RE: [xmca] A request for guidance

I suggest checking out
Lantolf, J. P., & Thorne, S. L. (2006). Sociocultural theory and the Genesis
of L2 Development. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press.

I don't have the book with me now, but I know that they review/mention at
least a couple empirical studies that address inner speech.

There may also be relevant work in
Lantolf, J. (Ed.). (2000). Sociocultural theory and second language
learning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Good luck!

Adam

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of anne radowick
Sent: Friday, May 02, 2008 7:24 AM
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: [xmca] A request for guidance

Dear Professors,
 
I have been on the side of the pool watching you all frolicking in the deep
waters. Can I ask you to come over in to the not-so-deep end for a moment?
 
I am trying to write a paper on private and inner speech in second language
learners, particularly adults. Perhaps I haven't worded my search requests
quite right up until now, but I am not finding an abundance of information
on adults. Would anyone happen to know in which direction I should turn to
find someone who has done any research on this topic? I would like to
compare the success in SLA between adults who are active producers of
private speech and those who don't seem to use it much, if at all. If there
is a clear advantage, can learners be trained to consciously produce more
private speech to enhance their SLL experience?
 
Any pointers you might be able to offer on this subject would be greatly
appreciated.
 
Very truly yours,
 
Anne Radowick
Inha University
Incheon, Korea

> From: xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu> Subject: xmca Digest, Vol 35, Issue
> 67> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2008 08:07:43 -0700> >
> Send xmca mailing list submissions to> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > To
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> line so it is more specific> than "Re: Contents of xmca digest..."> >
> > Today's Topics:> > 1. FW: Funding opportunities at the National
> Center for Special> Education Research (Peter Smagorinsky)> 2. Re:
> DIALECTICAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION, GROUPE and SEMINAR> (Martin Packer)>
> 3. Re: DIALECTICAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION, GROUPE and SEMINAR> (Andy
> Blunden)> > >
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > Message: 1> Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2008 05:59:49 -0400
> From: "Peter Smagorinsky" <smago@uga.edu>> Subject: [xmca] FW: Funding
opportunities at the National Center for> Special Education Research> To:
"langandlit" <LLE-L@listserv.uga.edu>, "lego"> <LEGO-L@listserv.uga.edu>,
"'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'"> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>,
<ngregg@uga.edu>> Message-ID: <004b01c8a9df$c3282b90$497882b0$@edu>>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"> > From: Caffrey, Erin
[mailto:Erin.Caffrey@ed.gov] > Sent: Monday, April 28, 2008 4:12 PM>
Subject: Funding opportunities at the National Center for Special Education>
Research> > > > Good afternoon, researchers! > > I am contacting researchers
who have recently published in Reading Research> Quarterly. I am a program
officer at the National Center for Special> Education Research (NCSER) at
the Institute of Education Sciences (IES),> U.S. Department of Education. I
am writing to start a conversation about> possible funding opportunities.
Many of you are already very aware of> IES/NCSER . Some of you have
existing projects or current applications. A> handful of you have already
contacted me regarding the fiscal year 2009> request for applications (RFA).
> > IES's over-arching priority is funding research that contributes to>
improved academic achievement for all students. At NCSER, we are>
particularly interested in improving outcomes for children and students
with> disabilities. Our research programs focus on identifying, developing,
and> validating interventions and measures that contribute to improving
outcomes> for students with disabilities. I am attaching NCSER's request
for> applications RFA here http://ies.ed.gov/funding/pdf/2009_84324A.pdf. I>
encourage you to pass the RFA along to your colleagues, especially those
who> conduct school-based research or those who would be willing to conduct>
research in both clinical settings and school settings.> > I would be happy
to discuss funding opportunities through email or over the> phone
(202-219-2126). Pl ease let me know if you have any questions.> > Best, >
Erin > > > > ------------------------------> > Message: 2> Date: Tue, 29 Apr
2008 09:58:35 -0500> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>> Subject: Re:
[xmca] DIALECTICAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION, GROUPE and SEMINAR> To: "eXtended
Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> Message-ID:
<C43CA1CB.1A65D%packer@duq.edu>> Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=ISO-8859-1> > Ed,> > My message came from a genuine confusion about
the links among messages from> Andy, Elinami and David. Three types of
confusion seemed to me to be going> on, though I'm still not sure.> > First,
a confusion between the analytic categories used by academics and> everyday
understanding. Linguists use concepts such as 'subject,' 'verb' and>
'grammar' in their intellectual reconstruction of speech. But there is>
little reason to think that the everyday use of language requires the use
of> such concepts, even at an unconscious level. This is something that
Bourdi eu> writes about convincingly. Researchers, in his view, generally
fail to> examine their own procedures of objectification, and as a result
attribute> the products of their analyses to the people being studied.> >
But, second, a more prevalent confusion, in my view, is to think that *any*>
kind of intelligent behavior requires the use of concepts. Here the guilty>
party is Kant, as Andy was pointing out some time back. Kant pretty much>
gave birth to the view that has become common-sense today, that humans>
construct mental representations of the world around us. Once one has>
accepted a dualistic ontology of mind and world the relationship between
the> two becomes a problem, and Kant's attempt at a solution was to propose
that> the relationship is one of representation. Mental categories and
concepts> underly all human action and knowledge, to this way of thinking.
