"But I will stop here. The ongoing dialogue permits no final conclusion. It would be a poor hermeneutist who thought he could have, or had to have, the last word."
Ed Wall On Mar 14, 2009, at 12:08 PM, Jay Lemke wrote:
Backing up a bit in this thread, to the connection with coding and categorization, I just wanted to say that Martin's description below is indeed one way that some researchers do a kind of 'grounded theory' analysis, reducing the primary data to categories, relations among categories, frequencies of items in the categories, etc. I certainly try to steer research students away from such an approach, and I don't think that the grounded theory tradition originally envisioned this. It was more hermeneutic, as one can see preserved a bit in the German-developed qual analysis software Atlas.ti . As such this style of qual analysis seeks an on-going refinement of categories by a back-and-forth, perhaps even a dialectic, with the primary data. So it is a procedure to facilitate this cycling, from interpretation of data in its own terms (a bit more EM), through interpretation in relation to the categories-so-far, to revision of the category system, to re-interpretation in relation to the new category system, rubbing up against the original text data, etc. etc.I think that in some ways this hermeneutic helps to bridge between EM and FA, without becoming quite so embroiled in the politics of who-trumps-whom. Michael Roth, and some of the California EM people have argued by asymmetry for EM to be in a way "meta" to FA. And there is an interesting truth in that, which I find most congenially in Latour's version, though it is common to most so-called "practice theories": that the primary work of making meaning through action (including discourse and representational/mediational practices) in some sense underlies the construction and use of all abstracted categories in FA. But despite the sometimes painful contortions of language that EM forces itself to, you just can't do the work of meaning making without already having and using a lot of higher- order categorical or category-like abstractions. Semiosis is based on linking or contextualizing, putting A in relation to B (by way of C, pace Peirce) and it jumps or slides along the cline from concrete to abstract and back again as we make meaning.I am happy to agree that the analysis of practice ought to always be part of the More whenever any FA is done, and to criticize when that does not happen, and especially when its absence leads to uncritical reifications or missed alternative interpretations and insights. But I don't think the metaphors that describe FA as built on the foundations of EM or practices, or as being a meta-analytic methodology that subsumes all possible FAs, are quite so helpful. What we have here is not unlike the old debates about macro-social forces or structures vs. micro-social practices and actions. EM takes the high ground when it argues about "methodology", because clearly all doing-science is also just plain doing. But EM also poses to some extent, heartily denied all round, as a theory of social action and meaningful social doings. Theories are not just descriptions or explanations, they are also paradigms of what matters and how to make sense of them. Theories and methodologies are as entwined as ends and means; they come in pairs, inseparable and pretty much meaningless if disconnected -- or perhaps I should say they mean different things when differently paired. If you've ever taught a course on pure method, you probably know this. We may call it the same method, but it does not work the same way or mean the same thing outside of some paradigm-connection to a theory.So, no master theories, and no master methods. A hermeneutic spiral staircase of mutually supporting and mutually subverting category- mediated and practice-focused modes of analysis. I think. For now. ;-)JAY. Jay Lemke Professor Educational Studies University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109 www.umich.edu/~jaylemke On Mar 10, 2009, at 6:19 PM, Martin Packer wrote:Ed,When you say coding in CA, are you refering to the identification of an utterance as, for example, the first part of a two-part pair? I don't view this as coding, but rather as a step in an ongoing articulation of theorganization of the conversation, in which component parts will beidentified in sequential and material context, always subject to revision as more of the conversation is considered. I think of coding, as for instance in grounded theory, as a practice of abstraction and generalization in which the codes replace the original data with abstract categories which are thencompared to produce more abstract features and kinds. In this kind ofapproach the researcher writes notes or memos not about the data but about the categories. The data becomes merely an 'illustration' of the categories, and the end result is a 'theory' that takes the form of stated regularities among categories. The data, in all its richness and complexity, is left farbehind. CA is a very different approach.Thanks for pointing to the Livingston book. I too find Ethnomethodology's Program very useful, both the book and the 1996 article with the same name.Anne Rawls (she is the daughter of John Rawls) is writing some veryinteresting pieces of EM, linking it to a fresh interpretation of Durkheim'ssociological project and his objections to Kant. Some references: Garfinkel, H. (1996). Ethnomethodology's program. Social Psychology Quarterly, 59(1), 5-21.Rawls, A. W. (1996). Durkheim's epistemology: The neglected argument. TheAmerican Journal of Sociology, 102(2), 430-482. Rawls, A. W. (1998). Durkheim's challenge to philosophy: Human reasonexplained as a product of enacted social practice. The