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It's the same in English Leif, or more exactly, the Latin roots of the
English word. Originally, in medieval English, "conscious" meant being "in
the know", ie., being part of a group with access to an esoteric knowledge.
From the Oxford English Dictionary Online:
f. L. consci-us knowing something with others, knowing in oneself, privy
to, conscious + -OUS. L. consci-us f. con- together + sci- knowing, as in
scire to know: cf. nescius unknowing, pręscius foreknowing. There is no
such word in F., which uses conscient in some of the senses (as did also
Bacon); but It. has conscio privy, accessary, guilty, from 16th c.
1. Knowing, or sharing the knowledge of anything, together with another;
privy to anything with another. Obs. [With quot. 1651, cf. L. alicui
alicujus rei conscius.]
Andy
At 07:43 AM 7/04/2008 +0200, you wrote:
>Hi
>
>Just a small note
>
>in my language the word consciousness is
>
>medvetande
>
>med+vetande
>with+knowing
>i.e. knowing with - another person
>
>Leif
>Sweden
>7 apr 2008 kl. 00.33 skrev David Kellogg:
>
>>No problem, Martin!
>>
>> In Halliday's 1992 essay "How do you mean?" (Collected Works,
>>Vol. 1, p. 354) he says:
>>
>> "We have often pointed out that it takes two to mean; but we
>>still tend to refer to consciousness as if it was an individual
>>phenomenon, with the social as an add-on feature. I would prefer
>>the Vygotskyan perspective, whereby consciousness is itself a
>>social mode of being."
>>
>> I asked Halliday about this when I met him in Tokyo, and he said
>>that he doesn't refer to Vygotsky much because he finds that when
>>people do they do not mean what Vygotsky meant, but that he DOES
>>mean what Vygotsky meant.
>>
>> The first page of the grammar is Halliday and Matthiessen,
>>Introduction to Functional Grammar, third edition, p. 3, where he
>>says the grammar purports to answer the question "Why does the text
>>mean what it does (to me, or to anyone else)?" To me and to
>>Widdowson, this suggests that a grammar, which necessarily
>>decontextualizes language, can explain how texts mean.
>>
>> Widdowson criticizes this view at BOOK LENGTH in his 2004 work
>>"Text, Context, Pretext: Critical Issues in Discourse Analysis",
>>which is essentially a reworking of his Ph.D. thesis. See
>>especially 16-35, Chapter Two.
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>>---------------------------------
>>You rock. That's why Blockbuster's offering you one month of
>>Blockbuster Total Access, No Cost.
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Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
mobile 0409 358 651
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Received on Mon Apr 7 06:59 PDT 2008