Re: [xmca] Passages from Chapter 5 of LSV

["Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

You have identified the problem, Andy. Not the solution to how to think
relationally with respect to these issues. Please solve the problem!

I believe that LSV was just not old enough, at the age of 34, to appreciate
the value of his own insights about development and to extend them into
"old age." Development is not, in his own system, unidirectional. Old age
itself is a relative concept. The average life expectancy of Americans in
1900 was about 30-35. It has been declining in Russia for a long time
(unimpeded by the "progress" since 1991). As a (relatively) old person, I
believe development to be a life long process (life itself, of course, being
a relative notion which my mind is too limited to encompass)
mike

On Sun, Jan 4, 2009 at 7:02 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> I believe that Vygotsky believed that the "development" which takes place
> up from birth to around the age of 17 is specific to "childhood" and
> constitutes "ontogenesis," whereas the change and growth which takes place
> during adulthood is "something else." (He also excludes gestation in the
> womb from the subject matter of child development.) I am quite unfamiliar
> with debates around that problematic claim, but I do recall reading
> something to this effect in Vygotsky.
>
> Other than that, the concept of "situation" and "social situation" are
> surely universal.
>
> Andy
>
>
> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>
>> A question on social situation of development (SSD):  how, why, in what
>> ways, is this concept particular to children?  What prevents it from being
>> equally applicable to adults?
>>
>> - Steve
>>
>>
>> On Jan 4, 2009, at 6:01 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>
>>  Mike, I think "situation" is a relational term. At one point in the
>>> Volume 5 text, LSV goes to some length to oppose the idea that "social
>>> situation of development" is the sum of attributes of the social environment
>>> (family wealth, number of children etc) because SSD is a concept of the
>>> child's situation. This means, as I see it, that we have to make a concept
>>> of the relation of the child to their social surroundings. This is aptly
>>> summarised in the notion of the child's *status*. So for example, without
>>> any change in the attributes of the social context, the child can be
>>> expected to operate differently, i.e., act out a different status,
>>> corresponding to different expectations. Clearly this means that the "social
>>> situation of development" exists as much in the child as in the surrounding
>>> people.
>>>
>>> Also, the individual psyche cannot be a "unit of analysis" for anyone in
>>> our tradition. It can be a datum or unit of observation, but not a unit of
>>> analysis, as I see it.
>>>
>>> Andy
>>>
>>> Mike Cole wrote:
>>>
>>>> I find myself, not for the first time, way behind the discussion.
>>>> I pick up only one thread. David wrote, late last year,  :--)),
>>>> For some problems (which we can call, somewhat misleadingly,
>>>> psychological
>>>> problems), LSV III's unit of analysis is consciousness and his
>>>> explanatory
>>>> principle is the social situation of proximal development (the
>>>> classroom,
>>>> the playground, etc.), which is in turn composed of two mutually
>>>> defining
>>>> elements: imitation and generalization.
>>>> David, Andy, and I have been working, without any notable success, on
>>>> a paper on LSV, Gestalt Psychology, and ...... the social situation of
>>>> development (among other imbricated concepts). Part of the reason for
>>>> our difficulty in finishing this project is my inability to understand
>>>> the
>>>> meaning(s) of the "social situation of development."
>>>> I am personally very inclined toward david's (classroom, playground,
>>>> etc.)
>>>> way of indexing the referent(s) of this concept. But in our discussions,
>>>> and
>>>> our readings of others (Seth Chaiklin was a key initiator of this
>>>> effort), I
>>>> lost my  way. Sometimes it seems as if the SSD refers to the child and
>>>> every
>>>> "situation" s/he participates in, and, indirectly of course, the
>>>> exosystem
>>>> (there is some good data on how that exosystem influences more proximal
>>>> environments of
>>>> development, to use another slippery word). In particular, I got lost in
>>>> trying to figure out the relation between neoformations and the
>>>> circumstances (another slippery word) that provided the gestalt (another
>>>> slippery word!!) for development.
>>>> Leontiev gives the example of a child going to school who, by virtue of
>>>> his
>>>> (sic?) new social status now participates in a different home "situation
>>>> of
>>>> development" when his parents excuse him from other chores because how
>>>> he must spend time studying at school.
>>>> Help!! I am trying to drag Boris Gurievitch into this discussion, but he
>>>> is
>>>> shy
>>>> about his English.