Hegel, Marx> and Vygotsky can be read as collaborators in an attempt to
reject this view> and find a good alt ernative. If I understand it
correctly (a dubious> presumption!), Ilyenkov's notion of the
"thinking-body" is intended to be> the center of a model which proposes that
intelligent human thought and> action is possible without mental
representations. Humans are first of all a> corporal, incarnate
intelligence. This is not to say that mental> representations are
impossible, but that they are not necessary for smart> practical action. The
formation of both mind and mental representations> might be a result of
living in modern society, somewhere along the> ontogenetic line. (Bourdieu
also explores such a model with his concept of> habitus. Merleau-Ponty is
important too.)> > But, third, I find I cannot completely agree with Sasha
when he suggests> that practical understanding is more adequate than a
scientfic> understanding. Of course it all depends on what one means by
scientific. But> when Sasha writes that "the knife is something basically
simple" and that a> "practical notio n" of it is fully adequate, I find
myself wondering how this> squares with Marx's description of the apparently
simply commodities of> everyday life. The ability to use a knife to cut is
certainly a "valid"> understanding of it. And (again) it is an understanding
which requires no> mental representation. (Perhaps we will want to say (as I
think Vygotsky> does) that there is a concept (or complex) *in* the
practical action. That> is a notion that in my view deserves to be explored
in much more detail.)> But is a knife only this? I think Marx would have
said that a more> scientific understanding of a knife would include a grasp
of the history of> its cultural evolution, its links with others tools, how
to make it and keep> it sharp, and the relations of its production and
exchange... I share> Shasha's frustration with the kind of scholastic
(schoolboy, scholarly)> knowledge which seeks to replace practical knowledge
and declare its> superiority, but I can't agree that the abil ity to use
the tool is all that> is needed, or all that is possible.> > Martin> > > On
4/28/08 6:36 PM, "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:> > > Martin> > > > I was
composing a reply and thinking that it doesn't seem, for> > example, that a
particular conception of hammer would contain all its> > uses. Perhaps what
is confusing for me is 'use' is a little like> > game (re Wittgenstein) and
'the concept' isn't. What happens if one> > introduces 'the use' and
'conception' into the mix?> > > > Ed> > > > > > > > On Apr 28, 2008, at 4:13
PM, Martin Packer wrote:> > > >> Ed,> >> > >> I suppose that arguably the
concept of a hammer will include a bit> >> of use.> >> (Though it's
interesting how many are declaring that they don't> >> know what a> >>
concept is!) But does that mean that the use of a hammer will> >> include a
bit> >> of concept?> >> > >> Martin> >> > >> > >> On 4/28/08 2:36 PM, "Ed
Wall" <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:> >> > >>> Martin> >>> > >>> Now I'm confused.
You say 'us e a hammer' and then 'not use the> >>> concept of a 'hammer."'
