Elinami, I can't answer your question because I was making a
negative point, that there is/was no society in which people
do not think in concepts. But I have reading Claude
Levi-Strauss's "The Savage Mind" and I am interested in his
work, even though some aspects of it are quite simply crazy
(that derived from de Saussure). But consider these last two
paragraphs of "The Savage Mind":
Certainly the properties to which the savage mind has access
are not the same as those which have commanded the attention
of scientists. The physical world is approached from
opposite ends in the two cases: one is supremely concrete,
the other supremely abstract; one proceeds from the angle of
sensible qualities and the other from that of formal
properties. But if, theoretically at least and on condition
no abrupt changes in perspective occurred, these two courses
might have been destined to meet, this explains that they
should have both, independently of each other in time and
space, led to two distinct though equally positive sciences:
one which flowered in the neolithic period, whose theory of
the sensible order provided the basis of the arts of
civilization (agriculture, animal husbandry, pottery,
weaving, conservation and preparation of food, etc.) and
which continues to provide for our basic needs by these
means; and the other, which places itself from the start at
the level of intelligibility, and of which contemporary
science is the fruit.
We have had to wait until the middle of this century for the
crossing of long separated paths: that which arrives at the
physical world by the detour of communication, and that
which as we have recently come to know, arrives at the world
of communication by the detour of the physical. The entire
process of human knowledge thus assumes the character of a
closed system. And we therefore remain faithful to the
inspiration of the savage mind when we recognize that the
scientific spirit in its most modern form will, by an
encounter it alone could have foreseen, have contributed to
legitimize the principles of savage thought and to
re-establish it in its rightful place.
What term would you use Elinami?
Andy
Elinami Swai wrote:
> I guessed you did not use it in the way Oxford defines it Andy, and
> that's why I was curious to know what people you were refering to, I
> still don't, especially in this context.
> On 4/28/08, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>> Oh I'm sorry, Elinami. I was trying to probe Sasha's view without using or
>> referring to the notion of "primitive." It appears I failed. I did not know
>> of the history of the word "tribal." Of course I do not share Oxford's idea
>> of people guided by instincts - My God! Is that book really still in print
>> with that rubbish! The implication of my probing was that all adult language
>> users use and always have used, genuine concepts.
>>
>> What word should I have used. In this particular context my meaning was
>> intentionally vague, but are there words which have more definite meanings?
>> Or is the conventional wisdom that there are no categorical distinctions
>> possible in this area?
>>
>> Andy
>> Elinami Swai wrote:
>>> I understand the usage of 'subject' David, but my curiosity was piqued
>>> to the use of 'tribal' in xmca. 'Tribal' as a description of certain
>>> people has a meaning that goes far in history, and has been contested
>>> for years. My curiosity was piqued to see it at Xmca. In Advanced
>>> Oxford Learners Dictionary, 'tribal people' are 'people belonging to
>>> primitive societies, still guided by primordial instincts.' Are these
>>> people you were refering to Andy? Just curious.
>>>
>>> Elinami.
>>>
>>> On 4/28/08, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I don't understand, Elinami. How is it possible to be a language user
>> and NOT use concepts like "subject", "verb", "speaker", "grammar" etc.? Even
>> if you say that concept use has to be conscious, isn't the self itself a
>> concept?
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Elinami Swai <swaiev@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> I cannot resist Andy, who are these tribal people?
>>>> Elinami.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 4/27/08, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>> > Sasha,
>>>> > I just wanted to probe you little on this question of concept
>> (Begriff) vs
>>>> > "abstract general" (or complex or "representation", etc).
>>>> >
>>>> > It seems to me that all of us, unless we have a psychiatric problem
>> or brain
>>>> > damage or something serious, by the time we become adults operate
>> with
>>>> > concepts. I notice that most theorists do not understand well what a
>> concept
>>>> > is and even the average Nobel Prize Winner cannot distinguish clearly
>>>> > between an abstract general notion and a genuine concept. But
>> nonetheless we
>>>> > all use genuine concepts. Difficulty in theoretically making this
>>>> > distinction explicit is a matter really of whether you have been
>> exposed to
>>>> > Hegelian ideas or Marx, Vygotsky, or other philosophy which
>> incorporates
>>>> > these insights. Tribal people for example, just as much as Logical
>>>> > Positivist philosophers, use concepts. Is that your understanding as
>> well?
