Re: [xmca] DIALECTICAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION, GROUPE and SEMINAR

I would have thought that the concept of "hammer" would
include things like "hammering home a point" in debate.

Andy

Ed Wall wrote:
> Martin
>
> I was composing a reply and thinking that it doesn't seem, for
> example, that a particular conception of hammer would contain all its
> uses. Perhaps what is confusing for me is 'use' is a little like game
> (re Wittgenstein) and 'the concept' isn't. What happens if one
> introduces 'the use' and 'conception' into the mix?
>
> Ed
>
>
>
> On Apr 28, 2008, at 4:13 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
>
>> Ed,
>>
>> I suppose that arguably the concept of a hammer will include a bit of
>> use.
>> (Though it's interesting how many are declaring that they don't know
>> what a
>> concept is!) But does that mean that the use of a hammer will include
>> a bit
>> of concept?
>>
>> Martin
>>
>>
>> On 4/28/08 2:36 PM, "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:
>>
>>> Martin
>>>
>>> Now I'm confused. You say 'use a hammer' and then 'not use the
>>> concept of a 'hammer."' I suspect I don't know what a 'concept' of a
>>> hammer is, but wouldn't it include a bit of use?
>>>
>>> Ed
>>>
>>> On Apr 28, 2008, at 12:18 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
>>>
>>>> David, I'm confused. Are you saying it would be impossible for
>>>> someone to
>>>> use a hammer and not use the concept of "hammer"?
>>>>
>>>> Martin
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 4/28/08 7:25 AM, "David Kellogg" <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I don't understand, Elinami. How is it possible to be a language
>>>>> user and NOT
>>>>> use concepts like "subject", "verb", "speaker", "grammar" etc.?
>>>>> Even if you
>>>>> say that concept use has to be conscious, isn't the self itself a
>>>>> concept?
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Elinami Swai <swaiev@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> I cannot resist Andy, who are these tribal people?
>>>>> Elinami.
>>>>>
>>>>> On 4/27/08, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>> Sasha,
>>>>>> I just wanted to probe you little on this question of concept
>>>>>> (Begriff) vs
>>>>>> "abstract general" (or complex or "representation", etc).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It seems to me that all of us, unless we have a psychiatric
>>>>>> problem or brain
>>>>>> damage or something serious, by the time we become adults operate
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> concepts. I notice that most theorists do not understand well
>>>>>> what a concept
>>>>>> is and even the average Nobel Prize Winner cannot distinguish
>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>> between an abstract general notion and a genuine concept. But
>>>>>> nonetheless we
>>>>>> all use genuine concepts. Difficulty in theoretically making this
>>>>>> distinction explicit is a matter really of whether you have been
>>>>>> exposed to
>>>>>> Hegelian ideas or Marx, Vygotsky, or other philosophy which
>>>>>> incorporates
>>>>>> these insights. Tribal people for example, just as much as Logical
>>>>>> Positivist philosophers, use concepts. Is that your understanding
>>>>>> as well?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>>>> ------ Forwarded Message
>>>>>>> From: Alexander Surmava
>>>>>>> Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2008 13:01:03 +0400
>>>>>>> To: 'Martin Packer'
>>>>>
>>>>>>> Cc: Mike Cole
>>>>>>> Subject: RE: Life, psyche, consciousness.doc
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Dear Martin,
>>>>>>> You write:
>>>>>>> To my reading, Ilyenkov's concept of ideality, based on the
>>>>>>> notion of the
>>>>>>> thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting that artifacts have a
>>>>>> cultural
>>>>>>> meaning. To me, this risks reintroducing a dualism between
>>>>>>> matter and
>>>>>>> meaning. It is a short step, to my view mistaken, to the belief
>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>> natural sciences study matter, while the social sciences study
>>>>>>> meaning. It
>>>>>>> also leads one to think that each artifact has a single meaning.
>>>>>>> Sasha,
>>>>>> when
>>>>>>> you said that the child really understands "the meaning" of the
>>>>>>> knife, I'm
>>>>>>> sure you would agree that a child cannot grasp the complexity of
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> relations that a single artifact like a knife has with society
>>>>>>> as a whole.
>>>>>>> Nor can a peasant understand the full complexity of the social
>>>>>>> world in
>>>>>>> which they are living, even though they have great practical
>>>>>>> wisdom.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I entirely share your idea that “Ilyenkov's concept of ideality,
>>>>>>> based on
>>>>>>> the notion of the thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting that
>>>>>>> artifacts have a cultural meaning? The latter is something banal
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> doesn’t need the first. No one of semiotics will disagree with the
>>>>>> statement
>>>>>>> that each artifact has some “cultural meaning? while all of them
>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>> hardly ever heard the very concept of “thinking body?and
>>>>>>> evidently don’t
>>>>>>> need in this notion.
>>>>>>> As well we never declare something like the statement “that the
>>>>>>> natural
>>>>>>> sciences study matter, while the social sciences study meaning?
>>>>>>> As for a child with a knife we do insist that to have a real
>>>>>> understanding,
