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Re: [xmca] Vygotsky's Plural Discourse!!
Haydi, yes, I continue to be in agreement with Engels and the theory
of the labor origins of human society. I view labor as a special case
of activity, 'special' by virtue of it being activity that is
associated with producing necessities for human survival and
development. I am not certain how to strictly distinguish labor from
activity in general. In any case, all the discoveries by classical
Marxism about labor still very much hold, in my opinion.
I am at a point where I am trying to catch my breath and catch up with
the flurry of complex questions being discussed.
The questions that I believe you are emphasizing in your post, Haydi,
are totally germaine. Is there or is there not a fundamental conflict
between Leontiev's view of activity as the unit of life, and
Vygotsky's view of word-meaning as the unit of consciousness? How can
both be true? If one is true, doesn't that mean the other has to be
false? And if Engels was right, while this may or may not make
Leontiev right, doesn't it make Vygotsky wrong?
To ask this question another way, to pick up on Sasha's dialogue with
me: isn't trying to combine the theories of Vygotsky and Leontiev a
classic example of eclecticism?
Since we are discussing these two trends, I will also bring up one
more, which Sasha speaks to: that of Ilyenkov and A. Meshcheryakov.
All three of these trends - LSV, ANL, and I/M - claim to follow in
M&E's footsteps. Sasha argues that these three approaches are
mutually incompatible at the level of psychological theory, and have
fundamentally different approaches to life, culture and history, and
consciousness.
Sasha provided a chart comparing these three trends in his December
post, comparing them according to whether "life" is taken into
account, whether "culture and history" is taken into account, and what
"unit of analysis" was being used. Jussi provided a chart comparing
three time periods of Vygotsky through which he developed his theory
of signs as semiotic mediators, comparing "explanatory concepts" and
"methodology of inquiry" in each period.
Could continuing with a comparative approach like this help us? What
questions could we ask the writings left behind by Vygotsky I, II and
III, AN Leontiev, Ilyenkov, and Meshcheryakov - and for that matter,
Marx and Engels - that could help us sort out how their theories would
respond to specific questions about life, activity, culture and
history, consciousness? How could we formulate these kinds of
questions precisely and usefully? What questions could help drive out
things like what units of analysis and what explanatory concepts did
each writer (and time period of each writer, where applicable) employ
for specific areas of inquiry? What other kinds of questions like
these could we ask?
In other words, in the spirit of comparative methodology, what
relevant **questions** could we ask each of them that would render
**different responses**?
I certainly have my thinking cap on ...
Highest regards,
- Steve
On Feb 2, 2009, at 4:01 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
Steve,
There were very kind responses . Thank you all !
Just some hints (or more of necessity) to avoid misunderstanding :
[[Btw, am I reading from your remarks correctly, that I sounded to
you annoyed
with Jussi's paper?]]By no means ! You've always been top in
manners ! I hope my mention of annoyance refers to some past
misinterpreted personal feeling ! My apologies for this misplaced
mentioning . One good thing I've learnt late : At whatever risk
being on the list is much better than being off .. [[As for
Vygotsky and activity theory ... to my knowledge, Vygotsky himself did
not formulate an activity theory.]]As he did not name his theory *
Cultural-Historical * himself either . [[For some, perhaps
many, it has always been an uneasy alliance.]]Since years years
ago , I've been accustomed to depicting the origin of language
around what follows by Leontiev ; At the moment I don't have a fresh
mind , but think sort of George-Thomspson-name , Christofer
Caudwell , etc.etc. were scarcely available in translation in the
form of pamphlets ; maybe that's why I cannot be so critical of some
alliance , convergence , divergence , whatever . Quotes could really
be optional in reading :Leontiev : Development of Mind : --thanks
again to Andy and Michael--{{II. The Origin of Human
Consciousness(page 183 to 197 full contiguous pages)1. The
Conditions for the Emergence of Consciousness...2. The Forming of
Thought and Speech...
The last point on which we must specially dwell is that of the form
in which man’s conscious reflection of the reality around him occurs.
The conscious image, notion, concept have a sensory basis, but
conscious reflection of reality is not just sensory experience of
it. Even simple perception of an object is reflection of it not only
as possessing form, colour, etc. but at the same time having a
certain objective, stable significance, as, for example, food, a
tool, etc. There must consequently be a special form of the
conscious reflection of reality that differs qualitatively from the
directly sensory form of psy-chic reflection peculiar to animals.