I suspect I don't know what a 'concept' of a> >>> hammer is, but wouldn't it
include a bit of use?> >>> > >>> Ed> >>> > >>> On Apr 28, 2008, at 12:18 PM,
Martin Packer wrote:> >>> > >>>> David, I'm confused. Are you saying it
would be impossible for> >>>> someone to> >>>> use a hammer and not use the
concept of "hammer"?> >>>> > >>>> Martin> >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 4/28/08 7:25
AM, "David Kellogg" <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>> >>>> wrote:> >>>> > >>>>> I
don't understand, Elinami. How is it possible to be a language> >>>>> user
and NOT> >>>>> use concepts like "subject", "verb", "speaker", "grammar"
etc.?> >>>>> Even if you> >>>>> say that concept use has to be conscious,
isn't the self itself a> >>>>> concept?> >>>>> > >>>>> David Kellogg> >>>>>
Seoul National University of Education> >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>
Elinami Swai <swaiev@gmail.com> wrote:> >>>>> I cannot resist Andy, who are
these tribal people?> >>>>>
  Elinami.> >>>>> > >>>>> On 4/27/08, Andy Blunden wrote:> >>>>>> Sasha,>
>>>>>> I just wanted to probe you little on this question of concept> >>>>>>
(Begriff) vs> >>>>>> "abstract general" (or complex or "representation",
etc).> >>>>>> > >>>>>> It seems to me that all of us, unless we have a
psychiatric> >>>>>> problem or brain> >>>>>> damage or something serious, by
the time we become adults operate> >>>>>> with> >>>>>> concepts. I notice
that most theorists do not understand well> >>>>>> what a concept> >>>>>> is
and even the average Nobel Prize Winner cannot distinguish> >>>>>> clearly>
>>>>>> between an abstract general notion and a genuine concept. But> >>>>>>
nonetheless we> >>>>>> all use genuine concepts. Difficulty in theoretically
making this> >>>>>> distinction explicit is a matter really of whether you
have been> >>>>>> exposed to> >>>>>> Hegelian ideas or Marx, Vygotsky, or
other philosophy which> >>>>>> incorporates> >>>>>> these insights. Tribal
people for ex ample, just as much as Logical> >>>>>> Positivist
philosophers, use concepts. Is that your understanding> >>>>>> as well?>
>>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy> >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin Packer wrote:> >>>>>>>
------ Forwarded Message> >>>>>>> From: Alexander Surmava> >>>>>>> Date:
Sun, 27 Apr 2008 13:01:03 +0400> >>>>>>> To: 'Martin Packer'> >>>>> >
>>>>>>> Cc: Mike Cole> >>>>>>> Subject: RE: Life, psyche, consciousness.doc>
>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Dear Martin,> >>>>>>> You write:> >>>>>>> To my reading,
Ilyenkov's concept of ideality, based on the> >>>>>>> notion of the> >>>>>>>
thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting that artifacts> >>>>>>> have a>
>>>>>> cultural> >>>>>>> meaning. To me, this risks reintroducing a dualism
between> >>>>>>> matter and> >>>>>>> meaning. It is a short step, to my view
mistaken, to the belief> >>>>>>> that the> >>>>>>> natural sciences study
matter, while the social sciences study> >>>>>>> meaning. It> >>>>>>> also
leads one to think that each artifact has a single meaning.> >>>>>>>
Sasha,> >>>>>> when> >>>>>>> you said that the child really understands "the
meaning" of the> >>>>>>> knife, I'm> >>>>>>> sure you would agree that a
child cannot grasp the complexity of> >>>>>>> the> >>>>>>> relations that a
single artifact like a knife has with society> >>>>>>> as a whole.> >>>>>>>
Nor can a peasant understand the full complexity of the social> >>>>>>>
world in> >>>>>>> which they are living, even though they have great
practical> >>>>>>> wisdom.> >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I entirely share
your idea that ³Ilyenkov's concept of ideality,> >>>>>>> based on> >>>>>>>
the notion of the thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting> >>>>>>>
that> >>>>>>> artifacts have a cultural meaning? The latter is something
banal> >>>>>>> and> >>>>>>> doesn¹t need the first. No one of semiotics will
disagree with> >>>>>>> the> >>>>>> statement> >>>>>>> that each artifact has
some ³cultural meaning? while all of them> >>>>>>> have> >>>>>>> hardly
ever heard the very concept of ³thinking body?and> >>>>>>> evidently don¹t>
>>>>>>> need in this notion.> >>>>>>> As well we never declare something
like the statement ³that the> >>>>>>> natural> >>>>>>> sciences study
matter, while the social sciences study meaning?> >>>>>>> As for a child
with a knife we do insist that to have a real> >>>>>> understanding,>
>>>>>>> real idea of knife a child needs only to be taught by adult how>
>>>>>>> to use it> >>>>>> in> >>>>>>> historically developed cultural
manner. The knife is a tool> >>>>>>> which helps> >>>>>>> humans to cut
something and a child who practically grasps this> >>>>>>> mode of> >>>>>>>
operation and adequately utilizes the knife has a valid idea of> >>>>>>>
knife. All> >>>>>>> complexities ³of the relations that a single artifact
like a> >>>>>>> knife has> >>>>>> with> >>>>>>> society as a whole?can add
nothing to this plain fact. The> >>>>>>> role of> >>>>>> society> >>>>>>>
consists in elaborating the a rtifact and in teaching new> >>>>>>>
generations the> >>>>>> way> >>>>>>> to utilize it.> >>>>>>> The knife is
something basically simple. The absolute majority> >>>>>>> of mankind,>
>>>>>>> those who use knifes in their everyday life needs and have only>
