This "old" discussion seems to connect to the post ISCAR messages in the
comments that Steve made on the use of the activity triangle as a tool of
thought.
From all the richness of the discussion, this point stuck out for me:
Mohammed Elhammoumi argues in a paper he will present at ISCAR that the unit
of analysis is the social relations of production. If that is the case - I
find this idea thought provoking - then activity would be an element in that
larger entity - activities are carved out of the existing social relations
and artifacts (artifacts include nature insofar as humans directly interact
with it).
Question: Might this UoA be termed, "joint, mediated, activity" ?
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 6:03 PM, Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@mac.com> wrote:
> Hi Martin,
>
> You bring up extremely important points, which interest me a lot. I really
> appreciate your perspective. Let's take this up in a few weeks once we are
> settled down after San Diego.
>
> Best,
> - Steve
>
>
>
> On Sep 4, 2008, at 4:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>
> -------- Original Message --------
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] déjatel' nost'
>> Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2008 15:27:28 -0400
>> From: Martin Packer <mpacker885@gmail.com>
>> To: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>
>> Andy, I'm having technical problem sending email. Any possibility you
>> could forward this to XMCA? thanks!
>>
>> Steve,
>>
>> I'll admit I have some problems with Ilyenkov's reading of Marx.
>> Consider, for example, the following excerpt. Is he saying we should study
>> the hydrogen atom? Is this the "elementary manifestation" that is analogous
>> to the the commodity in Capital? Yes, hydrogen is the simplest element, and
>> its analysis can enable us to understand the properties of more complex
>> elements. (The Schrodinger wave equation, for example, can be solved for a
>> hydrogen atom but is unsolvable for more complex atoms, if I remember my
>> college chemistry).
>>
>> >> Hydrogen appears in this
>> >> case as the elementary structure in the decomposition of which
>> >> chemical properties of matter disappear in general, whether the
>> >> analytical decomposition is performed in an actual experiment or only
>> >> mentally. Hydrogen is therefore a concrete universal element of
>> >> chemism.
>>
>> But not all the properties of hydrogen show up (appear) in a single atom.
>> Hydrogen atoms bond to form H2 molecules, and at low temperature and
>> pressure show a more exotic bonding form (the Bose-Einstein condensate). A
>> single atom doesn't go through phase changes (solid, liquid, gas). So, yes,
>> "the concrete universal concept registers a real objective elementary form
>> of the existence of the entire system rather
>> than an empty abstraction." But not in isolation.
>>
>> Ilyenkov claims that with the "single form" of direct exchange alone Marx
>> was able to identity all the phenomena and categories of advanced
>> capitalism, "without exception." I just don't think this is true. Marx
>> traced the commodity form back to these simple origins, but he analysed the
>> contemporary version of the form as well. So where Ilyenkov says that to
>> understand life we ought to study "the elementary protein body" (I think
>> this should be "protean" body), which I take to mean unicellular organisms,
>> yes of course this is important, but surely we also need to study modern
>> complex multi-cellular organisms?
>>
>> If it really were the case that Marx could come up with "all phenomena and
>> categories of advanced capitalism" from studying only "direct exchange of
>> one commodity for another" this would amount to be being able to predict, or
>> perhaps logically deduce, the direction and outcome of cultural evolution.
>> It would be like studying a single-celled organism and accurately predicting
>> its evolution into ammals and then humans. This might be possible if there
>> were a "universal dialectical law" unfolding everywhere. Ilyenkov appears to
>> believe that there is, and this is one way of reading Marx. But it is not
>> the way I read Marx, and I don't believe that there is an "objectively
>> universal" dialectical
>> logic that can be identified even in the simplest of forms.
>>
>> Martin
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/3/08 10:05 AM, "Steve Gabosch" <stevegabosch@mac.com
>> <mailto:stevegabosch@mac.com>> wrote:
>>
>> > You raise really good points, Martin. What are you thoughts on the
>> > distinction between an "analytical unit" versus a "basic unit of
>> > analysis", and where do you see the "concrete universal" fitting in?
>> > - Steve
>> >
>> >
>> > On Sep 3, 2008, at 6:16 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
>> >
>> >> Andy, Steve,
>> >>
>> >> I like the idea of exploring further the way Marx's analysis of the
>> >> commodity gives us a concrete (!) example of methodology. A good
>> >> place to
>> >> start is with the fact that the commodity is the unit of analysis in
>> >> Capital, in the sense that Andy defines, that it is the smallest
>> >> component
>> >> that shows the properties of the whole: in this case, it shows the
>> >> contradiction between use value and exchange value that characterizes
>> >> capital as a whole.
>> >>
>> >> But at the same time, it is a constituted unit, no? Or, better put,
>> >> it is at
>> >> the same time a process, which can be analytically decomposed into
>> >> cycles of
>> >> production and exchange. Ilyenkov apparently focuses on Marx's
>> >> analysis of
>> >> the historical development of the commodity, from unmediated exchange
>> >> through to complex money forms. But there is a synchronic dimension of
>> >> analysis too, and Marx explores how the process of exchanging
>> >> commodities is
>> >> the basis for the abstraction in which they come to have common
>> >> measure.
>> >> Equally the labor of producing commodities becomes abstract, and what
>> >> remains in each case is value.
>> >>
>> >> So we learn little by looking at a unit in isolation. "We may twist
>> >> and turn
>> >> a single commodity as we wish; it remains impossible to grasp it as
>> >> a thing
>> >> possessing value... [its objective character as value] can only
>> >> appear in
>> >> the social relation between commodity and commodity" (Marx). We need
>> >> to
>> >> examine units in relation. This seems to me to suggest that although
>> >> a unit
>> >> has the characteristics of the whole, this is the case only when the
>> >> unit is
>> >> examined *in* the whole. We need to study a commodity *in* capitalist
>> >> society.