What is this concrete form in which men’s consciousness of the
objective world around them really occurs? It is language, which is,
in the words of Marx and Engels, men’s ‘practical, real
consciousness’.37 Consciousness is therefore inseparable from
language. Language, like man’s consciousness also, arises solely in
the labour process, and to-gether with it. Language, like
consciousness, is a product of men’s activity, a product of the
group; only therefore does it also exist for the individual person.
Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical, real,
consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore
does it also exist for me.38
The origin of language can be understood only in relation to the
need developing for people in the process of labour to say something
to one another.
How then did speech and language take shape? People, as we have
seen, necessarily enter into relations with one another in labour,
into intercourse with one another. Originally their labour actions
proper and their intercourse were a single process. Man’s work
movements, in acting on nature, also acted on the other participants
in production, which meant that his actions acquired a dual function
in these circumstances, viz. a directly production function and a
func-tion of affecting other people, a function of intercourse.
Subsequently these two functions became separated. For that to
happen it was sufficient for people’s experience to show them that
even when a work movement did not lead to its practical result for
some reason or other, it was still capable of affecting others
involved in production, was able, for example, to draw them into
joint fulfil-ment of a given action. Movements thus arose that
preserved the form of the corresponding work movements but lacked
practical con-
37 Marx and Engels. “German Ideology.” Op. cit., p 44.
38 Ibid.
EVOLUTION OF THE PSYCHE 197
tact with the object, and consequently also lacked the effort that
con-verted them into real work movements. These movements, together
with the vocal sounds that accompanied them, were separated from the
tasks of acting on an object, and separated from labour activity,
and preserved in themselves only the function of acting on people,
the function of speech intercourse. In other words they were con-
verted into gestures. A gesture is nothing else than a movement sepa-
rated from its result, i.e. not applied to the object at which it is
aimed.
At the same time the main role in intercourse was transferred from
gestures to vocal sounds; vocal, articulated speech arose.
The content of some sort signified in speech was fixed, consoli-
dated in language. But for a given phenomenon to be signified and
reflected in language, it had to be singled out consciously, and
that, as we have seen, happened originally in men’s practical
activity, in pro-duction.
Men began, in fact (Marx wrote), with their appropriating of some
things of the external world as means suitable to satisfy their
needs, etc. etc.; later they came to designate them verbally as well
as what in practical experience they were for them, namely means to
satisfy their needs, things that ‘satisfied’ them.39
The production of language, and of consciousness and thought, was
originally directly interwoven in production activity, in men’s ma-
terial intercourse.
The direct connection of language and speech with men’s labour
activity was the chief and basic condition through which they were
evolved as bearers of the ‘objectified’, conscious reflection of
reality. By signifying an object in the labour process, a word
singled it out and generalised it for the individual consciousness
precisely in its ob-jective, social relation, i.e. as a social
object.}}
I don't have too many problems with this text ; I said I've been
repeatedly exposed to similar ones .
[[This concept, so seemingly obvious to many today, was genius-level
thinking in the 1920's in the USSR.]]
Really , actually so ! People learn from each other (albeit
critically); So do scholars . Is Pavlov to be blamed for all pure
American Behaviourism at the time ? Forget Introspectionism ? All or
nothing issuance ? In the Ilyenko article , there's a mention . This
does not mean activity/consciousness removed from investigation ,
non-refutation of the S====R .
Excuse me I can't preserve all your very long nice partially affec-
laden writing .
[[To my knowledge, to the extent he dealt with the concept of
"supremacy," he maintained an unwavering materialist and dialectical
understanding of the relationship of matter and mind, being and
consciousness, external (out of body) and internal (within body)
aspects of mind and culture, in all his writings, including Thinking
and Speech.]]