>>>>>>> practical> >>>>>>> notion of knives. On the contrary something that
pretends to be a> >>>>>>> ³scientific notion?of knife is something
ridiculous and> >>>>>>> scholastic.> >>>>>>> In exactly the same way
illiterate, but experienced peasant has> >>>>>>> real,> >>>>>>> practical
notion say of melon, while a schoolboy with all his> >>>>>>> ³scientific>
>>>>>>> definitions?is far from real comprehension of it. He can> >>>>>>>
successfully eat> >>>>>>> melon but he hardly can plant it. And here just as
in previous> >>>>>>> case ³the> >>>>>>> full complexity of the social world
in which they are living?has> >>>>>>> nothing> >>>>>> to> >>>>>>> do with
the idea of melon.> >>>>>>> Surely there are objects which can¹t be grasped
practically by a> >>>>>>> single> >>>>>>> person. Thus for example an idea
of agriculture as a socially and> >>>>>>> historically developed system of
relations which combines> >>>>>>> individual> >>>>>> forces> >>>>>>> of
people over the cooperative process of production and> >>>>>>> distribution>
>>>>>> can¹t be realized in abstract practical manner. Such attempts> >>>>>>
can be> >>>>>> resulted in a> >>>>>>> way similar to famous fable about
three blind and an elephant.> >>>>>>> The same we can say about such an
object as atom or nuclear> >>>>>>> particle. A> >>>>>>> single person never
deals practically with such objects. Only a> >>>>>> theoretical> >>>>>>>
culture ?which is essentially a special type of cooperative> >>>>>>>
practice> >>>>>>> ?lt;br>> can> >>>>>>> grasp the notion of such objects.>
>>>>>>> Explaining all this I meet a great difficultness with the lack>
>>>>>>> of proper> >>>>>>> English terminology (or, probably, my poor
knowledge of> >>>>>>> Eng lish). In> >>>>>> German> >>>>>>> and in Russian
there is a clear distinction between two notions,> >>>>>>> and two> >>>>>>>
terms: Begriff = pon¹atie, and Vorstellung = predstavlenije.> >>>>>>> The
highest form in development of thinking is obviously pon¹atie> >>>>>>
(Begriff).> >>>>>>> And in the same time it is the universal form of
thinking. While> >>>>>>> predstavlenije (Vorstellung) is subordinated
notion. The obscheje> >>>>>> (general)> >>>>>>> predstavlenije is understood
in dialectical culture as a meaning> >>>>>>> of word,> >>>>>>> like
something that enables us to distinguish among the known> >>>>>>> and fixed
in> >>>>>>> the matter of language culture objects. But one can have>
>>>>>>> predsatavlenije> >>>>>>> without having understanding of the essence
of the object.> >>>>>>> Thus the brilliant illustration of such divergence
of two> >>>>>>> forms of> >>>>>> thinking> >>>>>>> (Predstavlenija and
Pon¹atia) are so called ³artificial notions?> >>>>>>> from> >>> >>>>
Vygotsky-Sakharov¹s experiments, as well as many similar> >>>>>>>
constructions> >>>>>> from> >>>>>>> psychological theory. The artificial
notion is an empty notion,> >>>>>>> which is> >>>>>>> something that cannot
be understood not because their utmost> >>>>>>> complexity> >>>>>> but>
>>>>>>> because their utmost vacancy. Logically as ³artifcial notion?we>
>>>>>>> have an> >>>>>>> evident example of general definition (obshchego>
>>>>>>> predstavlenija), not> >>>>>>> understanding (ne pon¹atie). So it
corresponds not with> >>>>>>> dialectic logic> >>>>>> both> >>>>>>> in its
Hegel and Marxist form, but with formal logic, with logic> >>>>>>> of John>
>>>>>>> Locke.> >>>>>>> And this distinction is not something academically
formal but> >>>>>>> the core> >>>>>>> distinction for dialectically thinking
researcher. Thus Davydov> >>>>>>> based all> >>>>>>> his theory of
developmental instruction just on this> >>>>>>> distinction. (I¹m> >>>>>>
going> >>>>>>> to ask Peter Moxhay ?the translator of Davidov¹s latest book
-> >>>>>>> how he> >>>>>> cope> >>>>>>> the problem with insufficiency of
English terminology in this> >>>>>>> case.)> >>>>>>> As for the idea of
³thinking body?it is equal to basically new> >>>>>>> and in> >>>>>> the>
>>>>>>> same time genuine Marxist and Spinozian idea of thinking as not>
>>>>>>> banal> >>>>>>> manipulation with words and other conventional signs,
but as a> >>>>>>> special way> >>>>>>> of acting of one (active or
³thinking?body) according to the> >>>>>>> shape of the> >>>>>>> other body,
taken in the moment of its live realization.> >>>>>>> All this was
fundamentally explored in Ilyenkov¹s works and I> >>>>>>> agree with> >>>>>>
you> >>>>>>> that the joint rereading of this works would be extremely
useful> >>>>>>> for all> >>>>>> of> >>>>>>> us as a step to rethinking the
traditional understanding of CHAT.> >>>>>>> Sincerely,> >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>
Sasha> >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> __________________________
_____________________> >>>>>>> xmca mailing list> >>>>>>>
xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu> >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> --> >>>>>>
------------------------------------------------------------------> >>>>>>
--> >>>>>> ----> >>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380
9435 Skype> >>>>>> andy.blunden> >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>
_______________________________________________> >>>>>> xmca mailing list>
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >>>>>>
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> >
>>>> _______________________________________________> >>>> xmca mailing
list> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >>>>
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>>
_______________________________________________> >>> xmca mailing list> >>>
xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >> > >>
> >> _______________________________________________> >> xmca mailing list>
>> xmca who-is-at weber.u csd.edu> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >> >
>> > > > > _______________________________________________> > xmca mailing
list> > xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >
> > > ------------------------------> > Message: 3> Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2008
01:07:17 +1000> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>> Subject: Re: [xmca]
DIALECTICAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION, GROUPE and SEMINAR> To: "eXtended Mind,
Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> Message-ID:
<481739A5.60001@mira.net>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1;
format=flowed> > Martin, thanks for that ... still thinking about it ....> >
What distinction do you make between concept (Begriff) and > the
specificially *scientific* concept. It seems to me that > a concept can be
fully concrete without being scientific. Do > you agree?> > Andy> > Martin
Packer wrote:> > Ed,> > > > My message came from a genuine confusion about
the links among messages from> > Andy, Elinami and David. Thr ee types of
confusion seemed to me to be going> > on, though I'm still not sure.> > > >
First, a confusion between the analytic categories used by academics and> >
everyday understanding. Linguists use concepts such as 'subject,' 'verb'
and> > 'grammar' in their intellectual reconstruction of speech. But there
is> > little reason to think that the everyday use of language requires the
use of> > such concepts, even at an unconscious level. This is something
that Bourdieu> > writes about convincingly. Researchers, in his view,
generally fail to> > examine their own procedures of objectification, and as
a result attribute> > the products of their analyses to the people being
studied.> > > > But, second, a more prevalent confusion, in my view, is to
think that *any*> > kind of intelligent behavior requires the use of
concepts. Here the guilty> > party is Kant, as Andy was pointing out some
time back. Kant pretty much> > gave birth to the view that has become
common-sense today, that humans> > construct mental representations of the
world around us. Once one has> > accepted a dualistic ontology of mind and
world the relationship between the> > two becomes a problem, and Kant's
attempt at a solution was to propose that> > the relationship is one of
representation. Mental categories and concepts> > underly all human action
and knowledge, to this way of thinking. Hegel, Marx> > and Vygotsky can be
read as collaborators in an attempt to reject this view> > and find a good
alternative. If I understand it correctly (a dubious> > presumption!),
Ilyenkov's notion of the "thinking-body" is intended to be> > the center of
a model which proposes that intelligent human thought and> > action is
possible without mental representations. Humans are first of all a> >
corporal, incarnate intelligence. This is not to say that mental> >
representations are impossible, but that they are not necessary for smart> >
practical action. The formation of both mind and mental r epresentations> >
might be a result of living in modern society, somewhere along the> >
ontogenetic line. (Bourdieu also explores such a model with his concept of>
> habitus. Merleau-Ponty is important too.)> > > > But, third, I find I
cannot completely agree with Sasha when he suggests> > that practical
understanding is more adequate than a scientfic> > understanding. Of course
it all depends on what one means by scientific. But> > when Sasha writes
that "the knife is something basically simple" and that a> > "practical
notion" of it is fully adequate, I find myself wondering how this> > squares
with Marx's description of the apparently simply commodities of> > everyday
life. The ability to use a knife to cut is certainly a "valid"> >
understanding of it. And (again) it is an understanding which requires no> >
mental representation. (Perhaps we will want to say (as I think Vygotsky> >
does) that there is a concept (or complex) *in* the practical action. That>
> is a notion that in my view deserves to be explored in much more
detail.)> > But is a knife only this? I think Marx would have said that a
more> > scientific understanding of a knife would include a grasp of the
history of> > its cultural evolution, its links with others tools, how to
make it and keep> > it sharp, and the relations of its production and
exchange... I share> > Shasha's frustration with the kind of scholastic
(schoolboy, scholarly)> > knowledge which seeks to replace practical
knowledge and declare its> > superiority, but I can't agree that the ability
to use the tool is all that> > is needed, or all that is possible.> > > >
Martin> > > > > > On 4/28/08 6:36 PM, "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:> >
> >> Martin> >>> >> I was composing a reply and thinking that it doesn't
seem, for> >> example, that a particular conception of hammer would contain
all its> >> uses. Perhaps what is confusing for me is 'use' is a little
like> >> game (re Wittgenstein) and 'the concept' isn't.
