Re: [xmca] DIALECTICAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION, GROUPE and SEMINAR

Hi David,
It is true that we employ categories to refer to collectives. However,
Vygotsky pointed out the distinction between sense and meaning when we
use verbal signs to articulate intention. There is a longstanding
connotation with the word "tribal" by western psychologists. I think
Eli is graciously asking Andy to clarify what he means. What do you
think, Andy?
Cathrene

David Kellogg wrote:
> I don't understand, Elinami. How is it possible to be a language user and NOT use concepts like "subject", "verb", "speaker", "grammar" etc.? Even if you say that concept use has to be conscious, isn't the self itself a concept?
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
>
>
> Elinami Swai <swaiev@gmail.com> wrote:
> I cannot resist Andy, who are these tribal people?
> Elinami.
>
> On 4/27/08, Andy Blunden wrote:
>
>> Sasha,
>> I just wanted to probe you little on this question of concept (Begriff) vs
>> "abstract general" (or complex or "representation", etc).
>>
>> It seems to me that all of us, unless we have a psychiatric problem or brain
>> damage or something serious, by the time we become adults operate with
>> concepts. I notice that most theorists do not understand well what a concept
>> is and even the average Nobel Prize Winner cannot distinguish clearly
>> between an abstract general notion and a genuine concept. But nonetheless we
>> all use genuine concepts. Difficulty in theoretically making this
>> distinction explicit is a matter really of whether you have been exposed to
>> Hegelian ideas or Marx, Vygotsky, or other philosophy which incorporates
>> these insights. Tribal people for example, just as much as Logical
>> Positivist philosophers, use concepts. Is that your understanding as well?
>>
>> Andy
>>
>>
>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>
>>> ------ Forwarded Message
>>> From: Alexander Surmava
>>> Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2008 13:01:03 +0400
>>> To: 'Martin Packer'
>>>
>
>
>>> Cc: Mike Cole
>>> Subject: RE: Life, psyche, consciousness.doc
>>>
>>> Dear Martin,
>>> You write:
>>> To my reading, Ilyenkov's concept of ideality, based on the notion of the
>>> thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting that artifacts have a
>>>
>> cultural
>>
>>> meaning. To me, this risks reintroducing a dualism between matter and
>>> meaning. It is a short step, to my view mistaken, to the belief that the
>>> natural sciences study matter, while the social sciences study meaning. It
>>> also leads one to think that each artifact has a single meaning. Sasha,
>>>
>> when
>>
>>> you said that the child really understands "the meaning" of the knife, I'm
>>> sure you would agree that a child cannot grasp the complexity of the
>>> relations that a single artifact like a knife has with society as a whole.
>>> Nor can a peasant understand the full complexity of the social world in
>>> which they are living, even though they have great practical wisdom.
>>>
>>>
>>> I entirely share your idea that ³Ilyenkov's concept of ideality, based on
>>> the notion of the thinking-body, is not the same as suggesting that
>>> artifacts have a cultural meaning? The latter is something banal and
>>> doesn¹t need the first. No one of semiotics will disagree with the
>>>
>> statement
>>
>>> that each artifact has some ³cultural meaning? while all of them have
>>> hardly ever heard the very concept of ³thinking body?and evidently don¹t
>>> need in this notion.
>>> As well we never declare something like the statement ³that the natural
>>> sciences study matter, while the social sciences study meaning?
>>> As for a child with a knife we do insist that to have a real
>>>
>> understanding,
>>
>>> real idea of knife a child needs only to be taught by adult how to use it
>>>
>> in
>>
>>> historically developed cultural manner. The knife is a tool which helps
>>> humans to cut something and a child who practically grasps this mode of
>>> operation and adequately utilizes the knife has a valid idea of knife. All
>>> complexities ³of the relations that a single artifact like a knife has
>>>
>> with
>>
>>> society as a whole?can add nothing to this plain fact. The role of
>>>
>> society
>>
>>> consists in elaborating the artifact and in teaching new generations the
>>>
>> way
>>
>>> to utilize it.