>>>> mike
>>>> PS-- I am very sympathetic to both the palimpset notion of word meaning,
>>>> David, and the idea that different lines of development intersect. My
>>>> own
>>>> attempts to express that idea (very inadequately!) are in *Cultural
>>>> Psychology*, where I try to make it clear that this idea was shared by
>>>> such
>>>> diverse scholars
>>>> as Birdwhistle (kinesheologist -sp?), barker (ecological psychologist)
>>>> and
>>>> William James (whose statement of the idea i did not include because my
>>>> source for it was untrackable, unlike the Summerian "classroom" that
>>>> Peter
>>>> has kindly tracked down to its uncertain provenance).
>>>> A belated happy new year and wishes for a less violent 2009.
>>>> mike
>>>> But as Bronfenbrenner points out, some of the most important problems
>>>> the
>>>> child experiences are in the "exo-system", a set of relationships (e.g.
>>>> parental employment) in which the child has no actual role and cannot
>>>> take
>>>> part. Where does that fit?
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>> --- On Wed, 12/31/08, Paul Dillon <phd_crit_think@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>> From: Paul Dillon <phd_crit_think@yahoo.com>
>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Passages from Chapter 5 of LSV
>>>> To: packer@duq.edu, "xmc a xmx" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>> Date: Wednesday, December 31, 2008, 12:51 AM
>>>> - Show quoted text -
>>>> Martin,
>>>> I'm really struck by your question as to whether David finds your
>>>> counter-proposal (i.e., LSV developing (e.g., cultivating, growing) his
>>>> ideas
>>>> dialectically (e.g., seed, sprout, vegetative, florescent))  reasonable,
>>>> (I
>>>> am
>>>> supposing)  in contrast to David's interrpretation that " ...he was
>>>> constantly throwing everything away and starting over from the
>>>> beginning.
>>>> ".
>>>> Insofar as every question presupposes a range of answers (a domain),
>>>> what
>>>> is
>>>> the domain over which you expect a response?
>>>> Do you imagine a willow might become an oak upon reflection?  Are you
>>>> casting flies?
>>>> I'm curious.
>>>> Paul
>>>> --- On Tue, 12/30/08, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Passages from Chapter 5 of LSV
>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>> Date: Tuesday, December 30, 2008, 1:24 PM
>>>> David,
>>>> For a while - at least ever since reading Norris Minick's Introduction
>>>> (which is insightful in many ways) - I've been thinking that Vygotsky
>>>> didn't
>>>> so much change his mind as develop in his thinking dialectically. I know
>>>> that's in danger of sounding cliched, but I think I have found places in
>>>> his
>>>> texts where his earlier concepts are not simply abandoned or erased, but
>>>> truly aufgehoben (it's that grammatically correct) - maintained and
>>>> replaced
>>>> at the same time.
>>>> I haven't had the time to pursue this point systematically, and right
>>>> now I
>>>> can't even offer an example (though if I were try to find one it would
>>>> one
>>>> where reflexes show up again in his late writings). But does the
>>>> suggestion
>>>> strike you as resonable?
>>>> Martin
>>>> On 12/30/08 12:14 PM, "David Kellogg"
>>>> <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Second the motion! I think that one of the reasons why LSV is SO
>>>>> impatient
>>>>> with Stern (and also Werner) is that he really can't understand
>>>>>
>>>> thinkers who
>>>>
>>>>> never change their minds. LSV had only ten years to work (and thought
>>>>> he
>>>>>
>>>> had
>>>>
>>>>> less). Yet he was constantly throwing everything away and starting over
>>>>>
>>>> from
>>>>
>>>>> the beginning. That's courage.
>>>>>
>>>>> But of course that means that almost everything we read of Vygotsky's
>>>>>
>>>> has to
>>>>
>>>>> be read dendrochronologically, the way we look at tree rings. This is
>>>>> particularly true of Thinking and Speech, parts of which data from 1929
>>>>> (Chapter Four) and parts from 1931 (Chapter Five) and parts from his
>>>>>
>>>> deathbed
>>>>
>>>>> (Chapter Six and Seven).
>>>>>
>>>>> LSV is always going on about geological strata (Kretschmer). But
>>>>> perhaps
>>>>> the best metaphor for reading somebody who scribbles over everything
>>>>>
>>>> he's ever
>>>>
>>>>> done every three or four years would be archaeological, or better yet,
>>>>> textological: a palimpsest.
>>>>>
>>>>> So far the most useful guide to the Vygotskyan palimpsest I've read on
>>>>>
>>>> this to
>>>>
>>>>> date is Minick's intro to Thinking and Speech, now reprinted as the
>>>>>
>>>> very first
>>>>
>>>>> chapter in Daniels' mistitled "Introduction (sic) to
>>>>>
>>>> Vygotsky", 2005,
>>>>
>>>>> Routledge.
