RE: [xmca] Activity theory and qualitative research

Dear Mary,

This is a question that entertains me for some time as well. I approach it methodologically in the following way. CHAT is created within the environment of a particular paradigm. The question is: Is that paradigm compatible with the humanistic/qualitative paradigm you intend to use? My answer is: Probably not, although I am open to lean how this might become possible. I personally have interest in combining these options. I have conducted a study with such hybrid methodology, with the awareness about the compromises I make.

CHAT is a product of a modernist paradigm; most humanistic paradigms are pre-modernist/post-modernist. It will be very difficult to translate terminology and ideas between these different types of paradigms. CHAT is heavily reliant on deductive thinking. Qualitative research methods work just the other way. I see a contradiction here. The strength and contributions of CHAT is in the frameworks that it provides. These frameworks provide direction, save time, guarantee outcomes. However, the directions also work like filters and constrain research outcomes.

If we expand the notion of activity theory or activity methodology beyond CHAT, we might get different answers. The issue here is to what degree do CHAT and activity studies overlap or differentiate. Then we can have many different answers. I personally am looking for activity studies beyond CHAT, in order to explore other options as well.

Saying all this, I have to acknowledge that some strains of activity theory like activity methodology of the Moscow activity circle offer very powerful instruments for problem solving. They offer general activity frameworks that help shorten research and problem solving time and have a successful result. I am not sure what we lose in these cases. Probably something important, but if we don't see it, then we are satisfied. I am still planning to use activity methodologies. I simply keep them separate from qualitative methodologies, in separate projects. Even in such cases, I experience the pain of alternating different ways of thinking and the need to deal with very different concepts and to find ways to compare them.

Best,

Lubomir

Lubomir Popov, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
School of Family and Consumer Sciences
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403-0059
phone: (419) 372-7935
lspopov@bgsu.edu





-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Mary van der Riet
Sent: Friday, November 21, 2008 3:03 AM
To: arturo.escandon@gmail.com; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] Activity theory and qualitative research

Dear Arturo
I think that a ‘meta-scientific perspective is just what I am looking
for!

‘object’

You ask “does the qualitative research paradigm make a distinction
between ready-made concepts and the enaction of those in particular
"contexts" (activity systems)? Does it see the (potential, eventual)
contradiction between a fossilised language, product of kind of obsolete
social relations, and the enaction of the needs, or, as Leontiev puts
it, the orientation of activity towards an object?”

I’m not an expert on social constructionism, but my understanding is
that examines language ‘in use’ – it even sees language as ‘activity’,
and thus it would probably not see language as ‘fossilised’ in any way.
But I agree with you that it does not conceptualise the notion of
‘activity towards an object’. And I agree that the concept of ‘object’
is not theorised within social constructionism (and probably not in any
of the other qualitative research approaches) But in analysing the use
of language as social constructionists do (for example in ‘doing race’)
I think they are probably arguing the same thing: that ‘what
distinguishes one activity from another is its object’ (Leontiev)

>The whole advantage of CHAT is its unit of analysis. The social,
>linguistic and historical features are contained in the unit of
>analysis. I do not see how an "approach" can do that without some form
>of Hegelian methodological rendition.

I agree that the key difference is in the unit of analysis – a focus on
activity. Most qualitative approaches certainly do not have an
understanding of activity based on the concept of (labour) activity
based on Marx, Engels etc., or just generally on the CHAT assumptions
(e.g. Fichtner, 1999, p. 55: Activity is the mode of existence by which
organisms establish themselves as subjects of their life processes).


 But are they not arguing the same thing? ie that “we are constituted …
by our practical activity, in particular by our participation in social
and historical practices” (Tolman, 2001, p. 91)

Could you elaborate on this point that you make: “In social
constructionism, meaning and sense are thought to be the very same thing
because they are undifferentiated. Social constructionism is based upon
the idea of "meaning negotiation" in the construction of the social
world, but it does not deploy the conceptual tools to understand the
difference between objective meanings and personal meanings”
How does CHAT understand the difference between objective and personal
meanings? – do you mean through the concept of ‘object’?