  What happens if one> >> introduces 'the use' and 'conception' into the
mix?> >>> >> Ed> >>> >>> >>> >> On Apr 28, 2008, at 4:13 PM, Martin Packer
wrote:> >>> >>> Ed,> >>>> >>> I suppose that arguably the concept of a
hammer will include a bit> >>> of use.> >>> (Though it's interesting how
many are declaring that they don't> >>> know what a> >>> concept is!) But
does that mean that the use of a hammer will> >>> include a bit> >>> of
concept?> >>>> >>> Martin> >>>> >>>> >>> On 4/28/08 2:36 PM, "Ed Wall"
<ewall@umich.edu> wrote:> >>>> >>>> Martin> >>>>> >>>> Now I'm confused. You
say 'use a hammer' and then 'not use the> >>>> concept of a 'hammer."' I
suspect I don't know what a 'concept' of a> >>>> hammer is, but wouldn't it
include a bit of use?> >>>>> >>>> Ed> >>>>> >>>> On Apr 28, 2008, at 12:18
PM, Martin Packer wrote:> >>>>> >>>>> David, I'm confused. Are you saying it
would be impossible for> >>>>> someone to> >>>>> use a hammer and not use
the concept of "hammer"?> >>> >>> >>>>> Martin> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> On
4/28/08 7:25 AM, "David Kellogg" <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>> >>>>> wrote:>
>>>>>> >>>>>> I don't understand, Elinami. How is it possible to be a
language> >>>>>> user and NOT> >>>>>> use concepts like "subject", "verb",
"speaker", "grammar" etc.?> >>>>>> Even if you> >>>>>> say that concept use
has to be conscious, isn't the self itself a> >>>>>> concept?> >>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg> >>>>>> Seoul National University of Education> >>>>>>>
>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Elinami Swai <swaiev@gmail.com> wrote:> >>>>>> I
cannot resist Andy, who are these tribal people?> >>>>>> Elinami.> >>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/27/08, Andy Blunden wrote:> >>>>>>> Sasha,> >>>>>>> I just
wanted to probe you little on this question of concept> >>>>>>> (Begriff)
vs> >>>>>>> "abstract general" (or complex or "representation", etc).>
>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> It seems to me that all of us, unless we have a
psychiatric> >>>>>>> problem or brain> >>>>>>> damage or something serious,
by the time we become adults operate> >>>>>>> with> >>>>>>> concepts. I
notice that most theorists do not understand well> >>>>>>> what a concept>
>>>>>>> is and even the average Nobel Prize Winner cannot distinguish>
>>>>>>> clearly> >>>>>>> between an abstract general notion and a genuine
concept. But> >>>>>>> nonetheless we> >>>>>>> all use genuine concepts.