See ! dear Steve ! Leontiev says activity is a "unit of LIFE" for
better or worse . I dare say he compresses all universe in man's
activity emenating from Marx's Labour Activity . With matter and
mind (above) , I'd like to know if you still believe in the WORK
being the cause of the conversion (Engels) . With this in mind ,
what about Vygotsky with all features you recounted in his great
great capacities ? I mean I'd like to believe in it ! I say my
problem is Vygotsky , as you say , fathomed the * word meaning * to
explicate what consciousness is . And if I'm not mistaken , he
utters * word meaning is the microcosm of the world of CONSCIOUSNESS
* , not of life , not of the universe , not of what and what . Even
in the present quote , you can see traces of the same judgement with
Leontiev . The big problem is the genesis of the very MACROCOSM ,
that is , consciousness . This is for the nth time : WHERE DOES THAT
CACROCOSM COME FROM ? IS THAT
INNATE (DESCARTES , CHOMSKY , ??) AND IF YOU GO OUTSIDE FOR IT , YOU
SAY THE INDIVIDUAL ONE (CONSCIOUSNESS) IS THE COPY OF THE COLLECTIVE
ONE ? IT'S YOU AND MARX SAY * BEHIND CONSCIOUSNESS IS BEING * . AND
ENGELS SAID BEING (HUMAN) CAME FROM WORK !! ENGELS DID WRONG ? IF
SO , WHAT ESLE ? I SAY WHEN YOU PAY , YOU GET THE OBJECT , NOT THE
WORD FOR IT , BETTER , NOT THE MEANING OF THE WORD FOR IT . YOU JUST
COMMUNICATE WITH THE LATTER !!
very very best wishes
Haydi
On Feb 1, 2009, at 2:49 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:> > Steve, > To tell
you the truth , I still don't know the weight , height , and place
of AT within the whole CHAT . Is there , in principle , such a thing
as AT within the works of Vygotksy ? Where is it ? Where are they ?
Apparently , if the division is right whether with Jussi or with
David , whoever , Vygotsky III said a irreversible good-bye to the
AT . Then why CHAT ? Don't you think Faith overshadows Reason when
supporting Sign-Belief ? You might ask me the same question vis a
vis Leontiev : OK ! I'm not yet in the position to say for certain
if Vygotsky went wrong at some point and if he did , where exactly
was it ? I really need to read more . But with Leontiev , I don't
see so many things wrong . Just I know Leontiev here occupies a very
lower case UNFORTUNATELY as Marx does . One very good respectable
learned active participant once wrote to me Leontiev was one of
those whom he should stay away
from . Now , I sent you the article/lecture by Ilyenko > on Alexandr
Meshcheryakov , which now will be sent to others . This and these we
owe to Dot Robbins . I'm not so indeterminate over providing sort of
a discussion ; however , when I read the writing , for a moment I
thought as if Ilyenko were alive and knew about the discussion , so
he aimed at this article . Most and majority of the lines are direct
responses to the Sign-Belief . The secondary , derivative position
of sign and all semiosis vis a vis real object , artificial
objects , actions with them etc.etc. is so clear in this writing
which leaves no doubt as to the rejection of the supremacy of SIGN
over ACTION (within bounds of AT) when compared one to the other . >
When reading Jussi's paper , I marked as usual the points I liked to
think about afterwards , but after reading Ilyenko's writing , which
is also marked , I saw they could be seen as contrasts . And there
is always the option of
* delete * for non-enthusiasts . I , as one , always say * welcome *
to whatever is sent to us from comrades , let alone getting
annoyed .> Best > Haydi > --- On Fri, 1/30/09, Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com
> wrote:> > From: Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com> > Subject: Re:
[xmca] Vygotsky's Plural Discourse!! > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,
Activity"<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > Date: Friday, January 30, 2009,
2:47 PM> > Some comments on Jussi's very interesting paper. Semiotic
mediation, > socio-behaviorism, epistemological breaks.> >
********************************> First, on semiotic mediation.> >
Jussi's discussion of Vygotsky's theory of semiotic mediationbeing
the > basis of consciousness, formulated late in Vygotsky's short
career,and how > it transitioned from an instrumentalist concept,
seems to be hispaper's > strongest aspect, where Jussi assembles the
most persuasive quotes and > arguments. I believe this assemblage
adds up to an
unfortunately narrow > assessment of Vygotsky's overall approach to
psychology andconsciousness, > but Jussi makes a strong case that
needs to be taken very seriously. I applaud> his scholarship and
work on this. He offers a worthy argument. It appears that > his
work dovetails very nicely with many of David Kellogg's insightsinto
> Vygotsky's last and most important work, Thinking and
Speech,including > David's emphasis on semiotic mediation.> > I owe
Sasha a serious response to his recent comprehensive post, which
replied, > among other things, to my objection to what I perceived
as an erroneous > reduction of Vygotsky to a theory of sign
mediation. Again, as above, I claimed> that reducing Vygotsky -
meaning, Vygotsky I, II or III, to use David's > terminology - to
his 1932-34 theory of semiotic mediation, is a narrow > assessment
of his approach to psychology. Have I managed to climb my way out
on> a limb? We'll see ... :-))> > My question at this
point, since Jussi has spoken so well, is to Sasha - what> is your
evaluation of Jussi's take on Vygotsky's theory ofsemiotic or > sign
mediation? Do you agree, for example, with Jussi's descriptionof >
Vygotsky's views on sign mediation, for example, in the section"Sign
> and Meaning" (pg 11) where Jussi says things like:> > "If the
lower forms of activity are characterised by the immediacy of >
psychological processes, the higher psychological functions are
characterized> by sign-mediation."> > "It is clear for him
[Vygotsky] that the sign mediation ‘is themost > important
distinguishing characteristic of all higher mental functions.’(L. >
S. Vygotsky, 1999b, 41)."> > "The use of signs results in a
completely new and specific structureof > behaviour in man, a
structure that breaks with the traditions of natural > behaviour and
creates new forms of cultural-psychological activity. (L. S. >
Vygotsky, 1999b, 47)."> > "There is no sign without
meaning. ‘The formation of meaning is themain > function of sign.
