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[xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 50, Issue 77
2. Re: Re: xmca Digest, Vol 50, Issue 63 (Mike Cole)
-------------------------
HI MIKE. THANKS FOR YOUR REPLY.
Warning: this could put you to sleep.
My thinking is that Consumption in the way I think Engeström means it is a
process involved in every realm of activity ? production, collaboration
(exchange), and distribution. We consume ideas in production and
collaboration
- perhaps transform them in the process; we consume the products the system
creates and distributes. It is a necessary, and I argue (perhaps to my chagrin
;) that it should not occupy the center, because it does not hold the center.
Activity systems, much like Ingold?s (2006) concept that _history grows
itself, are autopoietic._ . Activity systems grow themselves and their members
play a part in that process. As systems grow , they develop ethos. Ethos
is both an artifact of that growth (I?m thinking tertiary) and
then mediational
means (tool) for its further development and the learning of its members.
Applying Ingold's interpretation of autopoiesis to activity system analysis,
the penumbra of activity grows the system?s ethos and individual participants
play a part in its development. applying CHAT model, development of
ethos must
account for conflict or tension among the various members' moral compasses as
much as from any smoother path. Ethos, like everything else, then, is a
process
of internalization and externalization. It moderates activity and may
become the
mediational means to attract certain people to join activity or to make
sense of
motivation or objects in activity. (I'm thinking examples like the
ethos of the
GOP vs. Democratic or Green parties.)
Through the concept of ?ethos?, community can become more visible. I'm
thinking about community as a group or network of participants; but there is
also the idea of having a ?sense of community?; and of "shared object? as the
motivation of community. Ethos incorporates these various shades of community,
motivating someone to join or leave the fold or being the means to developing
particular practices or models for participation. In a similar vein, Gordon
Wells noted the role of ethos in a classroom community.
ETHOS AS A TERTIARY ARTIFACT. whether Ethos is defined by Eisner (_the
underlying deep structure of a culture, the values that animate it, that
collectively constitute its way of life_), or by dictionary.com (e.g., _the
character or disposition of a community_), we can view it as a tertiary
artifact of activity and a tool for engagement in the system.
Tertiary artifacts are the mutual embodiment of the relationship
between imagination and materiality; they ??constitute a ?world? (or ?worlds?)
of imaginative praxis,? (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 207) in which we can ?play out?
our ?broader intentions and affective needs? (Cole & Derry 2005).
Ethos, generated IN AND THROUGH activity, is a theoretical construct, such as,
?methodologies or visions or world outlooks which serve as guidelines in the
production and application of secondary artifacts, i.e., models? (Engeström
2000/1987, p. 67). Perhaps, _ETHOS embodies imaginative praxis._ The
system's
ethos becomes a tool for thinking, being, and acting.
A recent article by Pickering (2009) states:
While an individual ethos is developing, an entire class, for
example, can be
communally constructing ethos as well, an ethos that is necessary for
successful
group functioning and communication. A central premise of this study is
that the
process of learning is a social one that develops through ?coparticipation?
(Freedman & Adam, 1996, p. 397), and in an online learning environment, the
socially constructed learning process relies on communally constructed and
evolving group ethos.
Pickering?s use of the term ?ethos?, however, seems to narrow its meaning to
the development of individual and social ?credibility and trust?, which she
notes is essential to participation in online communities (the context of her
study). She does not imagine a distinct place for ?ethos? in Engeström?s
(1987) model but does think to apply the model to the analysis of ethos
development. She posits that ?RULES? define the ?parameters for developing
ethos? and that the process of constructing ethos occurs in production and
distribution. She finds that ?The process of developing community is
influenced
by both individual and collective construction of ethos?.
I think Pickering is on to something when she says that ethos is a useful
concept for observing and analyzing ?changes [that] occur within an online
classroom environment, one that is constantly evolving and changing?.
I think we can take ethos farther. I think it?s useful in studying any
environment or system. When defined as ?deeply held guiding principles?,
it seems more fitting and more flexible in its application to observation and
analysis of systems developmetn that seems autopoietic, like Ingold?s concept
of history.
If we see it as tertiary artifact, then we recognize that the system
produces it - it does not come pre-fab, and we see its operation as a
psychological tool. The sense of community mediated by ethos is a means to
identify with a particular community and serves to develop Rules, community,
collaborative, productive and distributive practcies or the identification of
shared desired objects.
_Ok, that's enough. I don?t want to take up any more space or put any more
people than to sleep_, but, I?ll just add that i also think it useful to
explore the role of Bateson?s concept of _eidos_ and _etiology_ in CHAT
methodology.
THANK YOU - I\'D BE INTERESTED TO KNOW WHAT YOU THINK...
KAREN
-------------------------
MIKE"S COMMENTS ON ETHOS:
From: Mike Cole
Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 50, Issue 63
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Message-ID:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
Hi Karen-- Interesting idea to introduce ethos into the discussion of
activity and mediation, solidarity
and sociality.