>> >>
>> >> More specifically still, we need to study the unit in the processes
>> >> of which
>> >> it is the product. So Chapter 2 of Capital considers "The Process of
>> >> Exchange" in which "in order that these objects may enter into
>> >> relation with
>> >> each other as commodities, their guardians must place themselves in
>> >> relation
>> >> to one another as persons whose will resides in these objects." Our
>> >> analysis
>> >> only *begins* with an examination of the unit, the commodity. It must
>> >> proceed to an examination of the relations among units, and then to
>> >> the
>> >> relations among people which bring the units into relation.
>> >>
>> >> Here of course the famous passage, "a commodity appears at first
>> >> sight an
>> >> extremely obvious, trivial thing. But its analysis brings out that
>> >> it is a
>> >> very strange thing, abounding in metapysical subtleties and
>> >> theological
>> >> niceties." "The mysterious character" of the commodity "reflects the
>> >> social
>> >> characteristics of men's own labour."
>> >>
>> >> My reading of this is that the analysis of a unit cannot replace the
>> >> analysis of the whole, even though the unit "reflects" the whole. We
>> >> must
>> >> analyze the unit *in* the whole which constitutes it, for it is *we*
>> >> who
>> >> make the commodity what it is, "without being aware of it." Analysis
>> >> is a
>> >> process in which we "try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind
>> >> the
>> >> secret of [our] own social product." This analysis has an emancipatory
>> >> character because it enables us to see the contingent, historical
>> >> genesis of
>> >> forms which had come to seem natural, immutable, and finished. Marx is
>> >> interested in the commodity. But one might argue that he is *more*
>> >> interested in the festishism with which we generally understand
>> >> commodities,
>> >> the alienation which quantitative exchange of commodities gives rise
>> >> to, and
>> >> the "metamorphosis" of commodities into money which is the basis for
>> >> the
>> >> exploitation of labor (so Chapter 3 analyzes "The Circulation of
>> >> Commodities" now as a process that becomes mediated by money). None
>> >> of this
>> >> is exactly "in" the commodity, but only if we begin our analysis
>> >> with the
>> >> commodity will we be able to understand the other phenomena.
>> >>
>> >> Does this all get played out in Vygotsky's analyses?
>> >>
>> >> Martin
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 9/2/08 8:19 AM, "Steve Gabosch" <stevegabosch@mac.com
>>
>> <mailto:stevegabosch@mac.com>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> Andy, I am still absorbing your last message. While doing that I
>> >>> wanted to look at Ilyenkov's 1960 book The Dialectics of the Abstract
>> >>> & the Concrete in Marx's Capital, which deals with many things we
>> >>> are
>> >>> talking about in this thread.
>> >>>
>> >>> ****************
>> >>>
>> >>> The lengthy passage below is a helpful description of the concrete
>> >>> universal by Ilyenkov. After pointing out how Marx uses value as the
>> >>> concrete universal in the development of the capitalist economy,
>> >>> Ilyenkov gives helpful examples of concrete universals in chemistry
>> >>> and life in general.
>> >>>
>> >>> Btw, this transcription on Marxist Internet Archive is by Andy.
>> >>>
>> >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/abstra5a.htm
>> >>>
>> >>> Ilyenkov
>> >>> The dialectics of the Abstract & the Concrete in Marx's Capital
>> >>>
>> >>> from Chapter 5 – The Method of Ascent from the Abstract to the
>> >>> Concrete in Marx's Capital
>> >>>
>> >>> the beginning of the section Concrete fullness of Abstraction and
>> >>> Analysis as a Condition of Theoretical Synthesis
>> >>>
>> >>> We shall now turn to a consideration of the logical structure of
>> >>> Capital, comparing it both with the logic of Ricardian thought and
>> >>> the
>> >>> theoretical views of Marx's predecessors in the field of logic;
>> >>> this
>> >>> discussion should reveal Marx's logic in its actual practical
>> >>> application to the analysis of facts, to the analysis of empirical
>> >>> data.
>> >>>
>> >>> Our task is that of singling out the universal logical elements of
>> >>> Marx's treatment of economic materials, the logical forms that are
>> >>> applicable, due to their universality, to any other theoretical
>> >>> discipline.
>> >>>
>> >>> Capital, as is well known, begins with a most thorough and detailed
>> >>> analysis of the category of value, i.e., of the real form of economic
>> >>> relations that is the universal and elementary form of the being of
>> >>> capital. In this analysis, Marx's field of vision encompasses a
>> >>> single and, as we have already noted, extremely rare, in developed
>> >>> capitalism, factual relation between men – direct exchange of one
>> >>> commodity for another. At this stage of his inquiry into the
>> >>> capitalist system, Marx intentionally leaves out of account any other
>> >>> forms – money or profit or wages. All of these things are as yet
>> >>> believed to be non-existent.
>> >>>
>> >>> Nevertheless, analysis of this single form of economic relations
>> >>> yields, as its result, a theoretical expression of the objectively
>> >>> universal form of all phenomena and categories of developed
>> >>> capitalism
>> >>> without exception, an expression of a developed concreteness, a
>> >>> theoretical expression of value as such, of the universal form of
>> >>> value.
>> >>>
>> >>> The elementary type of the existence of value coincides with value in
>> >>> general, and the real actually traceable development of this form of
>> >>> value into other forms constitutes the objective content of the
>> >>> deduction of the categories of Capital. Deduction in this conception,
>> >>> unlike the Ricardian one, loses its formal character: here it
>> >>> directly
>> >>> expresses the real content of some forms of economic interaction from
>> >>> others.
