Thanks for that Robert. I hadn't heard that idea before.
The problem I have though, is that this is very much part of
an "observer standpoint" rather than a "participant
standpoint" approach. It is not "Romantic Science", to use
AR Luria's term. ... but that doesn't make it wrong!!
Andy
Robert Bracewell wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
> Very succinctly put. A major constraint, or at least condition, that such
> configuration constraints must meet is that it allow for novel
> configurations that are characteristic of creativity in activity.
>
> --Bob Bracewell
>
>
> On 8/29/08 11:31 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
>> Fascinating response, Robert. So let's see if I understand
>> you right. A mass of interconnected actions can be
>> understood as some *whole* (and not just an arbitrary
>> collection of individual things) if we can perceive some
>> kind of *constraint*, operating over the domain, which
>> limits the domain of possible configurations? Is that it?
>>
>> Andy
>>
>> Robert Bracewell wrote:
>>> Hi Andy and all,
>>>
>>> I agree with Michael that the relationship between activity and action is a
>>> constitutive one, but I think this points to a big theoretical gap in CHAT
>>> generally. If actions are the constituents of activity, then the issue
>>> arises as to how the constituents are arranged in order to constitute
>>> activity (and there may be other types of constituents in activity also). As
>>> Leont¹ev said, this arrangement cannot be serial (e.g., chains of s-r
>>> pairs), nor additive in the sense of accumulative (as contrasted with the
>>> mathematical sense). So how are we to theorize the arrangement? The issue of
>>> arranging constituents to achieve higher order structures has been treated
>>> by both linguistics and artificial intelligence. The general approach is to
>>> constrain the possible relationships between constituents--in linguistics
>>> this usually done via a grammar, in AI via a program. For CHAT I think our
>>> task may be to build on Leont¹ev and figure out these constraints.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> --Bob Bracewell
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 8/29/08 1:24 PM, "Wolff-Michael Roth" <mroth@uvic.ca> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>> I think he expresses the constitutive relation between actions and
>>>> activity. Activity is not just the sum of actions, it presupposes
>>>> them but is itself presupposed by the actions that constitute it. I
>>>> am pasting the definition from OED, which appears to be consistent
>>>> with this (my) reading of Leont'ev. Leont'ev and Vygotsky want to do
>>>> unit analysis, not element/al analysis. That is, even if you can
>>>> identify structures within activity, these cannot stand on their own
>>>> like elements. What they are is dependent on all the other structures
>>>> that can be identified, with which they stand in a constitutive unit,
>>>> and which are subordinate to activity. :-)
>>>>
>>>> molar, adj.3
>>>>
>>>> 2. Psychol. Designating a large-scale unit of behaviour, esp. an
>>>> integrated set of responses serving to bring about a common goal, as
>>>> distinguished from an elementary unit of behaviour such as a
>>>> physiological response (cf. MOLECULAR adj. 5); of or relating to (the
>>>> study of) such behaviour.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> Michael
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 29-Aug-08, at 7:11 AM, Michael Glassman wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Andy,
>>>>
>>>> This is just my perspective, but I still believe Activity Theory goes
>>>> back to roots in work done by Stanislavsky - in particular "On Being
>>>> an Actor" and his book on character development. I think the
>>>> argument that Stanislavsky makes is that you should never consider
>>>> each scene individually, as encapsulated and whole, I guess you could
>>>> say there should be no reification of a scene. You have to consider
>>>> a scene, and the actions of a character, not only in terms of the
>>>> entire play, but in terms of what has come before and what comes
>>>> after - that activity is part of an ongoing process. Stanislavsky
>>>> was working off the new form of playwrights such as Ibsen, Strindberg
>>>> and especially Chekhov of course. To give an example, when Nora
>>>> walks out on Torvald and her father at the end of "A Doll's House"
>>>> the scene makes little sense in an of itself, and if you think of the
>>>> scenes of the play as simply being additive you are shocked. But if
>>>> you consider it as part of a moral activity, with a building
>>>> motivation that leads to a choice of action it is extraordinarily
>>>> complelling.
>>>>
>>>> Anyway, that's my two cents.
>>>>
>>>> Michael
>>>>
>>>> ________________________________
>>>>
>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>> Sent: Fri 8/29/2008 9:53 AM
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>> Subject: [xmca] Molar, Molecular and Additive behaviour
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Can anyone help me out here. Leontyev says:
>>>>
>>>> "But human practice is not just a series or a sum of
>>>> actions. In other words, 'activity is a molar, not an
>>>> additive unit'."
>>>>
>>>> OED says:
>>>>
>>>> Molar, Psychol. Designating a large-scale unit of behaviour,
>>>> esp. an integrated set of responses serving to bring about a
>>>> common goal, as distinguished from an elementary unit of
>>>> behaviour such as a physiological response (cf. MOLECULAR
>>>> adj. 5); of or relating to (the study of) such behaviour.
>>>>
>>>> 1932 E. C. TOLMAN Purposive Behavior "On the one hand,
>>>> Watson has defined behavior in terms of its strict physical
>>>> and physiological details, i.e., in terms of
>>>> receptor-process, conductor-process, and effector-process
>>>> per se. We shall designate this as the molecular definition
>>>> of behavior. And on the other hand, he has come to recognize
>>>> that behavior is more than and different from the sum of its
>>>> physiological parts. Behavior has descriptive and defining
>>>> properties of its own. And we shall designate this latter as
>>>> the molar definition of behavior."
>>>>
>>>> Am I missing something. By "not additive" does Leontyev
>>>> simply mean that there's more to it than S -> R ?
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> David Preiss wrote:
>>>>> based on the work made by max plank and run by san francisco's
>>>>> exploratorium
>>>>> http://www.exploratorium.edu/evidence/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David Preiss, Ph.D.
>>>>> Subdirector de Extensión y Comunicaciones
>>>>> Escuela de Psicología
>>>>> Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
>>>>> Av Vicuña Mackenna - 4860
>>>>> 7820436 Macul
>>>>> Santiago, Chile
>>>>>
>>>>> Fono: 3544605
>>>>> Fax: 3544844
>>>>> e-mail: davidpreiss@uc.cl
>>>>> web personal: http://web.mac.com/ddpreiss/
>>>>> web institucional: http://www.epuc.cl/profesores/dpreiss
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435
>>>> Skype andy.blunden
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>
>>>>
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>
>
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmcaReceived on Mon Sep 1 16:52 PDT 2008
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