An American tries to explain those French...
<http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/french-theory-in-america/?em&ex=12
07713600&en=813ce2c4527f0de0&ei=5087%0A>
On 4/6/08 8:41 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
>> So we have a German who is confused about that as well as a lot of Frenchmen.
> Andy
>
>> ... By the way, Andy, Marcuse says that Marx based chunks of the 1844
>> manuscripts on Hegel's acount of lord and bondsman in the Phenomenology.
>> It“s not just those crazy French! :)
>>
>> Martin
>>
>>
>> On 4/6/08 6:24 PM, "David Kellogg" <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Andy--
>>>
>>> Since the ideal can also be material, how does the ideal/material
>>> distinction help to distinguish what is artefact from what is nature? Did I
>>> get you right?
>>>
>>> I always think of the ideal in terms of the potential. I suppose for most
>>> people (including Halliday) this would imply that somehow the material
>> is one
>>> possible instantiation of the ideal, and this leads to a distinctly
>> Platonic
>>> world view.
>>>
>>> But that's not how I see it at all. I think of the potential as something
>>> that the human mind constructs directly on the basis of real, lived
>>> experience. In a sense, the ideal is an abstract instantiation of the
>> material
>>> rather than the material being a concrete instantiation of the ideal.
>>>
>>> I suppose I'm in big trouble now!
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>> I think part of the difficulty with getting people to accept that
>> unity of
>>> material and ideal is that people generally take ideal to be almost
>>> synonymous with "subjective" or "in consciousness" whereas "material"
>>> simply means "outside of and independent of consciousness". For us,
>>> however, "ideal" can also be material, distinguishing what is artifact from
>>> what is nature.
>>>
>>> Andy
>>> At 02:37 PM 6/04/2008 -0700, Mike Cole wrote:
>>>> Andy tells me that my attempts to color code do not work any better than
>>>> my ideas! :-) I'll see if caps help in the future.
>>>>
>>>> Andy-- I intepreted Martin's interpretion to derive from our earlier
>>>> discussions of material/ideal psychologies and the effort to supercede
>> them
>>>> with a new psychology a la LSV. In that disucssion we started to come to
>>>> a position that consciousness emerges from interaction between
>>>> human organism and environment and in THAT sense is objective. Probably
>>>> just another of my confusions, probably.
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>> On Sun, Apr 6, 2008 at 2:00 PM, Andy Blunden
>>>> <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>> I don't really know what it would mean to say that "consciousness is ...
>>>>> objective." If consciousness is objective what is not objective, what is
>>>>> subjective? Activity is objective for sure, but if we say "consciousness
>>>>> is objective" surely we destroy the very meaning of subject and object,
>>>>> not just a distinction or a dichotomy.
>>>>>
>>>>> Classical German philosophy offered several solutions to this problem
>>>>> represented by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Marx. The
>>>>> "consciousness is ... objective" solution, i.e., erasing the difference
>>>>> between subjective and objective is, I think, the Schelling solution,
>>>>> which I see as a declaration that there ought not to be such a problem.
>>>>> But the fact is that there is such a problem, namely intelligent, active
>>>>> human beings with some kind of ability to have conceptions of the world.
>>>>> How is it so?
>>>>>
>>>>> Andy
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> At 01:48 PM 6/04/2008 -0700, you wrote:
>>>>>> I like that formulation a lot, Martin. Little chance to gain general
>>>>>> agreement, but perhaps a chance
>>>>>> for some finer grained pointers toward a more satisfactory formulation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> thanks
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sun, Apr 6, 2008 at 12:49 PM, Martin Packer
>>>>>> <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Mike,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, I agree with your characterization of "embryology onwards..."
>> When V
>>>>>>> writes of "psychological [mental] functions" perhaps the problem is
>> with
>>>>>>> me
>>>>>>> rather than him, but it's very easy to take for granted that
>> perception,
>>>>>>> attention, memory, emotion, thought are distinct mental systems. We all
>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>> to now exactly what each one is, and we think we can consider them
>>>>>>> separately.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> OK, let's assume the problem is with me. So V immediately redefines
>>>>>>> psychological functions as "forms of the activity of consciousness." In
>>>>>>> Sasha's terms, this would be "object-directed activity," no? If
>>>>>>> consciousness is real and objective, to be located in the interaction
>>>>>>> between person and environment, as I have argued, then the different
>>>>>> forms
>>>>>>> of its activity would also be real and objective, always aspects of a
>>>>>>> whole,
>>>>>>> albeit one that is organized differently over ontogenesis.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/6/08 1:29 PM, "Mike Cole"
>>>>>> <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Martin and Sasha-
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I am having trouble following all the differernt threads and have this
>>>>>>> idea
>>>>>>>> it would be a good idea
>>>>>>>> to summarize where we think each of them stands in terms of points
>>>>>>> agreed
>>>>>>>> upon, appoints clearly
>>>>>>>> disagreed about, and points of confusion (on the assumption we can
>>>>>>>> distinguish)!! A brief comment on
>>>>>>>> a move made here by Martin that strikes me as a misdirection: I
>> Bold in
>>>>>>> red
>>>>>>>> the part I want to focus on below.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Sun, Apr 6, 2008 at 10:50 AM, Martin Packer
>>>>>> <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Sasha,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I would like to respond to just two of the points in your message,
>>>>>>> though
>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>> think they are central. The first is something I've begun to think
>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>> have not taken very far.* It has been troubling me that Vygotsky
>>>>>> adopts
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>> notion of "psychological functions" which seems from the start to
>>>>>>> divide
>>>>>>>>> consciousness into separate components which then have to be stitched
>>>>>>> back
>>>>>>>>> together again.* I've been Goggling without much success to try to
>>>>>>>>> discover
>>>>>>>>> the history of this 'functionalism,' and some of it seems to be
>>>>>>> medieval,
>>>>>>>>> some of it even Greek (though perhaps the translations can be
>>>>>>>>> questioned?).