American Journal ofSociology, 104(3), 887-901.Rawls, A. W. (2006). Respecifying the study of social order: Garfinkel's transition from theoretical conceptualization to practices in detail. In H. Garfinkel & A. W. Rawls (Eds.), Seeing sociologically: The routine groundsof social action (pp. 1-98): Paradigm Publishers. Martin On 3/8/09 8:29 PM, "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:Martin There is a somewhat hard to find book by Eric Livingston:Making Sense Of Ethnomethodology you might want to add to your reading list (if you already haven't) and for my purposes, teaching a class orso in Education, pieces of Ethnomethodology's Program (by Garfinkel and edited by Rawls) has been useful. As far as coding goes, if one does Conversational Analysis, then there is some 'coding.' Ed Wall On Mar 8, 2009, at 8:01 PM, Martin Packer wrote:David,Coding does indeed not enable one to grasp the complexity of events.Itignores or denies, importantly, the intrinsic plurality or ambiguityofevents/actions, and their reciprocal relations with context. Both oftheseare characteristics which all of us use and exploit as interactionalresources in everyday life. Once an act has been coded a specific interpretation of it has been fixed, and it has been artificially removed from its sequential and material context. These are reasons why I have always been more drawn to ethnomethodology. That's the topic of the class I'm teaching tomorrow (in Spanish, heaven helpme - and them!) and so I've been refreshing my knowledge. I stumbledonto my copy of Roy Turner's collection, titled simply "Ethnomethodology," published by Penguin in 1974, which I brought with me from the UK to the US eons ago and now has travelled with me to Colombia. If that doesn't show affection for EM I don't know what does! And I've been reading old and new work by John Heritage, some of which deals with "epistemic landscapes" in a way that very successfully, I think, puts information at the center, as you put it. But ethnomethodology isn't based on empathy. It does assume that there is at least some degree of communality between the methods used by the researcher and those used by the participants to organize their everyday activity, but these methods are assumed to be procedural, practical, and not subjective or emotional. And the principal source of evidence for a reading of an interaction in ethnomethodology is the way an action displays the agent'sunderstanding of those events it responds to. So what you would liketo sayabout (a), (b), and (c) would be constrained and informed by what thestudents say in response to (a), (b), and (c). It works very well, without a single code being imposed.Okay, okay, I'll go do my reading. Between you and Andy I never havea spare moment! MartinOn 3/8/09 6:35 PM, "David Kellogg" <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:Martin: I'm afraid I'm not going to defend fuzzy thinking. Not because I don't agreewith it, but because I'm not very good at it. My fuzziness tends tobe of the nonvolitional sort. As I said, it's an aspect of Jay's work (and also Vygotsky's) I haven't really assimilated very well. For many years I've been trying to ENTIRELY reorganize the "present-practice-produce" paradigm of lessons here in Korea along the lines of his graphico-semiotic functions "getting attention-- presenting information--checking integration". It's a VERY powerful way of looking at lessons: it explains why skilledteachers NEVER begin with a blank slate, it puts information at thecentre of the exchange where it really belongs, and it provides a model of understanding that is miles from testing practices: integrating old and new, me and you, be and do.But I find it pretty hard to code stuff! Take this, for example, fromyesterday's introductory class: a)"Hi!" b) "I'm Mr. K." c) "And you?" Now, I'd like to say that a) is "getting attention", b) is "giving information" and c) is some kind of "checking integration". I'd like to go further, and say that greetings and DOWN intonation are generallya), indicative/declaratives with horizontal or UP-DOWN intonation aregenerally b) and teacher questions often often UP intoned and c).But the data won't code with any reliability Worse, I find there isa) in b) ("I'm") and b) in a) ("Hi" gives information about how the speaker envisions the relationship), and c) in eveything (even the grammar). Everything is everything. How nice it would be to shrug my shoulders like Hegel and say "So much the worse for the facts!" I would like to believe, as Benjamin says, that "insight into the relationship between essences is the prerogative of the philosopher and these relationships remain unaltered even if they do not take on the purest form in the world of fact." But I don't.This is think one of Mariane Hedegaard's GREAT strengths (shown inthe analysis of the Jens data but even more strongly at the end in her analysis of, and even her refusal to analyze, the Halime data) is her emic (empathetic, ethnomethodological) attitude towards what the subjects say. I don't think this is sentimentally motivated. I think it's a serious attempt "not to laugh, nor to cry, but to understand". So she has to recognize that to an outsider (Jens, Halime) a dominant culture really DOES look pretty monological and monolithic, and in fact it is, atleast in terms of its exclusiveness and inaccessibility. Given thatit iscategorical exclusiveness and inaccessibility that is the source ofthis apparent monolithicity, I think the idea that the categorial thinking of theoppressed and that of the oppressor have the same ontological basisis simply wrong. Roy follows up his quotation of Benjamin with a long reference to Malcolm X's well known speech about "the house negro" and the "field negro", recentlymisquoted