>>>> >
>>>> > Andy
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > Martin Packer wrote:
>>>> > > ------ Forwarded Message
>>>> > > From: Alexander Surmava
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2008 13:01:03 +0400
>>>>>>
>>>> > > To: 'Martin Packer'
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> Cc: Mike Cole
>>>>>> Subject: RE: Life, psyche, consciousness.doc
>>>>>>
>>>> > >
>>>> > > Dear Martin,
>>>> > > You write:
>>>> > > To my reading, Ilyenkov's concept of ideality, based on the notion
>> of the
>>>> > > thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting that artifacts have a
>>>> > cultural
>>>> > > meaning. To me, this risks reintroducing a dualism between matter
>> and
>>>> > > meaning. It is a short step, to my view mistaken, to the belief
>> that the
>>>> > > natural sciences study matter, while the social sciences study
>> meaning. It
>>>> > > also leads one to think that each artifact has a single meaning.
>> Sasha,
>>>> > when
>>>> > > you said that the child really understands "the meaning" of the
>> knife, I'm
>>>> > > sure you would agree that a child cannot grasp the complexity of
>> the
>>>> > > relations that a single artifact like a knife has with society as a
>> whole.
>>>> > > Nor can a peasant understand the full complexity of the social
>> world in
>>>> > > which they are living, even though they have great practical
>> wisdom.
>>>> > >
>>>> > >
>>>> > > I entirely share your idea that ?Ilyenkov's concept of ideality,
>> based on
>>>> > > the notion of the thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting that
>>>> > > artifacts have a cultural meaning? The latter is something banal
>> and
>>>>
>>>>>> doesna;t need the first. No one of semiotics will disagree with the
>>>>>>
>>>>> statement
>>>>>
>>>> > > that each artifact has some ?cultural meaning? while all of them
>> have
>>>>
>>>>>> hardly ever heard the very concept of ?thinking body?and evidently
>> dona;t
>>>>>> need in this notion.
>>>>>>
>>>> > > As well we never declare something like the statement ?that the
>> natural
>>>> > > sciences study matter, while the social sciences study meaning?
>>>> > > As for a child with a knife we do insist that to have a real
>>>> > understanding,
>>>> > > real idea of knife a child needs only to be taught by adult how to
>> use it
>>>> > in
>>>> > > historically developed cultural manner. The knife is a tool which
>> helps
>>>> > > humans to cut something and a child who practically grasps this
>> mode of
>>>> > > operation and adequately utilizes the knife has a valid idea of
>> knife. All
>>>> > > complexities ?of the relations that a single artifact like a knife
>> has
>>>> > with
>>>> > > society as a whole?can add nothing to this plain fact. The role of
>>>> > society
>>>> > > consists in elaborating the artifact and in teaching new
>> generations the
>>>> > way
>>>> > > to utilize it.
>>>> > > The knife is something basically simple. The absolute majority of
>> mankind,
>>>> > > those who use knifes in their everyday life needs and have only
>> practical
>>>> > > notion of knives. On the contrary something that pretends to be a
>>>> > > ?scientific notion?of knife is something ridiculous and scholastic.
>>>> > > In exactly the same way illiterate, but experienced peasant has
>> real,
>>>> > > practical notion say of melon, while a schoolboy with all his
>> ?scientific
>>>> > > definitions?is far from real comprehension of it. He can
>> successfully eat
>>>> > > melon but he hardly can plant it. And here just as in previous case
>> ?the
>>>> > > full complexity of the social world in which they are living?has
>> nothing
>>>> > to
>>>> > > do with the idea of melon.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> Surely there are objects which cana;t be grasped practically by a
>> single
>>>>>> person. Thus for example an idea of agriculture as a socially and
>>>>>>
>>>> > > historically developed system of relations which combines
>> individual
>>>> > forces
>>>> > > of people over the cooperative process of production and
>> distribution
>>>>
>>>>> cana;t be realized in abstract practical manner. Such attempts can be
>>>>> resulted in a
>>>>>
>>>> > > way similar to famous fable about three blind and an elephant.
