Mabel adds some provocative ideas to this discussion of a materialist
psychology. One of them is stressed by Ilyenkov - it has often been
the idealists in history, not as often the materialists, who have
contributed the most penetrating insights into consciousness.
Certainly, a concrete psychology, a new general psychology, would seek
to draw on these achievements, albeit setting them "right side up" in
the process.
It would surprise me if Martin could offer convincing evidence that
Vygotsky really felt that "idealist psychology has nothing to
contribute to his new general psychology." (Maybe he can - I have
certainly not read everything Vygotsky wrote, not by a long shot). My
take from my present sense of Vygotsky is that formulation seems to
overstate the case, mixing together past and future aspects of the
issue in a way he would not.
I don't think Vygotsky meant to dismiss idealist psychology's past -
just challenge its future. And he **was** ruthless and uncompromising
about idealist psychology's future. I think Vygotsky was saying that
the materialist camp - and not some new, "third" camp - should become
the inheritors of the achievements of the idealists, and the
leadership of the new psychology he was seeking. He seemed to be
proposing a revolutionary overthrow, with the materialists in power
and the idealists deposed - not a grand compromise where the two camps
somehow merge, or a where a "third camp" emerges in the fray. I think
Martin correctly emphasizes this part of Vygotsky's views.
Keep in mind, by the way, that Vygotsky was writing in 1927 in the
USSR when he wrote his unpublished manuscript "Crisis" - he might have
a very different strategic outlook today about how the different camps
within psychology today are interacting - in the US, Europe, Asia, C
America, S America, Africa, Russia, or elsewhere - and how
revolutionary materialists ought to deal with today's realities.
Martin has correctly stressed that Vygotsky should not be taken out of
context, and this strategic commentary by Vygotsky pertaining to
trends within the USSR in the mid-1920's would be a very easy one to
do that with.
At the same time, we can learn a lot from Vygotsky's thinking process
in formulating these ideas. Martin has been gleaning some very
valuable insights, which I and I think many others have been learning
a lot from. My take, although I have not looked into "Crisis" nearly
as deeply and effectively as Martin has, is Vygotsky was arguing the
**ontological** outlook of the idealists had to be abandoned, and
therefore, he was saying that idealist-based psychology needs to be
"severed" from general psychology. On this, I believe Vygotsky was
uncompromising and revolutionary, in the tradition of Marx, Engels,
Lenin, and others.
But I have never seen Vygotsky suggest that the many discoveries,
observations and insights that idealists have developed over the
centuries should be tossed aside, that idealist psychology has
"nothing to contribute." My sense of Vygotsky is he would stress just
the opposite, in the same way Marx and Engels approached Hegel's
accomplishments and contributions. I think it is important to make a
strong point of this at the same time as the other, and I appreciate
Mabel bringing this side of the issue up.
(As for some of Mabel's ideas about a "unified" psychology, and a
psychology that is both "causal" and "teleological," I would need
more ... these are excellent topics for discussion ... perhaps Mabel,
you might toss us some thoughts sometime about how these ideas fit in
with your studies of Vygotsky and other cultural-historical theorists
on emotion ... ).
Best wishes,
- Steve
On May 13, 2008, at 12:08 AM, Mabel Encinas wrote:
>
> Dear Martin,
>
> I do not agree with your reading of Vygotsky in terms of idealism.
> He used a dialectic approach in his endeavour of solving the crisis:
> the same resource Marx used for finding the synthesis in the
> opposition between the materialism of Feuerbach (in the Thesis on
> him, Marx suggests the criticism against this ‘gross
> materialism’), among others, and Hegel’s idealism. Lately, for
> example, Engestrom uses the same methodology when mapping the
> terrain in relationship to learning: a dialectic materialist
> approach solves the synthesis by recognising the active (expansive)
> element embedded in Jung’s idealism, ‘together with’ the
> material reality (that by itself is futile, reflective, repetitive),
> developed by Gagné (that I understand he uses as a paradigmatic
> example). In my understanding this ‘together with’ is history.
> Understanding things historically implies both material, and ideal
> in the ways it has been discussed here at some point (for example in
> considering a table not only as material but embedded with the ideas
> of the creator, and also embedded in the situation of being used in
> a purposeful way, and present, in a particular social context).