Thanks for the references (from you and from Phil – thanks). I will
follow them up (and report back!) It might take me a little while.



Mary




Mary van der Riet; School of Psychology; University of KwaZulu-Natal
Private Bag X01, Scottsville, 3209

email: vanderriet@ukzn.ac.za
tel: 033 260 6163; fax: 033 2605809

>>> "Arturo Escandon" <arturo.escandon@gmail.com> 11/20/08 01:22 AM >>>
Hi Mary.

Quite interesting. Your questions go obviously beyond the few lines I
can drop here. I will try to make some points from a meta-scientific
point of view. I think Mike gave an answer from the point of view of
practice already.

> need to be explored and examined in context, as they are lived. This,
in
> part, means understanding the social, linguistic and historical
features
> which shape human phenomena (Kelly 2006).

Fair enough but does the qualitative research paradigm make a
distinction between ready-made concepts and the enaction of those in
particular "contexts" (activity systems)? Does it see the (potential,
eventual) contradiction between a fossilised language, product of kind
of obsolete social relations, and the enaction of the needs, or, as
Leontiev puts it, the orientation of activity towards an object? The
whole advantage of CHAT is its unit of analysis. The social,
linguistic and historical features are contained in the unit of
analysis. I do not see how an "approach" can do that without some form
of Hegelian methodological rendition.

>
> [this bit seems to have the most synergies with CHAT – but I don't
> think it is meant in this way i.e. that there is a dialectical
> interaction between social and individual 'levels of analysis']

In CHAT the unit of analysis overcomes the "individual/social"
analysis. Vygotsky thought of "word meaning" as a unit, which also
tries to evercome that problem.
>
> And what about the 'critique' of the situated perspective which
> predominates in ethnographic approaches? This is articulated as
follows:
> * there is a need to move beyond describing and 'understanding' human
> experience in situ. Kelly (1994) argues that the participant, embedded
> in his or her reality, perspective and context, does not possesses the
> perspective necessary to provide a comprehensive account of an
> experience or phenomenon. There is thus a need to provide an account
of
> a phenomenon which exceeds the self-understanding of the participants,
a
> distanciated account (Kelly, 2006). Thus description alone, and a
> description in the participants' words, is insufficient for an
> explanation of a phenomenon. There is a need to provide an
elaboration,
> or expansion, of the participant's account.


> Is Activity Theory just a social constructionist approach? It might
> emphasize the historical trajectory ofand dilemmas, but it seems to be
essentially concerned with the same
> thing.

In social constructionism, meaning and sense are thought to be the
very same thing because they are undifferentiated. Social
constructionism is based upon the idea of "meaning negotiation" in
the construction of the social world, but it does not deploy the
conceptual tools to understand the difference between objective
meanings and personal meanings. More obscure yet is social
constructionism's concept of subject. I think CHAT has enough trouble
with the Notion of subject (in the Hegelian sense), but in social
constructionism there is no Notion at all (understood as a
methodological construct whereby the parts are contained in the unit
of analysis). There are many ontological issues here (see references
bellow). In an activity system, the division of labour gives you an
idea of the distribution of power but culture, understood as
ideological formations as well, is undertheorised in CHAT.


> Has anybody been writing about this?

Not precisely on qualitative research and CHAT as such that I know of,
but certain issues are touched by Sawyer, Perez Campos, and by Billet.

Sawyer, http://cap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/3/283
Perez Campos, http://cap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/171

Billet (2003) Sociogenesis, Activity and Ontogeny, Culture &
Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 2, 133-169 (2003)

I would appreciate if you can report back your findings to the list.

Best,


Arturo J Escandon

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Received on Sat Nov 22 12:09:01 2008