>>>>>
>>>>> Minick's palimpsestization (?) corresponds very well to most other
>>>>> periodizations, including Veresov (though Veresov adds a pre-Marxist
>>>>>
>>>> Vygotsky
>>>>
>>>>> from before 1924 which for rather tendentious reasons he finds very
>>>>> important). It will be VERY interesting to see if the work Jonna
>>>>> mentions
>>>>> confirms it.
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>
>>>>> --- On Tue, 12/30/08, Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Passages from Chapter 5 of LSV
>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>>>>
>>>> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>
>>>>> Cc: "Jussi Silvonen" <jussi.silvonen@joensuu.fi>
>>>>> Date: Tuesday, December 30, 2008, 8:58 AM
>>>>>
>>>>> We would welcome Jussi's input, thanks Jonna. We almost have a
>>>>>
>>>> "history
>>>>
>>>>> of
>>>>> psych" group here on
>>>>> xmca at presentl. Perhaps a strength we should find a way to use
>>>>> better.
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>>  a
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Mike Cole kirjoitti 29.12.2008 kello 2.55:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ooops, forgot to cc boris on my reply to david. He is author of,
>>>>>>
>>>>> among
>>>>
>>>>> other
>>>>>>> interesting articles, the article on "LSV's
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> terminology"
>>>>
>>>>> in the Daniels et
>>>>>
>>>>>> al
>>>>>>> Cambridge companion to vygotsky.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I forwarded the message to him.
>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 28, 2008 at 4:52 PM, Mike Cole
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks for these observations and inferences, David.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The task of reconstructing the chronology of LSV's
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thinking is
>>>>
>>>>> a
>>>>>
>>>>>> formidable
>>>>>>>> one. I wonder if anyone anywhere has published such a
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> chronology.
>>>>
>>>>> I will
>>>>>
>>>>>> cc boris meshcheryakov who will know, if anybody does.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 10:42 PM, David Kellogg <
>>>>>>>> vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  On p. 131 of Chapter Five, LSV already has the concept of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>
>>>>> psychological system, that is, the linkage of disparate
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> functions into a
>>>>>
>>>>>> single Gestalt, e.g. attention, association, judgement,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> representation,
>>>>>
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> motivation in activity.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But he denies that this linkage of disparate functions has
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> any
>>>>
>>>>> effect on
>>>>>
>>>>>> the functions themselves. The relations between functions
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> change. But
>>>>>
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> functions themselves do not change.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Now, what causes the relationships between these functions
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>
>>>>> change?
>>>>>
>>>>>> That
>>>>>>>>> is not clear. One possible answer is "activity",
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>
>>>>> that is the answer
>>>>>
>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> activity theorists give. But we can see that LSV is not
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> entirely
>>>>>
>>>>>> satisfied
>>>>>>>>> with this answer.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There are two problems. The first is that as Mike pointed
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> out
>>>>
>>>>> LSV is
>>>>>
>>>>>> using
>>>>>>>>> "activity" in a non-technical sense, it is
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> really
>>>>
>>>>> just the task plus the
>>>>>
>>>>>> contraints. (Note that Prout actually translates
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "task" as "problem").
>>>>>
>>>>>> In
>>>>>>>>> other words, an "activity" is just a subject, an
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> object, and a tool.
>>>>>
>>>>>> That
>>>>>>>>> brings us back to the old stimulus-response unit with
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> mediating
>>>>>
>>>>>> artefact!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The second is that Vygotsky suspects that when the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> relations
>>>>
>>>>> between
>>>>>
>>>>>> functions change, the functions DO change internally as
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> well.
>>>>
>>>>> We know,
>>>>>
>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>> example, that when role play is reconstrued as rule based
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> games, the
>>>>>
>>>>>> "roles"
>>>>>>>>> of rule based games are quite different, more abstract. So
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>
>>>>> the goal,
>>>>>
>>>>>> which is not to make an imaginary situation but to win a
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> real
>>>>
>>>>> prize.