Meaning is > everywhere where there is a sign --- meaning is
inherent in the sign..’ > (Vygotsky, 1997h, 134, 136)."> > Also,
Sasha, if you would, please repeat, even if ever so briefly, whatyou
> find incorrect about Vygotsky's views here, as Jussi has
expressedthem. > > ************************************* > Second,
on socio-behaviorism.> > Another theme in Jussi's paper is that
Vygotsky went through threestages, > the first, behaviorism.> >
David sees Jussi's three stages as overlapping quite a bit with his
> Vygotsky I, II, and III, which he bases on Norris Minick's
analysis. > Similar how? They strike me as quite different, except
for perhaps seeing > 1932-1934 as a specific phase. I like Minick's
analysis myself - itis a > good starting point for a very important
study. Certainly, Vygotsky wasin > constant transition his whole
career.> > But was there really more than one
Vygotsky? Were there enough Vygotskysto > satisfy both David's and
Jussi's sequences? Are there enoughLSV's > for each of us to have
several Vygotsky's of our very own? :-)) Anyway, > Plenum CW Vol 1
is on Google Books (yay!) and here is the Minick article. > "The
Development of Vygotsky's Thought: An Introduction" Isee no >
discussion of a behaviorist phase by Minick, btw.> > http://books.google.com/books?id=u8UTfKFWb5UC&pg=PA17&lpg=PA17&dq=vygotsky+collective+works+minick&source=web&ots=VAYusF0J-0&sig=xOE1A6IM58poswGLWdrpqawx7hU&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=3&ct=result#PPA33,M1
> > > Jussi does well discussing the aspects of the transition from
an instrumental > to semiotic viewpoint, from early to late CHP, but
I find his discussionof > Vygotsky's so-called "socio-behaviorist"
phase unconvincing. His > focus on pg 3-5 in his paper on a 1925
essay by Vygotsky, found in Plenum CW Vol > 3. Jussi offers a
reading of that essay that is, in an
important way, the > opposite of mine. I appreciate that Jussi's
paper got me to take thisclose > look at Vygotsky's 1925 essay. I
had looked at it before, but somewhat > quickly. This time, I read
it with great interest. In some passages, Vygotsky > does sound like
a behaviorist. And it is true that in this essay Vygotsky >
restricts himself to the terms of the behaviorism-reflexologism of
histime, > which was dominated by Pavlov (and according to Minick,
Bekhterev) in the Soviet> psychology of the time. My reading, which
is certainly somewhat speculative, > not having done the thorough
study of Soviet psychology in the 1920'sthat > this kind of inquiry
requires, is that Vygotsky was doing everything he could to > prove,
using Pavlovian terminology and his persuasive writing abilities,
that > the central subject of psychological research should be
consciousness, not > reflexes, and that behaviorism was simply dead
wrong about that and a lotof > things.
