think this question is important to CHAT. Might be
interesting to discuss.
Cheers,
~ Steve
**************************
**************************
original from http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essayint.htm
from Dialectical Logic, Essays on its History and Theory
by Evald Ilyenkov, written 1974, published in English by Progress
Publishers 1977
from the Introduction
In philosophy, more than in any other science, as Hegel remarked
with some regret in his Phenomenology of Mind, ‘the end or final
result seems ... to have absolutely expressed the complete fact
itself in its very nature; contrasted with that the mere process
of bringing it to light would seem, properly speaking, to have no
essential significance’.
That is very aptly put. So long as dialectics (dialectical logic)
is looked upon as a simple tool for proving a previously accepted
thesis (irrespective of whether it was initially advanced as the
rules of mediaeval disputes required, or only disclosed at the end
of the argument, in order to create the illusion of not being
preconceived, that is, of saying: “Look, here is what we have
obtained although we did not assume it”), it will remain something
of ‘no essential significance’. When dialectics is converted into
a simple tool for proving a previously accepted (or given) thesis,
it becomes a sophistry only outwardly resembling dialectics, but
empty of content. And if it is true that real dialectical logic
takes on life not in ‘naked results’, and not in the ‘tendency’ of
the movement of thought, but only in the form of ‘the result along
with the process of arriving at it’, then during the exposition of
dialectics as Logic, we must reckon with this truth. For it is
impossible to go to the other extreme, taking the view that we had
allegedly not set ourselves any aim determining the means and
character of our activity from the very outset in the course of
our analysis of the problem, but had set out swimming at random.
And we are therefore obliged, in any case, to say clearly, at the
very beginning, what the ‘object’ is in which we want to discover
the intrinsically necessary division into parts.
Our ‘object’ or ‘subject matter’ in general, and on the whole, is
thought, thinking; and dialectical Logic has as its aim the
development of a scientific representation of thought in those
necessary moments, and moreover in the necessary sequence, that do
not in the least depend either on our will or on our
consciousness. In other words Logic must show how thought develops
if it is scientific, if it reflects, i.e. reproduces in concepts,
an object existing outside our consciousness and will and
independently of them, in other words, creates a mental
reproduction of it, reconstructs its self-development, recreates
it in the logic of the movement of concepts so as to recreate it
later in fact (in experiment or in practice). Logic then is the
theoretical representation of such thinking.
*****************************
*****************************
The quote in the first Ilyenkov paragraph above is from the
passage below in Hegel.
from: http://web.mac.com/titpaul/Site/Phenomenology_of_Spirit_page_files/Preface.pdf
http://web.mac.com/titpaul/Site/Phenomenology_of_Spirit_page.html
from Phenomenology of Spirit by Hegel
Preface
1. In the preface to a philosophical work, it is customary for the
author to give an explanation – namely, an explanation of his
purpose in writing the book, his motivations behind it, and the
relations it bears to other previous or contemporary treatments of
the same topics – but for a philosophical work, this seems not
only superfluous but in light of the nature of the subject matter,
even inappropriate and counterproductive. For whatever it might
be suitable to say about philosophy in a preface – for instance,
to give some historical instruction about the biases and the
standpoint of the text, or some talk about the general content and
the results together with a set of scattered assertions and
assurances about the truth – none of these can count as the way to
present philosophical truth. – Moreover, because philosophy
essentially exists in the element of universality, which
encompasses the particular within itself,
[the following partial sentence is quoted by Ilyenkov in his
Introduction to Dialectical Logic, although translated there more
awkwardly -sg]
it might seem that in philosophy, indeed even more so than in the
other sciences, that what is salient about its subject matter,
even its perfect essence, would be expressed in the goal of the
work and in its final results, and that the way the project is in
fact carried out would be what is inessential.
In contrast, if a person were to have only a general notion of,
for example, anatomy, or, to put it roughly, if he were to have an
acquaintance with the parts of the body taken in terms of their
lifeless existence, nobody would thereby think that he has come
into full possession of the salient subject matter of that
science, which is to say, its content. One would think that in
addition he would have to go to the trouble to pay attention to
the particularities of the science. – Furthermore, that kind of an
aggregation of little bits and pieces of information has no real
right be called science, and a conversation about its purpose and
other such generalities would be in no way distinct from the
ordinary historical and uncomprehending way in which the content,
that is, these nerves and muscles, and so forth, is itself
discussed. In the case of philosophy, this would give rise to the
following incongruity, namely, that if philosophy were indeed to
make use of such a method, then it would have shown itself to be
incapable of grasping the truth.