Difficulty in theoretically making this> >>>>>>> distinction explicit is a
matter really of whether you have been> >>>>>>> exposed to> >>>>>>> Hegelian
ideas or Marx, Vygotsky, or other philosophy which> >>>>>>> incorporates>
>>>>>>> these insights. Tribal people for example, just as much as Logical>
>>>>>>> Positivist philosophers, use concepts. Is that your understanding>
>>>>>>> as well?> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin
Packer wrote:> >>>>>>>> ------ Forwarded Message> >>>>>>>> From: Alexander
Surmava> >>>>>>>> Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2008 13:01:03 +0400> >>>>>>>> To:
'Martin Packer'> >>>>>>>> Cc:
  Mike Cole> >>>>>>>> Subject: RE: Life, psyche, consciousness.doc>
>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Dear Martin,> >>>>>>>> You write:> >>>>>>>> To my
reading, Ilyenkov's concept of ideality, based on the> >>>>>>>> notion of
the> >>>>>>>> thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting that artifacts>
>>>>>>>> have a> >>>>>>> cultural> >>>>>>>> meaning. To me, this risks
reintroducing a dualism between> >>>>>>>> matter and> >>>>>>>> meaning. It
is a short step, to my view mistaken, to the belief> >>>>>>>> that the>
>>>>>>>> natural sciences study matter, while the social sciences study>
>>>>>>>> meaning. It> >>>>>>>> also leads one to think that each artifact
has a single meaning.> >>>>>>>> Sasha,> >>>>>>> when> >>>>>>>> you said that
the child really understands "the meaning" of the> >>>>>>>> knife, I'm>
>>>>>>>> sure you would agree that a child cannot grasp the complexity of>
>>>>>>>> the> >>>>>>>> relations that a single artifact like a knife has
with society> >>>>>>>> as a whole.> >>>>>> >> Nor can a peasant understand
the full complexity of the social> >>>>>>>> world in> >>>>>>>> which they
are living, even though they have great practical> >>>>>>>> wisdom.>
>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I entirely share your idea that ³Ilyenkov's
concept of ideality,> >>>>>>>> based on> >>>>>>>> the notion of the
thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting> >>>>>>>> that> >>>>>>>>
artifacts have a cultural meaning? The latter is something banal> >>>>>>>>
and> >>>>>>>> doesn¹t need the first. No one of semiotics will disagree
with> >>>>>>>> the> >>>>>>> statement> >>>>>>>> that each artifact has some
³cultural meaning? while all of them> >>>>>>>> have> >>>>>>>> hardly ever
heard the very concept of ³thinking body?and> >>>>>>>> evidently don¹t>
>>>>>>>> need in this notion.> >>>>>>>> As well we never declare something
like the statement ³that the> >>>>>>>> natural> >>>>>>>> sciences study
matter, while the social sciences study meaning?> >>>>>>>> As for a child
with a knife we do insist that to have a real> >>>>>>> understanding,>
>>>>>>>> real idea of knife a child needs only to be taught by adult how>
>>>>>>>> to use it> >>>>>>> in> >>>>>>>> historically developed cultural
manner. The knife is a tool> >>>>>>>> which helps> >>>>>>>> humans to cut
something and a child who practically grasps this> >>>>>>>> mode of>
>>>>>>>> operation and adequately utilizes the knife has a valid idea of>
>>>>>>>> knife. All> >>>>>>>> complexities ³of the relations that a single
artifact like a> >>>>>>>> knife has> >>>>>>> with> >>>>>>>> society as a
whole?can add nothing to this plain fact. The> >>>>>>>> role of> >>>>>>>
society> >>>>>>>> consists in elaborating the artifact and in teaching new>
>>>>>>>> generations the> >>>>>>> way> >>>>>>>> to utilize it.> >>>>>>>> The
knife is something basically simple. The absolute majority> >>>>>>>> of
mankind,> >>>>>>>> those who use knifes in their everyday life needs and
have only> >>>>>>>> practical> >>>>>>>> n otion of knives. On the contrary
something that pretends to be a> >>>>>>>> ³scientific notion?of knife is
something ridiculous and> >>>>>>>> scholastic.> >>>>>>>> In exactly the same
way illiterate, but experienced peasant has> >>>>>>>> real,> >>>>>>>>
practical notion say of melon, while a schoolboy with all his> >>>>>>>>
³scientific> >>>>>>>> definitions?is far from real comprehension of it. He
can> >>>>>>>> successfully eat> >>>>>>>> melon but he hardly can plant it.
And here just as in previous> >>>>>>>> case ³the> >>>>>>>> full complexity
of the social world in which they are living?has> >>>>>>>> nothing> >>>>>>>
to> >>>>>>>> do with the idea of melon.> >>>>>>>> Surely there are objects
which can¹t be grasped practically by a> >>>>>>>> single> >>>>>>>> person.