My reading is that Vygotsky was attempting to **defeat** behaviorism
in > that essay, using its own terms. Or more precisely, relegate it
to the study > only of animal and human reflexes, which it indeed
was making important > discoveries in.> > I think Jussi is right on
a very important observation: Vygotsky is certainly, > from our
point of view looking back, being somewhat contradictory at this
point> in his career, in 1925. But rather than assess Vygotsky as
"committed to> behaviorism," I would assess him has committed to
**anti**-behaviorism and > **anti**-reflexology, but still not
having found sufficient arguments and > evidence to fully dismiss
and move beyond them, that is, replace them. So, as > part of his
searing critique (and Vygotsky sure could cook, one of the things>
we love about him), he is forced to use behaviorism's own
discoveries and> terms to try to defeat them as serious contenders
for hegemony in Soviet > psychological research.
At the time, this was a David and Goliath endeavor..> > For that
moment in time, the behaviorist approach was one of the most
advanced> materialist psychology's available, but hopelessly and
erroneously committed > to denying the importance or even existence
of consciousness and will. It was a> materialist counterpoint, but a
badly mistaken one, to subjectivist psychology..> Vygotsky, to my
knowledge, was unwavering in this assessment of behaviorism - > its
objectivist materialism was equally erroneous in its approach to
human > psychology as was the subjectivist idealism of other
schools. One understated > mind and ignored it, the other overstated
and isolated it. That 1925 essay may > have been, in fact, LSV's
goodbye letter to behaviorism, his funeraladdress > to it. He was
going to go study consciousness, and so should all psychologists.>
'Nice knowing y'all. 'Bye!'> > In other words, my take on the 1925
essay Jussi cites is that Vygotsky was > using
dialectical thinking to challenge and stretch this mechanical
materialist > trend to its extremes, to force it over the boundaries
it refused to cross, with > a very deliberate intent on breaking its
back in the process. His 1924 speech> that started his Moscow career
was in that spirit, as was his 1926-27 Crisis> monograph wherever it
mentions behaviorism, and to my knowledge, everything he > ever said
about behaviorism was also written with these intents. No one >
confuses cultural psychology or cultural-historical research with
behaviorism in > any way today. The record shows Vygotsky always
opposed it. It does not appear> historically supportable to
characterize Vygotsky as a behaviorist, a > socio-behaviorist, a
reflexologist, or a reactologist, even for a month,let > alone from
say 1917 through 1927. He was a die-hard opponent, and neveran >
advocate of those schools. Yes?> > I should add that I don't think
discarding this aspect of Jussi'spaper >
takes away from the insights he offers in the above-discussed
portions. If > anything, it removes a distraction.> > Something that
is always hard to do from a distance, and especially fromthe >
future, let alone a different country, is fully grasp the rhetorical
issues and > contexts that drive a given piece of ideological
writing. Vygotsky in 1925 was > still establishing his own turf,
still even getting his doctorate, still > integrating himself as a
psychologist. Things were changing very fast in the > USSR, and all
over the world. These observations are only indicative, and of>
course don't prove that my reading is "better" thanJussi's. > My
point is that there can be much more going on than meets the eye
whenone > studies the meanings of quotes. To understand the quotes
Jussi offers, we need> to look at them historically for their full
meaning.> > One interesting viewpoint on this 1925 essay and
Vygotsky's view of > behaviorism, is that of AN
Leontyev, who wrote and introduction to the Russian> version of this
volume of the CW, "On Vygotsky's Creative > Development," where he
discusses this essay and Vygotsky andbehaviorism on > pg 14 of the
Plenum Vol 3 of the CW. There is no hint from Leontyev that >
Vygotsky went through a behaviorist phase. (Btw, what is > "socio"-
behaviorism?) I am interested in who else has offered > commentary
on the relationship of Vygotsky and behaviorism. I know I for one >
would benefit from others that have looked into this. And Jussi may
have more> insights and views in addition to those he shared in his
paper.> > ******************** > Finally, on Vygtosky's supposed
epistemological breaks.> > Here, Jussi, in my opinion, is on very
thin ice. I am afraid that neither > Althusser nor Foucault are much
help to Jussi's thesis, since neitherwere > discussing Vygotsky.