>> >>>
>> >>> That is precisely the point missing in the systems of Ricardo and of
>> >>> his followers from the bourgeois camp.
>> >>>
>> >>> The conception of a universal concept underlying the entire system of
>> >>> the categories of science, applied here by Marx, cannot be explained
>> >>> by the specificity of the subject-matter of political economy. It
>> >>> reflects the universal dialectical law of the unfolding of any
>> >>> objective concreteness – natural, socio-historical, or spiritual.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> This conception is of great significance for any modern science. To
>> >>> give a concrete theoretical definition of life as the basic category
>> >>> of biology, to answer the question of what is life in general, life
>> >>> as
>> >>> such, one ought to act in the same way as Marx acted with value in
>> >>> general, that is, one should undertake a concrete analysis of the
>> >>> composition and mode of existence of an elementary manifestation of
>> >>> life – the elementary protein body. That is the only way of
>> >>> obtaining
>> >>> a real definition and of revealing the essence of the matter.
>> >>>
>> >>> Only in this way, and not at all by abstraction of the general
>> >>> features of all phenomena of life without exception, can one attain a
>> >>> really scientific and materialist conception of life, creating the
>> >>> concept of life as such.
>> >>>
>> >>> The situation is the same in chemistry. The concept of chemical
>> >>> element as such, of chemical element in general, cannot be worked out
>> >>> through abstraction of the general and identical features that helium
>> >>> has in common with uranium or silicon with nitrogen, or the common
>> >>> features of all the elements of the periodic table. The concept of
>> >>> chemical element may be formed by detailed consideration of the
>> >>> simplest element of the system – hydrogen. Hydrogen appears in this
>> >>> case as the elementary structure in the decomposition of which
>> >>> chemical properties of matter disappear in general, whether the
>> >>> analytical decomposition is performed in an actual experiment or only
>> >>> mentally. Hydrogen is therefore a concrete universal element of
>> >>> chemism. The universal necessary laws that emerge and disappear with
>> >>> it, are the simplest laws of the existence of the chemical element in
>> >>> general. As elementary and universal laws they will occur in uranium,
>> >>> gold, silicon, and so on. And any of these wore complex elements may
>> >>> in principle be reduced to hydrogen, which, by the way, happens both
>> >>> in nature and in experiments with nuclear processes.
>> >>>
>> >>> In other words, what takes place here is the same living mutual
>> >>> transformation of the universal and the particular, of the elementary
>> >>> and the complex which we observed in the categories of capital, where
>> >>> profit emerges as developed value, as a developed elementary form of
>> >>> commodity, to which profit is continually reduced in the real
>> >>> movement
>> >>> of the economic system and therefore in thought reproducing this
>> >>> movement. Here as everywhere else, the concrete universal concept
>> >>> registers a real objective elementary form of the existence of the
>> >>> entire system rather than an empty abstraction.
>> >>>
>> >>> <end>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> On Sep 1, 2008, at 10:27 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>> Steve,
>> >>>> as I understand it, the concept of "concrete universal" is closely
>> >>>> related to UoA (or notion or "abstract concept") in this way. In
>> >>>> approaching the understanding of a complex phenomenon, the
>> >>>> researcher tries to determine a notion which will reveal at least
>> >>>> the aspects of that whole she is interested in. One and the same
>> >>>> phenomenon (e.g. "the real life of people" or "personality") may be
>> >>>> approached using different units of analysis (abstract notions) and
>> >>>> the result will be different insights into the same phenomena.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> This is where the ascent from the abstract to the concrete comes in:
>> >>>> the complex whole is to be "reconstructed" in thought, beginning
>> >>>> from this abstract concept of it, and the end result of such a
>> >>>> reconstruction is a "concrete universal". So if (for example) a
>> >>>> certain social formation is to be understood as a "concrete
>> >>>> universal", then you must begin by determining an "anstract notion"
>> >>>> of it. (The tricky bit is discovery of the "abstract notion" and the
>> >>>> only place to read about that process is in Hegel's Doctrine of
>> >>>> Essence in the Logic.)
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The contrary method is to begin with a thoughtlessly chosen element
>> >>>> and analyse it into its properties (or "attributes" or in old
>> >>>> English "accidents"). (The subject is the sum of all the predicates
>> >>>> which can be attached to it?) These attributes may then be used to
>> >>>> reconstuct a whole, which would be an "abstract general". For
>> >>>> example, someone who thinks that the working class are people who
>> >>>> work for a wage, then define the working class as the set of all
>> >>>> wage earners, and include policemen and senior managers among the
>> >>>> proletariat--+, whilst ecluding housewives. The same person might
>> >>>> define a bourseois as someone with a lot of money, and decide that
>> >>>> the Professor of FIne Arts is not a bourgeois, because he does not
>> >>>> own capital, only culture.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Does that help?
>> >>>> Andy
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>> >>>>> That is very helpful, Andy. The problem to solve, of course, is
>> >>>>> determining the "simplest" component of a whole, without entering
>> >>>>> into the realm of "elements," as Vygotsky would warn against in his
>> >>>>> example of water, which is not flammable, whereas its elements
>> >>>>> hydrogen and oxygen are. Your history of the concept is a very
>> >>>>> useful place to start and is appreciated. I got from Ilyenkov's
>> >>>>> writings, btw, that he thought "value" was the basic unit of
>> >>>>> analysis of commodities, money, capital, etc. and that Marx chose
>> >>>>> the simplest manifestation of value - the commodity - to build his
>> >>>>> case on what capital is and how it works. But that does not take
>> >>>>> anything away from the central points you are making.