**************************
**************************
<end>
On Sep 8, 2009, at 4:04 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
Steve:
Thanks. Yes, very useful. But I think the most useful thing about
it is that your paraphrase (which I would qualify as an English-
to-English TRANSLATION) differs from my reading of Ilyenkov in
EXACTLY the places I have trouble. Since sg is no philosophical
neophyte, ergo, dk is not losing what paltry philosophical wit he
was endowed with.
Here's what I mean:
sg: Hegel made an interesting remark about philosophy. He said
that, on one hand, the end results of philosophy express the
complete facts themselves in their very nature, whereas, on the
other hand, the mere process of bringing these facts to light has
no essential significance. –sg]
evi: In philosophy, more than in any other science, as Hegel
remarked with some regret in his Phenomenology of Mind, ‘the end
or final result seems ... to have absolutely expressed the
complete fact itself in its very nature; contrasted with that the
mere process of bringing it to light would seem, properly
speaking, to have no essential significance’.
dk: Hang on. That isn't how I read the Hegel at all, nor is it
how I read the Ilyenkov. I read Hegel as saying that philosophy,
unlike other sciences, has neither an experimental nor an
empirical METHOD to offer. The end is everything and the means is
nothing. This seems very true to me and it is a legacy of the
fact that philosophy is still in many ways a kind of intellectual
fossil, methodologically pre-scientific in the same way that
religion, art or literature is. But Ilyenkov takes this true and,
as he says, "very apt" observation and twists it into a comment
on how dialectics should not be used to "prove" things we already
know are true. This may also be true (one suspects he has certain
colleagues in mind), but it's a very different statement and in
some ways it means the precise opposite of what the Hegel says.
Ilyenkov holds that the MEANS is everything, precisely because it
leads to unexpected and surprising ENDS. This is really backed up
by
his statement later on that:
,
sg: 9. Real dialectical logic does not take on life in the form
of ‘naked results’ nor in the ‘tendency’ of the movement of
thought. It takes on life only in the form of ‘the result along
with the process of arriving at it.’ Therefore, we must take
this into account in our investigation of dialectics.
evi: And if it is true that real dialectical logic takes on life
not in ‘naked results’, and not in the ‘tendency’ of the movement
of thought, but only in the form of ‘the result along with the
process of arriving at it’, then during the exposition of
dialectics as Logic, we must reckon with this truth.
dk: Wait a minute. If we take 'the result ALONG WITH THE PROCESS
OF ARRIVING AT IT" we have very considerably more than naked
results. There is a unity of ends and means here that suggests a
scientific, rather than a pre-scientific, philosophy. And it also
suggests that a certain amount of reverse engineering is in fact
justifiable. So we have a contradiction upon a contradiction.
sg: 12. Our ‘object,’ that is, our ‘subject matter’, is
thought. Dialectical logic aims to scientifically represent
thought in its necessary concrete, developmental, objective
existences, including those aspects of these existences that are
objectively independent of will and consciousness.
evi: Our ‘object’ or ‘subject matter’ in general, and on the
whole, is thought, thinking; and dialectical Logic has as its aim
the development of a scientific representation of thought in
those necessary moments, and moreover in the necessary sequence,
that do not in the least depend either on our will or on our
consciousness.
dk: Hmmm. You, sg, say that the goal of dialectical logic is to
represent thought as an objective fact, including its aspects
that are involuntary and unconscious. That is excellent and good,
and I think it actually includes a lot of what Haydi and Mike
have been batting back and forth about the mental life of
animals. The problem is that YOU, evi, don't seem to be saying
that at all. Ilyenkov seems to be saying that our goal is the
representation of thinking (a process, and not, as he says later,
a kind of mental organ). We have to represent this process as an
objective process. We do that by representing it as a set of
determined, definite steps and stages, like any other objective
process. We do that by representing it as determined, definite,
defined steps and stages WHICH ARE INDEPENDENT OF HUMAN WILL AND
CONSCIOUSNESS. For me, that is, dk, that is a step too far. That
brings us right back to the entirely pre-scientific era of
philosophy.
Why would dialectical logic want a representation of thinking
that is independent of human will or human consciousness? That's
the task of religion, of metaphysics, and of teenage vampire
literature.
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
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