Thus for example an idea of agriculture as a socially and> >>>>>>>>
historically developed system of relations which combines> >>>>>>>>
individual> >>>>>>> forces> >>>>>>>> of people over the cooperative proce
ss of production and> >>>>>>>> distribution> >>>>>>> can¹t be realized in
abstract practical manner. Such attempts> >>>>>>> can be> >>>>>>> resulted
in a> >>>>>>>> way similar to famous fable about three blind and an
elephant.> >>>>>>>> The same we can say about such an object as atom or
nuclear> >>>>>>>> particle. A> >>>>>>>> single person never deals
practically with such objects. Only a> >>>>>>> theoretical> >>>>>>>> culture
?which is essentially a special type of cooperative> >>>>>>>> practice>
>>>>>>>> ?lt;br>> can> >>>>>>>> grasp the notion of such objects.> >>>>>>>>
Explaining all this I meet a great difficultness with the lack> >>>>>>>> of
proper> >>>>>>>> English terminology (or, probably, my poor knowledge of>
>>>>>>>> English). In> >>>>>>> German> >>>>>>>> and in Russian there is a
clear distinction between two notions,> >>>>>>>> and two> >>>>>>>> terms:
Begriff = pon¹atie, and Vorstellung = predstavlenije.> >>>>>>>> The highest
form in development of thinking i s obviously pon¹atie> >>>>>>> (Begriff).>
>>>>>>>> And in the same time it is the universal form of thinking. While>
>>>>>>>> predstavlenije (Vorstellung) is subordinated notion. The obscheje>
>>>>>>> (general)> >>>>>>>> predstavlenije is understood in dialectical
culture as a meaning> >>>>>>>> of word,> >>>>>>>> like something that
enables us to distinguish among the known> >>>>>>>> and fixed in> >>>>>>>>
the matter of language culture objects. But one can have> >>>>>>>>
predsatavlenije> >>>>>>>> without having understanding of the essence of the
object.> >>>>>>>> Thus the brilliant illustration of such divergence of two>
>>>>>>>> forms of> >>>>>>> thinking> >>>>>>>> (Predstavlenija and Pon¹atia)
are so called ³artificial notions?> >>>>>>>> from> >>>>>>>>
Vygotsky-Sakharov¹s experiments, as well as many similar> >>>>>>>>
constructions> >>>>>>> from> >>>>>>>> psychological theory. The artificial
notion is an empty notion,> >>>>>>>> which is> >>>>>>>> something that canno
t be understood not because their utmost> >>>>>>>> complexity> >>>>>>> but>
>>>>>>>> because their utmost vacancy. Logically as ³artifcial notion?we>
>>>>>>>> have an> >>>>>>>> evident example of general definition (obshchego>
>>>>>>>> predstavlenija), not> >>>>>>>> understanding (ne pon¹atie). So it
corresponds not with> >>>>>>>> dialectic logic> >>>>>>> both> >>>>>>>> in
its Hegel and Marxist form, but with formal logic, with logic> >>>>>>>> of
John> >>>>>>>> Locke.> >>>>>>>> And this distinction is not something
academically formal but> >>>>>>>> the core> >>>>>>>> distinction for
dialectically thinking researcher. Thus Davydov> >>>>>>>> based all>
>>>>>>>> his theory of developmental instruction just on this> >>>>>>>>
distinction. (I¹m> >>>>>>> going> >>>>>>>> to ask Peter Moxhay ?the
translator of Davidov¹s latest book -> >>>>>>>> how he> >>>>>>> cope>
>>>>>>>> the problem with insufficiency of English terminology in this>
>>>>>>>> case.)> >>>>>>>> As for the idea of
  ³thinking body?it is equal to basically new> >>>>>>>> and in> >>>>>>> the>
>>>>>>>> same time genuine Marxist and Spinozian idea of thinking as not>
>>>>>>>> banal> >>>>>>>> manipulation with words and other conventional
signs, but as a> >>>>>>>> special way> >>>>>>>> of acting of one (active or
³thinking?body) according to the> >>>>>>>> shape of the> >>>>>>>> other
body, taken in the moment of its live realization.> >>>>>>>> All this was
fundamentally explored in Ilyenkov¹s works and I> >>>>>>>> agree with>
>>>>>>> you> >>>>>>>> that the joint rereading of this works would be
extremely useful> >>>>>>>> for all> >>>>>>> of> >>>>>>>> us as a step to
rethinking the traditional understanding of CHAT.> >>>>>>>> Sincerely,>
>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sasha> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>
_______________________________________________> >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list>
>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >>>>>>>>
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -->
>>>>>>> --
----------------------------------------------------------------> >>>>>>>
--> >>>>>>> ----> >>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3
9380 9435 Skype> >>>>>>> andy.blunden> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>
_______________________________________________> >>>>>>> xmca mailing list>
>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >>>>>>>
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>
_______________________________________________> >>>>> xmca mailing list>
>>>>> xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu> >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> _______________________________________________> >>>>
xmca mailing list> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >>>>
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >>>> >>>
_______________________________________________> >>> xmca mailing list> >>>
xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >>>>
>>>> >> _______________________________________________> >> xmca mailing
list> >> xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu
/mailman/listinfo/xmca> > > > > >
_______________________________________________> > xmca mailing list> >
xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> > > > -- >
------------------------------------------------------------------------>
Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 > Skype
andy.blunden> > > > ------------------------------> >
_______________________________________________> xmca mailing list>
xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> > > End of
xmca Digest, Vol 35, Issue 67> ************************************
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Received on Fri May 2 07:48 PDT 2008