Just because it might rain in London does not mean it is. > The
biggest problem with Jussi's thesis
is that Vygotsky never claimedor > observed he underwent a change in
outlook of the magnitude of an > "epistemological break." (Or am I
wrong? Please correct me onthis if > I am!) The second biggest
problem is that Vygotsky was very clear, fromat > least the early
20's, that he was ontologically and epistemologicallya > dialectical
materialist. From this he never budged - in fact, he consistently >
grew more confident and capable as a Marxist theoretician. He
consistently > applied the methodology of dialectical and historical
materialism to psychology. > As a matter of fact, he made some
significant improvements to Marxist > methodology, making him one of
the preeminent Marxist theoreticians of the 20th > Century. In my
opinion, no epistemological assessment of Vygotsky makes sense >
without fully assessing him as a Marxist philosopher and
methodologist. > > This is part of the content of those sharp words,
"narrow," > "one-sided," I have used in this
regard. For me, to viewVygotsky as > first and foremost a semiotic
mediationist, a theoretician of sign mediation, > would be like
regarding Marx as first and foremost an economic analyst with an>
interesting theory about labor. This would be a narrow, one-sided
assessment of> Marx's work, as I think it is Vygotsky's.> > At the
same time, Jussi's chart and discussion of "Thedevelopment of >
Vygotsky’s theory of signs as semiotic mediators" needs to
bescrutinized > closely and given serious consideration. He suggests
not one but two > epistemological breaks, one between LSV's supposed
socio-behaviorismphase > and instrumentalist (early CHP) phase, and
another, which he puts aquestion > mark over, between early CHP, and
late CHP, when LSV solidified his his semiotic > approach to
consciousness. I like, by the way, the way Jussi looks for >
"explanatory concepts" and "methodology of inquiry" tomake > his
analytical comparison. Thumbs up to the thinking
that went into that. It> does not demonstrate epistemological
breaks, in my view, but it does suggest> ways to look at the
development of many of Vygotsky's ideas, in addition to> his theory
of signs as semiotic mediators.> > But restricting one's view of
Vygotsky's overall trajectory, > ideological development, research
work and discoveries to just his work on signs> - and judging
"epistemological breaks" therefrom - to me losessight > of far too
many other important contributions by Vygotsky - and this isvery >
important - the contributions of Vygotsky **and his associates**.
Vygotsky was > the leader of something much bigger than himself,
something which was broken up > by the Stalinist machine - but by no
means killed off. Just delayed..> > What is this something? As I
hope I emphasized above, Jussi makes some > valuable contributions
to better understanding some important **parts** of this >
something. But, I think, one has to step back and look at
much more than just> Vygotsky's innovative ideas about the role of
semiosis (sign use) in human > consciousness and meaning-making to
evaluate his work epistemologically, > methodologically, and above
all, as the founder of this"something," > place-named for the time
being cultural-historical psychology. Much more. Yes?> > Best,> -
Steve> > > > > > > On Jan 29, 2009, at 10:42 PM, Andy Blunden
wrote:> >> David, I am being quite frank when I said I know nothing
of this topic. I> responded because I was asked to. But in any case,
re Vygotsky vs. Behaviourism,> I think I was basing myself on the
Introduction to "Mind in Society"> so perhaps Mike could clarify for
me.>> >> Andy >> >> David Kellogg wrote: >>> In defense (!) of Louis
Althusser. He is really talking about the > youth of a science being
the SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS of newness, and as suchit's > a pretty good
metaphor. It's in the context of Althusser's essayon > Freud and
Lacan (in Lenin on Philosophy
and other Essays). My dear Andy, > behaviorism was the official
psychology of the USSR in 1923, when they barely > even had an
official army? When the Commissar of War, Leon Trotsky, was a fan
of> Freud's writings? And Vygotsky "trashed" behaviorism in apaper >
that claimed that consciousness could be explained as the structure
of behavior?> Doesn't seem likely, does it? >>> Unlike Andy, I agree
completely with Jussi's point onsemiotics. > Why else would LSV say
that word meaning is a microcosm of human consciousness? > When
Vygotsky says that the mind is made of semiotic material, he is
explaining > exactly how it is that it becomes possible to
internalize social relations as > psychological ones and exactly why
it is that human minds develop from the > outside in rather than
from the inside out. >>> In Hegel's Phenomeonology of the Mind
(section 157) hediscusses > the "inverted world", the moment where
two modes of existenceare > mapped on to each
other (e.g. being onto concept). We find this particular trope>
throughout Vygotsky whenever we pass from (e.g.) the phylogenetic >
semiohistorical timescale to the sociocultural one, or from the
sociocultural > semiohistorical timescale to the ontogenetic one.