From dictionary.com (not that I mind Eisner!):
1. Sociology. the fundamental character or spirit of a culture; the
underlying sentiment that informs the beliefs, customs, or practices of a
group or society; dominant assumptions of a people or period: In the Greek
ethos the individual was highly valued. 2. the character or disposition of
a community, group, person, etc. 3. the moral element in dramatic
literature that determines a character's action rather than his or her
thought or emotion.
I am not certain, however, that I would agree that ethos can be considered a
tertiary artifact (it does not seem to fit with
Wartofsky's proposal for what that term means, but the term itself needs
elaboration, so maybe it works well) and substituting
it for consumption in the Engestrom model seems odd. Playing on the example
above, might we not say that in the American
ethos, consumption is highly valued? (Contrast the Soviet emphasis on
production -- of course, both are required in all
societies).
Where does Tomasello use the term "joint mediated activity." I can see
something like "object mediated intersubjectivity" (or action) in his work,
but where does he talk about activity in contrast action, intentionality, or
intersubjectivity arise??
mike
-------------------------
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Today's Topics:
1. Re: Vygotsky and Saussure (David Kellogg)
2. Re: Re: xmca Digest, Vol 50, Issue 63 (Mike Cole)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2009 15:37:21 -0700 (PDT)
From: David Kellogg Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky and Saussure
To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind Message-ID: Content-Type:
text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Martin,
Both Andy and I are very interested in Volume Five, the unfinished
manuscript on Child Development in the Collected Works.
On pp. 272-273 LSV talks about "phones" instead of "phonemes". I
think this is a correct translation, and "phonemes" is an incorrect
one. I don't have the Russian original, though, so I can't be sure.
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
--- On Tue, 7/28/09, Martin Packer wrote:
From: Martin Packer Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky and Saussure
To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Date:
Tuesday, July 28, 2009, 12:03 PM
Andy,
In Problems of Child Development LSV writes that language shatters
the unity of infant and world. Your examples of the painter and
gymnast help us recognize that this rupture cannot be complete or
final. Both are kinds of work in which successful practice depends on
an embodied embeddedness in concrete reality.
But at the same time I think LSV is right to write of rupture, and of
the importance of language. First, he's right to insist that the
child is born embedded, and so he rejects the built-in mind/world
dualism that is presupposed by cognitive science. But, second, he's
right to say that in development this immediacy is disrupted so that
a mind is formed. The preschool age child is a dynamic part of their
situation and responds without pause to its demands. The school age
child, he writes, has lost this spontaneity. Language changes the
child's relationship to the world in large part by picking out
aspects of the situation as a distinct (kind of) 'thing.' It comes
'between' person and world, is an important part of the child's
differentiation from other people, and soon will be the basis for a
division between 'inner' and 'outer' aspects of the child's
personality, dividing her from herself.
A good gymnast or painter finds ways to suspend or overcome or forget
these divisions. But equally an adult without language would not be
able to be a painter or gymnast, even if they could put paint on
canvas or spin on a beam, because 'painter' and 'gymnast' are
positions in a social reality which someone without language would be
unable to adopt.
still dancing
Martin
On Jul 27, 2009, at 11:23 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Martin,
We've been round this mulberry bush before, so I suspect David might
agree with you, but I differ.
As I recall, LSV claims that word-meaning is the unit of analaysis
for intelligent speech and therefore the "microcosm" of
consciousness.
So LSV agreed with Marx, as do I, that practice, or artefact
mediated action is the unit of analysis of consciousness.
all linguists of course disagree. But I wonder if a painter would
agree, or a gymnast?
Andy
Martin Packer wrote:
David, ...
meaningful-sound is a concrete phenomenon, located in place and
time. And he promises that we will thereby find the unity of
thinking and speech, of generalization and social interaction, of
thinking and communication, of intellect and affect. In short, of
consciousness.
No? Yes?
Martin
On Jul 25, 2009, at 3:25 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
Martin:
Yes, definitely! If you read pp. 49-50 in the Minick translation
of Thinking and Speech, we get Vygotsky's remarks on Saussure's
phonology in pure form. Of course, he rejects (again and again)
the Saussurean view of semantics; it's nothing but associationism.
But since he rejects associationism on the basis of its
arbitrariness, its lack of an intelligent link, and its lack of
system, he has to reject Saussurean phonemes too, no?
No! As you say, there are two points here for Vygotsky to
appropriate. The first is that the phoneme is part of a gestalt,
specifically, a contrast with some other word (e.g. "back" and
"bag"). But the second is that that gestalt is defined by MEANING
and not by sound.
Here is where Vygosky really parts company, not only with Saussure
and structuralism but also with Gestaltism. For Saussure, the
relationship between phoneme and meaning is entirely arbitrary;
but for Vygotsky it is fully determined by the social situation of
development.
For Gestaltism, the structural relationship is not unique to
language; it's shared with perception. But for Vygotsky the
consciousness that is created by thought is never reducible to the
consciousness that is created by perception.
The question I have is what Saussure would have made of all this.