>> >>>>> Here are some more questions, for you, anyone. Ilyenkov also
>> >>>>> speaks of the concrete universal. How does the "concrete
>> >>>>> universal" concept fit in with the "unit of analysis" concept?
>> >>>>> Also, what is the distinction between unit of analysis, basic unit
>> >>>>> of analysis, and analytical units? And to just make sure there is
>> >>>>> no confusion, what is the difference between a "unit" and an
>> >>>>> "element"?
>> >>>>> - Steve
>> >>>>> On Sep 1, 2008, at 7:20 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>>>> Others may chine in on this. I am in the midst of writing stuff on
>> >>>>>> the topic, but a few basics:
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> "Unit of analysis" is the simplest component of something which
>> >>>>>> exhibits all the properties of the whole. It originates from
>> >>>>>> Goethe who called it the *Urphanomenon*, and David tells me that
>> >>>>>> Goethe got it from Vico, though I haven't been able to confirm
>> >>>>>> that myself. Goethe insisted that the UoA had to be itself a
>> >>>>>> "phenomenon" rather than a hypothesis or principle or mechanism
>> >>>>>> lying behind and beyond appearances, like an *embryo* or *germ-
>> >>>>>> cell*. Hegel took over the idea and he called it the *Notion*
>> >>>>>> (Begriff), and it is the key idea in his logic and his theory of
>> >>>>>> science. Marx applied the idea to political economy and came up
>> >>>>>> with the *Commodity*, as the simplest relation of bourgeois
>> >>>>>> society and the simplest unit of capital. Vygotsky took up the
>> >>>>>> idea and his study of Pavlov's work on the *conditioned reflex*
>> >>>>>> was his first idea for a UoA for psychology, and then of course
>> >>>>>> the famous *word meaning* as a UoA for the study of intelligent
>> >>>>>> speech. ANL then (it seems) took it further with the idea of *(an)
>> >>>>>> activity* as the UoA for the social life of humans.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> It is important that the UoA contains nothing outside within
>> >>>>>> itself (preconditions, axioms, etc.), and is in that sense
>> >>>>>> absolutely simple, and that it _is itself_ "an example" of what it
>> >>>>>> is the simplest component of, for example the *molecule* for
>> >>>>>> chemistry and the *particle* for physics. Hegel took *right*
>> >>>>>> (which he took as private property) for the UoA for the study of
>> >>>>>> modern society.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Hegel explained that a science must begin from the *Concept* (is
>> >>>>>> UoA) of its subject matter, and then while studying the field of
>> >>>>>> phenomena to guide perception, unfold out of the conception,
>> >>>>>> logically so to speak, everything that is contained within it.
>> >>>>>> Davydov and Elkonin's method of teaching the science of number
>> >>>>>> actually takes that conception of science as a research program
>> >>>>>> and applies it to teaching and learning, with *external
>> >>>>>> comparison* as the UoA for mathematics.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Hope that helps,
>> >>>>>> Andy
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>> >>>>>>> On your last comment, Andy, I for sure have much to learn about
>> >>>>>>> the concept "unit of analysis". I like the way Dot speaks of a
>> >>>>>>> "system" of units, levels, methodology, etc. A very quick read
>> >>>>>>> of the AA Leontiev article on "Units" that Dot refers us to
>> >>>>>>> reveals that it will take some serious study for me to absorb -
>> >>>>>>> in a way, it is a summary of many key themes over the history of
>> >>>>>>> activity theory, a history I most certainly have much to learn
>> >>>>>>> about. I know that one thing I do as I am learning a new concept
>> >>>>>>> is try to find ways to use it, to apply its terms, to incorporate
>> >>>>>>> it wherever I can, including into everyday situations if
>> >>>>>>> possible; in short, play with it - and sometimes I will stretch
>> >>>>>>> it too far from its intended meaning, throw it around too
>> >>>>>>> loosely, as you put it, and I will need to get reined in, which
>> >>>>>>> appears to be what you are graciously doing.
>> >>>>>>> So would you, or anyone, help me out: what is the "precise
>> >>>>>>> meaning" of "unit of analysis"?
>> >>>>>>> - Steve
>> >>>>>>> On Sep 1, 2008, at 4:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>>>>>> This is a bog topic, Steve. Marx's own views were hindered by
>> >>>>>>>> the non-existence of workers' states and substantial welfare
>> >>>>>>>> states, so he took quite an extreme position in relation to "the
>> >>>>>>>> public sector". But obviously I am saying that *labour which has
>> >>>>>>>> been subsumed under Capital* - the expression Marx uses in the
>> >>>>>>>> "unpublished sixth chapter of Capital" - has the object only of
>> >>>>>>>> expanding capital. Most people refer to house work as the
>> >>>>>>>> production of labour power for sale. Although over the yearws,
>> >>>>>>>> capital subsumes a greater and greater proportion of the social
>> >>>>>>>> labour, it has not yet subsumed all. That is obvious.
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> I am mixing two sligtly different genres here, marxist political
>> >>>>>>>> economy and soviet cultural-historical activity theory, but I'd
>> >>>>>>>> be interested in reactions. The Soviets always intended to be
>> >>>>>>>> faithful to Marx and political economy after all.
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> Andy
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> PS, Steve please revise the meaning of "unit of analysis". It
>> >>>>>>>> has a precise meaning and IMHO should not be thrown around so
>> >>>>>>>> loosely."
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>> Andy wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>> One could go on, but if one were to ask what object is served
>> >>>>>>>>>> by work then the answer is "expansion of capital". I caould
>> >>>>>>>>>> give 1000 examples of Marx making ths claim. The idea that the
>> >>>>>>>>>> object of one's labour is profit is always problemtatic for
>> >>>>>>>>>> people that work in the public sector, especially in education
>> >>>>>>>>>> or health, but if you were in the USSR where the state is
>> >>>>>>>>>> paying the wages, it would seem strange indeed. The idea that
>> >>>>>>>>>> one's work is part of the reproduction of the community in a
>> >>>>>>>>>> division of labour seems far more appealing. But that turned
>> >>>>>>>>>> out to be a passing episode in twentieth century history.