>>>>>
>>>>>> So why does Vygotsky stress in this passage that the basic
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> processes of
>>>>>
>>>>>> attention, association, judgment, representation, and
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> mindset
>>>>
>>>>> do not
>>>>>
>>>>>> actually change? I think there are two reasons.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> First of all, he is trying to critically appropriate the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> work
>>>>
>>>>> of people
>>>>>
>>>>>> like Buhler who deny that there is anything fundamentally
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> new
>>>>
>>>>> in the
>>>>>
>>>>>> transitional age. His way of doing this is to say that
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> they
>>>>
>>>>> are correct,
>>>>>
>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>> they are ignoring the way in which the familiar old
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> functions
>>>>
>>>>> are united
>>>>>
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> a new Gestalt.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Secondly, this is old work, first carried out in 1929 and
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> written up
>>>>>
>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>> time in 1931. LSV has not yet conceptualized the actual
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> mechanism by
>>>>>
>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>>> differentiation takes place WITHIN functions and not just
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> BETWEEN them.
>>>>>
>>>>>> That
>>>>>>>>> does not happen until 1932, when he formulates the zone of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> proximal
>>>>>
>>>>>> development, and he does not write about it until Chapter
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Six.
>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>
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>>>> Reply
>>>> Reply to all
>>>> Forward
>>>> On Thu, Jan 1, 2009 at 3:40 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
>>>> >wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Thanks, Martin. Actually, I need some help with PRECISELY this point
>>>>> right
>>>>> now.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm writing an article on "word meaning as palimpsest". I want to use
>>>>> the
>>>>> seventy-fifth anniversary of Thinking and Speech as a kind of platform
>>>>> from
>>>>> which to attack mainstream applied linguistics, for whom language
>>>>> exists as
>>>>> a hypostatized formal system and has always done, well, at least since
>>>>> Saussure.
>>>>>
>>>>> The mainstreamers like to say that we wild-eyed Vygotskyans are very
>>>>> nice
>>>>> people and do interesting work but the problem is that we've got no
>>>>> theory
>>>>> of language as a formal system (so says Mitchell and Myles, 1998: 161)
>>>>> and
>>>>> we can't make the kinds of neat predictions about the rate of learning
>>>>> and
>>>>> the route which learning takes which they can't make either (ditto, p.
>>>>> 162).
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course the answer (my answer, anyway) is that language is NOT a
>>>>> formal
>>>>> system and can't be theorized that way, and that the "rate of learning"
>>>>> and
>>>>> the "route which learning takes" doesn't tell us what we want to know,
>>>>> but
>>>>> the rate of DEVELOPMENT and the route that takes just might.
>>>>>
>>>>> And part of the argument goes like this. We Vygotskyans are really not
>>>>> socioculturalists. We're not even cultural-historicists. We're
>>>>> just phylo-socio-onto-microgeneticists. For that matter, we're not
>>>>> really
>>>>> Vygotskyans. We're Darwinian-Marxian-Vygotskyan-Integrationists.
>>>>>
>>>>> One of the reasons why Vygotsky didn't like to go around shouting about
>>>>> Marxian psychology was that if we start appending names to what we
>>>>> think on
>>>>> every scale of semio-history at which we think about it then our
>>>>> discipline
>>>>> will end up with more principal investigators than an astrophysics
>>>>> paper.
>>>>>
>>>>> Another reason is (I think) Vygotsky really rejected supra-theories,
>>>>> and
>>>>> for good reason. If you look at Mescheryakov's wonderful little chart
>>>>> in the
>>>>> Cambridge Companion, he gives us four "genetic laws", which he renders
>>>>> something like this, where "^" means something like "is differentiated
>>>>> into"
>>>>> and "-->" means something like "is reorganized into".
>>>>>
>>>>> NATURAL-->CULTURAL
>>>>>                      ^
>>>>>                 SOCIAL-->INDIVIDUAL
>>>>>                                       ^
>>>>>                                      EXTRAMENTAL-->INTRAMENTAL
>>>>>
>>>>> ^
>>>>>
>>>>> SPONTANEOUS-->SCIENTIFIC
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course, it's very tempting to see this as a neat little palimpsest
>>>>> of
>>>>> human culture: the first law, in which natural functions are
>>>>> reorganized
>>>>> into cultural ones, represents phylogeny, the second represents
>>>>> cultural
>>>>> historical progress, the third ontogenesis, and the fourth represents
>>>>> microgenesis.
>>>>>
>>>>> But the more I think about this, the fishier it looks. A natural "law"
>>>>> has
>>>>> no exceptions whatsoever. A socio-cultural law has infractions that are
>>>>> legally sanctionable, during ontogenesis, we learn laws (which we
>>>>> really
>>>>> need to start calling rules at this point) precisely by flouting them,
>>>>> and
>>>>> at the level of microgenesis, we hardly even know the rules are there
>>>>> unless
>>>>> we break them. Is there any non-metaphorical sense in which ALL of
>>>>> these
>>>>> semio-historical timescales can be said to be "lawful" or
>>>>> "rule-governed" or
>>>>> even "patterned"?