Saussure was actually quite skeptical about his own system; he had
good reason to instruct his wife and students not to publish any
of his work. And as the article Mike sent around (on the
Mandelshtam poem) makes clear, he had big big problems with
precisely the concepts at issue: the arbitrariness and linearity
of language.
Notice that Vygotsky doesn't really use the word "phonetic" very
much. The word which is usually translated as "phonetic" is
actually "phasal". But in the example Vygotsky gives about the
psychological vs. grammatical predicate/subject, where he talks
about psychological/grammatical gender, and number, and even
tense, it is very clear that for Vygotsky ALL the linear aspects
of language, the aspects which (unlike thought) include TIME in
their compositionality, are to be considered "phasal", not just
phonetics.
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
--- On Fri, 7/24/09, Martin Packer wrote:
From: Martin Packer Subject: Re: [xmca] Intensions in context and
speech complexity ; From 2-?
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Date: Friday, July 24,
2009, 8:03 AM
On Jul 23, 2009, at 2:46 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
I think Vygotsky actually finds the single kernel of truth in
Saussure's course when he argues that a science of phonetics
needs to be founded on MEANING MAKING and not on the physical
description of noises people make with their mouths. However, his
ability to find this kernel in a mountain of structuralist chaff
should not deceive you; he is no uncritical consumer of
Saussureanism.
David,
Coincidentally I was reading yesterday the section in Problems of
Child Psychology (vol 5 of the Collected Works) where Vygotsky
again makes this point. It is evidently Saussurian linguistics
that V is enthusiastic about: he refers to it as phonology and
contrasts it with an older phonetics which focused solely on
articulatory definitions. Phonology has the advantage of seeing
the sounds of language as a system, and so the child never learns
a single sound in isolation but always one sound against the
background of the others. V points out that this is a basic law of
perception: figure/ground, and also that the ground in the case of
oral language is provided by the speech of adults (so the 'ideal'
endpoint of development is present and available from the start,
as emphasized in the passage that Lois quoted a few days ago).
V is critical once again of analyses that divide a phenomenon into
elements and in doing so lose the properties of the whole.
Phonology, he says, has the advantage that in studying the sounds
of a language as a system it doesn't divide it into separate
elements, nor does it lose the central property of language,
namely that it has meaning. V adds that sounds always have
meaning: "the phoneme," he writes "is not just a sound, it is a
sound that has meaning, a sound that has not lost meaning, a
certain unit that has a primary property to a minimal degree,
which belongs to speech as a whole" (271).
V's analysis makes a good deal of sense to me. But my own limited
knowledge of Saussure - guided in part by Roy Harris' writing -
has indeed included the dogma that the sound level of language
carries no meaning. You are saying, I think, that V has a
reasonable reading of Saussure, if not the canonical one. Can you
say more about this way of reading Saussure? V seems to be
suggesting that the child does not learn first sounds, then words,
but always acquires the sounds of language in the context of the
use of words in communicative settings, and this has the
consequece that the sounds would be aquired as aspects of a
meaningful unit. Am I on the right track here?
Martin_______________________________________________
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Martin Packer, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Psychology Department
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 15282
(412) 396-4852
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Andy Blunden (Erythrós Press and Media) http://www.erythrospress.com/
Orders: http://www.erythrospress.com/store/main.html#books
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Martin Packer, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Psychology Department
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 15282
(412) 396-4852
www.mathcs.duq.edu/~packer/
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------------------------------
Message: 2
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2009 17:01:23 -0700
From: Mike Cole Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 50, Issue 63
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Message-ID:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
Hi Karen-- Interesting idea to introduce ethos into the discussion of
activity and mediation, solidarity
and sociality.
From dictionary.com (not that I mind Eisner!):
1. Sociology. the fundamental character or spirit of a culture; the
underlying sentiment that informs the beliefs, customs, or practices of a
group or society; dominant assumptions of a people or period: In the Greek
ethos the individual was highly valued. 2. the character or disposition of
a community, group, person, etc. 3. the moral element in dramatic
literature that determines a character's action rather than his or her
thought or emotion.
I am not certain, however, that I would agree that ethos can be considered a
tertiary artifact (it does not seem to fit with
Wartofsky's proposal for what that term means, but the term itself needs
elaboration, so maybe it works well) and substituting
it for consumption in the Engestrom model seems odd. Playing on the example
above, might we not say that in the American
ethos, consumption is highly valued? (Contrast the Soviet emphasis on
production -- of course, both are required in all
societies).
Where does Tomasello use the term "joint mediated activity." I can see
something like "object mediated intersubjectivity" (or action) in his work,
but where does he talk about activity in contrast action, intentionality, or
intersubjectivity arise??
mike
On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 11:15 AM, Karen Spear Ellinwood <
kse@email.arizona.edu> wrote:
RE: HALF A COCONUT
in response to Jay Lemke's comments:
>
I like your term "ur-solidarity" and the idea that this is more than
social
convention.