>>> The knife is something basically simple. The absolute majority of mankind,
>>> those who use knifes in their everyday life needs and have only practical
>>> notion of knives. On the contrary something that pretends to be a
>>> ³scientific notion?of knife is something ridiculous and scholastic.
>>> In exactly the same way illiterate, but experienced peasant has real,
>>> practical notion say of melon, while a schoolboy with all his ³scientific
>>> definitions?is far from real comprehension of it. He can successfully eat
>>> melon but he hardly can plant it. And here just as in previous case ³the
>>> full complexity of the social world in which they are living?has nothing
>>>
>> to
>>
>>> do with the idea of melon.
>>> Surely there are objects which can¹t be grasped practically by a single
>>> person. Thus for example an idea of agriculture as a socially and
>>> historically developed system of relations which combines individual
>>>
>> forces
>>
>>> of people over the cooperative process of production and distribution
>>>
>> can¹t be realized in abstract practical manner. Such attempts can be
>> resulted in a
>>
>>> way similar to famous fable about three blind and an elephant.
>>> The same we can say about such an object as atom or nuclear particle. A
>>> single person never deals practically with such objects. Only a
>>>
>> theoretical
>>
>>> culture ?which is essentially a special type of cooperative practice ?lt;br>> can
>>> grasp the notion of such objects.
>>> Explaining all this I meet a great difficultness with the lack of proper
>>> English terminology (or, probably, my poor knowledge of English). In
>>>
>> German
>>
>>> and in Russian there is a clear distinction between two notions, and two
>>> terms: Begriff = pon¹atie, and Vorstellung = predstavlenije.
>>> The highest form in development of thinking is obviously pon¹atie
>>>
>> (Begriff).
>>
>>> And in the same time it is the universal form of thinking. While
>>> predstavlenije (Vorstellung) is subordinated notion. The obscheje
>>>
>> (general)
>>
>>> predstavlenije is understood in dialectical culture as a meaning of word,
>>> like something that enables us to distinguish among the known and fixed in
>>> the matter of language culture objects. But one can have predsatavlenije
>>> without having understanding of the essence of the object.
>>> Thus the brilliant illustration of such divergence of two forms of
>>>
>> thinking
>>
>>> (Predstavlenija and Pon¹atia) are so called ³artificial notions?from
>>> Vygotsky-Sakharov¹s experiments, as well as many similar constructions
>>>
>> from
>>
>>> psychological theory. The artificial notion is an empty notion, which is
>>> something that cannot be understood not because their utmost complexity
>>>
>> but
>>
>>> because their utmost vacancy. Logically as ³artifcial notion?we have an
>>> evident example of general definition (obshchego predstavlenija), not
>>> understanding (ne pon¹atie). So it corresponds not with dialectic logic
>>>
>> both
>>
>>> in its Hegel and Marxist form, but with formal logic, with logic of John
>>> Locke.
>>> And this distinction is not something academically formal but the core
>>> distinction for dialectically thinking researcher. Thus Davydov based all
>>> his theory of developmental instruction just on this distinction. (I¹m
>>>
>> going
>>
>>> to ask Peter Moxhay ?the translator of Davidov¹s latest book - how he
>>>
>> cope
>>
>>> the problem with insufficiency of English terminology in this case.)
>>> As for the idea of ³thinking body?it is equal to basically new and in
>>>
>> the
>>
>>> same time genuine Marxist and Spinozian idea of thinking as not banal
>>> manipulation with words and other conventional signs, but as a special way
>>> of acting of one (active or ³thinking?body) according to the shape of the
>>> other body, taken in the moment of its live realization.
>>> All this was fundamentally explored in Ilyenkov¹s works and I agree with
>>>
>> you
>>
>>> that the joint rereading of this works would be extremely useful for all
>>>
>> of
>>
>>> us as a step to rethinking the traditional understanding of CHAT.
>>> Sincerely,
>>>
>>> Sasha
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> --
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>
>
>

-- 
Dr. M. Cathrene Connery
Assistant Professor of Education
607.274.7382
Ithaca College
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