>> >>>>>>>>> Perhaps you didn't mean this, but it sounds like you are saying
>> >>>>>>>>> that all work serves the accumulation or expansion of capital.
>> >>>>>>>>> But as you know, there are many kinds of work that don't. Here
>> >>>>>>>>> are three examples, as I see it:
>> >>>>>>>>> 1) House work (cleaning your own house) does not produce
>> >>>>>>>>> surplus value.
>> >>>>>>>>> 2) Cuban workers today don't contribute to the accumulation of
>> >>>>>>>>> capital, except in some small businesses and enterprises (such
>> >>>>>>>>> as some restaurants, farms), where how much gets accumulated is
>> >>>>>>>>> highly restricted. There is no capitalist class of any
>> >>>>>>>>> significance in Cuba today.
>> >>>>>>>>> 3) Public sector workers in the US are not producing surplus
>> >>>>>>>>> value. The health and education sectors especially are
>> >>>>>>>>> examples of workers and other oppressed layers demanding and
>> >>>>>>>>> fighting for social programs that enhance their quality of
>> >>>>>>>>> life, forcing the capitalists to devote a small percentage of
>> >>>>>>>>> the surplus value they accumulate to such programs - which have
>> >>>>>>>>> been under attack for some years now by the capitalists and
>> >>>>>>>>> political forces that support them precisely because these
>> >>>>>>>>> programs do not produce surplus value - they consume it.
>> >>>>>>>>> When one begins to look at economies, blocks of capital, wages,
>> >>>>>>>>> government, public service workers, workers states, classes,
>> >>>>>>>>> and other such issues, many of the core features of activity
>> >>>>>>>>> theory appear on a new level of analysis: historical
>> >>>>>>>>> materialism. There are of course other world views, but this
>> >>>>>>>>> is the one Vygotsky used. Vygotsky said he was applying
>> >>>>>>>>> historical materialism to psychology, which he explained would
>> >>>>>>>>> require the discovery of new laws of development and a new
>> >>>>>>>>> basic unit of analysis.
>> >>>>>>>>> Andy and I had some conversation about class and activity
>> >>>>>>>>> offline recently and I said that "class" is a unit of analysis
>> >>>>>>>>> in Marxism, as in "class analysis" and "the history of all
>> >>>>>>>>> hitherto existing society is the history of class
>> >>>>>>>>> struggle" (Communist Manifesto).
>> >>>>>>>>> But on further thought, that is incorrect. Marx and Engels say
>> >>>>>>>>> it right in that quote - they say **class struggle**, not
>> >>>>>>>>> "class". Thinking about this, a common error in sociology is
>> >>>>>>>>> to use class as the unit of analysis. Classes are only
>> >>>>>>>>> elements of class struggles. Class is an analytical unit, but
>> >>>>>>>>> not a basic unit of analysis.
>> >>>>>>>>> Relating this to CHAT, as I see it, classes are to class
>> >>>>>>>>> struggles as actions are to activity. Class struggle is a unit
>> >>>>>>>>> of analysis in historical materialism in the way that activity
>> >>>>>>>>> is seen as a unit of analysis in cultural historical
>> >>>>>>>>> psychology.
>> >>>>>>>>> But is activity really the **basic** unit of human existence?
>> >>>>>>>>> As David was saying, there is a difference between units of
>> >>>>>>>>> analysis and analytical units. Is activity an analytical unit,
>> >>>>>>>>> but not the basic unit of analysis? This would not overturn
>> >>>>>>>>> any work CHAT has done, just shift its attention to a different
>> >>>>>>>>> basic unit of analysis, and "demote" activity to an analytical
>> >>>>>>>>> unit, albeit a very useful and powerful one.
>> >>>>>>>>> Mohammed Elhammoumi argues in a paper he will present at ISCAR
>> >>>>>>>>> that the unit of analysis is the social relations of
>> >>>>>>>>> production. If that is the case - I find this idea thought
>> >>>>>>>>> provoking - then activity would be an element in that larger
>> >>>>>>>>> entity - activities are carved out of the existing social
>> >>>>>>>>> relations and artifacts (artifacts include nature insofar as
>> >>>>>>>>> humans directly interact with it). Activity could be
>> >>>>>>>>> understood as mutually constitutive with the aggregate social
>> >>>>>>>>> relations in a particular society, in the way that Michael
>> >>>>>>>>> describes actions and activity as mutually constitutive.
>> >>>>>>>>> Interesting to think about.
>> >>>>>>>>> Steve
>> >>>>>>>>> On Aug 31, 2008, at 7:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>> Thanks for all that Michael. I actually hardly slept last
>> >>>>>>>>>> night going over in my mind the points you made. I think I can
>> >>>>>>>>>> see my way through this now, and that "(a system of) activity"
>> >>>>>>>>>> or "an activity" is indeed a very good candidate for a "unit
>> >>>>>>>>>> of analysis". You will doubtless get something from me on your
>> >>>>>>>>>> editor's desk in a couple of months on the topic. But
>> >>>>>>>>>> altogether I feel much better about ANL now. Thank you.
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> But the questions about word meanings here are still
>> >>>>>>>>>> outstanding:
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> (1) "activity" - as used in Hegel and Marx and Leontyev when
>> >>>>>>>>>> he says:
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> "[The processes that mediate the influences of the objective
>> >>>>>>>>>> world reflected in the human brain] are those that realise a
>> >>>>>>>>>> person's actual life in the objective world by which he is
>> >>>>>>>>>> surrounded, his social being in all the richness and variety
>> >>>>>>>>>> of its forms. In other words, these processes are his
>> >>>>>>>>>> activity."