>>>>>>>>> I'd welcome eduction on this from any/everybody out there!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Where does this idea come from? We don'[t need lsv to know that at
>>>>>>> birth,
>>>>>>>> and before
>>>>>>>> birth for normal term infants, that the different "psychological
>>>>>>> functions"
>>>>>>>> are no "separate
>>>>>>>> components". From early embryology onward (at least!!) we are dealing
>>>>>>> with a
>>>>>>>> complex,
>>>>>>>> morphologically and functionally differentiated organism|environment
>>>>>>> (even
>>>>>>>> layers of
>>>>>>>> envrionment), the CONFIGURATIONS of which change over development. We
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>> not talking
>>>>>>>> about stitching together Frankenstein here, we are talking about
>>>>>> organic
>>>>>>>> evolution. Both
>>>>>>>> organism, "its" enviroment, and their inter-relationships are all and
>>>>>>> always
>>>>>>>> changing vis a vis
>>>>>>>> each other.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That is how I understand the starting point of our analysis. Is
>>>>>> this not
>>>>>>>> something we can agree upon?
>>>>>>>> And if not, what is a formulation we might be able to start with??
>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It seems that one would indeed, as you sugest, want to both start and
>>>>>>> end
>>>>>>>>> with monism: the neonate doesn't have distinct fuctions such as
>>>>>> memory,
>>>>>>>>> attention, emotion. The adult has a smoothly integrated system of
>> such
>>>>>>>>> functions. It's certainly the case that Vygotsky avoided trying to
>>>>>>> analyse
>>>>>>>>> these functions separately, and indeed insisted in Thought and
>>>>>> Language
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> what was new in his appoach was that it was the study of their
>>>>>>>>> *relations*.
>>>>>>>>> For example, although Thought & Language seems to be a study of two
>>>>>>>>> distinct
>>>>>>>>> functions and their interrelation, Vygotsky began the book by
>>>>>> insisting
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> consciousness has to be understood as a unity of functions and
>>>>>> that any
>>>>>>>>> analysis of these two has to be conducted against a background of all
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But why talk of "functions" at all?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 4/2/08 3:54 PM, "Alexander Surmava"
>>>>>> <monada@netvox.ru> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> To correspond this
>>>>>>>>>> statement with dialectical logic we have to turn it upside down and
>>>>>>>>> state
>>>>>>>>>> something like this: perception is an abstract form of conceptual
>>>>>>>>> thinking
>>>>>>>>>> while ³multiple psychological functions?do not ³work
>> together?lt;br>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>> do not exist anywhere beyond multiple psychological theories.
>> (By the
>>>>>>>>> way,
>>>>>>>>>> A.Leont¹ev in his late years realized the necessity of formulation
>>>>>>>>> basically
>>>>>>>>>> new, monistic, not knocked together from different ³psychological
>>>>>>>>> functions?lt;br>>>> > >>> psychological theory but let this task
>> to us
>>>>>>>>> ?his successors.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Your second point is that we need to pay attention not just to
>> the ape
>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>> also to the man. Here too I fully agree with you. When I read
>> Vygotsky
>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> with later thinkers in view, though for me it is not Leont'ev but
>>>>>>> thinkers
>>>>>>>>> (and actors) such as Bourdieu and Foucault. I'm not suggesting this
>>>>>>> choice
>>>>>>>>> of thinkers is better than yours, only that it's easier for me
>> because
>>>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>>>> later thinkers are located within work I am more familiar with,
>>>>>> such as
>>>>>>>>> critical theory and phenomenology.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When the fact of development take place, when after Kant do
>>>>>>>>>> appear firstly Hegel and lately Marx we have only one chance to
>>>>>>>>> understand
>>>>>>>>>> both later thinker and his predecessor starting from the later, more
>>>>>>>>>> developed theory. It sounds as paradox, but that is objective
>>>>>>>>> dialectical
>>>>>>>>>> paradox of the process of cognition.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>
>>>>> Andy Blunden :
>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3
>>>>> 9380 9435, mobile 0409 358 651
>>>
>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>>
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>
> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> mobile 0409 358 651
>
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Received on Mon Apr 7 19:26 PDT 2008
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