>>>>>
>>>>> Sure enough, when we read Vygotsky (p. 114 of Chapter Four) he's a lot
>>>>> more
>>>>> modest. The four laws are all there, but only in the context of
>>>>> ontogenesis.
>>>>> Here's the Hanfmann and Vakar version:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "Our investigations show that speech development follows the same
>>>>> course
>>>>> and obeys the same laws as the development of all the other mental
>>>>> operations involving the use of signs, such as counting or mnemonic
>>>>> memorizing. We found that these operations generally develop in four
>>>>> stages.
>>>>> The first is the primitive or natural stage, corresponding to
>>>>> preintellectual speech and preverbal thought, when these operations
>>>>> appear
>>>>> in their original form, as they were evolved at the primitive level of
>>>>> behavior."
>>>>>
>>>>> "Next comes the stage which we might call "naive psychology", by
>>>>> analogy
>>>>> with what is called "naive physics" – the child's experience with the
>>>>> physical properties of his own body and of the objects around him, and
>>>>> the
>>>>> application of this experience to the use of tools: the first exercise
>>>>> of
>>>>> the child's budding practical intelligence."
>>>>>
>>>>> "This phase is very clearly defined in the speech development of the
>>>>> child.
>>>>> It is manifested by the correct use of grammatical forms and structures
>>>>> before the child has understood the logical operations for which they
>>>>> stand.
>>>>> The child may operate with subordinate clauses, with words like
>>>>> because, if,
>>>>> when, and but, long before he really grasps causal, conditional, or
>>>>> temporal
>>>>> relations. He masters syntax of speech before syntax of thought.
>>>>> Piaget's studies proved that grammar develops before logic and that the
>>>>> child learns relatively late the mental operations corresponding to the
>>>>> verbal forms he has been using for a long time."
>>>>>
>>>>> "With the gradual accumulation of naive psychological experience, the
>>>>> child
>>>>> enters a third stage, distinguished by external signs, external
>>>>> operations
>>>>> that are used as aids in the solution of internal problems. That is the
>>>>> stage when the child counts on his fingers, resorts to mnemonic aids,
>>>>> and so
>>>>> on. In speech development it is characterized by egocentric speech."
>>>>>
>>>>> "The fourth stage we call the "ingrowth" stage. The external operation
>>>>> turns inward and undergoes a profound change in the process. The child
>>>>> begins to count in his head, to use "logical memory," that is, to
>>>>> operate
>>>>> with inherent relationships and inner signs. In speech development this
>>>>> is
>>>>> the final stage of inner, soundless speech. There remains a constant
>>>>> interaction between outer and inner operations, one form effortlessly
>>>>> and
>>>>> frequently changing into the other and back again. Inner speech may
>>>>> come
>>>>> very close in form to external speech or even become exactly like it
>>>>> when it
>>>>> serves as preparation for external speech – for instance, in thinking
>>>>> over a
>>>>> lecture to be given. There is no sharp division between inner and
>>>>> external
>>>>> behavior, and each influences the other."
>>>>>
>>>>> Sure, we can see that the first "stage" is a kind of residue laid down
>>>>> by
>>>>> phylogenetic evolution, just as the second one is an archaeological
>>>>> remnant
>>>>> of sociocultural progress, and the third represents the remains of the
>>>>> ontogenetic mastery of tools and signs and self.
>>>>>
>>>>> But we can also see that to the extent that we can really talk about
>>>>> "laws", we cannot talk about microgenesis, and to the extent we want to
>>>>> talk
>>>>> about "rules" we cannot talk about phylogenesis.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think it's even stretching it to call microgenesis rule-bound;
>>>>> "norms" is
>>>>> probably more suitable, and even then what we are really interested in
>>>>> is
>>>>> precisely the nonnormative. It's not just that at each stage some
>>>>> things
>>>>> recede into the background and others get foregrounded. It's that the
>>>>> scale
>>>>> of development itself has to develop.
>>>>>
>>>>> On some level, phylogenesis, cultural-historical progress, ontogenesis,
>>>>> and
>>>>> microgenesis are all one thing--namely time and the changes wrought
>>>>> thereby.
>>>>> But the changes and above all the means by which they are wrought are
>>>>> qualitatively different.
>>>>>
>>>>> The laws of phylogenesis are really not useful in describing the norms
>>>>> of
>>>>> microgenesis; the connection is of such generality that referring to it
>>>>> as a
>>>>> system of laws really has to be a violation of Marx's eleventh thesis
>>>>> on
>>>>> Feuerbach.