>
> Interestingly, in any of the quotations you wrote, Vygotsky says
> something like ‘let’s get rid of idealism’. On the contrary,
> they sound quite synthetic: not a third psychology, but a unified
> psychology. Then my question is: if we have been outlining the world
> in different ways, how can we ‘erase’ the outlines, or redesign
> them in such a way that we can built a unified psychology?
>
> Among other things, I wonder if what we would have after throwing
> away idealism, would be something different than a ‘gross’ or
> mechanical materialism. Vygotsky develops the way in which when you
> cut off and throw away something, it finishes by leaking
> unexpectedly by the unsealed fissures of the system. He demonstrates
> in his long (too long gosh!) 200 pages about ‘The teaching about
> emotions’ (Collected works vol. 6) how both, idealist psychology,
> but his main focus, materialist (‘gross’) psychology, are not but
> Cartesian! Funnily, both of them. They critique each other and
> finally, they succumb from the same disease. Although this may sound
> paradoxical, because, they outline the terrain and cut off and throw
> away ‘half’ :-) of the problem and this is not other thing but
> following Decartes. I would think that when throwing 'half' of the
> problem you are not facing the problem... maybe it is only taking
> the manageable part of it, and throwing away the real problem.
>
> I absolutely agree with what you say about emotions: “the study of
> emotion is not identical with the study of the *consciousness* of
> emotion”. I think many approaches in psychology take that stance,
> no psychoanalysis, by the way, but possibly ‘emotional
> intelligence', for example. However, by understanding consciousness
> in a non mentalist way, we could find a most comprehensive approach
> to emotions in practice. Also, if we do not consider any impact of
> consciousness on emotions, then they would be reduced to “simple
> manifestations of the soulless robot of our body” (Collected works
> vol. 6, again, p. 234).
>
> A possible hint would be in the distinction Vygotsky does between
> the kind of psychologies he analysis, that I synthesise with the
> question: how can we build a psychology that is causal and
> teleological simultaneously?
>
> Best wishes,
> Mabel
>
>> Date: Mon, 12 May 2008 14:45:20 -0500> From: packer@duq.edu>
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] a materialist psychology> To:
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > Mabel,> > In 'Crisis' Vygotsky seems to be
>> pretty clear that idealist psychology has> nothing to contribute to
>> his new general psychology. For example:> > “Two psychologies
>> exist―a natural scientific,materialistic one and a> spiritualistic
>> one. This thesis expresses the meaning of the crisis more>
>> correctly than the thesis about the existence of many
>> psychologies” (188)> > “Nobody contests that the general
>> psychology will not be a third psychology> added to the two
>> struggling parties, but one of them” 189> > "only a rupture and
>> the selection of a single psychology will> provide the way out of
>> the crisis."> > “I venture to prove for the whole council of
>> philosophers ― idealists as> well as materialists ― that the
>> essence of the divergence of idealism and> materialism in
>> psychology lies precisely here, and that only Husserl’s and>
>> Feuerbach’s formulas give a consistent solution of the problem in
>> the two> possible variants and that the first is the formula of
>> phenomenology and the> second that of materialistic psychology. I
>> venture, proceeding from this> comparison, to cut the living tissue
>> of psychology, cutting it as it were> into two heterogeneous bodies
>> which grew together by mistake" (231).> > The general psychology
>> was to unify psychology and physiology, and unify> theory and
>> practice, but *not* to unify idealism and materialism. Idealism>
>> was to be cut off and thrown away.> > But I completely agree with
>> you that a "gross materialism" won't do, and> it's not what
>> Vygotsky was after. He went to some lengths to argue that>
>> consciousness exists, and so its study will be central to his new>
>> psychology. The rejection of idealism was intended to eliminate
>> the> misconception that consciousness is some inner, spiritual,
>> mental realm of> ideas and concepts.> > Emotions certainly provide
>> a wonderful test case. I don't know Vygotsky's> writing on emotion
>> very well. But years ago I found it very fruitful to> study
>> emotions as interpersonal movements. I don't mean to say that this
>> is> *all* that they are but, especially with young children, the
>> embodied> character of emotion is undeniable, as is their
>> *relational* character.> Vygotsky argued that conscioussness exists
>> and can be studied in a> materialist psychology. But he also argued
>> that psychological ('mental')> processes are real processes, not
>> identical with subjectivity. It seems to> me this implies that the
>> study of emotion is not identical with the study of> the
>> *consciousness* of emotion.> > Martin > > On 5/12/08 1:53 PM,
>> "Mabel Encinas" <liliamabel@hotmail.com> wrote:> > > > > Dear
>> Martin, and all, I agree with the idea that Vygotsky’s
>> psychologist is> > materialistic, however, I do not think that he
>> has proposed to go for the> > elimination of an idealist
>> psychology, or said in a clearer way, there is> > something that
>> idealist psychology offers in the understanding of humans, that> >
>> a gross materialist approach does not offer: the consciousness of
>> the process.> > I am working on emotions, and I have been reading
>> as carefully as I can,> > Vygotsky's criticisms to James-Lange'
>> perspective on emotions as reduced to> > their material
>> physiological existence. When emotions are only reduced by the> >
>> material reality, and so to speak the ideal aspect of emotions is
>> kicked out> > of the house, this ideal component of the duality
>> seem to come in by the> > window. As much as James and Lange,
>> diminish the value of consciousness, and> > using Vygotsky's
>> example, disregard the pain of a mother for the dead of her> >
>> child, they have to recognise that there are certain emotions more
>> "sublime"> > apart of those whose physiology is clearly defined.