My sense is that there is more to the social structure and social
relations
that occur in activity than simply the milieu we join as newcomers,
although
there is that too. I think what happens is that in the activity of
building
social structure is the generation of Ethos - the guiding principles of
social
relations and activity combined. When newcomers arrive, they do not simply
adopt the Ethos. Rather, if the community ethos is repugnant to them (which
in
some organizations it might be, of course not this one, but originating
from NY
I can think of a few that might turn off some)...then they would not join.
Repugnance, then, would be the outer parameter defining refusal to
join/participate. Curiosity would define the minimal parameter -
attraction.
Some sort of common ground with the ethos or guiding principles as they are
illuminated or performed in activity by existing members of the community
would
then be grounds for participation - true engagement.
Once a newcomer joins, she/he contributes to the further development of
Ethos
through engagement in activity. All activity is an expression or
performance of
the community ethos.
I think ethos is what is at the core of any activity system. It does not
pre-exist, but develops along with and through the initial social structure
and
activity. It?s a tertiary artifact of activity.
Theoretically, I borrow more from sociology on the concept of Ethos but
include Tomasello?s concept of joint mediated activity as well.
Ethos is ?the underlying deep structure of a culture, the values that
animate
it, that collectively constitute its way of life? (Eisner 1994, p. 2)
(emphasis
added). Ethos is the ideational environment in which people interact, a
set of
guiding principles emerging and developing through the dialogic interaction
of
the members of a shared discourse (Eisner, 1994). Dialogic or perspectival
representations of ethos emerge through interaction with others and enables
the
development and sustenance of ?collective practices and beliefs? (Tomasello
&
Rakoczy, 2003). In this way, we can see it emerges from ?the relationship
between people and [represents] the values and principles underpinning
policy
and practice (Glover & Coleman, 2005). Its importance is that ?an ethos is
evaluative? and ?manifested in many aspects of the? community and has a
pervasive influence ?in the shaping of human perceptions, attitudes,
beliefs?
(p. 311).
It is, then, at the heart of the emergence and development of productive,
collaborative, and distributive practices. If we substitute, for example,
Ethos
for Consumption in Engeström?s expression of activity, it would seem that
we
could imagine ethos as a mediational force (means) in all realms of
activity,
production, collaboration (exchange) and distribution forms part of the
context
that is interwoven in actions and activity - it would be the glue that
holds the
center, if you will. In other words, organizations stay together not simply
because of what they do ? or the success of what they do, but because of
they
believe in the social importance of what they do.
Obviously ethos doesn't develop overnight and so including it in
understanding the underlying social structure of activity and production
accommodates the respective contributions of newcomers and old-timers in
ongoing activity. It is also imagines ethos as an ?unfinished product?
much
like the concept of co-configuration.
Karen
Karen C. Spear-Ellinwood
PhD Candidate, College of Education
Dept. of Teaching, Language & Sociocultural Studies
kse@email.arizona.edu
Cell: 520-878-6034
phone: 520-829-0749
-------------------------
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When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
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Today's Topics:
1. Re: Half a coconut (Jay Lemke)
2. elluminators please illuminate! (Mike Cole)
3. Fwd: [xmca] Intensions in context and speech complexity ;
From 2-? (Jay Lemke)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2009 16:27:40 +0200
From: Jay Lemke Subject: Re: [xmca] Half a coconut
To: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=WINDOWS-1252; format=flowed;
delsp=yes
I certainly understand that both Michael's MCA editorial on this, and
a lot of the background literature, may not be familiar to many xcma-
ers. And my timing in retrospect was not good in the midst of another
ongoing discussion.
In any case, I think there are important issues, and we can maybe find
a time and occasion to get more into some of them.
As to the always-already ongoing "communitas", the ground of co-
activity that is suggested as the basis for a sort of ur-solidarity
that is not simply a social convention, it's always already there in
the community into which we come, whether by birth or immigration. A
bit like what newcomers to xmca must sense when they first arrive in
our online co-activity!
JAY.
Jay Lemke
Professor
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke On Jul 25, 2009, at 2:15 AM, Mike Cole wrote:
Seems like you only got stunned silence back on this, Jay. Part of the
problem is almost certainly that many readers of xmca do not read
MCA, so
when we do not have a common text to refer to, we are in a fix.
The part of what I take from this that overlaps other matters I am
working
on at present is the following:
"the notion of an ontological or pre-discursive, actional solidarity
seems
very close to Victor Turner?s famous _communitas_: originating in the
underlying experience of co-activity, which is prior to social
structural
relations and can be glimpsed when these are set aside (his
liminality,
Bakhtin?s carnival)"
I am not sure when the "underlying of co-activity" begins. Perhaps
its there
in utero. Perhaps (a la Trevarthan) its there as
primary intersubjectivity at birth. But co-activity also appears to
require
adjustments upon infant and mother's parts (and more
so for fathers).
I know this comment does not address the ontology/truth/morality
issues
involved, but those are beyond my powers to grok
without a lot more help!!
mike
On Mon, Jul 20, 2009 at 6:02 AM, Jay Lemke wrote:
I recently had a chance to read more carefully Wolf-Michael Roth's
MCA
editorial on Solidarity and Responsibility.