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --- On Thu, 1/1/09, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Passages from Chapter 5 of LSV
>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> Date: Thursday, January 1, 2009, 12:22 PM
>>>>>
>>>>> It's another occasion when access to the Russian original for
>>>>> "discarded"
>>>>> would be helpful. After all, Vygotsky wrote of sublation as both
>>>>> destruction
>>>>> and preservation. My sense when reading Minnick was that when he wrote
>>>>> of
>>>>> Vygotsky trying out and rejecting a series of candidates for unit of
>>>>> analysis, one might instead see Vygotsky as exploring a complex
>>>>> totality,
>>>>> bringing first one aspect and then another to the fore. He wrote that
>>>>> "When
>>>>> the word sublation is used in relation to some organic feature, this
>>>>> does
>>>>> not mean that this feature is eliminated. Instead, the feature is
>>>>> sublated
>>>>> and preserved, embedded somewhere within; it recedes into the
>>>>> background,
>>>>> yielding to those regular features which arose at later stages.² This
>>>>> seems
>>>>> to me true *in* V's account of development (where reflexes are not
>>>>> eliminated but embedded) and *of* V's account of development, where a
>>>>> unit
>>>>> of analysis isn't abandoned but moves into the background as another
>>>>> moves
>>>>> to the foreground.
>>>>>
>>>>> Martin
>>>>>
>>>>> On 12/31/08 10:52 AM, "David Kellogg"
>>>>> <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>  Oh, I don't think that an oak is a sublated willow. And I do think
>>>>>>
>>>>> that LSV
>>>>>
>>>>>> II, the Vygotsky of the psychological system and the criss-crossing
>>>>>> lines
>>>>>>
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>> development, is a sublation of LSV I, the Vygotsky of the instrumental
>>>>>>
>>>>> act.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Vygotsky himself says this, though, and the end of the beginning of
>>>>>>
>>>>> Thinking
>>>>>
>>>>>> and Speech:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "This book is the product of nearly ten years work. Many of the
>>>>>>
>>>>> questions that
>>>>>
>>>>>> emerged in the investigation were not apparent to us when we began.
>>>>>>
>>>>> We were
>>>>>
>>>>>> frequently forced to reconsider our positions during the
>>>>>> investigation.
>>>>>> Consequently, the results of a great deal of hard work had to be
>>>>>>
>>>>> discarded.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Much of the remainder had to be redone, restructured, or
>>>>>>
>>>>> rewritten." (p. 40).
>>>>>
>>>>>> I take it this is Vygotsky's last word, both because of the phrase
>>>>>>
>>>>> "ten years
>>>>>
>>>>>> work", which covers Vygotsky's entire career in psychology and
>>>>>>
>>>>> because it's
>>>>>
>>>>>> the preface to his posthumously published work (which originally did
>>>>>> not
>>>>>>
>>>>> even
>>>>>
>>>>>> have a Chapter One; internal evidence suggests that in the first draft
>>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>> Piaget chapter was the first one).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So it's LSV III speaking to us from his deathbed, inviting us to
>>>>>>
>>>>> consider
>>>>>
>>>>>> carefully what exactly was discarded, what was redone, and what was
>>>>>>
>>>>> gained
>>>>>
>>>>>> thereby.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And here we are, seventy-five years later, doing exactly that. For
>>>>>>
>>>>> example, a
>>>>>
>>>>>> lot of our discussions seem to revolve around the question of whether
>>>>>> (as
>>>>>> neo-Vygotskyans believe) the fixation on object-oriented activity is
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>
>>>>> work
>>>>>
>>>>>> of a mature, continuing LSVIII or whether it was simply a discarded
>>>>>> part
>>>>>>
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>> LSV I (as I believe).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My problems with Chapter Five (discussed in this thread) are similar.
>>>>>>
>>>>> They
>>>>>
>>>>>> have to do with whether lines of development themselves become
>>>>>>
>>>>> functionally
>>>>>
>>>>>> differentiated. LSV II says no, but LSV III (as I read him) says yes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Finally, one of the most enduring threads of xmca has to be the zone
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> proximal development. It seems to me that this was the way in which
>>>>>> LSV
>>>>>>
>>>>> III
>>>>>
>>>>>> sublated the problems with LSV II: the idea of the psychological
>>>>>> system
>>>>>>
>>>>> was
>>>>>
>>>>>> reformulated to include a social situation of development, but this
>>>>>> meant
>>>>>> discarded the idea that lines of development do not functionally
>>>>>> differentiate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For some problems (which we can call, somewhat misleadingly,
>>>>>>
>>>>> psychological
>>>>>
>>>>>> problems), LSV III's unit of analysis is consciousness and his
>>>>>>
>>>>> explanatory
>>>>>
>>>>>> principle is the social situation of proximal development (the
>>>>>> classroom,
>>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>> playground, etc.), which is in turn composed of two mutually defining
>>>>>> elements: imitation and generalization.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But as Bronfenbrenner points out, some of the most important problems
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> child experiences are in the "exo-system", a set of
>>>>>>
>>>>> relationships (e.g.