>>>>>>> real idea of knife a child needs only to be taught by adult how
>>>>>>> to use it
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> historically developed cultural manner. The knife is a tool
>>>>>>> which helps
>>>>>>> humans to cut something and a child who practically grasps this
>>>>>>> mode of
>>>>>>> operation and adequately utilizes the knife has a valid idea of
>>>>>>> knife. All
>>>>>>> complexities “of the relations that a single artifact like a
>>>>>>> knife has
>>>>>> with
>>>>>>> society as a whole?can add nothing to this plain fact. The role of
>>>>>> society
>>>>>>> consists in elaborating the artifact and in teaching new
>>>>>>> generations the
>>>>>> way
>>>>>>> to utilize it.
>>>>>>> The knife is something basically simple. The absolute majority
>>>>>>> of mankind,
>>>>>>> those who use knifes in their everyday life needs and have only
>>>>>>> practical
>>>>>>> notion of knives. On the contrary something that pretends to be a
>>>>>>> “scientific notion?of knife is something ridiculous and scholastic.
>>>>>>> In exactly the same way illiterate, but experienced peasant has
>>>>>>> real,
>>>>>>> practical notion say of melon, while a schoolboy with all his
>>>>>>> “scientific
>>>>>>> definitions?is far from real comprehension of it. He can
>>>>>>> successfully eat
>>>>>>> melon but he hardly can plant it. And here just as in previous
>>>>>>> case “the
>>>>>>> full complexity of the social world in which they are living?has
>>>>>>> nothing
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> do with the idea of melon.
>>>>>>> Surely there are objects which can’t be grasped practically by a
>>>>>>> single
>>>>>>> person. Thus for example an idea of agriculture as a socially and
>>>>>>> historically developed system of relations which combines
>>>>>>> individual
>>>>>> forces
>>>>>>> of people over the cooperative process of production and
>>>>>>> distribution
>>>>>> can’t be realized in abstract practical manner. Such attempts can be
>>>>>> resulted in a
>>>>>>> way similar to famous fable about three blind and an elephant.
>>>>>>> The same we can say about such an object as atom or nuclear
>>>>>>> particle. A
>>>>>>> single person never deals practically with such objects. Only a
>>>>>> theoretical
>>>>>>> culture ?which is essentially a special type of cooperative
>>>>>>> practice
>>>>>>> ?lt;br>> can
>>>>>>> grasp the notion of such objects.
>>>>>>> Explaining all this I meet a great difficultness with the lack
>>>>>>> of proper
>>>>>>> English terminology (or, probably, my poor knowledge of
>>>>>>> English). In
>>>>>> German
>>>>>>> and in Russian there is a clear distinction between two notions,
>>>>>>> and two
>>>>>>> terms: Begriff = pon’atie, and Vorstellung = predstavlenije.
>>>>>>> The highest form in development of thinking is obviously pon’atie
>>>>>> (Begriff).
>>>>>>> And in the same time it is the universal form of thinking. While
>>>>>>> predstavlenije (Vorstellung) is subordinated notion. The obscheje
>>>>>> (general)
>>>>>>> predstavlenije is understood in dialectical culture as a meaning
>>>>>>> of word,
>>>>>>> like something that enables us to distinguish among the known
>>>>>>> and fixed in
>>>>>>> the matter of language culture objects. But one can have
>>>>>>> predsatavlenije
>>>>>>> without having understanding of the essence of the object.
>>>>>>> Thus the brilliant illustration of such divergence of two forms of
>>>>>> thinking
>>>>>>> (Predstavlenija and Pon’atia) are so called “artificial notions?
>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>> Vygotsky-Sakharov’s experiments, as well as many similar
>>>>>>> constructions
>>>>>> from
>>>>>>> psychological theory. The artificial notion is an empty notion,
>>>>>>> which is
>>>>>>> something that cannot be understood not because their utmost
>>>>>>> complexity
>>>>>> but
>>>>>>> because their utmost vacancy. Logically as “artifcial notion?we
>>>>>>> have an
>>>>>>> evident example of general definition (obshchego
>>>>>>> predstavlenija), not
>>>>>>> understanding (ne pon’atie). So it corresponds not with
>>>>>>> dialectic logic
>>>>>> both
>>>>>>> in its Hegel and Marxist form, but with formal logic, with logic
>>>>>>> of John
>>>>>>> Locke.
>>>>>>> And this distinction is not something academically formal but
>>>>>>> the core
>>>>>>> distinction for dialectically thinking researcher. Thus Davydov
>>>>>>> based all
>>>>>>> his theory of developmental instruction just on this
>>>>>>> distinction. (I’m
>>>>>> going
>>>>>>> to ask Peter Moxhay ?the translator of Davidov’s latest book -
>>>>>>> how he
>>>>>> cope
>>>>>>> the problem with insufficiency of English terminology in this
>>>>>>> case.)
>>>>>>> As for the idea of “thinking body?it is equal to basically new
>>>>>>> and in
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> same time genuine Marxist and Spinozian idea of thinking as not
>>>>>>> banal
>>>>>>> manipulation with words and other conventional signs, but as a
>>>>>>> special way
>>>>>>> of acting of one (active or “thinking?body) according to the
>>>>>>> shape of the
>>>>>>> other body, taken in the moment of its live realization.
>>>>>>> All this was fundamentally explored in Ilyenkov’s works and I
>>>>>>> agree with
>>>>>> you
>>>>>>> that the joint rereading of this works would be extremely useful
>>>>>>> for all
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> us as a step to rethinking the traditional understanding of CHAT.
>>>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sasha
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype
>>>>>> andy.blunden
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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