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> - is not a unit of analysis, but a presupposition, whilst "an
>> >>>>>>>>>> activity" or "system of activity", you have convinced me, is a
>> >>>>>>>>>> good "unit of analysis" for the study of the social life of
>> >>>>>>>>>> human beings. As when Marx says:
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> "The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not
>> >>>>>>>>>> dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be
>> >>>>>>>>>> made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their
>> >>>>>>>>>> activity and the material conditions under which they live,
>> >>>>>>>>>> both those which they find already existing and those produced
>> >>>>>>>>>> by their activity." (The German Ideology, 1a, 1845)
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> My concern is that we use the same word and I suspect the
>> >>>>>>>>>> observation that we have here two qute distinct concepts is
>> >>>>>>>>>> not something which is widely recognised.
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> (2) "activity" and "work" - I am going to spend some time
>> >>>>>>>>>> revising how ANL takes labour as the prototype of an activity
>> >>>>>>>>>> and the bases on which "an activity" and "a type of activity"
>> >>>>>>>>>> are delineated or developed. This is my major concern.
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> But look. Marx, Capital Vol 1:
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> "As a capitalist, he is only capital personified. His soul is
>> >>>>>>>>>> the soul of capital. But capital has one sole driving force,
>> >>>>>>>>>> the drive to valorize itself, to create surplus value, to make
>> >>>>>>>>>> its constant part, the means of production, absorb the
>> >>>>>>>>>> greatest possible amount of surplus labour. Capital is dead
>> >>>>>>>>>> labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living
>> >>>>>>>>>> labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks." -
>> >>>>>>>>>> Capital, p.342
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> One could go on, but if one were to ask what object is served
>> >>>>>>>>>> by work then the answer is "expansion of capital". I caould
>> >>>>>>>>>> give 1000 examples of Marx making ths claim. The idea that the
>> >>>>>>>>>> object of one's labour is profit is always problemtatic for
>> >>>>>>>>>> people that work in the public sector, especially in education
>> >>>>>>>>>> or health, but if you were in the USSR where the state is
>> >>>>>>>>>> paying the wages, it would seem strange indeed. The idea that
>> >>>>>>>>>> one's work is part of the reproduction of the community in a
>> >>>>>>>>>> division of labour seems far more appealing. But that turned
>> >>>>>>>>>> out to be a passing episode in twentieth century history.
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> I.e., the most important "activity" today is "capital." That
>> >>>>>>>>>> seems to have been lost somewhere, at least to some extent.
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>> >>>>>>>>>>> I am not trying to give you advice. I am talking about my own
>> >>>>>>>>>>> experiences of having struggled.
>> >>>>>>>>>>> One of the things Marx criticized his contemporaries for is
>> >>>>>>>>>>> that they looked at value abstractly. He wrote Das Kapital as
>> >>>>>>>>>>> a concrete analysis of value, its one-sided expressions in
>> >>>>>>>>>>> use-value and exchange-value, and how these concretized
>> >>>>>>>>>>> themselves in possible cases. Any time I want to think about
>> >>>>>>>>>>> activity abstractly, I get into trouble, which resolve
>> >>>>>>>>>>> themselves when I take concrete cases of activity and work
>> >>>>>>>>>>> them through, culturally and historically. I then realize
>> >>>>>>>>>>> that activity concretizes itself very differently, the
>> >>>>>>>>>>> activity of schooling is very different in U.S. suburbia then
>> >>>>>>>>>>> it is in inner-city neighborhood schools in Philadelphia. Not
>> >>>>>>>>>>> when I do an abstract analysis, but when I go concretely into
>> >>>>>>>>>>> the nitty-gritty details of everyday life in the schools.
>> >>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>> >>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 8:07 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>> Oh Gosh, Micahel I thought we were going to have a good ol'
>> >>>>>>>>>>> flame! :) and I was just getting started.
>> >>>>>>>>>>> OK. As I said, I will study those quotes, and their contexts,
>> >>>>>>>>>>> where I can, and think some more about it, but I really don't
>> >>>>>>>>>>> think I want to shift to "concrete cases" to clarify a
>> >>>>>>>>>>> concept if the concept isn't clear at the start. That's just
>> >>>>>>>>>>> not my style, if you know what I mean. I am not anywhere
>> >>>>>>>>>>> saying that the work Leontyev and others have done with these
>> >>>>>>>>>>> ideas is not perfectly good, valid science. But there *are*
>> >>>>>>>>>>> problems, there *are* limts to the applicability of these
>> >>>>>>>>>>> ideas, and I am exploring them.
>> >>>>>>>>>>> More later, and thanks heaps for laying hold of those quote
>> >>>>>>>>>>> and your explanations so speedily!