I know that there was some prior discussion of it here, in a thread
about
the eyes of a coconut, but that seems to have veered off from what
seems
interesting to me in the editorial, which was highlighted by Derek
Melser at
one point. I don't know if I've missed any subsequent discussion,
but don't
find it in the archives, at least with a google search.
So here are some notes on the ideas and arguments in the editorial,
for any
who are interested. (W-M R and I have been on a firstname basis for
a very
long time, but he's "Roth" in the notes because it's shorter!)
Notes on Roth editorial MCA
Solidarity and Responsibility. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 16: 105?
116,
2009.
= Roth appears to argue from Is to Ought, from a holistic-extension
notion
of primal solidarity in being/doing, prior to discursive notions of
voluntary solidarity, for a moral responsibility to respect, indeed
to
privilege uniqueness in the Other, rather than simple not-I
differentiation
and the corresponding notion of a constructed collective and its
artificial
solidarity.
= the notion of an ontological or pre-discursive, actional solidarity
seems very close to Victor Turner?s famous _communitas_:
originating in the
underlying experience of co-activity, which is prior to social
structural
relations and can be glimpsed when these are set aside (his
liminality,
Bakhtin?s carnival)
= Turner also argues in parallel with Buddhist philosophy (prajna vs
vijnana, or roughly intuition vs discursive reason), that
difference is the
product of social relations and discursive semantics, while what
precedes
them is more holistic.
= the notion of partes extra partes with which Roth characterizes
his view
of the ontology of unique wholes is a bit ambiguous in the
philosophical
tradition
there is a Cartesian version of it which is atomistic ? every part
exists
outside of and independent of every other part, and which leads to
a view of
space as consisting of just one damn place after another, only
externally
relatable
and then there is also the Leibnizian version, which I think is the
one
Roth is using, in which each thing or place is an extension or
diffusion of
its own unique qualities, but in which a principle like that of the
mirroring of monads allows larger scenes to also be wholes, within
which
qualities may extend across what on smaller scales are parts apart
from one
another, hence providing the sort of holism of absolute
differentnesses or
uniquenesses that Roth seems to want
= Roth takes all this finally to classrooms, schools-as-educating
communities, and the paradoxes of democracy. If we are all unique
within
larger wholes, then it makes sense to pay attention to others?
viewpoints
when decisions are to be made, indeed the more diverse the input
the more
likely a good, or at least an as-thoughtful-as-possible decision.
Some such decisions are not really decisions, outcomes are largely
predetermined by circumstances (habitual, predictable, routine);
but others
require breaking out of predictable patterns, choosing the risky or
unlikely
alternative, creating new options ? and so new wholes, within which
we all
become newly unique-again. (Which, by the way, is in itself a good
moral
argument for democratic decision-making, since we are all always
affected in
fundamental ways by decisions. Despite our cultural and masculinist
preference for the illusion of our independence. Being unique and
partes
extra partes does not, in the holistic paradigm, insure our
independence,
just the opposite. This might go some way towards explaining the
popularity
of Cartesian atomism, where we can just ignore the other atoms.)
Voluntarist solidarity, Roth is arguing, I think, is dangerous
because it
presupposes the atomist Cartesian ontology of our being: we begin
and remain
autonomous, we choose to come together in communities. What can be
chosen,
can also not be chosen. What is voluntary can be suspended,
delegated to
dictators, elites, teachers, curriculum bureaus.
Holistic solidarity, like communitas, on the other hand arises in our
being and doing together, which is a condition into which we are
born and
from which we never entirely depart (having internalized so much of
it
before we even try to get away). But it is nonetheless a condition
that also
reinforces our uniqueness (or supports it, or from which it is
emergent,
depending on your metaphysics), and from which we can no more get
away than
we can get away from ourselves.
But I am still not entirely sure that Roth is not over-claiming on
how
much democratic Ought is derivable from the holistic Is. Bakhtin is
fairly
casual about the logic of the ideational and the axiological (in
his later
terms), or the twin answerabilities of response and responsibility.
I am not
well enough read in Levinas to say in his case. Personally I don?t
see why
we should want to ground the moral-ethical in the ontological, in
the nature
of things. Isn?t that theology? Because a God exists, we should do
what He
says? Isn?t a secular philosophical version of this kind of
argument just
another desire to privilege the ontological, the factual, the true
over the
Good?
For me the good, the ought, in its many forms and aspects, has its
own
standing, equal with the true, and not subordinate to it. The good
and the
true, or by degrees as we really experience them, the more or less
desirable, the more or less likely, along with the more or less
important,
the more or less surprising, serious/humorous, mysterious/
comprehensible,
etc. all stand as equal partes extra partes in relation to one
another.
As they do in the semantics of our language. And I think as they
also do
experientially and phenomenologically, though the holism of
experience will
be something not so neatly corresponding to semantic categories,
will feel
like something more of a mish-mash, at least as seen from the neat
typologies of language and philosophy done in language.
From here this discussion could go in many directions, so I will
stop for
now and see what others may say.
Jay.