>> From a gross materialist> > approach, it would seem that
>> consciousness has not impact on emotions. I> > insist in saying
>> that I talk about emotions because that is my subject, but I> >
>> have the impression, that a similar dialectical view could be
>> traced in> > Vygotsky's thought, or at least the process of
>> construction of such an> > approach. In what you mention in your
>> note, I think that it would be important> > to separate Marx and
>> Vygotsky from Feuerbach, whose position could be more> > mechanical
>> and also, to distinguish between Marx and Vygotsky, and Hegel,> >
>> because indeed he does not only put him upside down. However,
>> because as I am> > a bit rusty from philosophy at this stage (I
>> have not read Hegel for some> > years now), I would suggest that we
>> could concentrate on Vygotsky for trying> > to untangle how a
>> concrete, not dualistic psychology could be built, instead> > of
>> keeping the separation in two psychologies. Unfortunately, in
>> relationship> > to emotions, I think Vygotsky only hints to how an
>> immanent psychology could> > be constructed for the understanding
>> of emotions, but he does not finish to> > develop it. > > Martin,
>> and all, would you think we could come back to discuss emotions? I>
>> > have lost most of the discussions, because of lack of time, but I
>> would love> > if taking Martin's ideas of a non-dualistic
>> psychology, we could have another> > go --I am an old time lurker-
>> Martin, I also agree with you that the mental is> > different from
>> the subjective, but being coherent with this, and recognising> >
>> the grounding of emotions in practices, emotions can not be only
>> subjective> > either. Mabel > > > > > > > >> Date: Mon, 12 May 2008
>> 11:22:17 -0700> From: lchcmike@gmail.com> To:> >>
>> ablunden@mira.net; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> Subject: Re: [xmca] a
>> materialist> >> psychology> CC: > > So, Andy and Martin--> > If
>> Andy's changes are acceptable> >> to Martin, where does this leave
>> us?> > Does ideality remain in the world,> >> and hence in humans,
>> by virtue of> inhabiting a human made world?> mike> > On> >> Sun,
>> May 11, 2008 at 6:54 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:> >
>> >> >> Martin,> > I agree with your main conclusion about LSV, that
>> it was a> >> *materialist*> > psychology that he aspired to, but
>> could I offer some pretty> >> small change> > "corrections" to your
>> observations?> >> > Hegel's ideas about> >> the origins of human
>> life are surprisingly> > inconsistent with a modern> >> reading of
>> him. He emphatically rejected the idea> > that humans originated>
>> >> from animals or that any animal originated out of> > another
>> animal. He was> >> familiar with Lamarck and rejected this theory
>> out of> > hand. He believed> >> that Spirit was created, as in the
>> Book of Genesis, all at> > once. This> >> doesn't stop us
>> "interpreting" him in a materialist spirit, in> > the light> >> of
>> Darwinism. However, Hegel did believe that consciousness> >
>> originated in> >> labour, child-rearing and speech. But not out of
>> "matter",> > whatever that> >> would mean. The idea of matter
>> having the potential for> > thinking is not a> >> Hegelian idea.