>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>> >>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy, After I sent off the mail I thought you might
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> misunderstand. I do understand and know your background. I
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> meant to say rather than discussing activity in the general,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> take a concrete one and talk about it. I meant discuss
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> concrete cases. I think if you were to have taken a concrete
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> case of activity from your experience and discussed activity
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in this situation some of the problems that appear when you
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> discuss it in the abstract would not show up.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Sorry for having written a message that could have been and
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> was mistaken in its intention.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 7:41 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> C'mon Michael. I spent 30 years as a union activist
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> transforming activity and thinking about what I was doing.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> At 62 I am now reflecting on that work. I don't need to be
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> told to "go out" and put someone under my microscope and
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> observe them.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy, it is and is not a system of actions. Actions and
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> activity stand in a constitutive relationship. There are no
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> actions independent of activity and no activity independent
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of action. One of the problems that can arise is because---
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> as we have done today----we talk about activity in the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> abstract, and this is what Marx didn't like about Hegel, we
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> talk about ideal things, not about concrete sensual
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> activity, which you only get when you analyze real activity
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> rather than the idea of activity. I see you struggle with
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the idea, when what you should be doing is go out and study
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> concrete activity. What you need to do is study concrete
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> everyday activity, that is, actual cases where an activity
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> realizes itself. And here you will find that people act but
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in the process concretize the activity in THIS rather than
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> other possible ways. Their actions are not JUST actions,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> they are oriented toward the activity, which only comes
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> about in and through the actions; yet the actions
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> presuppose the activity that they realize.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 7:25 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Apologies. I sent two mails just to Michael instead of the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> list by mistake!
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I will think about this some more. "Activity" here means a
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> system of actions which have a common societally-determined
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> object, like the collective hunt in his famous example. But
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> it seems to me that the idea of "activity" (in this sense)
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> as a "unit of analysis" poses some problems.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy, you can always identify structure, the question
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> is whether you can understand it own its own or only in
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> its relation to other structures. I think it is the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> latter. So even within the unit you can identify all sorts
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of things, but they are not independent and constitute
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> each other. That is why Yrjö's website is a bit
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> deceiving,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> because he talks about elements----I think the word
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> appears 6 times----when Vygotsky and Leont'ev always talk
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> about doing unit analysis. So there is structure, just
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> that it cannot be understood independently of other
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> structures, each of which is a one-sided expression of the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> unit, which is activity. Or so I read it.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 6:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Well spotted, Michael.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> In that same paragraph he says: "activity is ... a system
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> that has structure" so he is here referring to what might
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> be called the "*system of* activity", as opposed to acts
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> or operations, and actions - this entity that Robert
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> explained to me is constituted as an entity by means of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> system-theoretic means.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Is that right?
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think he does say something that is at least very close
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to naming it unit analysis on p.50:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Activity is a molar, not an additive unit of the life of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the physical, material subject. In a narrower sense, that
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> is, at the psychological level, it is a unit of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> life, mediated by psychic reflection, the real function of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> which is that it orients the subject in the objective
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> world. In other words, activity is
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> not a reaction and not a totality of reactions but a
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> system that has structure, its own internal transitions
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and transformations, its own development.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Where I would accentuate as follows:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Activity is "a *unit of life*", "a system that has
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> structure, *its own* internal transitions and
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> transformations, *its own *development."
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 6:27 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> OK, thanks for that Michael. I understand Tätigkeit, so
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> that settles some questions, though not all.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I have another question about Activity to add to these.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky, Davydov, Engstrom (to take just three) all talk
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> about "unit of analysis", "germ-cell" or single instance
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (as in Pavolv's study of the reflex), but in the works of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> AN Leontyev that I have access to (on marxists.org
>> <http://marxists.org>) he
>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> makes no reference to any of these terms. This seems not
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> accidental to me actually. Can anyone clarify this?
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Did Leonteyv (a) think that "activity" passes as a "unit
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of analaysis", (b) disagree with the idea that a science
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> should begin from a Unit of analysis, or (c) define
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> subject-activity-object as the "unit of analysis
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> somewhere?
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> And I need citation, I'm afraid.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> it's not just the Russian. In German there is the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> parallel distinction between "Tätigkeit" (deiatel'nost')
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and Aktivität (aktivnost'). In the former there is an
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> orientation----toward object/motive, which is not in the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> latter, and the former is oriented toward and a result
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of society (Gesellschaft), whereas the latter is not
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (necessarily). When Leont'ev is translated into German,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> you find the words Tätigkeit and the adjective
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "gesellschaftlich" (societal) whereas in English there
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> is activity and social----and that has made all the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> difference, to quote Robert Frost.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 31-Aug-08, at 4:18 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I wonder if our Russian speakers could indulge me again
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> with a point of clarification. déjatel'nost' (or
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> деятельность) is the Russian word for
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "activity".
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 1. I understand that in Russian the use of definite and
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> indefeinite partcles (a and the) is rare, so in the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> title to AN Leontyev's famous book, does déjatel'nost'
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mean "an activity" or "activity" - with the connotation
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of substance that a word has in English if used without
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> a or the. When we have "act, action and activity," is
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> that third category the same word, déjatel'nost'?
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 2. déjatel'nost' can also be translated as "work". How
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> strong is the connection between "work" and "activity"
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in the Russian mind when talking of "activity theory"?
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Does that sound like "work theory"? Or is this just like
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> any ambiguous word. I mean, English speakers would not
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> think that in this context "activity" referred to
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> autonomous physiological processes, which can also be
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> called "Activity". When "Theses on Feuerbach" is
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> translated into Russian, can Russian readers see the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> diffrence between "work" and "activity"?
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Fascinating response, Robert. So let's see if I
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> understand you right. A mass of interconnected actions
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> can be understood as some *whole* (and not just an
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary collection of individual things) if we can
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> perceive some kind of *constraint*, operating over the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> domain, which limits the domain of possible
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> configurations? Is that it?