>>>> > > The same we can say about such an object as atom or nuclear
>> particle. A
>>>> > > single person never deals practically with such objects. Only a
>>>> > theoretical
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> culture ?which is essentially a special type of cooperative practice
>> ?lt;br>> can
>>>>>> grasp the notion of such objects.
>>>>>>
>>>> > > Explaining all this I meet a great difficultness with the lack of
>> proper
>>>> > > English terminology (or, probably, my poor knowledge of English).
>> In
>>>> > German
>>>> > > and in Russian there is a clear distinction between two notions,
>> and two
>>>>
>>>>>> terms: Begriff = pona;atie, and Vorstellung = predstavlenije.
>>>>>>
>>>> > > The highest form in development of thinking is obviously pona;atie
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> (Begriff).
>>>>>
>>>> > > And in the same time it is the universal form of thinking. While
>>>> > > predstavlenije (Vorstellung) is subordinated notion. The obscheje
>>>> > (general)
>>>> > > predstavlenije is understood in dialectical culture as a meaning of
>> word,
>>>> > > like something that enables us to distinguish among the known and
>> fixed in
>>>> > > the matter of language culture objects. But one can have
>> predsatavlenije
>>>> > > without having understanding of the essence of the object.
>>>> > > Thus the brilliant illustration of such divergence of two forms of
>>>> > thinking
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> (Predstavlenija and Pona;atia) are so called ?artificial
>> notions?from
>>>> > > Vygotsky-Sakharova;s experiments, as well as many similar
>> constructions
>>>>
>>>>> from
>>>>>
>>>> > > psychological theory. The artificial notion is an empty notion,
>> which is
>>>> > > something that cannot be understood not because their utmost
>> complexity
>>>> > but
>>>> > > because their utmost vacancy. Logically as ?artifcial notion?we
>> have an
>>>> > > evident example of general definition (obshchego predstavlenija),
>> not
>>>>
>>>>>> understanding (ne pona;atie). So it corresponds not with dialectic
>> logic
>>>>> both
>>>>>
>>>> > > in its Hegel and Marxist form, but with formal logic, with logic of
>> John
>>>> > > Locke.
>>>> > > And this distinction is not something academically formal but the
>> core
>>>> > > distinction for dialectically thinking researcher. Thus Davydov
>> based all
>>>>
>>>>>> his theory of developmental instruction just on this distinction.
>> (Ia;m
>>>> > going
>>>> > > to ask Peter Moxhay ?the translator of Davidova;s latest book - how
>> he
>>>>
>>>>> cope
>>>>>
>>>> > > the problem with insufficiency of English terminology in this
>> case.)
>>>> > > As for the idea of ?thinking body?it is equal to basically new and
>> in
>>>> > the
>>>> > > same time genuine Marxist and Spinozian idea of thinking as not
>> banal
>>>> > > manipulation with words and other conventional signs, but as a
>> special way
>>>>
>>>>>> of acting of one (active or ?thinking?body) according to the shape
>> of the
>>>>>> other body, taken in the moment of its live realization.
>>>>>> All this was fundamentally explored in Ilyenkova;s works and I agree
>> with
>>>>> you
>>>>>
>>>> > > that the joint rereading of this works would be extremely useful
>> for all
>>>> > of
>>>> > > us as a step to rethinking the traditional understanding of CHAT.
>>>> > > Sincerely,
>>>> > >
>>>> > > Sasha
>>>> > >
>>>> > >
>>>> > > _______________________________________________
>>>> > > xmca mailing list
>>>> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>> > >
>>>> > >
>>>> >
>>>> > --
>>>> >
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> > Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype
>> andy.blunden
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>> > xmca mailing list
>>>> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Dr. Elinami Swai
>>>> Womens' and Gender Studies
>>>> University Hall 4220-A
>>>> The University of Toledo
>>>> Toledo, OH, 43606
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---------------------------------
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>> --
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>
>
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmcaReceived on Tue Apr 29 20:11 PDT 2008
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