Jay Lemke
Professor
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke _______________________________________________
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Message: 2
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2009 08:26:31 -0700
From: Mike Cole Subject: [xmca] elluminators please illuminate!
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" Message-ID:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
A "seat" licence appears to cost $100.00 for elluminate.
Those using it-- what does a site licence cost and who pays for it where
you
are??
mike
------------------------------
Message: 3
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2009 18:40:10 +0200
From: Jay Lemke Subject: Fwd: [xmca] Intensions in context and speech
complexity ;
From 2-?
To: XMCA Forum Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=WINDOWS-1252;
format=flowed;
delsp=yes
Mike sent this but it went only to me. He wanted it to go to the list.
Jay Lemke
Professor
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke Begin forwarded message:
From: Mike Cole Date: July 25, 2009 2:26:14 AM GMT+02:00
To: Jay Lemke Subject: Re: [xmca] Intensions in context and speech
complexity ;
From 2-?
Reply-To: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu
Yep, you got at what I was trying to discuss, Jay. And some of the
factors that I thought might provoke such spotty
"precociousness." I do not know Halliday well enough to know if what
you describe explains what I was asking about,
the general set of considerations you raise resonate.
David Kel and I discussed these issues a little by phone (taking
advantage of his presence in my time zone for a while).
It seems like the absence of kids being able to use speech on behalf
of their own motives in the way classrooms ordinarily
work -- e.g. they are in the responder role and have to guess at
what the teacher is after/about -- would reduce the complexity of
the thoughts to which they can give expression.
I believe that some of the electronic comm media such as elluminate
(as described by people in recent notes) may be an example
of conditions under which students can be more in control of what
they get to say and as a result get more agentive, excited, and
perhaps, even learn more.
mike
PS-- Long ago -- like in the early 1980's -- some of my colleagues
at LCHC found that if they had an asynchronous discussion
group that accompanied the live class, some of the students who
never responded, or did so only with difficulty, were leaders
in the a-synchronous interactions. My guess was that the shift in
medium changed the constraints on communication, "freeing"
some who could not manage the pace of the classroom. Not entirely
unlike the frequent comment that many people who mostly
read but do not write on xmca are knocked over by the pace and rapid
shifting.
On Fri, Jul 24, 2009 at 10:35 AM, Jay Lemke wrote:
I am replying to Mike's much earlier message about context and
speech complexity, though I've read the subsequent discussion,
mainly because I remain interested in the original issue he brought
up. I know the discussion has shifted, as it so often does, more to
critiques of ideas of internalization, but that seems to have
happened in part because one reading of Mike's question led to the
suggestion that internalization was an important part of the answer.
My version of his question is this:
How do we understand the phenomenon of young speakers producing much
more complex forms of speech in activities in which they appear to
have more intrinsic motivation and authentic interest, compared to
activities in which they are just following someone else's lead?
I am not an expert on early childhood language development, but I am
a developmentalist in the sense that I analyze meaning-making across
all timescales as a building up of later meanings on top of earlier
ones to reach greater complexity and efficacy. Just as in biological
development the complexity and efficacy (for something) of later
stages depends on the foundations laid in earlier ones (hence the
link with evolution).
I believe it is a well-known phenomenon in language development --
and I mean that term as shorthand for increasing complexity and
efficacy in (self- or other- directed) speech as an integral
component of some larger activity -- that new speakers occasionally
produce much more "advanced" speech than the average of what they
produce in some time frame (i.e. speech more like the average in a
much later timeframe). I think this is also true of other sorts of
longer-term learning processes. There are just time when it all
comes together for us and we perform with an apparent capability
well ahead of our usual performances. We appear to leap forward, and
then fall back.
Is this just luck? sometimes perhaps, and sometimes it is the over-
interpretation of the observer, reading more meaning into the speech
than may have been "intended" (another shorthand). But we also know
that in the case of speech, receptive understanding encompasses such
more complex forms, even if active production rarely or never-before
has shown them. And that of course has something to do with the more
complex forms being present in the environment, the community, the
co-activity with others. So the fact that it may not be
reproducible, or that it may not recur across different settings,
may not necessarily mean that it was not "intentional" (i.e.
functionally and deliberately meaningful on the part of the new
producer).
It may have arisen in play, in exploration of wording-possibilities.
It may have arisen in a less-self-monitoring context where
inhibitions against more complex production for fear of errors,
ridicule, communication failure, etc. were much reduced (like
speaking a foreign language when just a little drunk). It may have
been driven past all inhibitions or obstacles by intense desire or
need.
Or it may have been abetted by particularly supportive
circumstances. My own hypothesis about what Mike seems to be
describing is that precocious speech is more likely to occur when
more complex meanings are easier to build up on top of already
familiar meaning-speakings. Halliday gives some examples of this for
spoken dialogue, where very complex verb tenses will appear that are
far more complex than those normally (or ever) seen in written text,
because speakers build up time-relational meanings on top of prior
speakers sayings. This is micro-developmental, on the logogenetic or
text-production timescale (seconds to minutes).