(And also from the ontogenetic> to the microgenetic.) >>> In the
inverted world, the first shall be last and the last shallbe >
first. (Or, as Mike says, the only thing we really know for sure
about the > mirror is that right is left is right is left.) For
example, on the phylogenetic > timescale sex differentiation is late
emerging but on the sociocultural > timescale it's very early. This,
and not some purely functionaldifference, > is why tools are
different from signs. Tools are late emerging in phylogenesis, > but
they are very early emerging in sociocultural history, but the
mastery of> tools is late again in ontogenesis, and on the other
hand comparatively early in > the microgenetic
mastery of a skill. Signs (in the form of signals) arevery > early
emerging in phylogenesis, but very late (in the form of written
symbols)> in sociocultural history, and again very early in
ontogenesis. The SIGNIFICANCE > of signs (that is, there signifying
as opposed to their indicative function) is> late emerging in
microgenetic development. >>> It seems to me that THIS more than
anything accounts for the CRITICAL > differences we find in
development when we change time scales. Of course, on one> level,
it's a little like comparing weather and climate (or climate and >
global warming). We are always talking about time and the changes
wrought > thereby. >>> But the changes wrought are qualitatively
different and not simply > quantitatively so. When we change
semiohistorical timescales (when ontogenesis > erupts into
sociocultural history, as when children grow up and create social >
progress, or when sociocultural progress changes the course of
evolution,as > when clothes replace fur and houses replace caves),
the very order of things is> changed. >>> At some point the first
must BECOME last and the last must BECOME > first. That critical
tipping point is not a matter of smooth development; > it's a moment
of violent crisis. In ontogenesis, signs do not replacetools > in a
gradualistic, benevolent, Biblical manner after the beatitudes; they
must > lay violent hands upon them and overthrow them by force. The
same is true of> microgenesis, at least from what I've seen. The
transition from afirst > language to a foreign one is a profoundly
uprooting experience and onlymuch > later liberating (In first
language learning, we find that deliberate control of > phonemes is
very late, but in second language learning it's at thevery >
beginning; conversely, in first language learning, fluency occurs
almost > immediately while in foreign language learning it comes
late if at all.) >>> Contrary to what
Foucault says (and what Stalin thought), discourse is > part of the
SUPERSTRUCTURE of society. That is the very opposite of what >
Stalinist linguists like Ya Marr (and also Stalin himself)
claimed.It's > also AGAINST what Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan say
today (they believe that > language is the base and not the
superstructure of society). >>> Of course, if we say that language
is part of the ideological > superstructure and not part of the
productive base of socioculturalprogress > (that is, cultural
historical change), this does not mean that it is > insignificant.
But it DOES mean that it is not causative, at least with respect> to
cultural history. Language does not by itself bring about a
transformation in > the relations of production. On the
semiohistorical timescale of cultural > history, language cannot
create or destroy state power; it is a result and not a > reason, a
consequence and not a cause. Of course, as we know, results can
become >
reasons, and consequences can become causes. But when that happens,
there is a> qualitative change in the very domain, the timescale, of
history. >>> But late Vygotsky, Vygotsky III, knows that ontogenesis
isspecial, > distinguishable, distinct from cultural history. It's
distinctprecisely > because in ontogenesis (but not in cultural
history) language IS a reason and > not just a result, word meaning
IS a cause and not just a consequence. In fact,> verbal thinking and
imagination (and of course play) are precisely the result of> the
INABILITY of object oriented human activity to provide for the
child's> wants, needs, and desires. Here, actually, there IS a
parallel with cultural > history, for throughout sociocultural
change, man has created literature and art > precisely as a result
of the INABILITY of human labour to provide fromman's > wants,
needs, and desires for a harmonious society without the exploitation
of > man by man. But of course in
sociocultural history, play is late emerging and in> ontogenesis
it's quite early, because the first shall always be last and the>
last shall be first. >>> I also agree with Zinchenko's point on two
paradigms: theparadigm > of mediated action at the core of activity
theory is NOT the paradigm of word > meaning at the core of a
cultural historical psychology. I think that Mike and > other
founders of CHAT founded it as a loose federation between two rather
> incompatible Vygotskies, the Vygotsky of mediated action and the
Vygotsky of wod > meaning, with the assumption that a common
tradition and a set of common > practices would hold it together.
That assumption has proved quite justified. > In China, we say that
a good marriage is the same bed and differentdreams. > Otherwise,
what do you talk about over breakfast? David Kellogg >>> Seoul
National University of Education >>>
_______________________________________________ >>> xmca mailing
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xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>>
>>
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> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype >
andy.blunden>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden: >> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
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