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Robert Bracewell wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy and all,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I agree with Michael that the relationship between
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> activity and action is a
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> constitutive one, but I think this points to a big
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> theoretical gap in CHAT
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> generally. If actions are the constituents of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> activity, then the issue
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> arises as to how the constituents are arranged in
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> order to constitute
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> activity (and there may be other types of constituents
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in activity also). As
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Leont¹ev said, this arrangement cannot be serial
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., chains of s-r
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> pairs), nor additive in the sense of accumulative (as
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> contrasted with the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mathematical sense). So how are we to theorize the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> arrangement? The issue of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> arranging constituents to achieve higher order
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> structures has been treated
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> by both linguistics and artificial intelligence. The
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> general approach is to
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> constrain the possible relationships between
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> constituents--in linguistics
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> this usually done via a grammar, in AI via a program.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> For CHAT I think our
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> task may be to build on Leont¹ev and figure out these
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> constraints.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Regards,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> --Bob Bracewell
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 8/29/08 1:24 PM, "Wolff-Michael Roth"
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> <mroth@uvic.ca <mailto:mroth@uvic.ca>
>> <mailto:mroth@uvic.ca <mailto:mroth@uvic.ca>>> wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think he expresses the constitutive relation
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> between actions and
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> activity. Activity is not just the sum of actions, it
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> presupposes
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> them but is itself presupposed by the actions that
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> constitute it. I
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> am pasting the definition from OED, which appears to
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> be consistent
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> with this (my) reading of Leont'ev. Leont'ev and
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky want to do
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> unit analysis, not element/al analysis. That is, even
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> if you can
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> identify structures within activity, these cannot
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> stand on their own
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> like elements. What they are is dependent on all the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> other structures
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> that can be identified, with which they stand in a
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> constitutive unit,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and which are subordinate to activity. :-)
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> molar, adj.3
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Psychol. Designating a large-scale unit of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour, esp. an
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> integrated set of responses serving to bring about a
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> common goal, as
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> distinguished from an elementary unit of behaviour
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> such as a
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> physiological response (cf. MOLECULAR adj. 5); of or
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> relating to (the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> study of) such behaviour.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 29-Aug-08, at 7:11 AM, Michael Glassman wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> This is just my perspective, but I still believe
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Activity Theory goes
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> back to roots in work done by Stanislavsky - in
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> particular "On Being
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> an Actor" and his book on character development. I
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> think the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> argument that Stanislavsky makes is that you should
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> never consider
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> each scene individually, as encapsulated and whole, I
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> guess you could
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> say there should be no reification of a scene. You
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> have to consider
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> a scene, and the actions of a character, not only in
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> terms of the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> entire play, but in terms of what has come before and
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> what comes
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> after - that activity is part of an ongoing process.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Stanislavsky
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> was working off the new form of playwrights such as
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ibsen, Strindberg
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and especially Chekhov of course. To give an
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> example, when Nora
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> walks out on Torvald and her father at the end of "A
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Doll's House"
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the scene makes little sense in an of itself, and if
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> you think of the
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> scenes of the play as simply being additive you are
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> shocked. But if
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> you consider it as part of a moral activity, with a
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> building
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> motivation that leads to a choice of action it is
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> extraordinarily
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> complelling.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Anyway, that's my two cents.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Michael
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Fri 8/29/2008 9:53 AM
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [xmca] Molar, Molecular and Additive behaviour
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Can anyone help me out here. Leontyev says:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "But human practice is not just a series or a sum of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> actions. In other words, 'activity is a molar, not an
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> additive unit'."
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> OED says:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Molar, Psychol. Designating a large-scale unit of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> esp. an integrated set of responses serving to bring
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> about a
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> common goal, as distinguished from an elementary unit
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour such as a physiological response (cf.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> MOLECULAR
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> adj. 5); of or relating to (the study of) such
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 1932 E. C. TOLMAN Purposive Behavior "On the one hand,
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Watson has defined behavior in terms of its strict
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> physical
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and physiological details, i.e., in terms of
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> receptor-process, conductor-process, and effector-
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> process
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> per se. We shall designate this as the molecular
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> definition
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of behavior. And on the other hand, he has come to
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> recognize
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> that behavior is more than and different from the sum
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of its
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> physiological parts. Behavior has descriptive and
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> defining
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> properties of its own. And we shall designate this
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> latter as
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the molar definition of behavior."
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Am I missing something. By "not additive" does Leontyev
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> simply mean that there's more to it than S -> R ?
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Preiss wrote:
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> based on the work made by max plank and run by san
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> francisco's
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> exploratorium
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.exploratorium.edu/evidence/
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Preiss, Ph.D.
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Subdirector de Extensión y Comunicaciones
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Escuela de Psicología
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Av Vicuña Mackenna - 4860
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 7820436 Macul
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Santiago, Chile
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Fono: 3544605
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Fax: 3544844
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> e-mail: davidpreiss@uc.cl <mailto:davidpreiss@uc.cl>
>> <mailto:davidpreiss@uc.cl <mailto:davidpreiss@uc.cl>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> web personal: http://web.mac.com/ddpreiss/
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> web institucional: http://www.epuc.cl/profesores/dpreiss
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> --
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ----- Andy
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Skype andy.blunden
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> <
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> winmail
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> .dat>_______________________________________________
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> --
>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -----
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Skype andy.blunden
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> --
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------->
>> >>>>>>>>>
>> >> -
>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype
>> >>>>>>>>>> andy.blunden
>> >>>>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>> >>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> >>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>> >>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> >>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> --
>> >>>>>>>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------->>>>>>>>
>> -
>> >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype
>> >>>>>>>> andy.blunden
>> >>>>>>>>
>> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>> >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> --
>> >>>>>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> >>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype
>> >>>>>> andy.blunden
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>>> xmca mailing list
>> >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>>>
>> >>>> --
>> >>>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> >>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype
>> >>>> andy.blunden
>> >>>>
>> >>>
>> >>> _______________________________________________
>> >>> xmca mailing list
>> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> xmca mailing list
>> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > xmca mailing list
>> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>>
>> --
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
_______________________________________________
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Received on Sat Sep 27 09:20 PDT 2008
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