What circumstances support such short-term climbing to new heights?
it may be a particular speech-partner, it may be a particular
familiar topic, it may be a rush of need or desire to make the more
complex meaning, which is a meaning that has become appropriate to
the moment in the ongoing activity because we have been able to get
that far in terms of building connections on connections, meanings
(including those made by nonverbal gestures, actions, etc.) on
meanings.
It seems reasonable to me that there ought to be a strong social-
situational correlation between activities in which we are heavily
personally invested, or just really enjoy or want or need, and those
in which the other factors I've suggested are available to support
climbing unusually high up the ladder of meaning complexity -- i.e.
of meanings built on other meanings.
What do you think?
JAY.
Jay Lemke
Professor
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke On Jul 20, 2009, at 6:06 AM, Mike Cole wrote:
Hi Lois--
I appear eerily unable to communicate the issue that is the focus
of my
attention which is not whether kids imitate the language around
them, but
for the difference in performance of the same kids, within hours or
so of
when they first say something complicated, to "revert" to a
simplified
version of that utterance at about the level of what they do when
asked to
repeat
an utterance dreamed up by an experimenter to test some theory of the
process of grammatical development.
The kids are performing in both cases. But in one case they are
performing
to achieve THEIR goals. In the other they
are performing to achieve goals they have little understanding of.
Something or other ideas think furiously.
Neither you nor David, so far as I can tell, addresses the question
I am
asking. Since you both know a ton more about
language acquisition than I figure I am being totally dense. What
am I
missing here?
About Vygotsky writing *Something which is only supposed to take
shape at
the very end of development, somehow influences the very first
steps in this
development.
*I believe that Vygotsky is stating a very widely held view of the
process
of development, one which can be found in many scientific sources
but which
also has deep roots in the Judeo-Christian (and probably lots of
other
traditions). Here is a version of it from
T.S. Elliot, "East Coker" but I believe it is also intimately
related to the
idea of a spiral of development which is often found in
Hegelian and Marxist thought. Anyway, here is one catholic-convert's
expression of the idea:
In my beginning is my end. In succession
Houses rise and fall, crumble, are extended,
Are removed, destroyed, restored, or in their place
Is an open field, or a factory, or a by-pass.
Old stone to new building, old timber to new fires,
Old fires to ashes, and ashes to the earth
Which is already flesh, fur and faeces,
Bone of man and beast, cornstalk and leaf.
Houses live and die: there is a time for building
And a time for living and for generation
And a time for the wind to break the loosened pane
And to shake the wainscot where the field-mouse trots
And to shake the tattered arras woven with a silent motto.
In my beginning is my end. Now the light falls
Across the open field, leaving the deep lane
Shuttered with branches, dark in the afternoon,
Where you lean against a bank while a van passes,
And the deep lane insists on the direction
Into the village, in the electric heat
Hypnotised. In a warm haze the sultry light
Is absorbed, not refracted, by grey stone.
The dahlias sleep in the empty silence.
Wait for the early owl.
In that open field
If you do not come too close, if you do not come too close,
On a summer midnight, you can hear the music
Of the weak pipe and the little drum
And see them dancing around the bonfire
The association of man and woman
In daunsinge, signifying matrimonie?
A dignified and commodiois sacrament.
Two and two, necessarye coniunction,
Holding eche other by the hand or the arm
Whiche betokeneth concorde. Round and round the fire
Leaping through the flames, or joined in circles,
Rustically solemn or in rustic laughter
Lifting heavy feet in clumsy shoes,
Earth feet, loam feet, lifted in country mirth
Mirth of those long since under earth
Nourishing the corn. Keeping time,
Keeping the rhythm in their dancing
As in their living in the living seasons
The time of the seasons and the constellations
The time of milking and the time of harvest
The time of the coupling of man and woman
And that of beasts. Feet rising and falling.
Eating and drinking. Dung and death.
Dawn points, and another day
Prepares for heat and silence. Out at sea the dawn wind
Wrinkles and slides. I am here
Or there, or elsewhere. In my beginning.
*
*
On Sun, Jul 19, 2009 at 8:47 PM, Lois Holzman <
lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org> wrote:
Hi All,Mike's post sent me back to my most recent thinking on
imitation
(two weeks ago!) as well as to my language development research in
the
mid-70s with Lois Bloom. I do recall that my first published article
(Imitation in Language Development: If, When and Why) was one of a
handful
at the time that focused on spontaneous imitation as opposed to
elicited
imitation, such as Slobin's study Mike refers to.OUr findings from
longitudinal data from 6 children from single words to syntax were
quite
interesting: by our operational definitions, some of them didn't
imitate and
their language development was similar to those that imitated.
Those that
did imitate, imitated what they were in the process of learning,
and not
what they knew well nor what was beyond them. Today I would say they
imitated what was in their ZPD and that their imitations were
part of
creating that ZPD.
So it seems to me that the change referred to ?to the more
simplified
form? could be understood as the child making meaning with what
has been
said, playing with it, creating with it, using it. For the social
situation
doesn't end just because the child is alone--s/he takes it with
her/him; it
becomes part of her/his life world and repertoire.