>>>>>
>>>>>> parental employment) in which the child has no actual role and cannot
>>>>>>
>>>>> take
>>>>>
>>>>>> part. Where does that fit?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --- On Wed, 12/31/08, Paul Dillon <phd_crit_think@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Paul Dillon <phd_crit_think@yahoo.com>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Passages from Chapter 5 of LSV
>>>>>> To: packer@duq.edu, "xmc a xmx" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> Date: Wednesday, December 31, 2008, 12:51 AM
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Martin,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm really struck by your question as to whether David finds your
>>>>>> counter-proposal (i.e., LSV developing (e.g., cultivating, growing)
>>>>>> his
>>>>>>
>>>>> ideas
>>>>>
>>>>>> dialectically (e.g., seed, sprout, vegetative, florescent))
>>>>>>  reasonable,
>>>>>>
>>>>> (I am
>>>>>
>>>>>> supposing)  in contrast to David's interrpretation that " ...he
>>>>>>
>>>>> was
>>>>>
>>>>>> constantly throwing everything away and starting over from the
>>>>>> beginning.
>>>>>> ".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Insofar as every question presupposes a range of answers (a domain),
>>>>>>
>>>>> what is
>>>>>
>>>>>> the domain over which you expect a response?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Do you imagine a willow might become an oak upon reflection?  Are you
>>>>>> casting flies?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm curious.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Paul
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --- On Tue, 12/30/08, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>>>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Passages from Chapter 5 of LSV
>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>>>>>
>>>>> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Date: Tuesday, December 30, 2008, 1:24 PM
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For a while - at least ever since reading Norris Minick's Introduction
>>>>>> (which is insightful in many ways) - I've been thinking that Vygotsky
>>>>>> didn't
>>>>>> so much change his mind as develop in his thinking dialectically. I
>>>>>> know
>>>>>> that's in danger of sounding cliched, but I think I have found places
>>>>>>
>>>>> in
>>>>>
>>>>>> his
>>>>>> texts where his earlier concepts are not simply abandoned or erased,
>>>>>> but
>>>>>> truly aufgehoben (it's that grammatically correct) - maintained and
>>>>>> replaced
>>>>>> at the same time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I haven't had the time to pursue this point systematically, and right
>>>>>>
>>>>> now I
>>>>>
>>>>>> can't even offer an example (though if I were try to find one it would
>>>>>>
>>>>> one
>>>>>
>>>>>> where reflexes show up again in his late writings). But does the
>>>>>>
>>>>> suggestion
>>>>>
>>>>>> strike you as resonable?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 12/30/08 12:14 PM, "David Kellogg"
>>>>>> <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Second the motion! I think that one of the reasons why LSV is SO
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> impatient
>>>>>
>>>>>> with Stern (and also Werner) is that he really can't understand
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> thinkers who
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> never change their minds. LSV had only ten years to work (and thought
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> he
>>>>>
>>>>>> had
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> less). Yet he was constantly throwing everything away and starting
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> over
>>>>>
>>>>>> from
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the beginning. That's courage.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But of course that means that almost everything we read of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Vygotsky's
>>>>>
>>>>>> has to
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> be read dendrochronologically, the way we look at tree rings. This is
>>>>>>> particularly true of Thinking and Speech, parts of which data from
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1929
>>>>>
>>>>>> (Chapter Four) and parts from 1931 (Chapter Five) and parts from his
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> deathbed
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (Chapter Six and Seven).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> LSV is always going on about geological strata (Kretschmer). But
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> perhaps
>>>>>
>>>>>> the best metaphor for reading somebody who scribbles over everything
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> he's ever
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> done every three or four years would be archaeological, or better
>>>>>>> yet,
>>>>>>> textological: a palimpsest.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So far the most useful guide to the Vygotskyan palimpsest I've
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> read on
>>>>>
>>>>>> this to
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> date is Minick's intro to Thinking and Speech, now reprinted as
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>> very first
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> chapter in Daniels' mistitled "Introduction (sic) to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Vygotsky", 2005,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Routledge.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Minick's palimpsestization (?) corresponds very well to most
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> other
>>>>>
>>>>>> periodizations, including Veresov (though Veresov adds a pre-Marxist
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Vygotsky
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> from before 1924 which for rather tendentious reasons he finds very
>>>>>>> important). It will be VERY interesting to see if the work Jonna
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> mentions
>>>>>
>>>>>> confirms it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --- On Tue, 12/30/08, Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Passages from Chapter 5 of LSV
>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Cc: "Jussi Silvonen" <jussi.silvonen@joensuu.fi>
>>>>>>> Date: Tuesday, December 30, 2008, 8:58 AM
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We would welcome Jussi's input, thanks Jonna. We almost have a
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> "history
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> psych" group here on
>>>>>>> xmca at presentl. Perhaps a strength we should find a way to use
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> better.