by Al Qaida's Al Zawahiri with respect to Barack Obama. His argument, which I'm not sure I buy, is that BOTH are powerless, butthe field negro is still strong, and part of that strength is a clear, monolithic distinction between master and slave.But I am interfering with your time, Martin. Read Hedegaard-- it's areal treat! David Kellogg Seoul National University of Education --- On Sun, 3/8/09, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote: From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> Subject: Re: [xmca] Hedegaard article To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> Date: Sunday, March 8, 2009, 3:00 PM I don't know, David. I haven't had time yet to read the Hedegaard article, so I can't put the remarks in that context. I presume you're not proposing that one ought to categorize Danish culture as pathologically monological,or nasty. I don't understand how that kind of appeal to "what we inthe west... recognize" (which "we" is that, exactly?) can claim to identify theroots of a failure to think in "fuzzy" terms, not least, of course,because it's not exactly a fuzzy way of putting things. MartinOn 3/8/09 12:20 AM, "David Kellogg" <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:Dear Martin: I don't find Jay's comments at all offensive, and they are simplistic only in the sense of being telegraphic (like the word "nasty"). Actually, I find Jay's work anything but simplistic; if anything it's a little too nuanced for my purposes (coding data involves a LOT of categorial distinctions!)I interpreted Jay's comments in the context of Mariane Hedegaard'sarticle, particularly the ending, where Halime is describing her relationship to the Danish language and to the Danish "good life". I'm assuming that this article was written well after the Centre-Right Rasmussen government came to power (in 2001) with, of course, the support of the Bush administration, which they promptly returned by embroiling Denmark in the Iraq War. What is not so well known is that the Rasmussen government is supported by the Dansk Folkeparti of Pia Kjaersgaard, which is the equivalent of Jean Marie Le Pen's Front Nationale in France or Jurg Haidar's neo-fascist Austrian People's Party. This party, which has been shown to be infilitrated by terrorist neo-Nazi organizations like Combat 18, opposes all forms of immigration, consider white people to be oppressed by the Muslim minority in Denmark, and after 9/11 Kjaersgaard said that the Americans were wrong to call this a clash of civilizations because "There is only one civilization and that is ours."Here are some quotations from their parliamentary delegation, justto give you some sense of what Halime is talking about: Morten Messerschmidt, DPP member of Danish Parliament: "I believe that all Muslim communities are, by definition, loser communities. The Muslims are not capable of critical thinking."[24] Pia Kjærsgaard's newsletter (February 25, 2002): "The Social Security Act is passé because it was tailored to a Danish family tradition and work ethic and not to Muslims, for whom it is fair to be provided for by others while the wife gives birth to a lot of children. The child benefit grant is being taken advantage of, as an immigrant achieves a record income due to [having] just under a score of children. New punishmentlimits must be introduced for group rapes because the problem onlyarrived with the vandalism of the many anti-social second-generation immigrants." [25] It seems to me that in the USA in the sixties and again today there was a fairly common liberal sentiment to the effect that racism was above all just a bad idea, and that since it was nothing more than a bad idea, it could be cured fairly easily by a dose of Sidney Poitier or Barack Obama. The corollary of this sentiment is that, of course, the oppressed must not be allowed to cherish similar bad ideas, not merely because it might provoke the oppressor to even more savage acts of oppression but above all because racism is just a bad idea in general. Well, it doesn't take much to show that this liberal sentiment is simply wrong. Sidney Poitier did not cure American racism, and neither will Barack Obama. The reason is simple; racism is not "just a bad idea" but, like any other pervasive and systematic ideology, a reflection of real material historical conditions. Specifically, racism reflects the historical conditions of American slavery, European colonialism, and the not merely historical reserve army of the unemployed, which is growing by leaps and bounds as we speak. Perhaps it's time to consider the idea that so-called "reverse racism", or rather, the rage of the oppressed, is really NOT part of the problem, but in fact part of the solution. David Kirshner's colleague, Kaustuv Roy, has written a wonderful book (Thanks,David!) called Neighborhoods of the Plantation which begins with aquote from Walter Benjamin on immigration and borders as a means of keeping "culture" pure. Benjamin committed suicide when, fleeing the Nazis, he was not allowed to pass from occupied France into Spain : "Where frontiers are decided the adversary is not simply annihilated; indeedhe is accorded rights even when the victor's superiority of power iscomplete.And these are, in a demonically ambiguous way, 'equal rights', forboth parties ot the treat it is the same line that may not be crossed. Hereappears, in a terribly primitive form, the same mythical ambiguityof laws that may not be 'infringed' to which Anatole France refers satirically when he says that 'Poor and rich are equally forbidden to spend the night under bridges.'" David Kellogg Seoul National University of Education _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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