>> Matter is an abstraction of thought, for> > Hegel.> >> > Also,> >>
>> I think that to talk of how "knowledge can ... move beyond> >
>> appearance to> >> reality" is dubious. This retains the idea of a
>> reality hidden> > behind> >> appearances. If there are two kinds of
>> knowledge then I think> > "appearance"> >> and "reality" are not
>> the right names for them. If "appearance"> > and> >> "reality" are
>> meant to be categorically different things, then I think> >> >>
>> Lenin had it right in denying this.> >> >> >> http://marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/two1.htm
>> > >> > Andy> >> >> >> >> Martin Packer wrote:> >> > > Mike,> > >> >
>> > The more I think about this (and> >> I have been thinking on it
>> some in the> > > interim), the more comfortable I> >> am that
>> Vygotsky indeed insisted on> > > lopping> > > off the idealist
>> side> >> of psychology's dualism. The notion that the stuff> > >
>> of> > > the universe> >> is solely material, and that there is no
>> separate, distinct> > > 'mental> >> stuff' or 'spiritual stuff' has
>> a long and distiguished history,> > > as> > >> >> the BBC program
>> makes clear. A materialist psychology would have been> > >> >>
>> fully> > > in line with Marx's materialism. And even Hegel, despite
>> being> >> labelled> > > an> > > idealist and despite Marx's claim
>> to have turned him on> >> his head,> > > recognized> > > that
>> humans evolved from simpler stuff which> >> must have had its
>> origins> > > in> > > matter. The capacity for thinking,> >> Hegel
>> reasoned, is a potential which> > > is> > > inherent in matter,
>> and> >> develops over time, rather than having its> > > source in>
>> > > some other,> >> etherial, transcendental or platonic realm.> >
>> >> > > Vygotsky's materialist> >> psychology avoids equating the
>> mental with the> > > subjective, or> >> consciousness with
>> appearance as representation. It> > > follows> > > that> >> the
>> study of consciousness is not the study of appearances that are> >
>> >> >> entirely distinct from reality (Kant's vision). It is not the
>> study of> > >> >> the> > > way a person constructs mental
>> representations of a world that> >> exists> > > outside them. For
>> Vygotsky, like Hegel, Marx & Feuerbach, our> >> knowledge> > > can>
>> > > progress, and move beyond appearance to reality. If> >> we
>> accept this, we> > > need> > > to have a different conception of
>> the way> >> humans live in the world.> > > Vygotsky> > > wanted to
>> study the "material,> >> sensory acts" in which a person knows> > >
>> their> > > world. He wanted to> >> study the mind, but not as a
>> mental subject, or> > > subjectivity, related to> >> external
>> objects. This is the way mind appears> > > to> > > itself in> >>
>> introspection, but in action mind is not divided in this way.> > >
>> Mind, and> >> consciousness, are real and objective processes
>> because they> > > exist> > >> >> in the interactions between bodies
>> and material objects. And these can> > >> >> be> > > studied
>> empirically.> > >> > > Martin> > >> > >> > > On 5/11/08 1:29> >>
>> PM, "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:> > >> > > What is your
>> current> >> take on this issue, Martin? Perhaps a followup in> > >
>> > MCA> > > > is> >> warranted?> > > >> > > > mike> > > >> > > > On
>> Tue, Apr 29, 2008 at 6:08 PM,> >> Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
>> wrote:> > > >> > > > In the article published> >> in MCA that was
>> discussed here recently I> > > > > pointed> > > > > out that> >> in
>> Crisis Vygotsky declared the need to end the dualism in> > > > >>
>> >> psychology by eliminating the idealist pole and developing a> >
>> > > >> >> thoroughly> > > > > materialist psychology. Some of the
>> history of> >> materialism, both in> > > > > its> > > > >
>> reductionist and non-reductionist> >> versions (V¹s being the
>> latter)> > > > > can be> > > > > heard at the link> >> below, in
>> the BBC Radio program In Our Time. At> > > > > the end> > > > >
>> we>> >> > > > > learn that they ran out of time to discuss Hegel
>> and Marx, which is>> >> > > > > rather> > > > > a> > > > > shame.
>> (This is the same program which a> >> year or so ago ran a poll> >
>> > > > in> > > > > which> > > > > Marx was voted> >> the most
>> important philosopher of all time, much to> > > > > host> > > > >>
>> >> Melvyn Bragg¹s surprise and dismay.)> > > > >> > > > >> >> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/inourtime.shtm
>> l>> > > > >> > >> >> > > Martin> > > > >
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>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------>
>> >> >> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/
>> >+61 3> >> 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden> >> >> >> >>
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