>>>>>
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  a
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Mike Cole kirjoitti 29.12.2008 kello 2.55:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ooops, forgot to cc boris on my reply to david. He is author of,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> among
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>>> interesting articles, the article on "LSV's
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> terminology"
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> in the Daniels et
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> al
>>>>>>>>> Cambridge companion to vygotsky.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I forwarded the message to him.
>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 28, 2008 at 4:52 PM, Mike Cole
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thanks for these observations and inferences, David.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The task of reconstructing the chronology of LSV's
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> thinking is
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> formidable
>>>>>>>>>> one. I wonder if anyone anywhere has published such a
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> chronology.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I will
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> cc boris meshcheryakov who will know, if anybody does.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 10:42 PM, David Kellogg <
>>>>>>>>>> vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>  On p. 131 of Chapter Five, LSV already has the concept
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> psychological system, that is, the linkage of
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> disparate
>>>>>
>>>>>> functions into a
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> single Gestalt, e.g. attention, association,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> judgement,
>>>>>
>>>>>> representation,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> motivation in activity.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> But he denies that this linkage of disparate functions
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>
>>>>>> any
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> effect on
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the functions themselves. The relations between
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> functions
>>>>>
>>>>>> change. But
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> functions themselves do not change.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Now, what causes the relationships between these
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> functions
>>>>>
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> change?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That
>>>>>>>>>>> is not clear. One possible answer is
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "activity",
>>>>>
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> that is the answer
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> activity theorists give. But we can see that LSV is
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>
>>>>>> entirely
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> satisfied
>>>>>>>>>>> with this answer.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> There are two problems. The first is that as Mike
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> pointed
>>>>>
>>>>>> out
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> LSV is
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> using
>>>>>>>>>>> "activity" in a non-technical sense, it is
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> just the task plus the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> contraints. (Note that Prout actually translates
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "task" as "problem").
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In
>>>>>>>>>>> other words, an "activity" is just a
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> subject, an
>>>>>
>>>>>> object, and a tool.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That
>>>>>>>>>>> brings us back to the old stimulus-response unit with
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> mediating
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> artefact!
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The second is that Vygotsky suspects that when the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> relations
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> between
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> functions change, the functions DO change internally
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>
>>>>>> well.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We know,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>> example, that when role play is reconstrued as rule
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> based
>>>>>
>>>>>> games, the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "roles"
>>>>>>>>>>> of rule based games are quite different, more
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> abstract. So
>>>>>
>>>>>> is
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the goal,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> which is not to make an imaginary situation but to win
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>
>>>>>> real
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> prize.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So why does Vygotsky stress in this passage that the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> basic
>>>>>
>>>>>> processes of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> attention, association, judgment, representation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> mindset
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> do not
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> actually change? I think there are two reasons.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> First of all, he is trying to critically appropriate
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>> work
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of people
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> like Buhler who deny that there is anything
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> fundamentally
>>>>>
>>>>>> new
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> in the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> transitional age. His way of doing this is to say that
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> are correct,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>> they are ignoring the way in which the familiar old
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> functions
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> are united
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>> a new Gestalt.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Secondly, this is old work, first carried out in 1929
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>>> written up
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>> time in 1931. LSV has not yet conceptualized the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> actual
>>>>>
>>>>>> mechanism by
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>>>>> differentiation takes place WITHIN functions and not
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> just
>>>>>
>>>>>> BETWEEN them.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That
>>>>>>>>>>> does not happen until 1932, when he formulates the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> zone of
>>>>>
>>>>>> proximal
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> development, and he does not write about it until
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Chapter
>>>>>
>>>>>> Six.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>  _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>
>>>>>  _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>
>>> --
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
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>>
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>>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
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