What I can add about the relevance to school is the importance of
opportunities for language play, and especially the kind of creative
imitation Vygotsky believes is critical for very young children.
For the
most part schools do not create opportunities for children to play
with
language in the way that is described here. We've created this
thing called
"vocabulary" which they are obliged to learn. Children are asked
to get the
correct or finished version tas quickly as possible?and they are
typically
given simplified language to help them do this. There is little of
the
playfulness that happens when the language around you is not
simplified, and
you are free to play with and use it in a variety of ways.
Perhaps helpful in adding to what I am saying is part of this
quote from
Vygotsky, which I wrote about in an article several years ago and
resurrected for a just completed chapter for Cathrene-Ana-Vera's
upcoming
volume:
But is fully developed speech, which the child is only able to
master at
the end of this period of development, already present in the
child?s
environment? It is, indeed. The child speaks in one word
phrases, but
his mother talks to him in language which is already grammatically
and
syntactically formed and which has a large vocabulary*? *Let us
agree to
call this developed form, which is supposed to make its appearance
at the
end of the child?s development, the final or ideal form. And let
us call the
child?s form of speech the primary or rudimentary form. The
greatest
characteristic feature of child development is that this
development is
achieved under particular conditions of interaction with the
environment,
where this ?form which is going to appear only at the end of the
process of
development is not only already there in the environment ? but
actually
interacts and exerts a real influence on the primary form, on the
first
steps of the child?s development. *Something which is only
supposed to
take shape at the very end of development, somehow influences the
very first
steps in this development. *(Vygotsky, 1994, p. 348?the article is
The
Problem of the Environment, appearing in The Vygotsky Reader)
Apologies for
the slightly abridged version of the passage.
Not surprisingly, I "relate" creative imitation to performance....
Lois
Lois Holzman, Director
East Side Institute for Group and Short Term Psychotherapy
920 Broadway, 14th floor
New York NY 10010
tel. 212.941.8906 ext. 324
fax 212.941.0511
lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org
www.eastsideinstitute.org
www.performingtheworld.org loisholzman.org On Jul 16, 2009, at 5:00
PM, Mike Cole wrote:
David's note of a few days ago on 3-7 year old changes in
egocentric speech
reminded
me of an old article by Slobin and Welch (reprinted in Ferguson
and Slobin,
*Studies of Child Development, 1963)
*that it took a while to track down. The study is often cited in
studies of
elicited imitation where an adult says some
sentence and asks a little kid to repeat it. Kids simplify the
sentence in
normal circumstances ("Where is the kitty"
becomes "where kitty") and other such stuff. There is a pretty large
literature on this.
But when I went to find the phenomenon in the article that had
most struck
me, I could not find it in the recent lit
on elicited imitation. The phenomenon seems relevant to the
monologic,
dialogic etc speech discussion.
The phenomenon is this: When a 2yr/5month old child is recorded
saying
"If
you finish your eggs all up, Daddy, you
can have your coffee." they can repeat this sentence pretty much
as it is
right afterward. But 10 minutes later it has
become simplified a la the usual observation.
Citing William James (the child has an "intention to say so and
so") Slobin
and Welch remark:
If that linguistic form is presented for imitation while the
intention is
still operative, it can be faily successfully imitated. Once the
intention
is gone, however, the utterance must be processed in linguistic
terms alone
-- without its original intentional and
contextual support." In the absence of such support, the task can
strain
the child's abilities and reveal a more limited competence than may
actually
be present in spontaneous speech (p. 489-90).
This kind of observation seems relevant in various ways both to
language
acquisition in school settings and to my reccurrent
questions about the social situation of development. Is it
relevant to the
discussion of egocentric and social speech, David?
mike
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Karen C. Spear-Ellinwood
PhD Candidate, College of Education
Dept. of Teaching, Language & Sociocultural Studies
kse@email.arizona.edu
Cell: 520-878-6034
phone: 520-829-0749
kse@email.arizona.edu
Cell: 520-878-6034
phone: 520-829-0749
Fax: 520-626-8280
?To be able honestly to say, in response to a student's question, "I don't
know. How could we find out?" is probably more important, in creating an ethos
of collaborative inquiry in the classroom, than always being able to supply a
ready-made answer. Even for the most well-informed teacher there are almost
certain to be aspects of the topic that s/he does not fully understand. To be
able to wonder aloud about these and to be seen to take action to understand
them better not only provides an excellent model for the students to emulate,
it also demonstrates the authenticity of the teacher's commitment to inquiry.?
_In C.D. Lee and P. Smagorinsky (Eds.) Vygotskian perspectives on literacy
research.. New York: Cambridge University Press, (pp. 51-85)._
Wells sees this particular ethos as valuing inquiry as a lifelong process,
encouraging students to ask questions. I think Wells also implies that
ethos is
at the heart of a classroom, mediating particular approaches to learning and
teaching. Being at the heart of activity is consistent with the suggestion of
placing ethos at the heart of the activity system model.
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